A CHRONICLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS RELATING TO THE KOREAN QUESTION

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Preface

In 1910, the Japanese imperialists annexed Korea and turned it into a colony and military base for aggression against China. From that time on, the Korean people never ceased to wage a heroic struggle against Japan's ruthless colonial rule.

In 1925, the Communist Party of Korea was established and began to lead the workers, peasants and people of all other walks of life in the revolutionary struggle for national liberation from Japanese imperialism.

In 1931, the Japanese imperialists invaded Northeast China and, six years later, launched an all-out war of aggression against China. During this period, the Korean people resisted even more resolutely the rule of oppression and exploitation by Japanese imperialism which had become more savage and merciless than ever.

On December 1, 1943, China, the United States of America and the United Kingdom issued the Cairo Declaration which, in regard to Korea, stated: "The aforesaid three Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

In July 1945, the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom held a conference at Potsdam where it was agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States of America that the 38th Parallel north of the Equator should be the demarcation line between the respective spheres of military operations engaged in by the two countries in liberating Korea.

The Potsdam Declaration by China, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of July 26, 1945,

reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration, saying: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out."

Following its victory in the war against nazi Germany, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, and announced its adherence to the Potsdam Declaration made by the Allied Powers on July 26.

On August 9, 1945, the armed forces of the Soviet Union launched a powerful offensive against the Japanese imperialists. They annihilated more than 674,000 crack troops of the Kwantung Army, the main force of Japan. Within a week, the whole of Korea north of the 38th Parallel was liberated. The crushing blow dealt by the Soviet army to the Japanese imperialists precipitated the unconditional surrender of Japan.

The liberation of Korea by the Soviet army made it possible for the Korean people to build up an independent, free and democratic country. But the policy pursued by the United States of America in Korea frustrated the efforts made by the Korean people to set up a united, independent and democratic country and brought unparalleled sufferings to the Korean people.

In the following pages we recapitulate the course of events connected with the Korean question since the liberation of that country by the Soviet army on August 15, 1945.

1945

August 15 The armed forces of the Soviet Union liberated the entire territory of Korea north of the 38th Parallel. General Zhukov, Commander of the Soviet army in North Korea, issued a proclamation to the Korean people, stating: "Korea has become a free nation. . . . The Soviet army, on the basis of broad co-operation with all anti-Japanese democratic parties of Korea, will help the Korean people build their own democratic government."

August 17 In Seoul, democratic personages and patriots headed by the Korean Communist Party set up the Preparatory Committee for the Building of Korea.

August 24 A People's Committee as the organ of the people's political power came into being in South Hamkyong Province. This was followed by the formation of similar organizations throughout North Korea. The Japanese colonial regime and pro-Japanese elements and traitors were promptly disposed of by the Soviet army with the help of the People's Committee.

September 2 Japan affixed its signature to the instrument of unconditional surrender.

September 6 National People's Congress was held in Seoul attended by more than 1,100 anti-Japanese patriots headed by the Preparatory Committee for the Building of Korea. The Congress decided to conclude the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Building of Korea, elected the Central People's Committee, established the people's democratic political power and named the country "Korean People's Republic."

September 7 Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, issued a proclamation to the people of South Korea declaring that a military government would be set up in the area south of the 38th Parallel, that the Japanese colonial government would remain in power, that the people should obey MacArthur and his orders and that English would be the official language. This showed that, from the very beginning, the United States intended to split Korea.

1945 **September 8-9** U.S. troops landed at Inchon and Pusan. But for quite a long time after this, the Japanese troops which had occupied the entire area south of the 38th Parallel were not disarmed.

September 12 The population of Seoul staged a mass demonstration demanding the immediate disarming of Japanese troops. Mass protest meetings were held in all the major cities of South Korea as a result of the statement made by John R. Hodge, Commander of the U.S. occupation forces in South Korea, to the effect that the U.S. policy in South Korea aimed at maintaining the "status quo."

September 16 Pro-Japanese elements led by Kim Sung Su, formerly member of the Central Council attached to the Japanese Governor-General's Administration, formed the "Korean Democratic Party." The so-called "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea" admitted that this party was a political party of big landlords.

September 19 The U.S. occupation authorities in South Korea established the South Korea military government modelled after the former Japanese Governor-General's Administration. U.S. officers were appointed government chiefs at all levels.

October 5 The U.S. military government in South Korea formed an "Advisers' Council" with pro-Japanese elements Kim Sung Su and others as advisers.

October 8 A conference of the representatives of the people's committees from five provinces was held in North Korea. The conference adopted a decision to set up bureaux of industry, communications, post and tele-communications to shoulder the main tasks of national economic construction.

October 10 Kim Il Sung, who had led the Korean people in the struggle against Japanese imperialism, arrived in Pyongyang.

October 12 General Zhukov, Commander of the Soviet army in North Korea, issued an order stating: "All democratic parties and organizations whose aim is to permanently root out the remnants of Japanese aggression, establish a democratic system and consolidate people's freedom in North Korea are permitted to organize and carry on their activities." The order also said that "the working people in North Korea are granted the right to set up free trade unions, insurance companies and cultural societies."

October 16 Syngman Rhee arrived in Seoul from the United States, after having lived in that country for more than thirty years.

November 2 A. V. Arnold, U.S. Military Governor in South Korea,

issued Ordinance No. 21, declaring that all ordinances issued by the former Japanese colonial government would remain in force. 1945

November 13 The U.S. military government in South Korea issued an ordinance on the setting up of the Office of the Director of National Defence under which was established a Bureau of Armed Forces, with an Army Department and a Navy Department, to recruit army and navy personnel for the South Korean armed forces. According to the report of the "United Nations Commission on Korea" dated September 5, 1950, during the period from the day that ordinance was issued to the latter part of 1947, a "constabulary" was created in South Korea and later transformed into a regular army. In addition, a Coast Guard was established in South Korea during that same period.

November 20 Representatives of local people's committees and democratic organizations in South Korea held a meeting in Seoul. They unanimously demanded that the U.S. military authorities hand over the government of the country to the people's committees.

December 6 A. V. Arnold, U.S. Military Governor in South Korea, issued Ordinance No. 33 announcing that the U.S. military government had laid claim to all the properties formerly owned by the Japanese colonial government.

December 12 John R. Hodge, Commander of the U.S. occupation forces in South Korea, issued a statement refusing to recognize the People's Committee. Many government workers of the Korean People's Republic were arrested by U.S. military police. At the same time, the people's committees in various provinces and counties in South Korea were subjected to persecution.

December 27 At the Moscow Conference, the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom reached an agreement on the Korean question. The main points of the agreement were:

"1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.

"2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission

1945 consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing its proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and China prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

"3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations, to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean government, for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years."

It will be recalled that the question of Korea was discussed at the Moscow Conference on the initiative of the U.S. delegation. The U.S. draft proposed to set up a single administration headed by the commanders of the Soviet and U.S. forces in Korea. It was proposed that Korea would be ruled by the two military commanders, before the establishment of trusteeship. The U.S. draft further proposed that representatives of the United States, China, Britain and the Soviet Union should form an administrative body during the period of trusteeship. Before the establishment of the Korean government, this administrative body would exercise, through a high commissioner, such executive, legislative and judicial power as might be necessary for effectively governing Korea. The period of trusteeship should last five years and would be extended for another five years if necessary. The U.S. draft did not envisage the formation of a national government of Korea. The Soviet delegation disagreed with the U.S. draft and submitted its own proposal. Finally the Foreign Ministers' Conference reached an agreement on the basis of the Soviet proposal. Later, the Chinese Government endorsed this agreement.

1946

January 2 The democratic parties and social organizations of North Korea issued a joint statement supporting the Moscow Agreement on Korea, reached at the three foreign ministers' conference.

January 3 Democratic and progressive parties and social organizations in South Korea held a mass meeting in Seoul to voice support for the Agreement of the Moscow Conference.

January 16 Representatives of the Soviet and United States commands met in conference in Seoul, mainly to discuss economic coordination between the southern and northern parts of Korea, on the basis of Paragraph 4 of the Moscow Agreement on Korea reached at the three foreign ministers' conference. The Soviet representative proposed that a barter system on a wide range be established between North and South Korea for the mutual supply of consumer goods. The Soviet representative also proposed that two-thirds of the over-all volume of supplies from South Korea should be foodstuffs, while North Korea would supply the electricity, coal, mineral fertilizer, and industrial goods and equipment urgently needed by South Korea. Instead of seriously discussing this Soviet proposal, the U.S. representative attempted to browbeat the Soviet representative into agreeing to the United States proposal which would place the entire economy of both South and North Korea under United States control. When this scheme fell flat, the U.S. representative resorted to open sabotage of the conference. At his request, the conference concluded on February 5 without having achieved any results.

January 25 Reactionary parties and organizations in South Korea, in opposing the Moscow Agreement, spread the rumour that the Soviet Union, at the three foreign ministers' conference, had insisted on the establishment of a trusteeship system in Korea in contradiction to the United States' view. Tass News Agency refuted this false allegation.

The U.S. military government in South Korea, through Ordinance No. 45, prohibited free trading in rice and ordered the peasants to sell their grain to the military government at low prices. Earlier, the military government had proclaimed that the system of land ownership in South Korea would remain unchanged.

January 28 Two hundred thousand people in Seoul took part in a demonstration. They supported the Moscow Agreement and re-

1946 pudiated the slanders and objections raised by reactionary cliques against the Moscow Agreement.

February 1 Democratic parties and social organizations in South Korea, headed by the Communist Party, formed the National Democratic Front of South Korea and issued a declaration in support of the Moscow Agreement.

February 8 The decision to establish a central organ of governmental authority, the Provisional People's Committee for North Korea, was passed at a conference of representatives of all anti-Japanese democratic parties, social organizations, and the people's committees of all provinces and counties in North Korea. Kim Il Sung was elected Chairman of the Committee.

Syngman Rhee gathered pro-Japanese elements into the "National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence." The so-called "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea" in its report later admitted that this Association "served as the organizational means for extending Mr. Rhee Syngman's political influence throughout South Korea."

February 14 The U.S. military government in South Korea banded reactionary parties like the "Korean Democratic Party" and others to form a "National Representative Assembly," with Syngman Rhee as chairman, in order to help carry out U.S. policy and orders in South Korea. This "National Representative Assembly" continued to function until after the so-called "Legislative Assembly" was set up on December 12 and was formally dissolved only on May 29, 1948.

February 21 The U.S. military government in South Korea issued Ordinance No. 52, re-naming the Japanese imperialists' "Oriental Development Company" the "New Korea Company" and confiscating the Company's assets which constituted 80 per cent of the total assets in South Korea.

February 23 Through Ordinance No. 55, the U.S. military government in South Korea enforced rigid regulations for the registration of political parties, in order to curb the activities of democratic parties.

March 5 The Provisional People's Committee for North Korea proclaimed the Land Reform Law.

March 20 The U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission, formed after the Moscow Agreement, held its first meeting in Seoul. The U.S. delegation proposed that the Joint Commission consult solely with the "Advisory Council," formed on the basis of Syngman Rhee's "National Representative Assembly" and opposed to the Moscow Agree-

ment; and that the parties and social organizations which had joined the National Democratic Front of South Korea and stood for the Moscow Agreement should not participate in consultations. The Soviet delegation firmly held that the Joint Commission must act in accordance with the Moscow Agreement by consulting with democratic parties and social organizations which represented the will of the great majority of the people and supported the Moscow Agreement. But the U.S. delegation insisted on its own proposal. 1946

March 23 Kim Il Sung, Chairman of the Provisional People's Committee for North Korea, proclaimed a 20-point political platform. The main points were: all remnants of Japanese imperialist rule in Korea must be liquidated; the democratic freedoms and rights of all people safeguarded; all transport organizations, banks, mines and forests nationalized; and the land formerly belonging to Japanese imperialists, to traitors and landlords, confiscated and distributed gratis among the peasants.

April 17 The U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission reached agreement on the question of conditions of consultation—the Commission would consult with only those parties and social organizations that were truly democratic in aim and method and that would adhere to a declaration supporting the Moscow Agreement.

April 25 The Soviet delegation on the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission submitted a list of North Korean democratic parties and social organizations which had signed the declaration supporting the Moscow Agreement and were prepared to participate in consultations. The U.S. delegation also produced a list of South Korean parties and organizations to take part in the consultations. But 17 of the South Korean parties and organizations suggested by the U.S. delegation were opposed to the Moscow Agreement, and only three supported it. On the other hand, the U.S. delegation excluded from participation in the consultations such democratic parties and social organizations as the 600,000-member Korean Federation of Trade Unions, the 3,500,000-member All-Korea Peasants' Union, the 650,000-member All-Korea Youth Alliance and the Korean National Revolutionary Party. While deeming it impossible to agree to this position of the U.S. delegation, the Soviet delegation, however, made every effort to reach agreement. This proved of no avail and, on the proposal of the U.S. delegation, the work of the Commission terminated as from May 8.

May 4 The U.S. military government in South Korea stated, in Ordinance No. 72, that the military government had the power to jail or execute any Korean on any charge. The "criminal acts" listed

1946 in this Ordinance included an unfriendly attitude towards the personnel of the occupation troops or persons authorized by them and the maintenance of contact by anyone with relatives in North Korea.

May 16 John R. Hodge, Commander of the U.S. occupation troops in South Korea, ordered the arrest of 16 important members of the Korean Communist Party on the groundless charge of "forging banknotes."

May 18 *The Liberation Daily*, organ of the Korean Communist Party, was closed down by the U.S. military authorities.

June 24 The Provisional People's Committee for North Korea promulgated the Labour Law.

July 22 Democratic parties and social organizations in North Korea established the North Korean United National Democratic Front Committee.

July 30 The Provisional People's Committee for North Korea promulgated the Law on Women's Equal Rights.

August 10 The Provisional People's Committee for North Korea promulgated the Order of the Nationalization of Industry, Railways, Posts and Tele-Communications and Banks.

August 15 The U.S. occupation authorities forbade the people in South Korea to celebrate the first anniversary of their liberation. Many people who insisted on the celebration were shot to death.

August 28 The Korean Communist Party in North Korea and the North Korean New People's Party merged into one party—the North Korean Nodong Dang.

September 6 The U.S. occupation authorities in South Korea outlawed the Korean Communist Party.

September 24 Forty thousand railway workers in South Korea called a general strike demanding better pay, democracy and national independence. During the next two months a series of workers' strikes and peasants' uprisings followed, the best known being the October 2 uprising in Taegu, where for several days the people engaged the attacking police forces and U.S. troops in street fighting. Large numbers of people who took part in strikes and uprisings were arrested or killed outright. The South Korean paper *East Asia Daily* disclosed on April 2, 1947, that 118,866 people had been arrested in South Korea by the end of 1946.

November 3 Elections to the people's committees were held in all provinces, cities and counties of North Korea.

November 23-24 The Korean Communist Party in South Korea, the New People's Party and the People's Party in South Korea merged into the South Korean Nodong Dang, and held an inaugural meeting.

December 12 The so-called "Legislative Assembly" of South Korea was set up on orders of the U.S. military government. This Assembly could exercise its power only with the authority of the U.S. military government and was only allowed to submit draft ordinances for approval by the U.S. Military Governor. The latter had the power to dissolve and reorganize the Assembly and approve new members. Half of the 90 members of the Assembly were appointed by the U.S. Military Governor and the other half "elected." Among the members of the Assembly were 24 big landlords, 17 big capitalists and nine officials of the former Japanese colonial government. The Assembly was dissolved on May 20, 1948, on orders of the U.S. military government.

1947

February 10 The U.S. military government in South Korea set up a "Directorate of the Civil Administrator," whose orders or dispositions were subject to approval by the U.S. Military Governor before coming into effect.

February 17 A conference was held of representatives of the people's committees of the provinces, cities and counties of North Korea. The conference resolved to set up a People's Assembly as the highest organ of the people's state power in North Korea. This People's Assembly of North Korea was formally established on February 20 after the elections at the conference.

February 21 The North Korean People's Committee, the supreme executive organ of the people's state power in North Korea, was inaugurated. Kim Il Sung was elected Chairman of the Committee.

February 24 Many leading members of the South Korean Nodong Dang, the Korean Federation of Trade Unions and the All-Korea Youth Alliance were arrested in Seoul. Some days earlier, on February 19, the South Korean police had arrested 51 persons including Hu Sung Taik, Chairman of the Korean Federation of Trade Unions.

1947 March 22 In protest against the reign of terror under the U.S. occupation authorities, workers, employees and students in South Korea staged a 24-hour general strike, in response to the call of the National Democratic Front of South Korea. The strike was supported by the peasants in various places. Strikers and demonstrators were arrested in large numbers.

April 8 George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State, in a letter to V. M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., proposed reconvening the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission. In his reply on April 19, Molotov pointed out that the work of the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission had been suspended "owing to the fact that the American delegation in this Commission took a position contrary to the Moscow Agreement on Korea." Molotov proposed that the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission resume its work on May 20, on the basis of strict observance of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. On May 2, Marshall wrote to Molotov asking for confirmation of the basis on which the Commission was to resume its work. In reply, Molotov agreed on May 7 that the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission was to hold initial consultations with the parties and social organizations that had expressed their support of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. However, he pointed out that "parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not and will not actively oppose nor will they incite others to actively oppose the Moscow Decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case, such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission." On May 21, the Joint Commission reconvened in Seoul.

May 17 The U.S. military government in South Korea issued Executive Orders Nos. 2 and 3, dissolving the All-Korea Youth Alliance and banning all gatherings of a political nature while the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission was in session.

June 3 The South Korean "Interim Government" was set up on the orders of the U.S. military government. This "Interim Government" was composed of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the U.S. military government with a Civil Administrator as its chief. However, the "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea" recognized in its report that ". . . the supreme authority of the Military Governor prevailed. Executive acts of the Directorate and the bills passed by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly required his approval. In two important cases—namely, those of the Special Law dealing with National Traitors, Collaborators and Profiteers and of the Temporary Constitution of Korea (Chosen), both passed by the Legislative Assembly—the non-concurrence of

the Military Governor . . . prevented the measures from taking effect of law." (The U.S. military government made it plain that only under the control of the U.S. Military Governor could the "Legislative Assembly" exercise the right to make proposals. This so-called "Legislative Assembly" was thus nothing but a puppet institution set up to deceive the people of South Korea—*Editor.*) The report stated: "A further limiting condition on the authority of the South Korean Interim Government has been the presence of United States advisers in the central departments and in the provincial administrations (chief civil affairs officers)." 1947

June 11 The U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission declared that it would consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations that had given their support to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The number of representatives of the various parties and social organizations to participate in the consultations was to be determined by the Joint Commission in accordance with their membership.

This decision of the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission was welcomed unanimously by democratic parties and social organizations in both South and North Korea. The reactionary parties in South Korea, however, were still opposed to the Moscow Agreement and submitted to the Commission a large number of false statements purported to emanate from many organizations which, in fact, did not exist. Finally, the U.S. delegation submitted a list of 425 South Korean parties and social organizations, with a total membership of 70 million, which they wanted to be invited to take part in oral consultations. At that time, the total population in South Korea numbered no more than 18 million. The Soviet delegation proposed time and again that the Joint Commission examine the applications of the various parties and social organizations and immediately start consultations with those parties and social organizations that had been approved by the Commission. However, the U.S. delegation evaded such examination of the applications submitted by the various parties and organizations.

July 27 The National Democratic Front of South Korea held a mass meeting, attended by hundreds of thousands of people, in Seoul in support of the work of the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission. In the presence of members of the Joint Commission, the South Korean police arrested those who voiced their support of the Commission.

August 5 The Soviet delegation on the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission proposed to outline immediately the structure, political platform, and organization of the provisional Korean democratic govern-

1947 ment as well as the procedure for it to take over the work. This proposal was not accepted by the U.S. delegation.

August 12 The U.S. delegation on the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission proposed to consult the various parties and social organizations only in the form of a questionaire and to draft ordinances and political platform for a provisional Korean government; but the question of establishing a provisional Korean democratic government and the question of the Korean people themselves establishing such a government were side-stepped.

Many leading members of South Korean democratic parties and social organizations were arrested, among them many representatives already appointed to take part in oral consultations with the Joint Commission. On August 20, T. F. Shtykov, Head of the Soviet delegation on the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission, issued a statement on this event, saying: "Such a situation is evidently being created with the aim of disrupting the work of the Joint Commission." Shtykov firmly demanded that the U.S. delegate take appropriate measures to prevent further unwarranted arrests.

August 26 The Soviet delegation on the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission proposed that the Commission consult in writing democratic parties and social organizations only, set up a provisional all-Korean people's assembly, and help this provisional all-Korean people's assembly establish a provisional Korean democratic government. But the U.S. delegation rejected this proposal.

R.A. Lovett, U.S. Acting Secretary of State, in a letter to V.M. Molotov, Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., proposed that the Korean question be again submitted for discussion by the Four Powers. Lovett even fixed unilaterally the date for such Four-Power discussions and asked the Soviet Union to attend. The United States also proposed setting up provisional legislatures in South and North Korea respectively for the purpose of creating a national provisional legislature and subsequently for the establishment of a provisional government for a united Korea.

September 4 Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov replied to George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State, pointing out that it was inexpedient to submit the Korean question to the governments of the Four Powers. Molotov said that the U.S. proposal on Korea could only result in perpetuating an abnormal situation of splitting Korea into two.

September 17 The Soviet delegation on the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission proposed that steps should be taken to realize those items in the proposals of the U.S. delegation of August 12 and in

the proposals of the Soviet delegation of August 26 on which the views of the two delegations had been approximated. The U.S. delegation did not reply. 1947

U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in a speech at a plenary meeting of the Second U.N. General Assembly, expressed the intent to submit the Korean question to the U.N. General Assembly.

September 23 Before the Second U.N. General Assembly, A. Y. Vyshinsky, Head of the Soviet delegation, opposed inclusion of the Korean question in the agenda and said that it was "unlawful" and "incorrect." Vyshinsky pointed out that the Moscow Agreement had laid down a definite procedure for the settlement of the Korean question. He added that, according to the articles of the U.N. Charter relating to the competence of the General Assembly, and especially when an international agreement existed, the Korean question could not form a subject for examination by the General Assembly.

But the U.N. General Assembly illegally adopted a resolution to include the Korean question in the agenda.

September 26 T. F. Shtykov, Head of the Soviet delegation on the U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission, issued a statement, declaring: "The Soviet delegation holds that the Koreans may be given the opportunity to form a government by themselves, without the aid and participation of the Allies, on condition that the American and Soviet troops are withdrawn from Korea. The Soviet delegation declares that, if the American delegation agrees to the proposal that all foreign troops should be withdrawn in the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops will be prepared to leave Korea simultaneously with the American troops." The U.S. delegation refused to give a reply to this proposal.

This Soviet proposal was welcomed by all Korean parties and social organizations, except ultra-reactionary parties in South Korea.

October 9 Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, in a letter to George C. Marshall, U.S. Secretary of State, reiterated the Soviet proposal on the simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops from Korea at the beginning of 1948.

October 17 The U.S. delegation submitted a draft resolution on the Korean question to the Political Committee of the Second U.N. General Assembly.

October 18 The U.S.S.R.-U.S. Joint Commission suspended its work at the U.S. delegation's suggestion.

October 28 The Soviet delegation to the Second U.N. General Assembly submitted a draft resolution to the Political Committee to

1947 invite elected representatives of the Korean people from southern and northern Korea to take part in the discussion of the Korean question in the General Assembly. The Soviet delegation subsequently submitted another draft resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops simultaneously from northern and southern Korea respectively at the beginning of 1948, thereby leaving to the Korean people themselves the establishment of a national government in Korea. These two draft resolutions were rejected through U.S. manipulation.

November 14 Through U.S. manipulation, the Second U.N. General Assembly adopted an illegal resolution on Korea based on the U.S. draft resolution. According to this resolution, elections for the "National Assembly" were to be held, a "National Government" of Korea established and armed forces formed in Korea under the indefinite occupation by foreign troops. To supervise these activities, a "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea" was to be constituted, with representatives from Australia, Canada, Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang clique, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines and Syria. No time limit was set for this Commission to conduct its business. It was entrusted with great authority, including supervision of and interference in Korea's internal affairs.

Soviet delegate A. A. Gromyko had pointed out at the plenary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly on November 13 that this plan was not designed to settle the Korean question, "but would only put difficulties in the way of its settlement. Obviously, it is those who impose such plans that are primarily responsible for this situation."

1948

January 8 Members of the "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea" arrived in Seoul. Workers called a protest strike to greet their arrival.

February 7 South Korean people called a big strike protesting against the separate "elections" to be held in South Korea.

The decision to establish a Korean People's Army was made by the People's Assembly of North Korea. February 8 was adopted in Korea as Army Day.

February 21 The National Democratic Front of South Korea issued a statement protesting against separate "elections."

February 26 An illegal resolution which required the holding of separate "elections" in South Korea was adopted by the Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

March 6 The Central Committee of the National Democratic Front of South Korea issued a statement opposing the illegal resolution adopted by the Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. In a joint declaration, 13 centre and right-wing parties voiced their protest against the illegal "elections" to be held in South Korea.

March 14 Mass meetings were held throughout North Korea condemning separate "elections" for South Korea.

April 19 A united conference was held in Pyongyang by representatives of political parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea which were opposed to separate "elections" in South Korea. On April 23, the conference passed a resolution to oppose separate "elections" in South Korea, and cabled the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States its protest against the illegal resolution on Korea adopted by the Second U.N. General Assembly, and demanding the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops from Korea. The united conference announced on April 30 that the leaders of political parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea had reached agreement on the following points: 1) The U.S. Government must accept the Soviet proposal to withdraw its troops from Korea; 2) There must be no civil war or disorders after the withdrawal of foreign troops; 3) Following such withdrawal, a political conference was to be called by the signatory parties for all Korea, with the aim of forming a democratic provisional government. The provisional government would then elect a united Korean legislative organ which, in turn, would adopt a constitution; a unified national democratic government was to be established on the basis of this constitution; 4) The separate "elections" to be held in South Korea were merely a hoax and did in no way represent the will of the people.

May 7 In its reply to the united conference of political parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea, the Soviet Government stated: "The Soviet Government insisted that the U.S. and Soviet troops must be simultaneously withdrawn from Korea, considering this an essential requisite for the free expression of the will of the Korean people. . . . The Soviet Government is as hereto-

1948 fore prepared immediately to withdraw its troops from Korea on condition that the U.S. troops are withdrawn from Korea simultaneously."

May 8 One million workers in South Korea called a general strike, opposing separate "elections." During the days of "pre-election" preparations, the South Korean police, by fair means and foul, forced voters to register and made Syngman Rhee and his henchmen "members of the Legislative Assembly" without going through the usual election procedure. A large number of people who opposed the "elections" were arrested. In its report of October 15, 1948, the "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea" admitted that the following complaints about malpractices in the conduct of the registration were received: (a) . . . registration was taking place in local administrative offices which, among other functions, issued rice ration cards; (b) Threatened confiscation of rice ration cards resulted . . . in compulsory registration; (c) Against the background of Japanese rule, the advice given by the police and "youth organizations" to register was regarded as a form of coercion.

May 10 Separate "elections" were held in South Korea. Reporting on the manner in which the "elections" were carried out, a United Press dispatch said: "Trucks bristling with armed police and club-carrying deputies drew up at polling booths. While the streets and alleys were cleared for a hundred yards around, the padlocked wooden boxes were transferred into the trucks. Even rooftops were patrolled. . . ." Although South Korean policemen and terrorists coerced voters to cast their ballots, less than 30 per cent of the total of qualified voters took part in the "elections." The "National Assembly," established in South Korea as the result of these "elections," had among its 198 members 84 landlords, 32 capitalists and 23 pro-Japanese officials. The National Democratic Front of South Korea issued a statement refusing to recognize the "National Assembly." Many centre and right-wing parties also withheld their recognition of the "elections" and the "National Assembly" resulting therefrom.

June 29 A consultative conference was held in Pyongyang by leaders of political parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea which were opposed to separate "elections" for South Korea. On July 5, the conference came to the following decisions: 1) Non-recognition of the South Korean "National Assembly" and the "government" set up as a result; 2) Establishment of Korea's Supreme People's Assembly on the basis of general elections and a Korean Central Government composed of representatives from South and North Korea; 3) The Supreme People's Assembly and the Cen-

tral Government of Korea to see to the immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. The conference resolved to hold elections in both southern and northern Korea for the establishment of the Supreme People's Assembly. 1948

July 12 The South Korean "National Assembly" adopted a "Constitution of the Republic of Korea"; subsequently, Syngman Rhee was "elected" President.

August 15 The "Government of the Republic of Korea" was inaugurated under the personal surveillance of Douglas MacArthur. Martial law was enforced throughout the city of Seoul as if a state of emergency existed.

MacArthur said at the inaugural ceremony that the "artificial barrier" (i.e. the 38th Parallel—*Editor*) dividing the north and south "must and will be torn down."

August 24 A "provisional military agreement" was signed between Syngman Rhee and the U.S. occupation authorities, according to which South Korean troops, the police force and all important areas and establishments were put under the control of U.S. advisers.

August 25 Elections were held in North Korea for the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea. Of the entire electorate, 99.97 per cent took part in the voting and 212 Assembly members were elected. In South Korea, elections were held for representatives to the South Korean People's Congress, with 77.52 per cent of the entire electorate participating. Subsequently, the representatives elected convened the South Korean People's Congress at Haeju, North Korea, between August 21 and 26, and elected 360 members to the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea.

September 2 The Supreme People's Assembly of Korea held its first meeting in Pyongyang. On September 8, the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was adopted and a Standing Committee of the Assembly, with Kim Du Bong as President, was elected. The Assembly also appointed Kim Il Sung Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as proposed by Kim Du Bong.

September 8 The U.S. Army newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*, reported that 100,000 well-trained soldiers were needed for the occupation of the northern part of Korea.

September 9 The formal inauguration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed with the establishment of the Central Government.

1948 **September 10** The Supreme People's Assembly of Korea sent a message to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, requesting the immediate withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops from Korea. N. Shvernik, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., stated in his reply on September 18 that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. had given appropriate instructions to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to evacuate Soviet troops from northern Korea and to complete the evacuation by the end of December of 1948. At the same time, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. expressed the hope that the U.S. Government also agree to evacuate the U.S. troops from southern Korea by the same date. In a statement issued on September 20, the Soviet Foreign Ministry said that the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. had decided to begin the evacuation of Soviet troops from northern Korea not later than in the second half of October of 1948 and to complete it by January 1, 1949.

The U.S. State Department, in its statement on September 20, completely ignored the request of the Korean Supreme People's Assembly. On the contrary, it said that the carrying out of the illegal resolution adopted by the Second U.N. General Assembly was the prerequisite for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. It also shelved the question of troop withdrawal until the Third U.N. General Assembly.

September 11 The Syngman Rhee government and the U.S. Government signed an Initial Financial and Property Settlement, providing that the Syngman Rhee government be responsible for all expenses of the U.S. occupation forces and giving the United States the privilege to claim, or dispose of, any property in South Korea.

October 7 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cabled the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Third U.N. General Assembly, demanding the participation of the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the discussion of the Korean question in the General Assembly. This just demand was rejected by the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly under U.S. manipulation.

October 8 Premier Kim Il Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea addressed a letter to J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., proposing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Stalin agreed to this proposal on October 12.

Diplomatic relations were subsequently established between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on one side, and the People's Republic of Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,

Albania, Rumania, the People's Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, on the other.

October 20 More than one thousand officers and men of the 14th Regiment of Syngman Rhee's army revolted in Yosu. A number of revolts among Rhee's troops followed in South Chonna and North Kyongsang Provinces. These insurgent troops later became powerful guerilla forces of the people.

November 20 The South Korean "National Assembly" passed a resolution countenancing the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Korea.

December 1 The South Korean "National Assembly" enacted the anti-popular "National Security Law," making it a crime to seek, "in collusion with a betrayer . . . to consolidate or group together with the object of disturbing the tranquillity of the state." According to the report published on September 5, 1950, by the "United Nations Commission on Korea," "in the period from 4 September 1948 to 30 April 1949, 33,347 cases were handled under this Law and 89,710 persons were arrested."

The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated in a telegram to the United Nations on October 14, 1949: "South Korea is under a ruthless reign of terror where the people who are earnestly longing for freedom meet with brutal massacre. In the four years, from the day of liberation to early August of 1949, more than 478,000 patriots in South Korea were prosecuted, more than 154,000 arrested and more than 93,000 massacred. These facts amply substantiate my statement."

Describing the persecution of the people in South Korea by U.S. occupation troops and the Syngman Rhee clique, Mark Gayn, correspondent for *PM* and the *Chicago Sun*, reported in the November 4 and 5, 1947 issues of *PM* that except for those who had gone into hiding, almost all the leaders of trade unions, of big peasant unions, of democratic youth in rural areas, of the once influential People's Party and of twenty-odd left-wing parties were in jail. This U.S. journalist also stated that the political atmosphere in South Korea during the two years of U.S. occupation had made all democratic movement or free and uninterrupted elections impossible. The police and terrorist organizations were branches of big political organs under Syngman Rhee and his henchmen, Mark Gayn said.

December 9 The Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the Third U.N. General Assembly, calling for termination of the "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea." This resolution

1948 was rejected on December 12 by the U.N. General Assembly under U.S. domination.

December 10 The Syngman Rhee government and U.S. Government signed a "Korea-U.S. economic assistance agreement," which provided for U.S. control of South Korea's foreign trade and encouraged investments in South Korea by U.S. private capital.

December 12 An illegal resolution on Korea was adopted by the Third U.N. General Assembly under U.S. manipulation, recognizing the "Government of the Republic of Korea" as a "lawful government" and the "only such government in Korea." The resolution also aimed at establishing a "United Nations Commission on Korea" to continue the work of the "Temporary Commission."

December 25 Withdrawal was completed of all Soviet troops from Korea.

1949

January 1 The government of the "Republic of Korea" (South Korea) was recognized by the U.S. Government and, subsequently, by the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang regime, by France, the Philippines and Britain.

January 19 The government of the "Republic of Korea" applied for membership in the United Nations.

February 9 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in a cable to the United Nations, applied on behalf of the Republic for membership in the United Nations.

February 15 Through U.S. manipulation, the U.N. Security Council refused to refer the U.N. membership application of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Council's Committee on the Admission of New Members.

February 24 The U.N. Security Council's Committee on the Admission of New Members approved the Syngman Rhee regime as "qualified" for membership in the United Nations. The Soviet Union and the Ukrainian S.S.R. voted against the application.

March 20 The Governments of the Soviet Union and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced the conclusion of an

Agreement on Economic and Cultural Co-operation for a period of ten years, and of three other agreements. The other three agreements were: the trade and payments agreement, the agreement on U.S.S.R.'s allocation of credits to Korea and the agreement on Soviet technical aid to Korea.

April 23 The Syngman Rhee government signed a trade agreement with Japan. According to this agreement, the Syngman Rhee government would export rice and important strategic materials to Japan.

May 5 A group of officers and men of the 8th Regiment, 6th Brigade, of the South Korean "National Defence Army" revolted and crossed over to North Korea. On May 12, a group of South Korean navy personnel crossed over to North Korea.

May 12 The democratic parties and social organizations in South Korea headed by the South Korean Nodong Dang submitted a proposal to the Central Committee of the North Korean United National Democratic Front regarding the formation of a United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea by the democratic parties and social organizations throughout the country which would strive for the early withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and for Korea's peace and unification.

May 16 The North Korean United National Democratic Front sent a reply to the democratic parties and social organizations in South Korea asking their representatives to come to Pyongyang to form a Preparatory Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea.

May 25 The Preparatory Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea held its first meeting. It was attended by the representatives of 51 political parties and social organizations in South and North Korea.

June 25 The Preparatory Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea unanimously decided to establish the Front and resolved to hold the inaugural meeting immediately. The meeting issued a declaration on June 27, proposing a programme of peaceful unification of Korea. The main points of the declaration were:

Korea's peaceful unification must be effected by the Korean people themselves;

U.S. troops must be withdrawn immediately;

The "United Nations Commission on Korea" must leave Korea immediately;

Elections to a unified legislative organ must be held in both

1949 South and North Korea in September 1949. This legislative organ would be responsible for drafting the constitution of the Korean republic and a government would be formed on the basis of the constitution. The government would dissolve the regimes existing in South and North Korea after taking over their functions;

The armed forces in South and North Korea must be merged according to democratic principles under the guidance of the government of the Korean republic.

The meeting closed on June 28, after electing a central committee.

June 30 The U.S. War Department claimed that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea had been completed. But, on July 1, the United States announced the setting up of a 500-man Military Advisory Mission in South Korea. This body had control over Syngman Rhee's army, navy and air force. Ostensibly, U.S. troops had been withdrawn, but a large number of U.S. officers and men were still stationed at the U.S. naval and air bases in Pusan, Inchon, Kumpo, Suwon, Kwangju, Taegu and Chinhae and on Cheju Island.

July 15 The South Korean "National Assembly" passed a "conscription law" which obliged all able-bodied men between 17 and 60 to go through military service.

Earlier, the Syngman Rhee government had issued in January 1949 an order to the effect that all youths between 17 and 28 years of age who had served in the Japanese army or received military training in the youth terrorist organizations must serve in the army for a period of two years. According to a U.P. report in May 1949, the Syngman Rhee government, at that time, had 114,000 men under arms—65,000 in the army, 45,000 in the police and 4,000 in coast guard units. The United States gave the Syngman Rhee government large amounts of weapons and other military equipment. In July 1949 alone, the United States sent Syngman Rhee 110 million U.S. dollars' worth of arms, enough to equip 50,000 troops.

July 17 South Korean Minister of National Defence Sin Seng Mo stated in Inchon that the South Korean army was waiting for an order from Syngman Rhee and that it could occupy Pyongyang and Wonsan in a day if given the signal to do so.

September 30 The Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the *ad hoc* Political Committee of the Fourth U.N. General Assembly, calling for the abolition of the "United Nations Commission on Korea." It was rejected on October 3, through U.S. manipulation.

October 1 Syngman Rhee made a statement to the press which ran as follows: "I hope that the statesmen at Lake Success should take the following facts into consideration: (1) That we can restore

the lost territories of North Korea. . . . (2) That we are afraid the longer we leave matters, the more difficult such steps will become. . . ."

October 4 The U.S.-dominated *ad hoc* Political Committee of the Fourth U.N. General Assembly decided to expand the powers of the "United Nations Commission on Korea" and to prolong its term. According to this illegal decision, the "U.N. Commission on Korea" would send military "observers" to areas along the 38th Parallel.

October 7 Syngman Rhee told Joseph L. Johnston, United Press Vice-President, "I am firmly convinced that we can occupy Pyongyang within three days."

October 11 Kim Du Bong, Chairman of the Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea, sent a letter to U.N. Secretary-General, submitting a report on the investigations into the armed provocations by Syngman Rhee's troops and police along the 38th Parallel. The report stated that between January and September 1949, there had been 432 attacks, involving more than 49,000 Syngman Rhee troops and police. In the same period, there had been 71 air raids and 42 attacks by warships.

October 13 Syngman Rhee said at a press conference that conditions in Korea would be far better if South Korea's boundary were extended to the borders of China. He added that it would be much easier to achieve this end with U.S. aid.

October 14 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a cable to U.N. Secretary-General and the President of the Fourth U.N. General Assembly protesting against the illegal inclusion of the Korean question in the General Assembly agenda and the unlawful activities of the "United Nations Commission on Korea."

October 21 An illegal resolution on the Korean question was adopted by the U.S.-manipulated Fourth U.N. General Assembly. The resolution stated that the "United Nations Commission on Korea" should continue in being and that Turkey should replace Syria as one of the Commission's members. The Commission was authorized to "observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict in Korea" along the 38th Parallel.

November 25 The Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea issued a message to all Korean patriotic parties and social organizations and the people throughout the country, opposing the illegal resolution on the Korean question adopted by the Fourth U.N. General Assembly. The message

1949 pointed out that the aim of including military "observers" in the "United Nations Commission on Korea" was an invitation to the Syngman Rhee gang to perpetrate fresh provocations along the 38th Parallel.

December 12 On the first anniversary of the recognition of the "Government of the Republic of Korea" by the U.N. General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of South Korea expressed the "hope that the people will make every effort to remove the 38th Parallel line so as to consummate the national unification of Korea by 12 December next year. With this end in view, it is requested that the people should be firmly determined and prepared to shed their blood from now on." This statement was contained in the 1949 report of the "United Nations Commission on Korea" to the Fifth U.N. General Assembly. The report also stated: "The Commission, however, noted, from time to time, statements by the President, the Foreign Minister, and other leading and influential politicians, which suggested that time was running out, that in desperation unification by force might have to be resorted to as the ultimate solution."

December 30 Syngman Rhee said at a press conference: "In the New Year we shall all strive as one man to regain the lost territory. . . . We must remember, however, that in the New Year, in accordance with the changed international situation, it is our duty to unify southern and northern Korea by our own strength."

1950

January 26 The United States and South Korea signed an "Agreement for Joint Defence and Mutual Assistance," the terms of which placed South Korea within the perimeter of the U.S. "line of defence."

March 1 Syngman Rhee in a speech at Seoul stated: "Small arms alone are not enough. We need and we shall continue to get the planes and ships, the tanks and heavy artillery that our situation demands."

March 14 Walter Sullivan, correspondent of the *New York Times*, reported that 13 members of Syngman Rhee's "National Assembly" were arrested and that one of the charges levelled against

them was that they had opposed the invasion of North Korea by South Korean troops. 1950

April 4 U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in an aide-mémoire ordered Syngman Rhee to stop the runaway inflation, as "the financial situation in Korea has already reached critical proportions." Besides, since some members of Rhee's "National Assembly" had been arrested and many others had purposely absented themselves, the aide-mémoire ordered that Rhee hold new elections for the "National Assembly" as soon as possible. In accordance with this order, the "State Council" of the Rhee government decided to hold "elections" for the "National Assembly" on May 30.

May 19 Testifying before the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, E. A. Johnson, Director of the Korean Division of the U.S. Economic Co-operation Administration, said that a 100,000-strong South Korean army equipped by the U.S. and trained by the U.S. military mission, had completed its preparations and could start a war at any time.

Up to the end of June 1950, U.S. military and economic aid given to Syngman Rhee amounted to more than U.S. $730,000,000.

May 30 "Elections" were held for South Korea's "National Assembly." Although the police forced voters to cast their ballots, the number of voters who went to the polls was even smaller than at the "elections" on May 10, 1948, and many votes were cast for Syngman Rhee's opposition. The New York City newspaper *Daily Compass* reported on July 8, 1950, that Rhee's opposition commanded 162 seats in the "National Assembly."

June 1 U.S. President Harry S. Truman in a message to Congress requested an extension of the foreign military aid programme, stating: "The rapidly changing conditions in and around China require the constant re-evaluation of the situation in that area, and constant readiness to act in the interests of peace when we can do so effectively."

June 5 Marguerite Higgins, correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*, reported that Major-General Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in South Korea, had told her that his Group "is a living demonstration of how an intelligent and intensive investment of five hundred combat-hardened American officers and men can train 100,000 men who will do the shooting for you. . . . I have at least thirteen to fourteen Americans with every division. They work with the Korean officers, they live there with them at the front—the 38th Parallel—and stay with them in battles and in rest periods. . . ."

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared on May 2, 1951,

1950 that by the time the war broke out in Korea these security forces of South Korea "had been increased to 150,000 with our assistance."

June 7 The Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea appealed to all the democratic parties and social organizations of South and North Korea and to all the Korean people for the peaceful unification of the country. It put forward the following suggestions for the peaceful unification of Korea: General elections to be held throughout Korea from August 5 to August 8, to bring a united supreme legislative organ into being. This supreme legislative organ should call a meeting in Seoul on August 15. Prior to all this, a consultative conference should be convened at Haeju or Kaesong from June 15 to 17 between representatives from democratic parties and social organizations in the whole of Korea which desired the peaceful unification of the country. This consultative conference was to discuss and decide on the terms for peaceful unification, to establish the procedure for the general elections to the supreme legislative organ, and to set up a Central Steering Committee for the general elections. The prerequisites for participation in the consultative conference were: (a) Criminals like Syngman Rhee, Li Bum Suk and Kim Sung Su who had undermined the peaceful unification of the country were not allowed to attend; (b) the "United Nations Commission on Korea" must not interfere.

June 8 "Special vigilance" was enforced in various parts of South Korea. Chai Byung Duk, chief of the general staff of Rhee's "National Defence Army," declared: "The peaceful unification initiated by the United Democratic Fatherland Front is absolutely impermissible." Sin Seng Mo, "Premier and Minister of National Defence" declared at a press conference that the Syngman Rhee government was "considering the issuing of general mobilization orders" and added that the United States would increase its "military aid" and "send large quantities of arms" to South Korea.

William L. Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group, declared in Seoul that South Korea had been made part of the U.S. "line of defence" in the Far East.

June 9 The "United Nations Commission on Korea" sent two military "observers" to an undisclosed point on the 38th Parallel to discuss with Syngman Rhee forces the "question of military observation."

The South Korean police received orders to prohibit any trespassing on the 38th Parallel.

June 10 The United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea sent Li In Giu, Kim Tai Hong and Kim Jai Chong to Rehen on the 38th Parallel to transmit the text of the appeal for the peaceful unification of the fatherland to the representatives and members of the

South Korean political parties and social organizations as well as to delegates on the "United Nations Commission on Korea." At the appointed place, concentrated fire from Syngman Rhee troops met Li In Giu and others who were thus prevented from meeting the representatives and members from South Korean political parties and social organizations. Representatives of the "United Nations Commission on Korea" witnessed this occurrence. 1950

June 11 The three-man group headed by Li In Giu instructed to proceed from Rehen to Seoul across the 38th Parallel, in order to transmit the appeal of the United Democratic Fatherland Front to the representatives and members of South Korean political parties and social organizations, but were arrested after they had crossed the 38th Parallel, and tortured.

June 16 The Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea decided to request that the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea urge the Government of the Republic to take appropriate measures for the peaceful unification of the country. The Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly acted on this request and decided on June 19 to submit a proposal to the "National Assembly" of South Korea that the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the "National Assembly" of South Korea jointly organize a single all-Korea legislative organ to draft a constitution and organize a government. With the adopted constitution as a basis, elections to the all-Korea legislative organ based on universal suffrage should be held. In order to achieve this goal, national traitors like Syngman Rhee, Kim Sung Su and Li Bum Suk who obstructed the peaceful unification of the country should be arrested; safeguards for the people's freedoms should be found; and the persecution of democratic parties and social organizations should be stopped. The existing army, police or security forces in South and North Korea should be reorganized on a democratic basis. The "United Nations Commission on Korea" should be driven out of Korea at once. All these measures relating to peaceful unification should be put into effect before August 15.

June 17 John Foster Dulles, Special Consultant to the U.S. State Department, arrived in Seoul. He inspected the South Korean forces massed near the 38th Parallel and their positions. In a speech to the South Korean army he stated: "No adversary, not even the strongest, can oppose you. The time is not far off when you will be able to display your strength."

U.S. Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson and Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley arrived in Tokyo to confer with MacArthur.

1950 June 19 Dulles addressed the South Korean "National Assembly," saying: "The eyes of the free world are upon you. Compromise with communism would be to take the road leading to disaster." He went on to tell the Assembly members of the "readiness of the United States to give all necessary moral and material support to South Korea which is fighting so valiantly against communism."

Syngman Rhee told his "National Assembly": "If we cannot defend democracy in the cold war, we will win victory in a hot war."

June 21 Dulles left Korea for Tokyo.

June 23 Answering questions put to him by newsmen, Kim Du Bong, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, said: "The chieftains of the Syngman Rhee treacherous brigands have more than once openly clamoured for a so-called 'march to the north.' They have long ago made preparations for war for this. Therefore, it is quite likely that they may start their 'march to the north' venture as they have been ranting."

June 23-24 South Korean troops for two successive days bombarded the area of Pyoksong County, North Hwanghae Province, north of the 38th Parallel.

June 25 At daybreak, South Korean troops suddenly attacked North Korea along the entire length of the 38th Parallel. They invaded North Korea from the west of Haeju, and from Kimchon and Chorwon. Garrison troops of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea immediately put up resistance and, in co-ordination with the People's Army, completely repulsed the enemy, switching to counter-attack.

On the request of the United States, the United Nations Security Council adopted by illegal means the U.S. draft resolution on the Korean situation, slanderously charging the forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with an attack upon South Korea. The draft resolution was adopted in the absence of the delegates of two permanent members of the Security Council: the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China.

June 26 Premier Kim Il Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in a radio speech, called on the people of the whole country to fight in this just war.

The Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea issued the Mobilization Order.

June 27 U.S. President Truman issued a statement early in the morning: "I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. . . . I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. . . . The

determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations. I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government accelerated. I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the associated states in Indo-China and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces." 1950

On the afternoon of the same day, the United Nations Security Council adopted illegally, in the absence of the representatives of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, a resolution that "urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security" and demanded that members of the United Nations furnish the Syngman Rhee government with the necessary assistance.

June 28 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement saying: "Truman's statement of the 27th and the actions of the American Navy constitute armed aggression against the territory of China and total violation of the United Nations Charter. . . . The attack by the puppet Korean government of Syngman Rhee on the Korean Democratic People's Republic at the instigation of the U.S. Government was a premeditated move by the United States, designed to create a pretext for the United States to invade Taiwan, Korea, Viet-Nam and the Philippines. It is precisely a further act of intervention by American imperialism in the affairs of Asia." Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese people were determined to liberate Taiwan.

Ten thousand people at a mass meeting in New York City demonstrated against intervention in Korea. Throughout the world people expressed their opposition to U.S. intervention in Korea.

The Korean People's Army liberated Seoul and captured a large number of secret documents concerning plans for war prepared by the United States and Syngman Rhee.

June 29 The Government of the Soviet Union pointed out in a reply to Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, that the resolution on Korea adopted by the Security Council was in violation of the United Nations Charter and had, therefore, no legal force.

Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other countries declared their support for Truman's armed intervention.

June 30 Truman ordered the U.S. army into the Korean war.

July 1 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a statement protesting against U.S. armed intervention in Korea in the name of the United Nations.

First groups of U.S. army arrived in Korea to join the fighting.

1950 July 4 The Korean People's Army liberated Inchon and Suwon.

A. A. Gromyko, Deputy Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., issued a statement condemning the illegal resolution on Korea adopted by the U.N. Security Council. He pointed out that U.S. intervention in Korea "is to rob Korea of its national independence, not to permit the creation of a united democratic Korean state, and forcibly to establish in Korea an anti-popular regime which would allow the ruling circles of the United States to convert the country into their colony and to use Korea's territory as a strategic base in the Far East."

July 6 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Chinese People's Republic, cabled Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, stating that the resolution on Korea adopted by the Security Council on June 27 was illegal and that "despite any military steps of obstruction taken by the United States Government, the Chinese people are irrevocably determined to liberate Taiwan without fail."

July 7 A resolution on Korea was adopted by the U.N. Security Council in the absence of the representatives of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It authorized a unified command under the United States and allowed it to use the forces of the various countries participating in the armed intervention in Korea. The resolution asked the U.S. Government to designate the commander of these forces and authorized it to use the United Nations flag.

Truman issued a conscription order.

July 8 Truman appointed MacArthur "Commander-in-Chief" of the "U.N. Forces."

July 11 The Soviet Government declared that the resolution which was adopted by the U.N. Security Council on July 7 was unlawful and that it constituted direct support of the armed aggression against the Korean people.

July 13 Prime Minister J. Nehru of India sent a message to J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, proposing a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

July 15 Stalin's reply to Nehru stated: "I welcome your peace initiative. I fully share your view as to the expediency of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council with the obligatory participation of the representatives of the five Great Powers, including the People's Government of China. I consider that for a speedy settlement of the Korean question it would be expedient for the Security Council to hear representatives of the Korean people."

July 18 Acheson in his reply to Nehru rejected the latter's proposal for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

July 24 The Korean People's Army liberated Mokpo—the last major port on the west coast. More than half of the territory in South Korea was liberated during the past month.

August 4 Soviet delegate Y. A. Malik submitted to the U.N. Security Council a draft resolution on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. He demanded that the Security Council when discussing the Korean question invite the representative of the People's Republic of China and also hear representatives of the Korean people. He also demanded an end to the hostilities in Korea and at the same time the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

August 5 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cabled Y. A. Malik, Chairman of the U.N. Security Council, demanding an end to the atrocities committed by the U.S. air force in bombing and strafing peaceful cities and inhabitants.

August 8 Soviet delegate Y. A. Malik tabled a draft resolution at the U.N. Security Council demanding an end to the wanton bombing of Korea by the U.S. air force.

August 10 The Korean People's Army liberated Pohang—a key port on the east coast. By now, the U.S. troops had been completely hemmed in the Pusan perimeter—the southernmost area of South Korea.

August 15 Kim Il Sung, Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, made a report at the meeting held to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea. He said: "Industrial production in the northern part of the Republic in 1949 was nearly four times that of 1946. After the land reform, great success has also been achieved in rural economy. There is a marked increase in the acreage of cultivated land. The total output of grain in 1949 was 120.9 per cent of that of 1944 (pre-liberation days). Therefore, the northern part of the Republic has been transformed from a food-deficient area into a food self-sufficient area."

Kim Du Bong, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea, said in an article: "The people's well-being in the northern part of the Republic has steadily improved. The Korean workers' real wages in 1949 increased more than 50 per cent over 1947. This has been coupled with a series of price reductions for foodstuffs and manufactured goods during these years. Considerable amounts of money are now being set aside for social insurance, public hygiene and medical purposes."

The "Government of the Republic of Korea" in South Korea marked the second anniversary of its existence. The tyrannical rule

1950 of Syngman Rhee and the U.S. occupation authorities have reduced South Korea to bankruptcy and the people's living conditions are deplorable. According to the report of the so-called "United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea" of October 15, 1948, "the level of industrial production in South Korea during the first part of 1948 was estimated to be about 20 per cent of its pre-war level." The "United Nations Commission on Korea," in its report of September 5, 1950, pointed out that the condition of the South Korean economy showed no "promise of easy or rapid improvement." It stated: "During 1949, the financial situation of the Republic steadily deteriorated. . . . Inflationary pressures, resulting chiefly from heavy supplemental police and army expenditures, were intensified by a very large 1949 budgetary deficit and poor tax collections. The amount of currency in circulation increased from 38,000 million *won* in March 1949 to 74,000 million in January 1950. The index numbers of wholesale prices almost doubled between January 1949 and January 1950. Frightening and disturbing to the average citizen was the steady rise in the price of the food staple, rice, the price of which had almost doubled between December 1948 and December 1949. . . . The Government failed, however, to control the price of rice, which by June 1950 had increased almost 300 per cent since December 1949."

August 18 The Investigation Commission of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea released its first report on the atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. armed interventionists and the Syngman Rhee brigands.

August 20 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, cabled Y. A. Malik, Chairman of the U.N. Security Council, and Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, supporting the draft resolution on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question submitted by the Soviet delegate on August 4.

August 22 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cabled Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, requesting the distribution of the investigation report on U.S.-Rhee atrocities among the member states of the United Nations.

August 25 In a speech delivered in Boston, U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Francis Matthews said: "To have peace we should be willing, and declare our intention to pay any price, even the price of instituting a war." Though "it would win for us a proud and proper title—an initiator of a war of aggression," he declared, "we could accept that with complacency."

August 27 U.S. planes violated China's territorial air to reconnoitre, bomb and strafe Chinese territory. Since then, provocations were repeatedly perpetrated by U.S. aircraft and warships intruding into China's territorial air and waters.

1950

Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, lodged a strong protest with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson against the criminal acts committed by the aircraft of the U.S. aggressive forces in Korea intruding into China's territorial air and strafing Chinese people. Foreign Minister Chou En-lai cabled twice, on the 27th and on the 30th, to Y. A. Malik, Chairman of the U.N. Security Council, and Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, demanding that measures be taken to punish the United States for its grave crime of sending aircraft into the territorial air of China.

August 29 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cabled Y. A. Malik, Chairman of the U.N. Security Council, and Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, protesting against the bombing of Korean hospitals by U.S. aircraft.

The U.N. Security Council voted to include in its interim agenda the Korean question and the charge made by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China against U.S. armed aggression in Taiwan which in fact constituted an act of aggression against China itself. On the same day, the Security Council decided by a majority vote to invite the People's Republic of China to send a representative to take part in the discussion of China's complaint against U.S. armed aggression in Taiwan. Foreign Minister Chou En-lai notified the U.N. Secretary-General in a cable on October 23 that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had appointed Wu Hsiu-chuan special representative with ambassadorial rank to attend the U.N. Security Council meetings discussing China's charge.

September 4, 7 and 16 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent three cables to the Chairman of the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Secretary-General, protesting against the wanton bombing of peaceful cities and hospitals by U.S. aircraft.

September 10 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, cabled G. Jebb, Chairman of the U.N. Security Council, and Trygve Lie, U.N. Secretary-General, requesting that a Chinese representative should participate in the discussion in the Security Council of the draft resolution accusing the U.S. air force of violating China's territorial air. On September 24 and 27, 1950, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai twice cabled U.N. General Assembly President Nasrollah Entezam, U.N. Security Council Chairman G. Jebb, and U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie, protesting against repeated air intrusions by aircraft of the U.S. aggressive forces in Korea and the atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. navy in its violation of China's navigation rights.

1950 September 15-16 The U.S. aggressive forces in Korea mustered 300 U.S. and British warships and over 500 aircraft to cover the landing of more than 40,000 infantrymen at Inchon.

September 16 The Investigation Commission of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea published its second report on the atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. armed interventionists and the Syngman Rhee brigands.

September 30 The Korean People's Army voluntarily evacuated Seoul.

Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China made a report to the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at a meeting in celebration of the National Day. He stated: "The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded by imperialists." Premier Chou En-lai stressed: "The Chinese people enthusiastically love peace, but, in order to defend peace, they never have been and never will be afraid to oppose aggressive war."

October 1 The General Headquarters of the Korean People's Army announced that the people's army had withdrawn in an organized manner to new positions in the north.

October 2 The U.S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R., Byelorussian S.S.R., Poland and Czechoslovakia submitted to the Political Committee of the Fifth U.N. General Assembly a draft resolution on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, recommending "to the belligerents in Korea that they immediately cease hostilities; to the Government of the United States and the governments of other states that they immediately withdraw their troops from Korea and thereby establish conditions which would secure for the Korean people the possibility of enjoying the inalienable sovereign right to settle freely the internal affairs of their state." On October 10, a spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China issued a statement endorsing the draft resolution. But the draft resolution was rejected by the U.S.-manipulated U.N. General Assembly on October 7.

October 7 The Fifth U.N. General Assembly adopted an illegal resolution on the "unification" of Korea based on the draft resolution of eight nations including Britain and Australia. The resolution stated: The U.N. General Assembly recommends that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea"; that "all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations," for the establishment of a unified "government" in the sovereign state of Korea; that

the "United Nations forces" may remain in any part of Korea for the achievement of the foregoing objectives; and that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the "economic rehabilitation" of Korea. The resolution declared: The U.N. General Assembly resolves that a "United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea," consisting of Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, be established to carry out the foregoing functions. 1950

October 9 U.S. invading troops crossed the 38th Parallel and pushed northwards. They met with stiff resistance from the Korean People's Army.

October 10 A spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China stated that the aim of the illegal resolution adopted by the Fifth U.N. General Assembly on the "unification" of Korea "is to use once again the name of the United Nations to extend aggression in Korea." The statement pointed out that U.S. troops "are now actively taking steps for a large-scale crossing of the 38th Parallel in an attempt to bring the flames of aggressive war to the borders of China." The spokesman noted that "the Chinese people cannot stand by idly with regard to such a serious situation created by the invasion of Korea by the United States and its accomplice countries and to the dangerous trend towards extending war."

October 18 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, cabled Nasrollah Entezam, President of the U.N. General Assembly, Warren Austin, Chairman of the U.N. Security Council, and Trygve Lie, U.N. Secretary-General, strongly protesting against repeated intrusions into China's territorial air by military aircraft of the U.S. aggressive forces in Korea. On the 26th and 28th, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai twice cabled U.N. General Assembly President Entezam, U.N. Security Council Chairman Austin and U.N. Secretary-General Lie, accusing the United States of constant intrusions by its aircraft into the territorial air of Northeast China and of intrusion over China's Shantung coast.

October 21 U.S. troops occupied Pyongyang and continued to push northwards.

According to a United Press report, a spokesman for the U.S. First Corps in Korea said on October 25 that the U.S. 8th Army had ordered the commanders of U.S. and British troops "to use whatever forces are necessary to reach the Manchurian border."

October 25 To resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, to protect their homes and defend their country, the Chinese People's Volunteers left for Korea. Fighting alongside the Korean People's Army,

1950 they immediately launched a counter-attack against the invading U.S. and Syngman Rhee troops which had pushed towards the Yalu River. This campaign ended on November 5 with the Korean and Chinese people's forces recovering Chosan, Huichon, Unsan and other cities and putting out of action more than 15,800 U.S.-Rhee troops. The U.S.-Rhee troops were forced to retreat to the area south of the Chongchon-gang River.

November 4 The Communist Party of China and ten other democratic parties of China issued a joint declaration, pledging support to all the Chinese people who voluntarily undertook the task of resisting U.S. aggression, aiding Korea, protecting their homes and defending their country.

November 6 Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," issued a communiqué slandering the just action of the Chinese people who had voluntarily come to the aid of Korea. He submitted a "special report" to the U.N. Security Council.

November 8 The U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution excluding the representative of the People's Republic of China from participation in any discussion of the Korean question except the discussion of MacArthur's "special report."

November 11 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, in a cable to the U.N. Security Council, declined the invitation prescribed by the Council's November 8 resolution. He demanded that the Security Council discuss the charge made by the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China against the U.S. Government for armed invasion of Taiwan, simultaneously with the question of armed intervention in Korea by the U.S. Government.

November 18 Kuo Mo-jo, Head of the Chinese People's Delegation to the Second World Peace Congress, submitted a five-point proposal to the Congress calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. On November 22, the Congress adopted an "Appeal to the United Nations" which demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and a peaceful settlement of the Korean question with the participation of the representatives of the Korean people. The Appeal further stated that the Korean question should be settled in the Security Council with the participation of the representative of the People's Republic of China.

November 25 The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers launched a counter-attack against MacArthur's so-called "end-the-war offensive." When the campaign ended on Decem-

ber 8, the Korean and Chinese people's forces had annihilated more than 36,000 enemy troops. The entire U.S.-Rhee battle line crumbled and the aggressors retreated southwards. 1950

November 26 The Foreign Minister of the Korean Democratic People's Republic cabled another message to the U.N. Security Council protesting against the atrocities by the U.S. and Rhee troops in Korea.

November 28 Wu Hsiu-chuan, Special Delegate of the People's Republic of China, in a speech before the U.N. Security Council, charged the United States Government with armed invasion of Taiwan and armed intervention in Korea. He requested the Security Council (1) to condemn and to take concrete steps to apply severe sanctions against the Government of the United States of America for its criminal acts of armed aggression against the territory of China, Taiwan, and armed intervention in Korea; (2) to immediately adopt effective measures to bring about the complete withdrawal by the Government of the United States of America of its forces of armed aggression from Taiwan; and (3) to immediately adopt effective measures to bring about the withdrawal from Korea of the armed forces of the United States of America and all other foreign countries and to leave the people of North and South Korea to settle the domestic affairs of Korea themselves, so that a peaceful solution of the Korean question might be achieved. On November 30, Wu Hsiu-chuan once again accused the U.S. of its crime of aggression.

November 30 U.S. President Harry S. Truman issued a statement on the Korean situation declaring: "We may suffer reverses as we have suffered them before. But the forces of the United Nations have no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea."

December 6 Pyongyang was liberated jointly by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. On the eve of Pyongyang's liberation, the U.S.-Rhee troops abducted large numbers of civilians from that city.

December 7 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a telegram to the President of the U.N. General Assembly and the Chairman of the U.N. Security Council, protesting against the U.S.-Rhee troops' atrocities in Korea.

December 9 The Delegation of the Soviet Union to the Fifth U.N. General Assembly tabled a draft resolution at the Political Committee concerning the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The draft resolution recommended that all foreign troops be withdrawn immediately from Korea and that the Korean people be left to settle their own problems.

1950 **December 14** The Fifth U.N. General Assembly, through the manipulation of the United States, adopted an illegal resolution on the formation of a "Three-Man Committee for Cease-fire in Korea . . . to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged." On December 22, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, made a statement in this connection. The statement pointed out that the United States favoured a cease-fire only after it had sustained defeat in its aggression so that it might "gain a breathing space and prepare to attack again; or at least hold its present aggressive positions in preparation for further advance." The statement declared: "We firmly insist that, as a basis for negotiating for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea, and Korea's domestic affairs must be settled by the Korean people themselves. The U.S. aggressive forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan. And the representatives of the People's Republic of China must obtain a legitimate status in the United Nations. . . . To put aside these points would make it impossible to settle peacefully the Korean problem and the important problems of Asia."

December 16 Wu Hsiu-chuan, Special Delegate of the People's Republic of China to the U.N. Security Council, in a statement at a press conference at Lake Success, New York, declared: "Our Government consistently holds that the various important world questions should be settled by peaceful means, settling first of all the Far Eastern question which was brought about by the policy and action of the U.S. ruling clique in its armed aggression against China and Korea. Although our basic proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Far Eastern question was rejected by the United Nations Security Council as a result of the manipulation of the U.S.-British bloc, we shall still exert our utmost efforts in striving for a peaceful settlement. We are willing to find ways and means to advise the Chinese People's Volunteers, who were impelled to resist the U.S. invading forces together with the Korean People's Army, to conclude their military action at an early date."

December 26 The Investigation Commission of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea released its third report on the atrocities of the U.S. armed interventionists and Syngman Rhee brigands.

December 31 The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers launched a New Year offensive which was concluded on January 10, 1951. The Korean and Chinese people's forces advanced 150 kilometres, reached areas on the 37th Parallel, recaptured Seoul and put 19,850 enemy troops out of action.

1951

January 6 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a message to the United Nations and the peoples of the whole world, protesting against the wanton bombing of Pyongyang by U.S. aircraft.

January 13 The Chairman of the Political Committee of the Fifth U.N. General Assembly cabled Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, transmitting a statement of the five principles concerning the Korean and other Far Eastern problems adopted by the Political Committee. The contents of the statement include: immediate arrangement for a cease-fire in Korea; the withdrawal of all non-Korean troops from Korea by appropriate stages after the cease-fire and the carrying out by various measures of the "United Nations" resolution to establish a unified "government" in Korea; discussion by the representatives of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic of the settlement of Far Eastern problems, including the question of Taiwan and of representation of China in the United Nations.

January 17 Foreign Minister Chou En-lai sent a reply to the Chairman of the Political Committee of the Fifth U.N. General Assembly. The reply stated: "The principle of cease-fire first and negotiations later is only advantageous to the maintenance and the extension of aggression by the United States, and cannot possibly lead to a genuine peace. Therefore, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China cannot agree to this principle." Chou En-lai proposed to hold in China a Seven-Power Conference with the participation of the Chinese People's Republic, the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States, France, India and Egypt, to conduct negotiations on the basis of an agreement on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of the internal affairs of Korea by the Korean people themselves. The questions to be negotiated should include the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait and other problems concerning the Far East.

January 22 The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, in a reply to the Indian Ambassador's inquiries concerning Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's reply to the Chairman of the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, stated:

1) If the principle that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea is accepted and is put into practice, the Central People's

1951 Government of the People's Republic of China will assume the responsibility for advising the Chinese volunteers to return to China.

2) The conclusion of the war in Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem can be carried out in two steps. First step: A cease-fire for a limited time-period can be agreed upon at the Seven-Power Conference, and put into effect, so that the negotiations may proceed further. Second step: All the conditions for the conclusion of the war must be discussed in connection with the political problems so that an agreement may be reached on the following: steps and measures for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea; proposals to the Korean people on the steps and measures to effect the settlement of the internal affairs of Korea by the Korean people themselves; withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait; and other problems concerning the Far East.

3) The definite affirmation of the legitimate status of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations must be ensured.

January 25 U.S. and Syngman Rhee troops, numbering 230,000-strong south of the Han-gang River launched an attack. They were met with strong resistance by the Korean and Chinese people's forces. The Korean and Chinese people's forces voluntarily withdrew from Seoul on March 14 and continued their fight against the enemy north of the Han-gang River. During this campaign, which ended on April 21, the Korean-Chinese people's forces put out of action more than 78,000 enemy troops.

February 1 Through United States manipulation, the Fifth U.N. General Assembly adopted an illegal resolution slandering the People's Republic of China as "aggressor." On February 2, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement saying that this resolution most clearly proved that the U.S. Government and its accomplices wanted not peace but war and that they were blocking the path to a peaceful settlement. Chou En-lai stated that the United States resolution, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly without the participation of the representatives of the People's Republic of China and encroaching upon the powers of the Security Council, was obviously illegal, slanderous, null and void and that the Chinese people firmly expressed their opposition to it.

February 16 J. V. Stalin answered questions on international situation put to him by a *Pravda* correspondent. Stalin said: "If Great Britain and the United States of America definitely reject the peace proposals of the People's Government of China, the war in Korea can only end in defeat for the interventionists." On the United Nations decision declaring the People's Republic of China an "aggressor," Stalin said: "I consider it a shameful decision. Indeed, one must have lost all vestige of conscience to assert that the United States

of America, which has seized Chinese territory, the Island of Taiwan, and invaded Korea as far as the frontiers of China, is a defensive party, and that the Chinese People's Republic, which is defending its frontiers and trying to recover the Island of Taiwan, seized by the Americans, is an aggressor."

February 17 A spokesman of the Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army denounced the U.S. forces for slaughtering the Korean people and the war prisoners of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

February 26 The first session of the World Peace Council adopted a resolution on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It demanded the immediate convening of a conference of all countries concerned and firmly held that foreign troops must be withdrawn from Korea to enable the Korean people to settle their internal affairs by themselves.

March 1 The United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea made public a report on the investigations into the atrocities committed by U.S. and Syngman Rhee troops in Seoul, Inchon and other cities.

March 24 Douglas MacArthur issued a statement, threatening to extend the Korean war to China. He said that ". . . a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse."

April 11 Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the "United Nations" forces, was removed from his post. He was succeeded by Matthew B. Ridgway.

April 15 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a message to the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council, once more protesting against the crimes committed by U.S. and Syngman Rhee troops, in slaughtering the Korean people.

April 22 The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers launched a spring counter-offensive. The campaign ended on May 21. The enemy was thrown back fifty to seventy kilometres along the entire battle-front and a total of 46,303 enemy troops were put out of action. To date, five large campaigns were fought since October 25, 1950, when the Chinese People's Volunteers went to Korea to fight alongside the Korean People's Army. During the five campaigns, the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers completely pulverized all the offensives launched by the enemy. This basically altered the war situation in Korea and stabilized the battle-line around the 38th Parallel. In this period, the Korean-Chinese

1951 people's forces put out of action more than 196,700 enemy troops, among them more than 88,800 U.S. troops. According to an article published in the April 12 issue of the *U.S. News and World Report*, the U.S. army, navy and air force suffered only a little more than 50,000 casualties during the first year of the Second World War.

May 3 The Red Cross Society of China filed a charge with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies, accusing U.S. troops of committing the inhuman crime of using prisoners of war for bacteriological experiments. The charge pointed out that under the guise of taking measures to control epidemics, a U.S. landing craft loaded with bacteriological installations sailed into the Korean harbour of Wonsan, where it tested out germ weapons on Chinese war prisoners.

May 8 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a message to the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council, protesting against the use of bacteriological weapons by the U.S. forces to spread smallpox.

May 16 The Women's International Commission for the investigation of war atrocities committed by U.S. and Syngman Rhee forces in Korea, organized by the Women's International Democratic Federation, began its investigations in Korea. The investigations ended on the 27th. Concerning the atrocities committed by the U.S. forces in Korea, the Commission said in its report: "Mass tortures and mass murders surpass the crimes committed by Hitler Nazis in temporarily occupied Europe." The report said that those responsible for these crimes, among them MacArthur and Ridgway, "must be charged as war criminals as defined by the Allied Declaration of 1943 and must be brought to trial by the peoples of the world."

May 18 Through the manipulation of the United States, the Fifth U.N. General Assembly adopted an illegal resolution imposing an embargo on the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

A spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China made a statement on May 22 protesting against this illegal resolution.

June 23 Y. A. Malik, Soviet delegate to the United Nations, broadcast a speech on the radio programme "Price of Peace" sponsored by the Department of Public Information of the United Nations. Malik said: "The peoples of the Soviet Union believe that it is possible to uphold the cause of peace. The Soviet peoples also believe that the armed conflict in Korea—the most acute issue of the present time—could also be settled. The readiness of the parties to take to the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question

is necessary for this. The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step the belligerents should negotiate a cease-fire and armistice with the mutual withdrawal of troops from the 38th Parallel." 1951

Later, the Peking *People's Daily* carried an editorial stating *inter alia*: "The Chinese people completely support Malik's proposal and are willing to strive for its realization. . . . The Chinese people love peace and have constantly struggled for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. . . . The purpose of the Chinese People's Volunteers taking part in the anti-aggression war in Korea was to secure a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. . . . The Chinese people have more than once expressed their support of reasonable proposals by other countries concerning a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. However, the United States Government still dreamed of conquering all Korea and of threatening Northeast China with its military forces. As a result of this, all efforts to secure a peaceful settlement of the Korean question failed in the end. . . . There is little doubt that Malik's proposal, as the first step towards the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, is just and reasonable. . . ."

June 25 The official inquiry into MacArthur's dismissal held jointly by the U.S. Senate Committees on Armed Services and on Foreign Relations ended, having lasted more than seven weeks. Giving testimony on May 22, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs-of-Staff Bradley said: "No one believed the North Koreans were as strong as they turned out to be." In his testimony on June 12, another U.S. general, Albert C. Wedemeyer, said that the Korean war was "a bottomless pit with no foreseeable victory for the United Nations."

June 29 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cabled the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council, protesting against the criminal acts perpetrated by U.S. and Syngman Rhee troops in abducting large numbers of North Korean inhabitants to South Korea, slaughtering these people and forcing North Korean youths and children to spy for them in the rear of the Korean People's Army.

June 30 Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," sent a communication to the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers proposing Korean armistice negotiations.

July 1 Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai replied to Ridgway agreeing to the holding of the armistice negotiations and proposing Kaesong as the conference site.

1951 **July 10** The Korean armistice negotiations began in Kaesong. The Korean-Chinese side put forward a three-point proposal, namely:

1) On the basis of mutual agreement, both sides simultaneously order the cessation of hostile military actions of each and every sort.

2) The 38th Parallel should be fixed as the military demarcation line from which the armed forces of both sides should simultaneously withdraw ten kilometres. At the same time, talks should be conducted immediately on the exchange of the prisoners of war.

3) All foreign troops should be withdrawn in the shortest possible time.

July 12 The U.S. side refused to attend the armistice talks until the question of news coverage of the negotiations was settled. The negotiations were resumed on the 15th after the Korean-Chinese side had agreed to make Kaesong a neutral zone and settled the question of press coverage by the U.S. side. During discussions on the question of agenda, the U.S. side refused to discuss the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a statement made on the 19th, expressed refusal to withdraw foreign troops from Korea.

July 24 Chang Han-fu, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement strongly protesting against the violation of the territorial air of China's Northeast by planes of the U.S. aggressive forces in Korea.

July 25 General Nam Il, senior Korean-Chinese delegate, issued a statement agreeing to leave the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea to another conference after the cease-fire and armistice have been realized, in order to arrive at an early armistice agreement.

July 26 Both sides agreed to a five-item agenda for the Korean cease-fire and armistice negotiations:

1. Adopting of the agenda.
2. Fixing the military demarcation line between both sides to establish a demilitarized zone.
3. Making practical arrangements for the carrying out of the cease-fire and armistice within the confines of Korea.
4. Questions of arrangements concerning prisoners of war.
5. Proposals to the governments of the various countries concerned on both sides.

The delegations to the Korean armistice negotiations began to discuss the second item on the agenda.

July 29 During the discussion of the second item on the agenda for the Korean armistice negotiations, the Korean-Chinese side

reiterated its reasonable stand of fixing the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line. But, claiming to possess so-called "naval and air superiority," the U.S. side demanded that the military demarcation line be fixed north of the 38th Parallel well behind the Korean-Chinese positions. It asked the Korean-Chinese side to withdraw from an area of 12,000 square kilometres. This U.S. demand brought the negotiations to a deadlock. 1951

August 5 The U.S. side suspended the negotiations for five days making issue of the incident of guards of the Korean-Chinese side who had inadvertently passed through the conference area. After the Korean-Chinese side had responsibly dealt with the incident, the talks resumed on the 10th.

August 19 Armed personnel of the U.S. side entered the neutral zone, fired on and killed Yao Ching-hsiang, platoon leader of a military patrol of the Korean-Chinese side, and seriously wounded soldier Wang Jen-yuan.

On August 31, armed personnel of the U.S. side again penetrated into the Kaesong neutral zone and abducted three men of a military patrol of the Korean-Chinese side of whom Yang Hsien-tse and Chang Jen-feng were killed and Cheng Chung-nan was seriously wounded.

August 22 U.S. aircraft invaded the Kaesong neutral zone and bombed and strafed General Nam Il's residence. The Korean-Chinese side demanded that the U.S. side deal responsibly with the matter and announced suspension of the talks as from August 23. The U.S. side, however, flatly denied responsibility for the incident. At the same time, its planes continued to bomb and strafe the Kaesong neutral zone, while its armed personnel made further attempts to murder Korean-Chinese military police inside the neutral zone.

The Peking *People's Daily* carried an editorial on the 26th, pointing out that, having murdered military patrolman Yao Ching-hsiang in the Kaesong neutral zone, the U.S. side sent aircraft to invade the Kaesong neutral zone to bomb and strafe the areas in the vicinity of the residence of the Korean-Chinese delegation, in an attempt to murder the delegates with whom they were negotiating. "This is contemptible and barbarous conduct, unprecedented in diplomatic history," the paper noted.

September 19 After the U.S. side admitted that their aircraft had strafed the Kaesong neutral zone, Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai replied to Ridgway proposing immediate resumption of the armistice negotiations and stating that matters awaiting solution should not stand in the way of the talks. But the U.S. side

1951 demanded a change of the conference site and thus prevented the immediate resumption of the negotiations.

September 25 James A. Van Fleet, Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, announced the conclusion of the "summer offensive" and the beginning of the "autumn offensive." On May 22, the U.S. forces launched the so-called "summer offensive" and began wantonly to bomb peaceful towns and villages in North Korea in an attempt to apply "military pressure" on the Korean-Chinese side. It was designed to achieve the unreasonable claim made by the U.S. side when discussing the second item of the agenda regarding the establishment of a military demarcation line. This claim would allow the U.S. side to seize from the Korean-Chinese side more than 12,000 square kilometres north of the 38th Parallel. Van Fleet declared on September 10: "The only medicine for the armistice talks is victory for the U.N. army." But the counter-attack by the Korean-Chinese people's forces turned the "summer offensive" into a debacle. From May 22 to September 24, the Korean-Chinese people's forces put out of action 162,775 enemy troops. Later, the so-called "autumn offensive," of which Van Fleet had bragged so much, was smashed by the Korean-Chinese people's forces by the end of October. More than 88,000 enemy troops were put out of action. The attempt of the U.S. side to apply "military pressure" failed and, on January 18, the London *Sunday Times* wrote: "The American negotiators are more and more aware that there is really no further advantage to be secured for the United Nations by continuing the fighting."

October 15 The Government of the Soviet Union sent a note to the U.S. Government on the Korean situation and on the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The note pointed out that the real cause of the dragging out of the Korean armistice negotiations lay in the obstructions put up by the U.S. Command. Therefore, the note said, the best way to achieve results in the armistice talks was to instruct Ridgway not to bedevil the negotiations and not to put obstacles in the way. The note added that genuine efforts towards speeding up the successful conclusion of the talks would be energetically and fully supported by the Soviet Union.

October 23 Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, delivered a speech at the opening of the third session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. He said: "We have long said that the Korean question should be settled by peaceful means. This still holds good now. So long as the U.S. Government is willing to settle the question on a just and reasonable

basis and will stop using every possible shameless means to wreck and delay the progress of the negotiations, as it has done in the past, success in the Korean armistice negotiations is possible; otherwise it is impossible." 1951

Hsinhua News Agency reported that from October 25, 1950, to October 10, 1951, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers killed, wounded or captured more than 387,000 enemy troops, including 176,655 U.S. troops.

October 25 The Korean armistice negotiations which had been suspended for 63 days through unreasonable obstructions by the U.S. side were resumed at Panmunjom as a result of the great efforts made by the Korean-Chinese side which agreed to move the armistice talks from Kaesong to Panmunjom. In discussing the second item of the agenda, the Korean-Chinese side proposed to fix the actual line of contact as the military demarcation line with each side withdrawing two kilometres from this line to establish a demilitarized zone. The U.S. side, however, arrogantly insisted that the Kaesong area be handed over to it, and asked the Korean-Chinese side to withdraw from an area covering 1,500 square kilometres.

November 7 The second session of the World Peace Council adopted a resolution on the Korean question. The resolution pointed out that the Korean armistice talks were being dragged out by those who desired to extend the conflict. The resolution asked the parties engaged in the hostilities speedily to settle the conflict in Korea by conducting peace talks on a fair and reasonable basis.

November 8 A. Y. Vyshinsky, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the U.N., put forward a four-point peace proposal to the Sixth U.N. General Assembly. The proposal concerning the Korean question runs as follows: a) The participants in the hostilities in Korea immediately cease fire, conclude an armistice and withdraw their troops from the 38th Parallel within ten days; b) That all foreign troops and all foreign volunteer units be withdrawn from Korea within three months. Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, made a statement on the 18th in support of Vyshinsky's four-point proposal.

November 14 Col. James M. Hanley, Chief of Staff member of the U.S. 8th Army Judge Advocates Section, issued a statement slanderously accusing the Korean-Chinese side of killing P.O.W.s. A spokesman for the Korean People's Army Supreme Headquarters and the Chinese People's Volunteers Command refuted his accusation in statements made on the 16th and 19th respectively. Quoting facts, they pointed out that it was the U.S. troops themselves that had butchered P.O.W.s.

1951 November 27 Both sides to the Korean armistice negotiations reached an agreement on the second item of the agenda: the actual line of contact shall be the military demarcation line and the forces of both sides shall withdraw two kilometres from this line to establish the demilitarized zone for the period of the armistice. Should no armistice agreement be signed within thirty days after this agreement is ratified, the above-mentioned military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone shall be revised in accordance with the changes in the actual line of contact.

The delegations to the armistice negotiations began the discussion of the third item of the agenda. At the very beginning, the Korean-Chinese side put forward a five-point proposal. It proposed that all the armed forces of both sides should cease all hostile actions immediately after the signing of the armistice and, within a specified period, withdraw from the demilitarized zone and from the rear areas, and coastal islands and waters of the other side; that an armistice commission be established consisting of an equal number of members designated by each side who will be jointly responsible for supervising the enforcement of the armistice agreement. But the U.S. side demanded free access to any part of Korea for members of the armistice supervisory organizations, restrictions on the Korean-Chinese side in building air installations, but no restrictions on the rotation and replenishment of armed personnel, weapons and munitions. To reach agreement at an early date, the Korean-Chinese side put forward several revised proposals. It agreed that, after the armistice, both sides carry out within reasonable scope the replacement of personnel and equipment and proposed that both sides appoint members to a military armistice commission which would be established to supervise the enforcement of the armistice. It also proposed that both sides ask neutral nations to establish a supervisory commission which would send inspection teams to inspect mutually agreed ports of entry in the rear. But the U.S. side continued to insist on its unreasonable demands and created obstructions on the questions of rotation quota, the number of ports of entry in the rear and the nomination of neutral nations. As a result, agreement on this item of the agenda was only reached on May 2, 1952.

December 11 The Korean armistice negotiations simultaneously went into the third and fourth items of the agenda. At the beginning of the discussion of the fourth item, the Korean-Chinese side proposed immediate repatriation of all P.O.W.s after the armistice. The U.S. side refused to make clear its stand and insisted first on an exchange of P.O.W. lists.

December 18 To deprive the U.S. side of all pretexts for dragging out the discussion on the fourth item of the agenda, the Korean-Chinese side agreed to an immediate exchange of data about all the

P.O.W.s held by both sides and the same day handed over to the U.S. side complete and detailed data on P.O.W.s. The P.O.W. lists handed over by the U.S. side consisted only of transliterations of names in English and of the serial numbers of the P.O.W.s. The number of P.O.W.s in the lists was 1,456 less than that submitted by the U.S. side at the conference table and 44,205 less than that in the P.O.W. lists handed over by the U.S. side through the "International Committee of the Red Cross." The Korean-Chinese side asked the U.S. side to account for this glaring discrepancy but the latter all along evaded an answer.

1952

January 2 In the discussion on the P.O.W. question in the Korean armistice negotiations, the U.S. side raised the so-called principle of "voluntary repatriation," in violation of the Geneva Convention. It also proposed exchanging war prisoners on a one-for-one basis, exchanging war prisoners for civilians and releasing prisoners of war instead of repatriating them. The Korean-Chinese side opposed these proposals designed to retain the war prisoners by force, and firmly insisted on repatriating all prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The P.O.W. question remained unsolved for a long time, owing to the U.S. side's persistence in its unjustifiable stand. Meanwhile, the U.S. side incessantly created provocative incidents outside the conference tents, bombing and strafing the Kaesong neutral zone and the vehicles of the Korean-Chinese delegation and strafing the P.O.W. camps of the Korean-Chinese side.

January 3 A. Y. Vyshinsky, Head of the Soviet Delegation, proposed at the Political Committee of the Sixth U.N. General Assembly, that the Security Council convene without delay a periodic meeting to examine in the first place the measures which the Security Council should take to help to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations being held in Korea for the cessation of hostilities.

January 28-29 Germ-laden insects spread by U.S. aircraft were discovered in Pyonggang, Ichon and other places in Kangwon Province in North Korea. According to the depositions of the captured Colonel Frank H. Schwable, Chief of Staff of the U.S. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, the United States started bacteriological warfare in Korea as early as in the winter of 1951. Soon U.S. aircraft extended

1952 the area over which they were dropping germs to the whole of North Korea and across the border of China.

February 6 The delegations to the Korean armistice negotiations took up the fifth item on the agenda: Proposals to the governments of the various countries concerned on both parties. In the course of the discussions, the U.S. side attempted to avoid the holding of a Political Conference after the armistice and the discussion of other questions related to peace in Korea, finally attempting to throw this item of the agenda overboard. Through the efforts of the Korean-Chinese side, however, agreement on that item was reached on February 17. The agreement affirmed that, within three months after the armistice, a Political Conference of a higher level should be convened by the governments of the countries concerned on both sides to discuss questions concerning the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

February 18 War prisoners in the United States P.O.W. camp No. 62 on Koje Island were slaughtered by the U.S. side for resisting forcible "screening." According to the report of the "International Committee of the Red Cross," 373 prisoners of war were killed or injured. The U.S. side, while insisting on the so-called principle of "voluntary repatriation" in the armistice negotiations, made use of Kuomintang and Syngman Rhee special agents planted in its P.O.W. camps to force the prisoners to be tattooed, to write petitions in blood, to be subjected to "screening" and to "refuse repatriation." To break down the resistance of the war prisoners, the U.S. side subjected them to unparalleled persecution and successive massacres.

February 22 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a statement strongly protesting against the germ warfare waged by U.S. forces.

March 8 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement strongly protesting against the intrusion by U.S. aircraft into China's territorial air to wage germ warfare.

March 20 The Korean armistice negotiations reached agreement on the question of the designated ports of entry in connection with the third item of the agenda. But discussion of this item continued to be dragged out as a result of the U.S. side's persistence in restricting the rights of the Korean-Chinese side to build airfield installations and in opposing the nomination of the Soviet Union as a neutral nation.

March 25 The staff officers' meeting of the Korean armistice

negotiations for the discussion of the fourth agenda item on the P.O.W. question entered into executive sessions. 1952

March 31 The Commission of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers issued a "Report on U.S. Crimes in Korea." The report confirmed the atrocities and war crimes, particularly the crime of waging bacteriological warfare, perpetrated by the U.S. and Syngman Rhee troops.

April 1 The Bureau of the World Peace Council issued the appeal "Against Bacteriological Warfare," calling on the people of the whole world to demand an end to bacteriological warfare and prohibition of the bacteriological weapon.

April 6 A spokesman for the Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army and the Headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteers stated that the reasonable stand taken by the Korean-Chinese side that the belligerents repatriate all prisoners of war after the armistice would not be affected by the fact that Korean and Chinese prisoners of war had been tattooed and subjected to other atrocities during their captivity. He added: "We are fully aware that such acts were certainly not done of their own accord, and they should not be held responsible for them. We entirely welcome all our prisoners of war back to their motherlands."

April 8 The U.S. side conducted large-scale forcible "screening" among Korean and Chinese war prisoners in the P.O.W. camps on Koje Island.

April 25 The staff officers' meeting of the Korean armistice negotiations dealing with the P.O.W. question ended its executive sessions. On March 21, the Korean-Chinese side put forward points based on the principle of the release and repatriation of war prisoners. It was proposed that, after the armistice, the Korean-Chinese side should release and repatriate all the 11,559 prisoners of war in its custody and that the U.S. side should release and repatriate all the 132,474 prisoners of war in its custody, the rosters of war prisoners to be given a final checking by both sides. The U.S. side agreed to settle the question within the scope of these points. U.S. senior staff officer George W. Hickman stated at the April 1 executive session that the number of war prisoners to be repatriated by the U.S. side was 116,000. But on April 19, the U.S. side reduced the number of war prisoners to be repatriated to 70,000 and declared that this was the result of "individual interrogation" (screening). The Korean-Chinese side could not accept this unreasonable stand and on April 25 declared an end to the executive sessions.

An editorial carried by the Peking *People's Daily* on May 9 pointed out that the Korean-Chinese side had made concessions for

1952 the solution of the question. On March 21, it put forward a principle concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war, based on the U.S. figure of more than 132,000 prisoners of war instead of the figure of more than 170,000 prisoners who, as the U.S. side had previously admitted, were in its custody. But the U.S. side, contradicting its own previous statement, submitted the shameful figure of 70,000, thus giving yet another example of its perfidy. "The figure of 70,000 prisoners of war whom the enemy allege they will repatriate," the paper said, "is clear proof that they are determined to violate the Geneva Convention, to persist in forcibly retaining the captured personnel of this side and to refuse any compromise."

April 28 U.S. President Truman appointed Mark Clark to succeed Matthew B. Ridgway as Commander-in-Chief of the "United Nations Command."

The full delegation's meeting of the two sides to the Korean armistice negotiations entered into executive sessions on the request of the U.S. side to discuss an overall proposal for the settlement of the remaining questions on the various items of the agenda. At the executive meetings, the U.S. side withdrew its unjustifiable demand for restrictions on the building of airfield installations by the Korean-Chinese side, but persisted in its unreasonable stand on the question of the nomination of neutral nations and insisted on repatriating only 70,000 prisoners of war. The Korean-Chinese side declared on May 2 that if the U.S. side accepted the reasonable Korean-Chinese proposal on the P.O.W. question and gave up its interference in the internal affairs of Korea, the Korean-Chinese side would agree to the forming of a neutral nations supervisory commission by four neutral nations. Thus basic agreement on the third item of the agenda was reached. On May 7, the Korean-Chinese side proposed to end the executive sessions because the U.S. side still persisted in its stand of forcibly retaining prisoners of war.

May 5 The Korean-Chinese side made public the depositions of U.S. air force P.O.W.s Quinn and Enoch about the waging of germ warfare in Korea by the U.S. forces.

May 7 Ridgway issued a statement declaring that the proposal submitted by the U.S. side to repatriate only 70,000 P.O.W.s "is not subject to substantive change," adding that "regardless of the views of the enemy on individual issues, the United Nations Command solution is contingent upon acceptance as a whole by the Communists." Earlier, U.S. negotiator Joy stated: "This proposal is firm...final and irrevocable."

Korean and Chinese P.O.W.s in the United States P.O.W. camp No. 76 on Koje Island detained the United States P.O.W. camp commandant Dodd as a protest against the U.S. side's forcible "screen-

ing" and inhuman treatment. In his reply to the P.O.W.s, Dodd's successor Colson admitted that "many prisoners of war have been killed and wounded by U.N. forces" and that the P.O.W.s did not get "humane treatment in this camp according to the principles of international law." Colson also admitted that the P.O.W.s were subjected to "forcible screening" and "rearming." Following this incident, which exposed the truth of the so-called "voluntary repatriation," the U.S. side gathered together U.S., British and Canadian troops and used tanks, flame throwers and other weapons to suppress and slaughter prisoners of war in various camps. In addition, the U.S. side shipped the P.O.W.s it intended to retain by force to camps on the mainland and shipped Chinese captured personnel to Cheju Island. In May and June there were repeated cases of bloodshed in the United States P.O.W. camps on Koje Island, in Pusan, Masan and other places. These atrocities committed by the U.S. side aroused a wave of angry protests all over the world. These atrocities also evoked widespread comment in the capitalist world. Many American papers pointed out that U.S. "prestige" had been damaged as a result of the Koje Island atrocities. 1952

In an article published on May 18, the editor of the British paper *Reynolds News* said that the incident on Koje Island "begins to make the American story and American screening methods smell very high indeed.... After the Dodd-Colson episode it is impossible to believe in the American-say-so story of the reluctant prisoners."

May 23 The U.S. side unilaterally declared a three-day recess at the full delegation's meeting of the armistice negotiations. The U.S. side later asked for three-day recesses on three different occasions.

June 22 The U.S. side declared that it was preparing to classify the 27,000 P.O.W.s of the Korean People's Army as "civilians" and hand them over to the Syngman Rhee clique. The "handing over" would begin before the end of June and conclude on August 10. On June 23, the Korean-Chinese side denounced the unilateral and illegal disposition of the P.O.W.s by the U.S. side and declared that it would never recognize this act.

June 23 U.S. aircraft began to bomb the Suiho and other hydroelectric power plants on the Yalu River on the Korean-Chinese border. The U.S. side resorted to such acts of violence in its futile attempt to intimidate the Korean and Chinese side into accepting its senseless claims for illegally retaining the P.O.W.s. According to an A.P. report of June 23 from Washington, an "official of the Defence Department" said: "The great air strike at the power installations on the Yalu River is an outgrowth of the stalling of Korean truce talks at Panmunjom...."

1952 July 4 The full delegation's meeting of both sides to the Korean armistice negotiations entered into an executive session to seek a settlement of the P.O.W. question. The Korean-Chinese side proposed on the 3rd that all Korean armed personnel (South Korean forces or Korean People's Army) taken prisoner by either side whose homes were in areas of the custodian side should be allowed to return home directly and need not be repatriated; while all foreign armed personnel (United Nations forces or Chinese People's Volunteers) taken prisoner by either side should be repatriated *in toto*. The U.S. side, however, was not willing to accept this reasonable proposal. On July 13, it submitted the approximate number of 83,000 P.O.W.s to be repatriated, attempting to hold back 20 per cent of the P.O.W.s of the Korean People's Army and 68 per cent of those of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The U.S. side declared that this proposal too was firm, final and irrevocable. The executive session wound up on July 25 as a result of the U.S. side's refusal to negotiate.

July 12 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement strongly protesting against the provocative raids by U.S. aircraft which intruded over China's territorial air, killing and wounding Chinese citizens.

July 13 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued statements on China's recognition of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and of the 1925 "Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare."

Mark Clark, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," submitted a report to the United Nations indicating that he would retain by force 100,000 Korean and Chinese war prisoners.

July 26 The U.S. side unilaterally announced a seven-day recess at the full delegation's meeting between the two sides to the armistice negotiations. Subsequently the U.S. side repeatedly asked for recesses of seven days.

August 5 Full agreement was virtually reached on the detailed phrasing of the Draft Korean Armistice Agreement. Paragraph 51 of the Draft Agreement defined the principle of repatriation of P.O.W.s as follows: "All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible." However, due to the U.S. side's refusal to put in force the principle it had agreed upon, the P.O.W. question remained unsettled.

The U.S. 5th Air Force Headquarters announced that it would bomb 78 peaceful towns in the northern part of Korea.

August 31 A ceremony was held to mark the signing of the Re-

port of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacteriological Warfare in Korea and China. The conclusion of the report said: "The peoples of Korea and China have indeed been the objective of bacteriological weapons. These have been employed by units of the U.S.A. armed forces, using a great variety of different methods for the purpose, some of which seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese army during the second world war." 1952

September 16 The Korean-Chinese side made public the depositions of U.S. air force P.O.W.s O'Neal and Kniss on the waging of germ warfare in Korea by U.S. forces.

September 20 The U.S. side announced that another 11,000 P.O.W.s of the Korean People's Army would be classified as "civilians" from October 1 and would be "released" and turned over to the Syngman Rhee clique.

September 28 The U.S. side advanced a three-point proposal in the armistice negotiations. It still proposed to divide the P.O.W.s into two categories, those willing to be repatriated and those who "refuse repatriation." It proposed that after the armistice became effective the P.O.W.s should be shipped to a demilitarized zone where they could choose which side to go to, or that the P.O.W.s who "refuse repatriation" be divided into small groups to be interviewed by representatives of neutral nations or that they be divided into small groups to be released. These proposals were obviously of a deceptive nature since the P.O.W.s were under the control of special agents of the U.S. side and had no way to express their desire for repatriation. After submitting these proposals the U.S. side asked for a recess of ten days.

October 1 For celebrating the National Day of the People's Republic of China, 165 Chinese P.O.W.s interned on Cheju Island were killed or injured by U.S. troops.

October 8 At the armistice talks, the Korean-Chinese side, while stressing the deceptive nature of the U.S. three-point proposal, accepted the formal changes introduced in the U.S. proposal. The Korean-Chinese side suggested that after the armistice all P.O.W.s be sent to a demilitarized zone and placed in the custody of the other side, and then be interviewed, classified according to their nationality and place of residence, and repatriated. Ignoring this effort by the Korean-Chinese side, the U.S. side arbitrarily and indefinitely recessed the talks and walked out of the conference without stopping to hear the answer of the Korean-Chinese side.

On the 9th, the Peking *People's Daily* carried an editorial on the U.S. attempts to wreck the armistice negotiations. The editorial

1952 pointed out that the U.S. side was completely disregarding the demand for peace by people all over the world in turning a blind eye to the efforts made by the Korean-Chinese side, in categorically refusing to negotiate, and in indefinitely recessing the meetings. The purpose of all this was to threaten to wreck the talks. "This certainly cannot be tolerated by people throughout the world," the paper said, adding that the U.S. side "must bear serious responsibility for their crime of dragging out and wrecking the Korean armistice negotiations." The editorial stressed that the threats of the U.S. imperialists could not intimidate the Korean and Chinese peoples who, standing firm and determined to smash the U.S. scheme to wreck the negotiations, would struggle to the end for a Korean armistice.

Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State, and Mark Clark, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," issued statements trying to evade responsibility for wrecking the negotiations.

October 12 The Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions adopted a resolution on the Korean question, calling upon all the peoples of the Asian and Pacific regions, as well as upon all other peoples throughout the world, to demand the solution of the Korean problem on a just and reasonable basis at the earliest possible date.

October 14 The U.S. forces launched in the Sangkumryung area, north of Kumhwa, their biggest offensive since the autumn of 1951. The U.S. side, after arbitrarily announcing the "indefinite recess" of the armistice negotiations, once again attempted to apply so-called "military pressure" to compel the Korean-Chinese side to accept its absurd proposal on the forcible retention of prisoners of war. The heavy blows dealt by the Korean and Chinese people's forces had, however, completely smashed this offensive by November 25, with the enemy suffering more than 25,000 casualties.

October 16 Generals Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai sent a message to Commander-in-Chief of the "United Nations Command," Mark Clark, demanding that the U.S. side immediately stop the unreasonable action of breaking off the armistice negotiations, that all P.O.W.s be repatriated in accordance with international practice, the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the draft Korean armistice agreement and that the armistice be realized speedily on the basis of the draft Korean armistice agreement. Clark replied on the 19th, categorically refusing to resume the armistice talks.

October 24 Twenty-one nations, including the United States and Britain, submitted a draft resolution on the Korean question to the Seventh U.N. General Assembly in an attempt to make use of the United Nations to force the Korean-Chinese side to accept the so-called principle of "voluntary repatriation" and to extend the war

in the name of the United Nations if the Korean-Chinese side rejected this proposal. After this, Indonesia, Israel, India and other countries successively put forward proposals on this question. 1952

The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army and the Command of the Chinese People's Volunteers issued a joint communiqué on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Chinese People's Volunteers' entry into the Korean war. The communiqué said that fighting heroically and in close co-ordination, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had waged five large-scale campaigns in the past two years. They had hurled back the U.S. aggressive forces from the Yalu River to areas in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. In addition, they had smashed the so-called "summer offensive" and "autumn offensive" of the U.S. forces and dealt heavy blows to the enemy. "During the past year and more," the communiqué said, "the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers have built strong defences in depth along areas near the 38th Parallel and north of it. Each day they throw back scores of enemy attacks and constantly carry out counter-attacks against the enemy forces, annihilating large numbers of their troops and holding them completely in check.... What has happened in the past two years testifies to the fact that our forces grow stronger with each battle and become richer in experience with each passing day. They have achieved great victories, wiped out a large number of enemy troops and smashed all his frenzied moves and schemes." The communiqué said that from October 25, 1950 to October 15, 1952, the people's forces killed, wounded or captured 661,034 enemy troops, among them 291,011 U.S. troops.

October 29 The Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution on the peaceful settlement of the Korean question to the Political Committee of the Seventh U.N. General Assembly. The draft resolution which was amended twice, on November 10 and 23 respectively, stipulated that the belligerents in Korea immediately cease fire on the basis of the draft armistice agreement; that the P.O.W. question be referred for solution to a commission for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question which shall consist of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea; and that in the commission questions shall be decided by a two-thirds majority vote. The Korean and Chinese Governments issued statements on November 28, endorsing the Soviet proposal. But because of U.S. manipulation, the U.N. General Assembly rejected this proposal.

November 4 The United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea appealed to people throughout the world to stop U.S. wanton air raids.

1952 The Government of the Soviet Union sent a note to the U.S. Government condemning the latter's scheme to set up a so-called "sea defence zone" around Korea as a new act of aggression in the Far East.

December 2 U.S. President-elect Eisenhower arrived in Korea for a visit. At a press conference held in Seoul on the 5th, Eisenhower said: "We have no panaceas, no tricks of settling any problems." He declared: "How difficult it seems to be in a war of this kind to work out a plan that would bring a positive and definite victory without possibly running the grave risk of enlarging the war." On his return to the U.S. on December 14, he made another statement saying: "All of us have long realized that there can be no simple formula for bringing a swift victorious end to this war. But at very least that knowledge prepares us for whatever tough tasks lie ahead." He announced the speeding up of the training and expanding of the South Korean army and stated: "We must all recognize in all our thinking and our planning that the Korean war is but the most dramatic and most painful phase for us...."

December 3 The Seventh U.N. General Assembly adopted an illegal resolution on the Korean question. Based on the U.S. "principle" of "non-forcible repatriation," which was in effect forcible retention of P.O.W.s, the resolution endorsed the U.S. crime of forcibly holding back P.O.W.s. The Chinese and Korean Governments replied to the President of the United Nations General Assembly on December 14 and 17 respectively, protesting against this illegal resolution. They demanded the rescission of this resolution and immediate peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the Soviet proposal.

December 14 The U.S. side killed and injured 207 Korean P.O.W.s in the Pongam Island P.O.W. camp.

December 25 Replying to the questions put forward by a *New York Times* correspondent, J. V. Stalin stated: "The U.S.S.R. is interested in ending the war in Korea."

1953

January 21 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement in strong protest against the

intrusion by U.S. planes into Northeast China to carry out strategic reconnaissance.

U.S. planes strafed a convoy of the Korean-Chinese delegation, wounding three staff members. Since disrupting the armistice negotiations on October 8, 1952, the U.S. side had continuously created provocations including bombings and strafings and air intrusions over the Kaesong Neutral Zone, and bombings of P.O.W. camps of the Korean and Chinese side.

January 25 The Chinese People's Volunteers defeated the biggest offensive which the U.S. Command had launched that winter at "T-Bone Hill," at Songsan and Chisandong west of Chorwon. In this battle, the ratio in casualties between the enemy side and the Korean-Chinese side was 9 to 1. According to figures released at that time, the Korean-Chinese side, while suffering only 17 casualties, put more than 150 enemy troops out of action on the single day of January 25 and shot down or damaged seven enemy planes.

After this heavy reverse of the U.S. troops, even United Press had to admit on January 27 in a dispatch from Washington: "The ill-fated assault against the Communist positions on T-Bone Hill stirred anxious congressional speculation." The report, quoting U.S. congressional sources, said: "No matter what course is followed, many Congressmen are convinced that the Americans must brace themselves for longer casualty lists."

February 7 Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, in a speech at the Fourth Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, said about the Korean question: "We want peace. However, so long as U.S. imperialism does not give up its arrogant and unreasonable demands and its scheme to expand aggression, the sole determination of the Chinese people must be to go on fighting alongside the Korean people. It is not that we like war. We would like to stop the war at once and leave the remaining questions for later settlement. But U.S. imperialism prefers not to. All right, then go on fighting. However many years U.S. imperialism prefers to fight, we are ready to fight it, right up to the moment when U.S. imperialism prefers to quit, right up to the moment of complete victory for the Chinese and Korean peoples."

February 22 The Korean-Chinese side made public the depositions of the captured personnel of the U.S. air force Col. Frank H. Schwable and Major Roy H. Bley, on bacteriological warfare waged by the United States.

General Mark Clark, Commander-in-Chief of the "U.N. Command," in a letter to the Korean-Chinese side proposed the exchange

1953 of sick and injured prisoners of war while hostilities were still in progress.

March 28 Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai in their reply agreed to the proposal of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war, pointing out that the reasonable settlement of this question during the period of hostilities should lead to the smooth settlement of the entire P.O.W. question and to an early armistice in Korea. Hence they proposed the immediate resumption of negotiations at Panmunjom.

March 30 Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, said in a statement on the question of the Korean armistice negotiations: "The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hold in common that the delegates of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers to the armistice negotiations and the delegates of the United Nations Command to the armistice negotiations should immediately start negotiations on the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war during the period of hostilities, and should proceed to seek an over-all settlement of the question of prisoners of war."

The statement pointed out that, in order to eliminate differences between the two sides on the question of the prisoners of war and bring about an armistice, the Chinese and Korean Governments proposed the following: "Both parties to the negotiations should undertake to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation, and to hand over the remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state, so as to ensure a just solution of the question of their repatriation."

The statement further pointed out that this proposal did not in any way imply the relinquishment of the principle of P.O.W. repatriation as set forth in the Geneva Convention, nor did it imply any acknowledgement of the assertion of the United States that there were among the prisoners of war individuals who allegedly refused repatriation. This proposal, the statement pointed out, represented a new step towards terminating bloodshed in Korea so that after the cessation of hostilities, the captured personnel of our side who had been intimidated and oppressed by their captors to the point where they became afraid to return home, might be handed over to a neutral state and given explanations by the side concerned. Thus the question of their repatriation would be assured of a just settlement.

Chou En-lai's proposal was warmly endorsed by people everywhere in the world. Public opinion in the capitalist countries also welcomed this proposal, admitting that it would remove the last obstacles in the way of an armistice and that it testified to the

Korean-Chinese side's sincere desire for peace. The proposal eventually brought about a resumption of armistice negotiations. 1953

March 31 Premier Kim Il Sung of the Korean Democratic People's Republic, in a statement, supported Chou En-lai's proposal.

April 1 V. M. Molotov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., supported the statements made by Chou En-lai and Kim Il Sung. Molotov's statement stressed that the United Nations should in its membership include the lawful representatives of China and Korea.

April 6 The liaison groups of the two sides to the Korean armistice negotiations started to meet again. On April 11, they signed an agreement for the repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel.

April 16 The Political Committee of the Seventh U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted the Brazilian proposal which expressed hope for the early achievement of an armistice in Korea and provided for reconvening the General Assembly session, in the event of the signing of the Korean armistice or an important development in the situation in Korea, if the majority of the member nations demanded such reconvening. This proposal was adopted on April 18 by the U.N. General Assembly.

April 19 At a liaison group meeting, the two sides to the Korean armistice negotiations agreed to resume meetings on the delegation level on April 25. This date was subsequently changed to April 26.

April 20 The two sides began exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war. The Korean-Chinese side completed the repatriation of the 684 sick and injured prisoners of war of the U.S. side in its custody on April 26. The U.S. side declared on May 3 that the repatriation of all the sick and injured captured personnel of the Korean-Chinese side due for repatriation had been completed. In all, 6,670 captured prisoners of war were repatriated to the Korean-Chinese side. All the repatriated sick and injured of the Korean-Chinese side were unanimous in accusing the U.S. side of forcibly retaining prisoners of war, of maltreatment and persecution.

April 26 The delegations of both sides to the Korean armistice negotiations resumed their meetings. The Korean-Chinese side offered a six-point proposal providing that all the prisoners of war who insisted upon repatriation should be repatriated within two months after the Armistice Agreement had come into force. After that, the remaining prisoners of war should be released from military control by the detaining side within a time limit of one month and handed over to the custody of a neutral state. The proposal also

1953 provided that the nations to which these prisoners belonged would send personnel to give explanations during six months to these prisoners of war.

The proposal further provided that all prisoners of war demanding repatriation after explanations should be repatriated immediately. If, after six months, there were still prisoners of war in the custody of the neutral state, their disposition should be submitted to the Political Conference provided for in the Armistice Agreement for settlement through consultation.

The U.S. side adopted a non-conciliatory attitude towards the proposal of the Korean-Chinese side, opposed sending the non-directly-repatriated prisoners of war to a neutral state and rejected the nomination of any Asian country as a neutral state.

May 7 To overcome obstructions from the U.S. side, the Korean-Chinese delegation to the Korean armistice negotiations made a new eight-point proposal for the settlement of the question of prisoners of war, that is, to set up a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden and India, to take the prisoners of war into custody. The nations to which the prisoners of war belonged should give them four months' explanations, so as to ensure a just settlement of the question of their repatriation.

May 11 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Chinese People's Republic, issued a statement strongly protesting against the violation by U.S. aircraft of Northeast China's territorial air, killing and wounding Chinese people.

May 13 The U.S. side in the Korean armistice negotiations made the proposal that all non-directly-repatriated Korean prisoners of war be "released on the spot" when the Armistice Agreement became effective. The proposal also would have put many restrictions on the powers and functions of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and on the explanatory work of the nations to which the prisoners of war belonged. The Korean-Chinese side stood firm against this proposal by the U.S. side.

May 19 Li Dong Ken, Acting Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, issued a strong protest against the repeated bombings by U.S. planes of reservoirs in South Pyongan Province between May 13 and 16, 1953. These reservoirs were exclusively used by peaceful civilians for irrigation purposes. These bombings, the statement said, had resulted in big losses in lives and property of peaceful Korean civilians.

May 25 At the request of the U.S. side, the delegations of both

sides to the Korean armistice negotiations went into executive sessions. These sessions concluded on June 7, 1953. 1953

June 8 The two sides to the Korean armistice negotiations reached agreement on the question of the prisoners of war, and signed the Terms of Reference of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. This agreement provided that all prisoners of war who were not directly repatriated would be released from military control of their detaining side within 60 days after the Armistice Agreement became effective and turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, composed of the representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden and India, for custody on Korean territory. The nations to which the prisoners of war belonged should have the freedom and facilities to send their representatives to make explanations to the prisoners of war during 90 days from the day when the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission took over the custody of the prisoners of war. If after the expiration of the 90 days, there were still prisoners of war who had not exercised their right to be repatriated, the question of their disposition should be submitted to the Political Conference for settlement within 30 days. After that, if there were still prisoners of war who had not exercised their right to be repatriated and no agreement had been reached on their disposition at the Political Conference, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission should release these prisoners of war from P.O.W. to civilian status within 30 days and assist them to go to places of their own choosing.

With this, agreement was reached on all the items of the Korean armistice negotiations. The two sides then proceeded to revise the Military Demarcation Line and work out details of procedure for signing the Armistice Agreement.

June 18 The Syngman Rhee clique, with U.S. connivance, began to abduct by force captured personnel of the Korean and Chinese side, totalling over 27,000 men. A spokesman of the Syngman Rhee Defence Ministry declared on June 20 that the captured personnel of the Korean People's Army "will be enlisted in the R.O.K. armed forces."

Following this incident, even the *Washington Post* in an editorial on June 20 stated: "It is scarcely conceivable that the release of the North Korean prisoners could have come as a complete surprise to the 8th Army. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that individual Americans, if they did not participate in the plot, at least knew of it in advance.... The unconcealed glee of those few persons in this country who have urged expanded war adds to the suspicion."

The *New York Times* on June 20 carried a report from Pusan date-lined June 19 which said: "The United Nations P.O.W. Command is unofficially turning its back on the situation."

1953 The world was unanimous in its indignation at this crime committed by the Syngman Rhee clique, with U.S. connivance, in open violation of the agreement on the P.O.W. question.

A spokesman for the Indian Prime Minister Nehru on June 19 called this incident "deplorable and most objectionable."

Prime Minister Churchill read in the House of Commons on June 22 the British note of protest to the Syngman Rhee government which said: "Her Majesty's Government strongly condemn this treacherous violation...."

June 19 Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai sent a letter to General Mark Clark demanding the immediate recovery of all captured personnel of the Korean-Chinese side whom Syngman Rhee had abducted by force. The letter also demanded a reply to the question as to what assurances there were for the implementation of the Armistice Agreement on the part of South Korea if the Syngman Rhee clique would not observe it.

In his reply of June 29 General Clark admitted that the forcible abduction of prisoners of war by the Syngman Rhee clique was a "serious incident," but asserted that it was "unrealistic" and "impossible" to seek to recover them all. He gave assurances that the co-operation of the Syngman Rhee clique would be obtained for the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and that, "Where necessary the United Nations Command will, to the limits of its ability, establish military safeguards to insure that the armistice terms are observed."

June 25 Walter Robertson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and President Eisenhower's special envoy, arrived in Korea for talks with Syngman Rhee.

Prime Minister Nehru of India, in a cable to the President of the U.N. General Assembly, Lester B. Pearson, called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. General Assembly to discuss the serious situation arising from Syngman Rhee's "release" of prisoners of war. The U.S. delegate to the United Nations Henry C. Lodge immediately declared himself against this proposal. On June 26, U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold conferred with Pearson but no concrete decision was taken on Nehru's proposal for an emergency meeting of the U.N. General Assembly.

July 7 Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai in their reply to General Clark pointed out that the U.S. side "bears at all times the responsibility for recovering" all the prisoners of war forcibly retained by Syngman Rhee. They agreed that the delegations of both sides meet at an appointed time to discuss the implementation of the Armistice Agreement and the necessary preparations for signing the Armistice Agreement. Owing to the efforts

of the Korean-Chinese side, the delegations of both sides resumed their meetings on July 10. 1953

July 12 Robertson concluded his talks with Syngman Rhee; a joint statement was issued which, however, did not make it clear whether Syngman Rhee would abide by a Korean armistice agreement. The statement merely said that the United States and Syngman Rhee had reached agreement on the question of signing a "Mutual Defence Treaty." Before releasing this statement, Syngman Rhee had told a correspondent of the U.S. Scripps-Howard newspaper chain that he would not accept the armistice but only agreed not to obstruct it for 90 days. He did not think, he said, that the Korean question could be peacefully settled. All the while, Syngman Rhee declared time and again that he would "resume the fight" to "unify" Korea.

July 13 The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers launched a powerful counter-attack on the central front, putting four Syngman Rhee divisions out of action within twenty-four hours. Up to July 26, the Korean and Chinese people's forces wiped out over 123,000 enemy troops, of whom over 100,000 were Syngman Rhee troops. The frontline had been pushed southwards across an area of more than 220 square kilometres. This great victory scored by the Korean-Chinese side dealt a grave blow to the enemy's opposition to an armistice, and hastened the signing of an armistice agreement.

July 19 General Nam Il, senior delegate of the Korean-Chinese side to the Korean armistice negotiations, made a statement on the question of assurances given by the United States for the implementation of the armistice. The statement, quoting the record of the meetings, summarized the assurances given by William K. Harrison, senior delegate of the U.S. side, that the Syngman Rhee clique "will not obstruct in any manner the implementation of the terms of the draft Armistice Agreement," and that "the U.N. Command will not give support during any aggressive action of units of the Republic of Korea Army in violation of the armistice." General Harrison also gave assurances that the U.N. Command would maintain the state of armistice, if the Korean-Chinese side took the necessary action to resist any aggressive acts on the part of South Korea.

July 27 The Korean Armistice Agreement and the Temporary Agreement Supplementary to the Armistice Agreement were signed at 10 a.m. Korean time. Marshal Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, issued armistice

1953 orders to the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, respectively, and enjoined them strictly to observe the Armistice Agreement and to sharpen their vigilance. The orders pointed out: "The signing of the Armistice Agreement is the first step towards the settlement by peaceful means of the Korean question and is therefore beneficial to the peace of the Far East and of the world. It has received the fervent support of the Korean and Chinese peoples and has made all the peace-loving people of the world rejoice." Meanwhile, General Clark, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," in a statement to his subordinates declared, however: "This does not mean an immediate or even early withdrawal from Korea. The conflict will not be over. We must maintain our strength." Syngman Rhee declared: "I have opposed the signing of the truce. . . ."

The Peking *People's Daily* carried an editorial on July 28 which said: "The victory won by the Korean and Chinese people in their great and just war against aggression and in their fight for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question has proved that the awakened Asian people are invincible in their just struggle to resist aggression and defend peace. It has proved that the world camp of peace headed by the Soviet Union is inviolable and that the forces of world peace and democracy are infinitely powerful."

The editorial further pointed out: "The course of the Korean war and the armistice negotiations are clear proof that, whenever the people of the world uphold the cause of peace, the spirit of negotiation triumphs over force."

It was stressed that, in order to go further in the peaceful settlement of the whole Korean question, there must be consultations at a higher level through the Political Conference. The Korean and the Chinese people, together with peace-loving people throughout the world fervently hoped, the editorial added, that this Political Conference could be successfully convened and achieve a settlement. The Korean and Chinese people were determined, the editorial concluded, to persist in their struggle until the Korean question was settled by peaceful means.

The Korean Military Armistice Commission was established.

July 28 In a mass rally in Pyongyang in celebration of the Korean armistice attended by people of all strata, Marshal Kim Il Sung called upon the Korean people to continue their efforts for the peaceful unification of Korea with the slogan: "All for strengthening our democratic base, all for the rehabilitation and development of a post-war people's economy!"

The P.O.W. Repatriation Commission was set up, which decided to begin the exchange of directly repatriated P.O.W.s on August 5.

July 30 The armed forces of both sides completed the withdrawal of their units from the Demilitarized Zone.

August 1 The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was established.

The Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China issued a statement strongly protesting against the criminal intrusion into the territorial air over Northeast China by U.S. military aircraft and their attack on a Soviet passenger plane.

According to available figures, from the beginning of the Korean war to the end of July 1953, U.S. military aircraft intruded into Chinese territorial air and bombed and strafed Chinese people in 7,144 flights, totalling 31,851 sorties.

U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the ambassadors of the 15 other countries participating in the Korean war that U.S. forces would stay in Korea to help "rebuild" the country. He demanded that the forces of these 15 countries also remain in Korea.

August 2 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in South Korea to hold talks with Syngman Rhee.

August 4 The north-bound and south-bound teams of the Joint Red Cross Societies started their trips from Panmunjom. Representatives of the Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies in the south-bound team who visited the P.O.W. camps of the U.S. side were unable to perform their duties owing to the many restrictions imposed on them by the U.S. side. Three of the representatives of the Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies were injured by armed men of the U.S. side. Representatives of the Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies visiting Koje Island were attacked with poison gas by the U.S. side.

Representatives of the American Red Cross Society in the north-bound team who visited the P.O.W. camps of the Korean and Chinese side, however, were given every facility and carried out their work successfully.

August 5 Repatriation of the prisoners of war to be directly repatriated started. This whole operation was completed on September 6. The Korean and Chinese side repatriated to the U.S. side 12,773 prisoners of war. The U.S. side repatriated to the Korean and Chinese side 75,801 prisoners of war, retaining part of the captured personnel to be directly repatriated. All the repatriated personnel of the Korean and Chinese side accused the U.S. side of forcible retention and ill-treatment.

The Council of Ministers of Hungary adopted a decision to help the rehabilitation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

1953 August 7 The United States and 15 other nations participating in the aggressive war in Korea issued a "declaration" to the effect that in case of renewed attack, "we should again be united and promptly resist," and that, in this event, "in all probability it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

The London *Observer*, commenting on this, said: "It seems odd that the United Nations should remain so completely silent about the open threats of Mr. Rhee, while being gratuitously bellicose about purely 'hypothetical circumstances.' "

August 8 G. M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., in his address to the final sitting of the Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., declared that the Soviet Government had resolved to allocate one thousand million rubles for the rehabilitation of the economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, after four days' talks with Syngman Rhee, signed the "Draft U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty." The treaty stipulated: "Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under their respective administrative controls, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

"The Republic of Korea grants, and the U.S. accepts, the right to dispose U.S. land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement."

Dulles and Syngman Rhee also issued a joint statement which said that if the aim of bringing the whole of Korea under Rhee's rule could not be achieved within 90 days of the holding of the Political Conference, "we shall then be prepared to make concurrent withdrawal from the Conference."

During this period and afterwards, Syngman Rhee raised a continuous outcry to the effect that if his aim of "unifying" Korea was not achieved, he would "resume the fight" and "march north." On August 14, Syngman Rhee, in a speech in Seoul, declared that it was South Korea's "wish and determination to march north at the earliest possible time."

On August 17, in an interview with the *U.S. News and World Report*, he declared that he believed "the U.S. will resume the fight to accomplish the common objective" of "unifying" Korea.

On September 9, 1953, Karl Hong Kee, Syngman Rhee's spokesman, declared: "The Korean government has never, in any way, expressed any plans to unify Korea by peaceful means."

August 10 Lieutenant-General Lee Sang Cho, senior member of the Korean and Chinese side on the Military Armistice Commission, issued a statement protesting against continued U.S. support, assistance and use of the Kuomintang special agents for forcible retention of prisoners of war after the armistice.

August 13 The Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea issued a statement in protest against the "U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty."

August 15 The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army and the Headquarters of the Chinese People's Volunteers issued a joint communiqué summarizing the results of the war. From June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953, the communiqué said, 1,093,839 enemy troops were killed, wounded or captured, of whom 397,543 were U.S. troops. The number of enemy aeroplanes shot down or damaged were 12,213.

August 17 The Seventh U.N. General Assembly resumed meetings to discuss the Korean question.

August 18 The Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly began discussing the question of the composition of the Korean Political Conference. The Soviet delegation proposed that the Political Conference should be a round-table conference, composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, India, Poland, Sweden, Burma, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea. The decisions of the conference, the resolution said, would be deemed to have been adopted if they had the consent of the parties which had signed the Armistice Agreement. The Soviet Union also proposed that China and Korea be invited to take part in the U.N. General Assembly discussion, but this proposal was rejected.

The proposal put forward by the 15 nations headed by the U.S. stated that the Political Conference should be a conference between two opposing sides. Australia and New Zealand, which sponsored the 15-nation resolution, put forward an amended resolution which recommended the participation of the Soviet Union in the Conference, "provided the other side desires it." The United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada and Australia put forward still another amended resolution which recommended the participation of India in the Conference.

August 24 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued the following statement: "In order that the Political Conference may proceed harmoniously, so as to set an example in international affairs for the settlement of disputes through

1953 peaceful negotiation, the Political Conference should take the form of a round-table conference; that is, it should take the form of joint negotiation between both sides of the Korean armistice with the participation of other nations concerned, but should not take the form of negotiations between the two sides of the Korean armistice only. However, any decisions of the Conference must obtain the unanimous agreement of both sides of the Korean armistice before they are adopted.

"The terms of reference of the Political Conference should be in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, firstly to negotiate the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces, including the United Nations forces and the Chinese People's Volunteers, and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and thereafter to discuss other questions."

August 25 Nam Il, Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, issued a statement which fully supported Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's statement on the question of the Political Conference.

The U.S.S.R. moved a resolution at the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly recommending the following composition for the Political Conference: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, India, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, South Korea, Indonesia, Syria, Egypt, Mexico, and Burma. It also provided that any decisions of the Conference must obtain the unanimous agreement of both sides of the Korean Armistice Agreement before they were adopted.

August 28 The plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly adopted by a bare majority of 43 votes the resolution moved by the 15 nations headed by the U.S. and the proposal for the participation of the U.S.S.R. in the Conference by 55 votes. The proposal for inviting India to participate in the Conference, although it was carried in the Political Committee by a majority of 27 votes, was not put to the vote at the plenary session upon the suggestion of the Indian delegate.

September 2 The Czechoslovak News Agency reported that the Czechoslovak Government had decided to give assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to help rehabilitate its national economy.

September 9 Lieutenant-General Lee Sang Cho, senior member of the Korean and Chinese side on the Military Armistice Commission, pointed out that the U.S. side was still forcibly retaining at

least 340 prisoners of war who insisted upon repatriation, and demanded that the U.S. side give a responsible account of these prisoners of war.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was set up.

September 10 The U.S. side began turning over the Korean and Chinese captured personnel not directly repatriated to the Indian Custodian Force of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

September 11 The U.S. Government announced the appointment of General John E. Hull to succeed General Mark Clark as Commander-in-Chief of the "U.N. Command."

September 13 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reiterating that the Korean Political Conference should take the form of a round-table conference. Chou En-lai also recommended that participating members of the Political Conference should be all nations on the two belligerent sides in Korea, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea, and the following neutral nations concerned: the Soviet Union, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma. Any decisions of the Political Conference must obtain the unanimous agreement of both belligerent sides in Korea. Chou En-lai demanded that, while the U.N. General Assembly was discussing the question of enlarging the membership of the Political Conference at its 8th Session, the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should be invited to send their representatives to attend the General Assembly to join in the discussions.

September 14 Li Dong Ken, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations fully supporting Chou En-lai's recommendations and made similar recommendations.

September 19 The delegations of the Soviet Government and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea concluded negotiations which started in Moscow on September 11. A communiqué was issued, saying that the two delegations had discussed the question of how to use the 1,000 million rubles allocated by the Soviet Union to help Korea rehabilitate its national economy. It was agreed by both sides that the allocations should be used to restore the Suiho Hydroelectric Plant, restore and build ferrous and non-ferrous metal works, chemical works and cement factories and build up textile and food industries.

September 23 The U.S. side completed the turning over of 22,604

1953 Korean and Chinese captured personnel not directly repatriated to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Later, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in its Interim Report pointed out : "There is no doubt that the prisoners at the time of taking over were well organised in groups and that this pattern of organization still persists in the camps. The leadership which existed amongst prisoners before they were taken over by the Indian Custodian Force continues to exert its influence on the prisoners who are subjected to a considerable degree of pressure involving, in some cases, acts of violence."

The Report pointed out that the P.O.W. organizations had their "General Headquarters . . . in Seoul under the control of the Provost Marshal of the Republic of Korea. The General Headquarters was linked with four branch organizations controlling the six P.O.W. enclosures: the branch organizations, in their turn, controlled the compound organizations in all the fifty-five compounds. An effective communication system functioned between the three sets of organizations. The U.N. 64th Field Hospital constituted the most significant link in the communication system."

From the beginning of the transference to October 15, when the Korean and Chinese side started explanatory work, a total of 127 prisoners of war escaped from the P.O.W. compounds at the risk of their lives to demand repatriation. The Interim Report of the N.N.R.C. pointed out: "The abnormal manner in which the repatriate prisoners have had to express their wish naturally raises the suspicion that all prisoners of war are not free agents."

September 24 The Korean and Chinese side turned over to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission 359 prisoners of war of the U.S. side who had refused to be repatriated although they had been repeatedly urged to return home.

September 25 Because of the delay in the provision of facilities for the work of explanation, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission sought the agreement of both sides of the Korean armistice to postpone the explanatory work for five days and to extend the period of explanation accordingly. The Korean and Chinese side agreed to both proposals. The U.S. side only agreed to the postponement but rejected the corresponding extension of the explanation period.

September 26 The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission adopted the "Rules of Procedure Governing Explanations and Interviews." The U.S. side objected to the provisions concerning explanations contained in the Rules of Procedure.

October 1 Explanatory work could not start because the U.S. side had delayed the providing of explanation facilities.

The "U.S.A.-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty" was signed in the United States.

October 3 On the basis of lists of prisoners of war produced by the U.S. side at different times, the Korean-Chinese side pointed out to the Military Armistice Commission that the Korean and Chinese captured personnel who had not yet been repatriated and of whom the U.S. side had not given any account numbered 98,742. The Korean-Chinese side demanded that the U.S. side rectify this by a definite and responsible accounting.

October 9 Indian Prime Minister Nehru in a speech in Bombay said, when referring to the P.O.W. question in Korea: "Obviously there was intimidation or pressure on some prisoners. If this intimidation persisted, then the Commission (the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission) would become futile. In that case there was no need for us to go there. The whole thing would become a farce." He said it was "strange" that the U.S. side delayed the providing of explanation facilities and, at the same time, opposed the extension of the explanation period. The U.N. Command, he said, "must either provide facilities immediately or extend the time."

October 10 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, said in a statement in reply to three communications from the U.S. Government concerning the Political Conference: "For the purpose of insisting on the policy of peaceful settlement of the Korean question to facilitate the consolidation of peace in Asia and the world, and of expediting the speedy convocation of the Political Conference, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, after consultations with the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, agrees that the Governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China will appoint representatives to meet with a U.S. representative to hold discussions on the question of the Political Conference.

"These discussions not only should settle the questions of place and time of the Political Conference, but, what is more essential, should settle the question of composition of the Political Conference. . . .

"It is appropriate that the place of the discussions be Panmunjom, Korea."

Nam Il, Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, made a similar statement.

October 12 The U.S. side falsely charged the Korean-Chinese

1953 side with having introduced reinforcing combat aircraft in crates to the airfield at Uiju and asked the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to send a mobile inspection team to investigate. The mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Team No. 4, after the inspection of the Uiju airfield from October 15 to 21, submitted a report to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. In evaluating the report, the Commission unanimously found the U.S. charge to be absolutely groundless.

October 14 After having been prompted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and under the pressure of world public opinion, the U.S. side completed the construction of explanation facilities after a 15-day delay. From September 10, when the U.S. side began to turn over non-directly repatriated prisoners of war of the Korean-Chinese side to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, till October 14, a total of 127 Korean and Chinese prisoners of war demanded repatriation despite the terror to which U.S. agents exposed them.

October 15 The Korean-Chinese side began its explanatory work for Korean and Chinese captured personnel who had not been directly repatriated. Because U.S. agents were planted among the prisoners of war to prevent them from coming out to hear explanations and because those prisoners of war who had already heard explanations were not segregated; also because the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission failed to discharge its duty of clearing out special agents and breaking up the agents' organizations: it became impossible for the Korean-Chinese side to proceed normally with its explanatory work.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in its Interim Report pointed out that the reason why U.S. agents disguised as "representatives of the P.O.W.s" rejected the segregation of the P.O.W.s "lay in their expressly stated fears that the breaking up of camps may lead to a loosening of the camp organizations and to the consequent weakening of the influence which these 'representatives' exercised over the main body of the prisoners of war."

By December 23, the Korean-Chinese side had succeeded in giving only 10 days' explanations: on October 15, 17 and 31; November 3, 4, 5 and 16; and December 21, 22 and 23. Over 85 per cent of the prisoners of war failed to get any explanations, while an overwhelming majority of those who had heard explanations were unable to express freely their desire for repatriation under the continued terror let loose by U.S. agents.

Up till December 23, 104 Korean and Chinese prisoners of war had risked their lives climbing over the barbed wire fence to de-

mand repatriation, while 138 demanded repatriation in the course of the explanations given. 1953

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in its Interim Report admitted that even those Korean or Chinese prisoners of war who went through the process of individual explanations were not "completely freed from force or threat of force arising from and intimately connected with the camp organization and its leadership."

October 16 The explanatory work of the Korean-Chinese side was held up because U.S. agents prevented the captured personnel of the Korean People's Army from coming out to hear explanations. The Polish and Czechoslovak members of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission maintained that, if persuasion failed, the use of force against the U.S. agents was necessary in order to enable the explanatory work to proceed. But the Swiss and Swedish members were opposed to the use of force. The Swiss member even stated that Switzerland might withdraw from the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission if force was used against the U.S. agents planted among the prisoners of war.

Although the Indian delegation considered that, in accordance with the Terms of Reference, it was permissible for the N.N.R.C. to use force in order to carry out its functions and responsibilities, the attempt to use force against the U.S. agents was given up on the ground that the Commission had failed to reach a unanimous decision. Because the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission refused to take any effective measures against the U.S. agents, including the use of force, the Korean-Chinese side was unable to proceed normally with its explanatory work.

October 19 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement in reply to a U.S. Government communication of October 14, concerning the question of the Political Conference. The statement reiterated that the Political Conference should be held with the participation of the neutral nations concerned, and agreed that representatives of the Korean and Chinese Governments would meet with the U.S. representative at Panmunjom on October 26 for discussions on the question of the Political Conference. The statement also pointed out: ". . . what is more essential, these discussions should settle the question of composition of the Political Conference."

Nam Il, Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea replied similarly.

Lim Bieng Zik, Syngman Rhee's observer at the United Nations, acknowledged in a television programme that Syngman Rhee had started the Korean war. He pointed out that the United States sup-

1953 ported South Korea when the hostilities began, with the idea of unifying Korea. "Naturally," he said, "that's the main purpose. Otherwise why fight? . . . The main and only purpose of starting this war and coming in to fight is to unify the country. . . . And that is why we started this war and if we are going to finish this war, we must fulfill this objective."

October 20 Marshal Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh-huai sent a letter to General John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, "U.N. Command," demanding that the U.S. side give a responsible and concrete account of the whereabouts of 98,742 Korean and Chinese captured personnel.

October 23 The Governments of the People's Republic of Rumania and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed an agreement in Bucharest, according to which Rumania would give economic and technical assistance to Korea's economic rehabilitation.

October 26 Discussions began at Panmunjom between the two sides on questions of the Political Conference. Because the U.S. side refused to discuss the question of composition, agreement on the question of the Conference agenda was long delayed.

November 2 The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission arrested seven men who had murdered prisoners of war for demanding repatriation in Compound 28 of the Tongjang-ni P.O.W. camp, where the Korean and Chinese captured personnel were being held in custody.

November 3 The Governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed an agreement on economic and technical assistance to Korea for rehabilitating its national economy.

November 4 The Korean and Chinese side conducted explanations for 205 out of the 403 captured personnel of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Compound 28. After the explanations, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission failed to comply with the Rules of Procedure to separate the prisoners of war who had already heard explanations from those who had not, and sent all of them back to their original compound. The same was the case on November 5. The Korean-Chinese side lodged protests on the 4th and 5th, and demanded on November 6 that explanations be given to those prisoners of war who had not yet heard explanations on the 4th and 5th. However, because the U.S. agents prevented the prisoners of war from leaving the compound, explanatory work was once again held up.

The Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission sent a letter to the Korean-Chinese side on November 6, saying that a new compound was going to be constructed for segregating prisoners of war, and requesting that no explanations be made to the prisoners of war of another compound before explanations had been made to all the prisoners of war in one. The Korean-Chinese side agreed to this request. However, because the U.S. agents would not allow prisoners of war to be segregated, and because the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission refused to take any effective measures, the Korean-Chinese side was still unable to proceed with its explanatory work.

November 7 The advisers of the two sides held a meeting to continue to discuss the agenda of the Political Conference.

November 10 The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission submitted to the Military Armistice Commission a brief report on the movement of military personnel and war supplies by both sides during the period from July 27 to September 30, 1953. The report stated that, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, the U.S. side had brought 106 trench mortars into Korea and had moved into Korea more combat aircraft than it had moved out. There was a discrepancy between the number of rotated military personnel reported by the U.S. side and that reported by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams. The Korean-Chinese side lodged on November 18 a strong protest against these violations.

November 11 The Korean-Chinese side began publishing the depositions of 19 captured U.S. airmen, including U.S. Air Force Colonel Walker M. Mahurin and Colonel Andrew J. Evans, Jr., on the U.S. Government's crime of waging bacteriological warfare in Korea.

An agreement was signed between the Government of the People's Republic of Poland and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, providing for Polish aid in the rehabilitation of Korea's national economy.

November 14 Agreement was reached on the agenda and procedure of the discussions between the two sides on questions of the Political Conference. The U.S. side agreed to discuss the composition question.

November 16 Discussions between both sides on questions of the Political Conference proceeded in two sub-committees, one on the composition and place of the Political Conference and the other on the time of the Conference. The Korean-Chinese side proposed that the Political Conference take the form of a conference between the

1953 two sides on an equal footing; that all decisions be made by unanimous agreement between the two sides; that five neutral nations—the Soviet Union, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma—participate; and that the Conference be held in Panmunjom in December 1953. But the U.S. side still tried to exclude neutral nations from participating in the Political Conference and, finally, proposed that neutral nations participate in the Conference as "non-voting observers" who "will be entitled to speak at the Conference only on items on the agenda agreed upon between the two sides at such times, places, meetings, committees and in such manner as are agreed upon unanimously by both sides." On the question of where the Conference was to take place, the U.S. side proposed over a dozen cities, including Madrid in Franco Spain. Regarding the time of the Conference, the U.S. side ignored the repeated efforts of the Korean-Chinese side to reach an agreement and proposed that, if agreement on the various agenda items was reached before December 1, the Conference should be convened not earlier than 28 days and not later than 42 days thereafter; otherwise the time for the convocation of the Political Conference should not be fixed. The sub-committees continued deliberations for two weeks without any results.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission informed the Korean-Chinese side that the Indian Custodian Force on November 7 intercepted a radio set which the U.S. side had tried to smuggle into the P.O.W. camp for its agents. On November 21, the Korean-Chinese side lodged a strong protest with the U.S. side for illegally directing its agents to sabotage the explanations.

November 17 John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, declared in Washington that the United States would insist on "releasing" all P.O.W.s not yet repatriated to "civilian" status at midnight, January 22, 1954.

November 23 An Economic and Cultural Co-operation Agreement was signed in Peking between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A communiqué issued by the delegations of the two Governments stated that the Government of the People's Republic of China had decided to grant gratis to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea all supplies given and expenses incurred in aiding Korea between June 25, 1950, when the United States Government started its aggressive war in Korea, and December 31, 1953; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China had also decided to grant gratis to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the restoration of its national economy, a sum of 8,000,000 million yuan over a period of four years, from 1954 to 1957.

November 25 The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission handed to the Korean-Chinese side a copy of the secret instructions sent by the U.S. side to its agents in the Tongjang-ni camp, which had been intercepted by the Indian Custodian Force on November 8. These secret instructions revealed that the U.S. side directed its agents to disrupt the explanations given by the Korean-Chinese side and to murder P.O.W.s desiring repatriation. 1953

November 30 The discussions between the two sides on questions of the Political Conference resumed in plenary session. The Korean-Chinese side set forth an over-all proposal that the Conference should be composed of the countries on the two sides concerned in the Korean war; that all decisions of the Conference should be made by unanimous agreement among the nations on the two sides and binding upon each signatory nation; that five neutral nations—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Burma—should be invited to participate in the Conference, but not to take part in any voting; that the Conference should be held at New Delhi, India, opening on December 28, 1953, and that the agenda of the Conference should consist of: (a) the question of prisoners of war; (b) the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea; (c) the question of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and (d) other related questions. But the U.S. side refused to agree to this proposal.

December 2 The U.S. side began explanations to its P.O.W.s who had refused repatriation. The Interim Report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission noted that these "explanations were singularly free from all disturbances and manifestations of violence." As for the Songgong-ni camp where the prisoners of war of the U.S. side were kept in custody, the Interim Report stated: "The Commission had no evidence of any activities of the former detaining side in respect of the prisoners in that camp. While these prisoners appeared to be well disciplined, the Commission again had no evidence which might have thrown any light on the existence of any organization, its character and objectives." The U.S. side curtailed the right of the prisoners of war to hear explanations, refused to give full explanations to them or answer their questions in connection with their return home to lead a peaceful life, and even insulted and intimidated them. Consequently, the prisoners of war refused to leave their compounds until the U.S. side changed its attitude. The explanations were thus suspended from December 12. All the 224 P.O.W.s who had listened to the explanations refused to be repatriated.

December 3 The Eighth U.N. General Assembly, under the mani-

1953 pulation of the United States, adopted an illegal resolution slanderously accusing the Korean-Chinese side of "atrocities" against P.O.W.s.

December 6 Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, issued a statement, pointing out that the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly slandering the Korean-Chinese side was "illegal, calumnious and invalid." The statement also severely denounced this action of the U.N. General Assembly.

December 7 The Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a statement, strongly condemning the aforesaid illegal resolution of the U.N. General Assembly.

Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, sent a notification to the U.N. General Assembly on the Korean situation. The notification pointed out: "The situation in Korea has now developed to a critical stage . . . due entirely to the criminal policies of the United States Government which attempts to wreck the Korean Armistice Agreement, to forcibly retain prisoners of war, to obstruct the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, for the purpose of maintaining international tension."

Hsinhua News Agency released a documented report of the Red Cross Society of China on the investigation into the massacre and ill-treatment of prisoners of war by the U.S. army, and another report on the investigation into the medical atrocities and malpractices committed by the U.S. army against the sick and wounded captured personnel of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea.

December 8 Foreign Minister Nam Il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea sent a notification to the U.N. General Assembly, fully supporting Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's notification.

December 9 The Eighth U.N. General Assembly was recessed indefinitely.

December 10 The Central Committee of the United Democratic Fatherland Front of Korea made public an investigation report of the atrocities committed by the U.S. aggressors against the captured personnel of the Korean People's Army.

December 12 In the discussions between both sides on questions of the Political Conference, the U.S. side unilaterally declared an indefinite recession and walked out of the meeting. Earlier, on December 8, the U.S. side had put forward a 17-point proposal which listed the Soviet Union, a neutral nation, on the side of one of the belligerents, restricted the right of neutral nations to make statements at the Conference, insisted on the so-called unit voting procedure and, at the same time, stipulated that nations participating in the voting

should not be bound by a decision to which they did not agree. The Korean-Chinese side rejected this unreasonable proposal. 1953

The Peking *People's Daily*, in its editorial of December 15, stated that the U.S. side's "aim in breaking off the discussions is to make it impossible to convene the Political Conference, so that the U.S. side can arbitrarily withhold by force the more than 20,000 captured Korean and Chinese personnel who have not heard explanations, and maintain international tension." The editorial pointed out that the Korean-Chinese side stood firm for the continuation of the discussions between the two sides and that if the U.S. Government ignored the denunciation of the people of the world and refused to negotiate, it must bear the heavy responsibility of sabotaging the convocation of the Political Conference.

December 13 The Indian Custodian Force arrested 17 culprits who were responsible on the night of December 12 for the murder of four captured personnel of the Korean-Chinese side who had demanded repatriation.

December 14 The representatives of the Korean-Chinese side to the discussions between the two sides on questions relating to the Political Conference issued a joint statement on the unilateral recession of the discussions by the U.S. side.

December 15 Maxwell Taylor, U.S. 8th Army Commander, declared that his headquarters was "making plans to receive" the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who would be forcibly removed from the neutral zone after January 23, 1954. He said that the "first step of the operation" would be the "removal" of the prisoners of war "from the neutral zone north of Munsan" and then "the Korean prisoners would be turned over to the government of South Korea and the Chinese prisoners of war would be taken to Nationalist China on the Island of Formosa."

December 16 Chang Han-fu, Vice-Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, received the Swiss Minister in Peking and handed him an aide-mémoire containing a reply to the Swiss Government. The aide-mémoire pointed out that Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission members should faithfully carry out the Terms of Reference and the Rules of Procedures Governing Explanations and Interviews, eliminate the secret agents and see that the explanation period be continued to make up for the length of time originally agreed upon.

December 22 U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, "U.N. Command," declared on the 22nd and 23rd respectively that they would turn over the forcibly

1953 retained Korean and Chinese prisoners of war to South Korea and the Kuomintang brigands in Taiwan.

December 23 The Korean-Chinese side, in a letter to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, opposed the unreasonable demand of the U.S. side to end explanations on December 24 and demanded that the 90-day explanation period prescribed by the Terms of Reference be made up for.

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India declared in the House of the People that the period of explanations to prisoners of war should be extended. He said that if a few weeks more could solve this question more satisfactorily, then the view insisting that the period could not be extended was a "very rigid legalistic and rather narrow-minded interpretation" of the agreement.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission adopted, by majority vote (India, Switzerland and Sweden), a resolution rejecting the Korean-Chinese side's demand for continuance of explanations. The Polish and Czechoslovak members of the Commission voted against the resolution and insisted on extending the explanation period and continuing the explanations.

December 24 Explanations to prisoners of war by the Korean-Chinese side were unilaterally suspended by the U.S. side.

December 28 The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission sent its Interim Report adopted by majority vote and the Separate Interim Report of its Swiss and Swedish members to the two sides of the Korean armistice. The Interim Report covered the Commission's activities from September 9, 1953, to December 23, 1953. Facts contained in the Interim Report showed that the U.S. side had directed its agents to sabotage the explanation work of the Korean-Chinese side and that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission had not taken effective measures to prevent the agents' disruptive activities. The Separate Interim Report by the Swiss and Swedish members, while trying to whitewash the U.S. side, could not but admit that the Korean and Chinese captured personnel were under the control of the terroristic organizations of the secret agents.

December 31 One hundred and twenty-eight Chinese prisoners of war broke away from the control of the agents of the U.S. side and demanded repatriation during a roll call conducted by the Indian Custodian Force.

1954

January 2 K. S. Thimayya, Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, in a letter to Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, requested a decision on the continuance of explanations. In a memorandum annexed to the letter, the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission said: "Explanations have not been completed. An overwhelming majority of prisoners of war have not even been through explanation procedure. . . . Extension of the period of explanations which the Commission considered legitimate and necessary was not acceptable to the U.N. Command. . . . The opinion of the majority of the Commission is still that explanations should be continued." The memorandum stated: "The reference of the question of the future of the non-repatriated prisoners to the Political Conference is mandatory." But it also stated: "Continuance of explanations is possible only if the two commands agree" and "in the event of the failure of the Political Conference to meet within the relevant period," both sides should "come to an agreement between themselves in respect of the further procedure in regard to disposition of prisoners of war and to inform the Commission expeditiously." The memorandum further said that, failing an agreement between the two sides, the custody of P.O.W.s by the Indian force would terminate at the end of 150 days after the taking over of the P.O.W.s and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission would simultaneously declare its dissolution.

January 3 John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," in a letter to K. S. Thimayya in connection with the Interim Report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and its annexes, declared that explanation work must end on December 23, 1953, and that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission should terminate its custody of the P.O.W.s on January 22, 1954, and turn over the P.O.W.s to the "United Nations Command" on January 23.

January 6 The Indian military court began the trial of the agents of the U.S. side who had been murdering P.O.W.s desiring repatriation. The trial was interrupted and tampered with because the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission allowed the U.S. side to provide defence lawyers for the murderers. At the hearings, both the accused and the defence "witnesses" admitted that the Korean and

1954 Chinese prisoners of war were not free to demand repatriation. All evidence pointed to the murder of P.O.W.s by the accused.

January 7 Marshal Kim Il Sung and Commander Peng Teh-huai, in a letter to K. S. Thimayya in connection with the Interim Report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and in reply to Thimayya's letter and memorandum of January 2, stated that the Interim Report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission showed that "the United Nations Command side should of course be held chiefly responsible for the disruption of the Terms of Reference and for the failure of the Commission to accomplish its task, but that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission itself cannot but also share a certain responsibility." The letter continued that in order to carry out the explanations "in a manner consistent with the fundamental objectives embodied in the Terms of Reference . . . the only way is to hold to the stand of the Commission that explanations should be continued. This is also what the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission should give its earnest consideration to." The letter further stated: "In order to be in accord with the fundamental objectives of the Terms of Reference, we insist that the 90-day explanation period should be made up for, that the question of those prisoners of war who have not yet exercised their right to be repatriated should be submitted to the Political Conference for disposition within 30 days after it is convened, and that before the realization of these steps, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Indian Custodian Force should continue to discharge their unfinished legitimate functions. This means that explanations to the prisoners of war should be resumed at once, that the segregation of the prisoners of war should be effected, that the organizations for violence of the secret agents should be broken up, that all secret agents should be eliminated, and that the custody of prisoners of war should be continued after the 90-day explanation period is made up for, pending a disposition by the Political Conference."

January 9 Foreign Minister Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China, in a statement concerning the resumption of the discussions between the two sides on the question of the Political Conference on Korea, stated with firm resolve that the discussions between the two sides on the question of the Political Conference on Korea should be resumed immediately. He declared: "From the Korean question, it can be seen that certain pressing international problems in Asia . . . have now developed to a stage when they have to be examined and settled by the Great Powers concerned through the holding of negotiations." Thus the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, he added, supported the proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union on the convening of a confer-

ence of the five Great Powers. He said further: "We consider that it will serve the interest of easing international tension and safeguarding international peace and security, for the forthcoming conference of Foreign Ministers of the four Great Powers in Berlin to lead to a conference of the five Great Powers with the participation of the People's Republic of China to promote the settlement of pressing international problems." 1954

Maxwell Taylor, U.S. 8th Army Commander, announced that U.S. marines and military police and Syngman Rhee's military police would be called up to "release" the P.O.W.s after the midnight of January 22.

January 10 Foreign Minister Nam Il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea made a statement, endorsing the statement of Chou En-lai.

At a Military Armistice Commission meeting, the Korean-Chinese side lodged a strong protest against the invasion by U.S. aircraft of areas on the Korean-Chinese side. It was pointed out that from the day the Korean armistice was signed to the end of December 1953, according to data available, U.S. aircraft made 302 sorties in 136 groups over areas on the Korean-Chinese side.

Air and ground violations of the Armistice Agreement by the U.S. side have continued since January 10. Statistics available show that from the day the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed to the end of February 1954, U.S. military aircraft made 524 sorties in 226 groups over the Demilitarized Zone on the Korean-Chinese side.

In the same period, the ground forces of the U.S. side violated the Armistice Agreement on 19 occasions.

January 11 Representatives of the Korean-Chinese side at the discussions between the two sides on questions of the Political Conference sent a letter to the U.S. side, asking the latter to send its liaison secretary to meet the liaison secretary of the Korean-Chinese side on January 13 to discuss the date for the resumption of the talks. In reply, the U.S. side agreed to hold a liaison secretaries' meeting on January 14 to discuss the "conditions" and the "date" for resuming the discussions.

January 14 At the liaison secretaries' meeting, the Korean-Chinese side proposed January 16 as the date for resuming the discussions. But the U.S. side, evading the question of the date, proposed the revision of records of previous discussions as a condition for the resumption of the discussions. Because of this U.S. demand, the liaison secretaries' meeting was convened five times without any result.

K. S. Thimayya, Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation

1954 Commission, addressed a letter to the two signatories of the Korean Armistice Agreement, declaring that he, as chairman and executive agent of the Commission, had decided "to restore the unrepatriated prisoners of war immediately prior to the 23rd January, 1954, to their former and respective detaining sides" and that "the restoration of custody to former detaining sides should start at 09:00 hours on 20th January, 1954." Thimayya further stated: "The Commission, in pursuance of its functional authority to interpret the Terms of Reference, is of the view that the alteration of the status of P.O.W.s either by declaration of civilian status or disposition in any other manner requires the implementation of the procedures of explanation and Political Conference to precede it; such procedures being pursued to their legitimate terminations as prescribed in the aforesaid Terms, unless the two Commands agree on alterative procedures or courses of action in regard to status and disposition of P.O.W.s. Any unilateral action by any party concerned will not be in conformity with the said Terms of Reference." The Polish and Czechoslovak members of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission resolutely opposed Thimayya's decision unilaterally to hand the P.O.W.s over to the former detaining sides. They pointed out that this would be a violation of the Terms of Reference and of the Korean Armistice Agreement and was "inhumane, unjust, illegal." But the Swiss and Swedish members of the Commission agreed to this measure and thought that the P.O.W.s should be "released" and accorded "civilian status."

January 16 John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," replying to Thimayya's letter, declared that the U.S. side was prepared to "arrange for their (P.O.W.s') accommodation" on January 20 and stressed that this would "in no way affect" the plan to "release" the P.O.W.s at 00:01 hours on January 23.

January 18 K. S. Thimayya, in his reply to John E. Hull, reiterated the view that any unilateral action in regard to the change of status or disposition of P.O.W.s prior to the implementation of the procedures of explanation and Political Conference would not be in conformity with the Terms of Reference.

January 19 Marshal Kim Il Sung and Commander Peng Teh-huai, in their reply to Thimayya, pointed out that Thimayya's proposal of restoring the P.O.W.s, who had not exercised their right to repatriation, to their former detaining sides, beginning at 09:00 January 20, 1954, would be a violation of the Armistice Agreement and of the Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Marshal Kim Il Sung and Commander Peng Teh-huai demanded that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission Chairman

"withdraw this proposal, actually shoulder the duties and obligations stipulated in the Terms of Reference, and, in accordance with the correct interpretation made by the Commission itself, decide to continue the custody of the prisoners of war, resume the explanations, make up the ninety days for explanations, and await the disposition of the prisoner of war question by the Political Conference within thirty days of its convocation." 1954

January 20 The Indian Custodian Force started the illegal transfer of the Korean and Chinese P.O.W.s to the U.S. side at 08:50 hours. It was completed at 03:00 hours on January 21. The U.S. side deployed large numbers of troops, military police and police off the southern border of the Demilitarized Zone and sent a large number of aircraft to circle in the air to intimidate the P.O.W.s. All the way from the P.O.W. compounds to Munsan, the highway was lined on both sides with barbed wire entanglements and heavily guarded by sentries. U.S.-directed agents planted among the P.O.W.s drove the P.O.W.s out of the compounds. John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," Maxwell Taylor, Commander of the U.S. 8th Army, Stevens, U.S. Secretary of the Army, and top agents of the Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek brigands personally supervised the operation. The Korean P.O.W.s, after being abducted from their compounds, were immediately escorted to Syngman Rhee's replacement centres at Pohang and Kunsan. The Chinese P.O.W.s were escorted to Inchon and then shipped to Taiwan under U.S. air and naval escort and were interned in concentration camps.

During the transfer, 99 prisoners of war risked their lives to escape from the control of the agents and returned to the Korean-Chinese side. Earlier, after the suspension of explanation work, 162 prisoners of war had escaped on different occasions from the control of the agents and returned to the Korean-Chinese side. From September 10, 1953, when the U.S. side turned over the non-directly-repatriated Korean and Chinese prisoners of war to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to this day, a total of 630 prisoners of war returned to the Korean-Chinese side either after explanations or by breaking away from the control of the agents.

The trial by the Indian military court of U.S.-directed agents on the charges of murder of P.O.W.s was suspended as a result of the obstructionist activities by the U.S. side.

January 21 The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission passed a resolution declaring that "any alteration of the status of the prisoners of war so handed over or proposed to be handed over either by declaration of civilian status or by disposition in any other man-

1954 ner prior to the implementation of the explanation procedures and deliberation by the Political Conference is contrary to the Terms of Reference and the Armistice Agreement." The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission resolution was sent to both signatories of the Armistice Agreement.

K. S. Thimayya, Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, in a reply to Marshal Kim Il Sung and Commander Peng Teh-huai, refused to continue the custody of P.O.W.s, resume explanations and await the disposition of the P.O.W.s by the Political Conference. He asked the Korean-Chinese side to take over the P.O.W.s in the northern camp before midnight on January 22, or the custody of the P.O.W.s in the northern camp would be ended at midnight on January 22.

January 22 General Lee Sang Cho, representative of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, in a letter to Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission Chairman K. S. Thimayya, strongly protested against the illegal restoration of P.O.W.s to the U.S. side and demanded that the custodian force continue the custody of the P.O.W.s in the northern camp.

General Lee Sang Cho, in a letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, demanded an investigation into the incident in which the U.S. side, in violation of the Armistice Agreement, prohibited the Neutral Nations Inspection Team from entering the port of Inchon to conduct inspection on the afternoon of January 20 and on the morning of January 21 on the pretext of "the move of prisoners of war." The facts revealed during the discussion of the subject by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission showed beyond doubt that the U.S. had violated the Armistice Agreement in this incident. The relevant records of meetings handed by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to the Korean-Chinese side listed a number of facts showing how the U.S. side time and again obstructed or interfered in the work of the Commission.

January 23 John E. Hull, Commander-in-Chief, "United Nations Command," announced that the forcibly retained Korean and Chinese prisoners of war now had "civilian status" and "became free men." But subsequent facts showed that these prisoners of war had been pressganged into the armies of Syngman Rhee and the Kuomintang brigands in Taiwan.

The Korean-Chinese side, at a Military Armistice Commission meeting, lodged a strong protest with the U.S. side against the illegal alteration of the status of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, the forcible retention of more than 21,900 of them and the pressganging of these men into the armies of the Syngman Rhee clique and the Kuomintang brigands in Taiwan.

January 25 The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France opened in Berlin.

January 26 The representatives of the Korean-Chinese side at the discussions on questions of the Political Conference, in a letter to the representative of the U.S. side, proposed the resumption of the discussions at Panmunjom on February 1. No reply to this proposal has been made by the U.S. side.

The prisoners of war of the U.S. side who had refused repatriation held a press conference at Panmunjom and issued a statement explaining the reasons why they had refused repatriation and demanded that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission help them obtain the right to reside in Korea or China.

January 28 Representatives of the Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies received the 347 P.O.W.s of the U.S. side formerly in the Songgong-ni camp. The representatives of the Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies declared in a statement: "The Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies have not been able to remain indifferent to the situation in which the prisoners of war in the Songgong-ni P.O.W. camp (the northern camp) were left uncared for. . . . The Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies have sympathetically considered the attitude and demand of the prisoners of war in the Songgong-ni camp and have requested the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers to allow us to receive these prisoners of war and take responsibility for securing to them the right to reside in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China."

The request was granted. It also received the approval of the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Consequently, the Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies received these P.O.W.s and took the responsibility for securing for them the right to reside in Korea or China. The representatives of the Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies stated: "In the future, when the P.O.W. question is submitted for discussion at the Korean Political Conference or at any other related international conference, the Korean and Chinese Red Cross Societies will be responsible for giving an account for these prisoners of war formerly in the custody of the Indian force in the Songgong-ni P.O.W. camp."

Three hundred and forty-seven ex-prisoners of war of the U.S. side arrived in Kaesong and began to lead a free life. The 21 Americans and one Briton, who had applied, through the Red Cross Society of China, for permission to live in China and had received it, arrived at Antung in China on February 24.

1954 **January 29** Foreign Minister Chou En-lai issued a statement, strongly protesting against the forcible retention of Korean and Chinese P.O.W.s by the U.S. side. The statement said: "The U.S. side has at all times the responsibility of recovering all the 21,900 Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who were forcibly retained on this occasion and the more than 27,000 Korean and Chinese prisoners of war who were forcibly retained from June 18 to 22, 1953, and of giving an account for them to the Korean and Chinese side; we also reserve the right to submit this question for discussion to the Political Conference on Korea and other relevant international conferences. And regardless of when the Political Conference is convened, regardless of where these prisoners of war are forcibly retained, we will never let pass such criminal acts of the United States side so long as it does not recover them." The statement pointed out that the Korean-Chinese side had already proposed a date for the resumption of the discussions by both sides and that it was prepared to consider any date which the U.S. side wished to propose for resuming the discussions, and, "therefore, whether the discussions between the two sides can hereafter be resumed is a question that rests upon the United States side." The statement added that the peaceful settlement of the Korean question was being rendered more and more difficult by the forcible retention of prisoners of war by the U.S. side and by its policy of obstructing the convening of the Political Conference; and, therefore, the United Nations "should immediately bring about the re-convening of the Eighth U.N. General Assembly to examine the critical situation in Korea" and invite the Governments of China and Korea to send their representatives to participate in the discussions.

The statement further declared that in view of the international tension created by the aggressive policy pursued by the United States in Korea, Asia and throughout the world, it was more necessary than ever to convene a conference of the Five Great Powers and for this reason the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China fully supported the proposal put forward by Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov at the Berlin Conference "on measures for easing tension in international relations and the convocation of a conference of the foreign ministers of France, Britain, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China."

Foreign Minister Nam Il of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a statement on January 30, endorsing Chou En-lai's statement.

February 6 Lee Sang Cho, senior Korean-Chinese member on the

Military Armistice Commission, in replying to a letter of February 2 from the U.S. senior member J. K. Lacey, insisted that the staff officers of both sides continue to discuss what constituted "spare parts," so that no more reinforcing war materials be brought into Korea from the outside. In his letter of February 2, Lacey had declared that the U.S. side would unilaterally suspend the staff officers' meeting on this question and proposed that war materials in the form of spare parts and dismantled parts could be freely brought into Korea without violating the Armistice Agreement. Lee Sang Cho pointed out in his reply that the U.S. side was violating the Armistice Agreement by introducing reinforcing war materials into South Korea disguised as spare parts, and cited a number of facts as evidence. 1954

Even the incomplete data which the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, stationed at the ports of entry in the U.S.-controlled area, had been able to gather showed that the U.S. side had brought in more than 1,100,000 pounds of spare parts for combat aircraft and tanks through these ports between August 1953 and February 1954. No report of this had ever been made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission by the U.S. side. The amount of spare and dismantled parts which the U.S. side had brought in between August and the end of November 1953 alone was sufficient to assemble a considerable number of combat aircraft, armoured vehicles and fire-arms. This amount included at least full sets of dismantled parts for the following: more than 5,000 machine-guns of 0.3-inch calibre; 100-odd howitzers of 155-mm calibre; 35 howitzers of 105-mm calibre; 40 mortars of 106.7-mm calibre; 37 jet-fighter-planes; and 106 mortars of 4.2-inch calibre.

The Korean-Chinese side, at the Military Armistice Commission meeting on March 18, vigorously denounced the U.S. side on the basis of these facts.

February 16 Despite the protest of the Korean-Chinese side, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission Chairman K. S. Thimayya decided to hand over to the U.S. side, on February 18, the 17 secret agents who had murdered Korean and Chinese captured personnel desiring repatriation. In a letter to the U.S. side, Thimayya stated that "investigations conducted by the Commission have clearly established a *prima facie* case of murder against the accused." Thimayya also declared: "I must register my protest against your command's refusal to co-operate in upholding the principles of justice." He hoped that the U.S. side "would not take any steps which have the effect of frustrating justice and enable the guilty to escape unpunished." But as soon as the 17 murderers were handed over to

1954 the U.S. side on February 18, they were released and turned over to Syngman Rhee and the Kuomintang brigands on Taiwan.

February 18 The Indian, Swedish and Swiss members of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission resolved over the opposition of the Polish and Czechoslovak members to dissolve the Commission at 24:00 hours on February 21, 1954. On February 20, the Korean-Chinese side lodged a strong protest against this illegal resolution.

The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission adopted the final report, covering the events subsequent to those narrated in the 1953 Interim Report of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

The concluding part of this final report stated that "those conclusions and facts" set out in the Interim Report "remain not only unimpaired by anything described in this final report, but receive some added confirmation. The proceedings of the military court and the testimony of the prosecution and the defence witnesses point unmistakably to the existence of the prisoner of war organizations and reveal their essential nature and objectives."

The concluding part of the final report reads: "The prisoner of war organizations in the south camp and the leadership which sustained them negate all assumptions or assertions about freedom of choice. . . . The Commission must frankly state the conviction founded on its experience that in the absence of fuller and further implementation of the Terms of Reference, it would be bare assertion unsupported by any evidence that the prisoners had voluntarily sought non-repatriation." The report declared: "The Commission had decided that the necessary legal pre-conditions to declaring the relief of the prisoners of war to civilian status did not obtain and that, consequently, such 'relief' would be illegal."

The Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and the United States issued a communiqué after its conclusion which said:

The Foreign Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, meeting in Berlin,

considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and in restoring peace in other parts of Asia;

propose that a conference of representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the other countries the armed forces of which participated in the hostilities in Korea, and

which desire to attend, shall meet in Geneva on April 26th for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Korean question; 1954

agree that the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China will also be discussed at the Conference, to which representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states will be invited.