FAR EAST SPOTLIGHT

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U. S. State Dept. adviser John Foster Dulles with American and South Korean officers looking North from the 38th Parallel, June, 1950. He said to Syngman Rhee soldiers, "The Time is not far off when you will be able to display your strength."

A Documented Record . . .

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"WHO BEGAN THE KOREAN WAR?"
The Documentary Record

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This is not a comprehensive analysis of the Korean War, but a documentary record to answer the specific question "Who began the Korean war?"
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I. INTRODUCTION

The comprehensive explanation of the Korean Affair - now the Korean War - can be made only in terms of the character, aims and acts of Washington's total foreign policy particularly its Far Eastern policy. The Committee for A Democratic Far Eastern Policy in its publications - "Facts on Korea", July 1950 and "Korean Crisis: An Analysis of American Policy", November 1950 - has taken the position that the United States was the aggressive intruder in Korean internal affairs, and that its Korea policy led up to and was responsible for the Korean War.

In addition, documentary evidence on the specific question "Who began the war on June 25th 1950?" leads to only one conclusion: that the Korean War was clearly desired, planned for and instigated by the Rhee regime in cooperation with the United States, and has become a war of the United States against the whole Korean people.

The Committee For A Democratic Far Eastern Policy herewith offers documentary material taken from American publications and from a compilation of "Documents and Materials Exposing the Instigators of the Civil War in Korea", a collection of documents captured in Seoul by the People's forces. These documents were communicated to the United Nations, supported by photo-stated copies; they were not brought publicly before the General Assembly or the Security Council, but they were communicated to the press; the American Government has not discredited them. They will be referred to as "Documents and Materials" in the text.

Sources of Material

Korea Today by George M. McCune, Harvard University Press, 1950

American Military Government in Korea by E. Grant Meade, Kings Crown Press (Columbia University 1951)

Japan Diary by Mark Gayn, William Sloane Associates, Inc. 1948

The Riddle of MacArthur by John Gunther

The Epic of Korea by A Wigfall Green, Public Affairs Press

United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, State Department "White Paper" on Korea, State Department July 1950

Department of State Bulletin April 24, 1950

Far East Survey article by George M. McCune September 8, 1948

United Nations Documents

Congressional Records

New York Times

New York Herald Tribune

New York Compass

United States News & World Report

Los Angeles Times

The United Press

"Crossroads" Bombay, India

Documents & Materials Exposing the Instigators of the Civil War in Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, 1950 from photostats of Documents from the Archives of the Syngman Rhee Government.

II. THE EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY

1. PRESSURES AND PREPARATION FOR MILITARY ACTION BY RHEE AND US

A. Syngman Rhee and the United States Authorities Agree on Aim To Unify Korea By Force.

In December, 1946, Syngman Rhee declared: "On returning to Korea I advocated unification to make the world think we were united, so that we could drive the Russians from the north. America is our friend...We must fight those who are not our friends. As soon as the time comes I'll instruct you. Then you should be prepared to shed blood." He added: "I have already made connections abroad."

"Foreign Minister Chang declared that the South Korea Government would not hesitate to go into action against traitors in the north to recover "lost territory". He also stated that Koreans in the North will be dealt with "if they continue to support the Communist dominated government of North Korea. United Press dispatch, Seoul, December 18, 1948" (Korea Today George M. McCune page 267, footnote)

In a confidential bulletin of the Office of Intelligence Research of the U. S. State Department, No. 4849, dated January 28, 1949, it was recorded that "It is also an American desire to secure through a stable and friendly government in Korea a partial stabilization of the Far East, and to offset by success in Korea, diplomatic reverses suffered elsewhere in Asia." (Documents & Material page 210 pp VI-72,73 of original State Dept. document)

The United States promised Syngman Rhee all-out military support in his campaign against the north. As testified by Kim Hyo-suk (former Home Secretary of the Rhee government in a statement on September 26, 1950) MacArthur's chief adviser, Sebald, who visited Seoul in January 1950, assured Syngman Rhee that when the march on the north is started the American Fleet and Air Force based in Japan would fight on the side of the South Korean government. (Documents & Material page 120)

Yun Chi Yong, former Minister of Home Affairs and Vice Speaker of the South Korean National Assembly, told a press conference on March 9, 1949, following a consultation with the United Nations Commission is that peaceful unification of South and

North Korea is for the Republic of Taehan to regain the lost land in North Korea by force."

Syngman Rhee's Ambassador to the United States, Chang Myun, in a letter addressed to Syngman Rhee, dated April 6, 1949, wrote, "General Wedemeyer's personal and confidential advice is that highly trained, trustworthy and competent young men be sent to North Korea to infiltrate among the Koreans there, sow distrust in the communist cause and the People's Government and prepare the way for the Republic." (Documents & Material; Photostat copy of Chang Myun letter, opp. page 98)

On September 30, 1949, Syngman Rhee wrote to Dr. Robert Oliver, pressing his American friend in this matter:--"I feel strongly now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join our loyal communist army in the north to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim Il-sung's men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position....We will all quietly work together, you in Washington and in New York and our two Ambassadors and other friends, and we here in Seoul and Tokyo toward one end; that they agree to cleaning up and setting our house in order. Use the old phrase that Churchill used once, "Give us the tools and we will do the job". Convince the American statesmen and the general public and let them quietly agree that we go ahead and carry out our program and give us all the material backing we need. The longer we drag along the harder it will be." (Documents & Material Photostat copy of Rhee's letter opp. page 36)

B. Rhee Gears His Plans Into United States Global Policy

At a press conference December 30, 1949, Syngman Rhee stated frankly:- "In the coming year we shall all unanimously strive to regain the lost territory. Up to now in connection with the international situation we carried out a peace policy in conformity with the peace policy of the U.S.A. and the United Nations. However, we must remember that in the coming year in connection with the change in the international situation, we must unite south and north Korea through our own efforts."

In a letter of November 3, 1949 addressed to Syngman Rhee, Cho Byung-ok (Syngman's Rhee's personal representative in the U.S.) referring again to Syngman Rhee's letter to Oliver, wrote:--"I am of the firm conviction that unification of Korea can be brought about only through exercise of the sovereign power of our Government. Any policy of compromise or conferences is out of the question.. The cold war cannot go on indefinitely like this. All these world problems could not be possibly solved without a third world war. Our plan of achieving unification must be mapped out in March with the developments of the world situation as a whole. In the meantime, our national preparedness in military power and economic strength is the most compelling task imposed upon our Government."

(Documents & Material Photostat copy of letter from Cho to Rhee opp p 57)

C. Anti-Rhee Elements South of 38th Parallel Create Problems For Rhee And US

In October 1946 Mark Gayn, as recorded in his "Japan Diary" tells of the "unrest sweeping our (American) zone" "We were taken to an enclosure where copies of American police reports were being kept. There was a huge wall map with labels showing the trouble spots. The labels were grouped in three clusters: one near the 38th parallel, another in the city called Taegu, in the heart of our zone; and a third in the extreme south, around the city of Pusan...What we had before us was the face of a revolution: it was full scale revolution which must have involved hundreds of thousands if not millions of people. In Taegu alone a third of the 150,000 inhabitants took part in the uprising; it was here that the fuse of revolution was set off last month; from the city it spread to the countryside, and was taken over by the sharecroppers....As for us we did more than just transport Korean police to the troubled areas, or supply arms, or maintain preventative controls. Our troops...fired on the crowds, conducted mass arrests, combed the hills for suspects, and organized posses of Korean rightists, constabulary and police for mass raids. "It was amazing that despite our active involvement, no harm came to a single American...an indication of stern discipline in the ranks of the rebels. The revolutionists wanted no trouble with us" (And then follows two pages of the facts - killings, arrests, demonstrations, strikes, raids, etc - of the people's revolution against their domestic oppressors)

(Gayn, Japan Diary page 387-390)

On April 3, 1948, an uprising began on the island of Cheju which was to shake all of South Korea. In 13 months of fighting 10,000 guerrilla fighters and 2000 civilian bystanders were killed. On October 20, 1948, troops that were being dispatched to crush the rebellion themselves revolted.

Taking over the port of Yosu and nearby Sunchon, the mutinous troops and their partisan allies held out until 9450 of them had been killed and 23000 arrested. (Allen Raymond in N.Y. Herald Tribune)

Despite suppression, or because of it, the partisan movement continued to grow. From mountain strongholds all over South Korea the partisans not only repelled punitive expeditions sent in against them but captured a good deal of armament in the process. By September 1949 there were some 77,000 partisans in action.

The jails overflowed. Said the UN Commission "89,000 people had been arrested between September 4th 1948 and April 3rd 1949". (See also "Korea Today George McCune p 241-2)

In the latter half of July 1949, United States Ambassador Muccio called together General Roberts, Page, Secretaries Sin Sung-mo, Kwon Seung-yer and Kim Hyo-suk, and gave them the following instructions:- "As we have already decided to carry out the campaign against the north in July and August, it is now essential to enforce the the state security law and to carry out mass arrests of anti-government elements and members of the South Korean Worker's Party, so as to prevent internal disorders. I am convinced that such measures are of utmost importance, to which due attention must be given." (Documents & Material testimony September 26, 1950 Kim Hyo-suk, former Home Secretary, Rhee Government)

On March 14, 1950, Walter Sullivan, New York Times correspondent, reported from Seoul that 13 deputies of the National Assembly of South Korea had been sentenced to imprisonment for violations of the Security Act under five heads, one of which was "opposing the invasion of North Korea by South Korean forces".

D. The Timing of the Assault on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Cho Byung-ok, Syngman's Rhee personal representative in the United States, sent the following

letter to Syngman Rhee on October 12, 1949:--"It was with great care and interest that I read your letter to Dr. Oliver with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet regime in the North. The proposals you expounded therein are, under the circumstances prevailing, the only logical and ultimate method of bringing about our desired unification. However, after taking into consideration all the factors involved I am inclined to view that the time is not opportune as yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our preparedness, and international opinion will not approve of such an action to be taken....I have discussed it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that this matter should be regarded as the basic plan of our government that should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune." (Documents & Material; Photostatic copy of Cho letter to Rhee opp. page 44)

On November 1, 1949, the N.Y. Herald Tribune carried a UP interview with Sihn Sung Mo, South Korean Defense Minister, which said: "Referring to the readiness of his troops to drive into North Korea, Mr. Sihn expressed confidence that they could wrest control from the Communists. 'If we had to wait until they (American government leaders) are ready. They keep telling us, "No, no, no, wait. You are not ready" '...'We are strong enough to march up and take Pyongyang (the northern capital) within a few days', he said".

In October 1949, at a conference of division commanders held at the army staff office, Roberts said: "The attacks on the territory north of the 38th parallel have been and will be undertaken only upon my instructions. But many military units have attacked the north unwarrantedly, wasting an uncountable number of shells without achieving any results and sustaining terrific losses. Attacks north of the 38th parallel may be undertaken by the National Defense Army only on the instructions of the American Military Advisory Group." (Documents & Material, page 117, Testimony of Kim Hyo-Suk former Home Secretary, Rhee Government)

E. Detailed and Intensified Preparation For Attack

The training of the South Korean Army was completely under control of the American Military Advisory Group in Seoul. The Syngman Rhee government willingly proposed to use south Korean ports as American naval bases and to convert a former Japanese naval base in Chin Hai into a main American naval base after having declared it a secret zone. (Documents & Material, photostat letter from Son Wonil to Admiral Radford opp. p. 232)

After the visit of the American Fleet to south Korea, Son Wonil, chief of staff of the South Korean Navy, wrote in a letter to Admiral Radford, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, dated July 18, 1949: "We shall be glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchun, Pusan, Yosu, Nukko and the Naval Base of Chinhas as temporary Mobile Bases of any such unit of your Fleet." (Documents & Materials, photostat letter from Son Wonil to Admiral Radford opp. page 232)

On March 2, 1950, according to the New York Times, President Syngman Rhee, told the Korean people that despire advice given by "friends from across the seas" not to attack the "foreign puppets" in North Korea, the cries of "our brothers in distress" in the north could not be ignored. "To this call we shall respond", he said. "The statement contained in a Korean independence day speech", says the Times, "was one of the most outspoken hints in recent months of a desire to unify the country if necessary by force."

On February 16th, 1950 the UP told of another visit to MacArthur by Rhee who this time invited Japan to "bury the hatchet with Korea and join forces in an anti-communist alliance under the leadership of MacArthur". Accompanied by the chief of the general staff of the South Korean Army, Rhee reached an agreement with MacArthur on the matter of intensifying the preparations for an attack on the north.

On May 9, 1950, the director of the Korean Division of E.C.A., Johnson, stated at the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress that the South Korean Army, 100,000 strong, equipped with American arms and trained by the American Military Advisory Group, had completed its preparations and can start war at any moment.

The United States Secretary of Defense Johnson, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the American Armed Forces Bradley and the adviser of the U.S. State Department Dulles, visited the Far East and held secret conferences with General MacArthur.

Dulles especially visited South Korea. As Ambassador Chang Nyun reported in his letter to Syngman Rhee dated June 14, 1950, Dulles before leaving for Korea had assured him that the United States would not desert Korea and would help her. In south Korea Dulles, when inspecting the area of the 38th parallel, addressed Syngman Rhee's troops with provocative speeches extolling their combat power and calling for the intensification of war preparations. "No adversary, not even the

strongest will be able to oppose you," he said to the Syngman Rhee soldiers. "The time is not far off when you will be able to display your strength."

In his speech made at the National Assembly of south Korea June 19, Dulles gave his blessings to Syngman Rhee for the armed adventure and stated that the United States was ready to render all necessary moral and material support to south Korea in its fight against communism. In his farewell letter addressed to Syngman Rhee, dated June 20, 1950, Dulles stressed the role assigned to Korea was to create incidents to kindle the flames of war. He wrote: "I attach great importance to the decisive role which your country can play in the great drama that is unfolding."
(Documents & Materials page 243)

F. The World Peace Campaign's Gathering Strength

The world-wide Peace Campaign then centered in the petition to ban the use of atomic weapons and to brand their first users as war criminals, was gathering impressive weight; hundreds of millions of signatures from all lands, including the United States, were giving expression to the people's demand for an end to the cold war.

The popular tide was turning in favor of peace and against war. Not only in the world in general but specifically in Korea itself, the peace forces were seriously affecting the war-makers arguments and plans.

Those who were planning and implementing the cold war thus had a direct interest in starting armed conflict (preferably on a restricted "police action" basis for the time being) in the hope of upsetting the world Peace Campaign and stampeding people into war hysteria on the basis of a gang war.

2. IMMEDIATE EVENTS AROUND JUNE 25TH, THE OUTBREAK OF THE KOREAN AFFAIR.

A. May 20, 1950

General William Roberts, head of U.S. Advisory Mission in South Korea, made a plea for air power for this strategically placed country; he expressed fear that an invasion by the air force of North Korea could immobilize the South Korean ground forces. "Communists will probably engage in some limited action" to disrupt national elections on May 30th, "but at this point we rather invite it; it will give us target practice" Roberts said he considered the South Korean army which is well trained and well equipped to be the

best insurance the Western world has in these parts against Communist aggression. (NY Herald Tribune May 30, 1950)

B. May 30, 1950

Syngman Rhee was defeated in the elections of May 30, his party winning only 48 of the 210 seats in the National Assembly. (New York Times June 2, 1951)

C. Ambassador John Chang of the Rhee Government returned to Washington after the elections and reported the Rhee regime about to collapse and appealed for immediate American aid. (New York Herald Tribune June 14, 1950 New York Herald Tribune June 26, 1950 Bigart)

D. June 5, 1950

General Roberts, in a press interview said: "In Korea the American taxpayer has an army that is a fine watchdog over the investments placed in this country and a force that represents maximum results at minimum costs. The Advisory Group", he said, "was a living demonstration of how an intelligent and intensive investment of 500 combat-hardened American men and officers can train 100,000 people who will do the shooting for you". Describing the work of the American Military Mission he continued "If you are going to train a foreign army you have to make up your mind to have a big enough staff to have Americans at every level, including battallion. I have at least 12 to 14 Americans with each divisions. They work with the Koreans officers; they live right here with them at the front - the 38th parallel - and they stay with them in battles and in periods of rest". (China Weekly Review, Shanghai) American publication, July, 1950

E. June 13, 1950

John Foster Dulles in an interview June 13th, on eve of departure for Japan and Korea says, "Obviously we cannot pledge the United States to go to war if South Korea is invaded". He is reported to feel that the US should avoid giving any guarantee of military aid to countries that are not of strategic importance to the security of the US. What he might do to allay uneasiness is to tell the people of 'no-man's land' that the US will never remain indifferent to the efforts of despotism to crush a nation that has remained faithful to democratic traditions. He may remind them that the US has twice gone to war without treaty committments". (NY Herald Tribune Homer Bigart June 14, 1951)

F. June 22, 1950

John Foster Dulles, advisor to the US State Department, conferred with General MacArthur today on Communist menaced Asia and predicted "positive action" by the United States to preserve peace in the Far East". (New York Times, June 22, 1950)

G. "MacArthur's views - "In the West's defense planning Japan cannot be considered as an isolated problem but must be included as a part of the whole Pacific security problem, particularly in conjunction with Formosa and Korea" (New York Times, June 22, 1950)

H. June 24, 1950 9:26 PM

State Department at Washington receives Ambassador John J. Muccio's report that North Koreans had launched an all-out offensive across 38th parallel just before daybreak on Sunday June 25th (Korean time).

June 25, 1950 3:00 AM EST

United States Government brings matter of assault upon Republic of Korea to attention of the United Nations and requests an immediate meeting of the Security Council.

But the cable from Ambassador Muccio from Seoul was not conclusive on the point of an "invasion". The cable said:

> "According to Korean (South) Army reports, which are partly confirmed by Korean Military Advisory Group (American) field advisor reports, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning."

I. June 25, 1950 EST (June 26 Korean time)

A Norwegian shipmaster told how he and his crew of 38 evacuated 650 women and children from a Korean port (Inchon) a few hours before the North Korean Communists allegedly invaded South Korea. His ship, the Reinholt, was anchored in the port of Inchon, an hour's drive from Seoul, on June 26th, when the Captain, Johansen, was awakened at 5:30 A M and asked by a member of the American mission in the port if he would take half of the 650 women and children anxious to get away from the threatened invasion. (New York Herald Tribune August 26, 1950)

The State Department White Paper on Korea, "The

Korean Crisis", in Document 1 says "About 6:00 A M North Korean infantry commenced crossing the 38th Parallel in the Onjin Area". This was after the American and mission member had arrived at the port, wakened the captain, and asked him to evacuate women and children.

J. June 25, 1950 Noon, Korean time

John Gunther, in Japan gathering material for his book "The Riddle of MacArthur", was on a picnic party which included an officer of the American occupation. During lunch, before any news of the conflict in Korea had broken, the officer was called to the 'phone to receive a call from Tokyo; he returned to the sight-seeing party luncheon and whispered to Gunther, "A big story has just broken: the South Koreans have attacked North Korea!"
(Gunther in "The Riddle of MacArthur")

K. June 26, 1950, New York Times, date line June 25

"This morning, according to the South Korean office of Public Information, South Korean troops pushing northward captured Kaeju, capital of Wranghoe province, which is a mile north of the border"

L. The New York Times reporter, Walter Sullivan wrote, "The war-like talk strangely has almost all come from South Korean leaders. In asserting that his Government needed more heavy weapons, Dr. Rhee said, at the Independence Day rally on March 1st that the cries of distress from his countrymen in the North could not long be ignored. On a number of occasions Dr. Rhee has indicated that his army would have taken the offensive if Washington had given its consent". When Louise Kim, a member of Rhee's Parliament, who left Korea a few days before June 25th, was confronted in New York a few days later with this report by Sullivan she said, "That's our spirit, to go ahead and smash the North".

3. USE OF UNITED NATIONS AS COVER FOR U.S. ACTION ON KOREA

A. United Nations Action in Relation to the June 25th outbreak

The United Nations Security Council was called into meeting on the urgent request of the US State Department - not by the UN Commission in Korea, on information "according to Korean Army reports which are partly confirmed by Korean Military Advisory Group field advisor" (American - ed.) UNCOK (United Nations Commission on Korea) report of hostilities based on "Government of Korea states

that about 04:00 hours 25 June attacks were launched...by North Korean forces". (State Dept. White paper on Korea UN Policy in the Korean War, July 1950)

UNCOK Report, dated June 24th, received at Security Council on June 29 has all the appearances of an after-the-event argument that the South Korean forces were not at all prepared to go on the offensive. It was signed by the Kuomintang representative on the Commission, Ssu-Tu. (State Dept. White Paper on Korea; page 21-22)

According to the statement of Kim Kyo-suk, ex-Secretary of Home Affairs of the Syngman Rhee government, in January 1950, General Roberts, giving instructions to Syngman Rhee's ministers, said, "The plan for the campaign against the north is decided upon. Not much time is left before it will be carried into life. Although the attack will be begun by us, nevertheless a pretext should be provided to have a justifiable excuse. For this, most important is the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea. The United Nations Commission will naturally submit a report advantageous to the United States but at the same time you must pay attention to this question and win the sympathy of the United Nations Commission." (Documents & Material, page 119)

Within hours after the start of the Korean war the United States bluntly accused North Korea of "armed aggression" against South Korea, an action which it described as a "wholly illegal and unprovoked attack". In the absence of the Soviet Union, and with Yugoslavia abstaining, nine members of the United Nations Security Council upon the insistence of the United States hurriedly passed a resolution "noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea". All subsequent events of the intervention proceeded from this original assumption of North Korean guilt.

Only one side was heard. No information was requested regarding the North Korean side of the matter; no representative of North Korea was present nor was any arrangement made for hearing their side of the dispute. No effort was made to ascertain the facts. And all of this in spite of the knowledge that several hours before North Korean troops crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel, the North Korean radio had broadcast news of an offensive by the South Koreans and had warned of stern counter-measures unless South Korea suspended "their adventurous military actions."

The haste with which the American Government,

and through its efforts, the United Nations, has condemned North Korea is in startling contrast to the interminable investigations and resulting equivocation with which the Dutch assault on the Indonesian Republic and the Arab attacks upon Israel were treated. This extraordinary haste in the Korean matter must raise the same questions as to the actual motives of the American government as did the interminable delays it engineered in the cases of Indonesia and Israel.

(Daily Compass, I.F.Stone November 14, 1951. For UN Resolution see US Policy in the Korean Crisis page 66-67)

B. Pressure on UN Members

Senate action July 31st, 1950 re Marshall Plan: Amendment to 3rd Year Appropriation Bill:

"That no part of the funds herein appropriated shall be used to provide assistance to any participating countries which in the opinion of the President, has failed, refused or neglected to support the UN in the Korean war by supplying armed personnel, materials of war, or services". (August 1950, Los Angeles Times in article "Truman's Reflexes Seen Slow")

4. SUBSEQUENT VERIFICATION OF US RESPONSIBILITY AND INITIATIVE IN KOREAN AFFAIR

A. Teheran, December 6, 1950 Early US Plans for Korea action

"A frank admission that the South Korean Army started the war in Korea on direct orders from American headquarters in Tokyo was made recently by Col. Ader, American advisor to the Iranian Army. Having boasted at a meeting with representatives of the Iranian General Staff that he knew this for a fact, Col. Ader repeated the statement at a talk with pupils of the Iranian Military Academy, where he added that the American plan for the landing of troops on Korea's Western and Eastern coasts had been drawn up long before the opening of military operations in Korea. Commenting on a remark that the Americans could obviously not have carried through their attack on Korea had the Soviet representative been present in the Security Council discussion and had he used his right of veto to block the American plan, Col. Ader replied cynically, "I don't see how that would have changed the situation; we would have done what we wanted anyway, and the American troops would have gone ahead and landed in Korea".

Col. Ader served in Japan directly under MacAr-

thur. According to his own statements, he had wide access, as a member of MacArthur's headquarters, to information on the American plan for the "unification of Korea". This plan provided for the occupation of Korea north of the 38th parallel with direct participation of President Syngman Rhee's troops and with the support of the United States navy and air force." (Crossroads, Bombay, December 22, 1950)

B. Testimony in the MacArthur Dismissal Hearings in Congress: May - June 1951

a. MacArthur testifies on the origin of the Korean war

Source: Military Situation in the Far East; Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, Part I, May 3-14, 1951 (MacArthur Hearings).

page 230-231.

Disposition of North Korean forces before fighting:

"..both sides organized what might be called light troops. They were of the nature of border patrols, a little stronger than the normal constabulary, but not comparable to troops of the line...As I recall, their (the North Korean) security forces were organized into what they call four brigades. These brigades, in strength, were about the same as the North Korean division..."

"But back of that security force that the North Koreans had along the thirty-eighth parallel, there was organized a new army... That force was carefully organized; that force was carefully trained and drilled, quite possibly just north of the Yalu..."

In short, the North Korean forces were disposed in depth, with the great bulk far to the north of the 38th parallel, a disposition for defense, not for attack.

"The South Koreans were no match for them at all, and the disposition by the South Koreans of their logistical potential was extraordinarily poor.

They had put their supplies and equipment close to the thirty-eighth parallel. They hadn't developed any positions in depth. Everything between the thirty-eighth parallel and Seoul was their area of depot."

Yes, an "extraordinarily poor" disposition

for defense--but one which indicates an intention to attack, a disposition not made by South Koreans, but by the U.S. managers of the South Korean army.

(True, MacArthur tries to fit these facts into the myth of North Korean "aggression". He has the main North Korean army striking "like a cobra" from North of the Yalu River--quite a feat for a largely non-motorized army to strike like a cobra at an enemy several hundred miles away!)

If South Koreans really began war, and North Koreans were not prepared for attack, how could they advance so rapidly? MacArthur explains that also, in terms of the Syngman Rhee forces piling everything up right behind the 38th parallel:

MacArthur: "When they lost that immediate line, they lost their supplies. They were not able apparently to destroy them en masse; so that at one initial stroke this North Korean Army had a new supply base in the area between the thirty-eighth parallel and Seoul, which enabled them to press south with the full strength of their base being immediately behind them; they no longer had to rely upon the long distance from the Yalu to get their supplies down."

In short, the North Koreans were able to advance rapidly because of their success in thwarting the original South Korean attack, because the South Korean forces melted at the first shots, leaving their supplies to the North Koreans. And the original advance of the North Koreans was supplied militarily not by the U.S.S.R. and China, but by the U.S. via Syngman Rhee, just as the U.S. supplied the Chinese People's Army via Chiang Kai Shek.

b. <u>The United States Was Using Military Power in Korea Before The United Nations Resolutions of June 27th Calling on Members To Furnish Such Assistance to the Republic of Korea As May Be Necessary To Repel Armed Attack and Restore International Peace In The Area.</u>

"Bradley: On June 26, the instructions were furnished MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing for the employment of US naval and air forces against the North Korean units south of the 38th parallel"

"Byrd: As a matter of fact our forces went in the day before the UN authorized them to."

"Bradley: The air units went in the day before and the naval units went in the day before to help evacuate our nationals."

"Byrd: Well, the 'Instructions Concerning The Employment of U S Naval & Air Forces VS North Korean Units South of the 38th Parallel' does not say anything about evacuating our nationals. That means they go right in the war."

"Bradley: That is correct."

"Byrd: And they did it twelve hours before they were authorized to do it by the United Nations."

"Bradley: That was considered necessary to help cover the evacuation of our nationals."

"Byrd: That may be all right but it does not agree with your statement of yesterday that you said we had entered Korea on the resolution of the United Nations. The fact is then that you were actually in conflict with North Korean units one day before the resolution was passed by the United Nations."

c. Other United Nations Forces Went In To Support, Not The South Korean Forces, But To Support The United States Forces Already Engaged In Action In Korea.

"Acheson: The South Korean forces were knocked to pieces in the first attack." (June 6, 1951 testimony)

"Bradley: On June 30, the Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Forces (CICFE) (MacArthur) informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff after reconnaisance in the battle area, that the South Korean army was in confusion, supplies and equipment abandoned or lost, the South Korean army was incapable of united action and there was grave danger of a further breakthrough. The CIGFE further stated that the only assurance of holding the Han River line and to regain lost ground would be through committment of United States ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. He stated, if authorized, that it was his intention to move immediately a United States regimental combat team to the combat area as a nucleus of a possible build up of two divisions from Japan for early offensive action in

accordance with his mission of clearing South Korea of North Korean forces."

"Sen Smith: Was General MacArthur at that time just acting for the United States or was that after he had been made Commander of the United Nations forces?"

"Bradley: He was not made Commander of the United Nations forces until around the 7th or 8th." (July, 1950)

"Smith: Then we were taking heavy steps..to carry on an offensive there against the North Koreans under our own steam and without United Nations support in the sense of his being the representative of the United Nations?"

"Bradley: It was United States action."

"Smith: That was approved here in Washington?"

"Bradley: Yes, that was approved; his request was approved."

"Knowland: In the situation which faced us on the 25th, 26th and 27th of June, General MacArthur, having been given a mission, indicated that they would have to send some ground troops in order to carry out that mission."

d. General MacArthur Acted as the Representative of the United States, Rather than the United Nations.

"Sen Russell: General, will you clarify for the benefit of the Committee your position as Commander in Chief of the United Nations there as well as of the United States forces.
When you submitted your request for troops, did you submit it to the Government of the United States or did you submit it to the United Nations or both?"

"General MacArthur: Senator, my connection with the United Nations was largely nominal. There were provisions made that the entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff and my channel of communication was defined as the Army Chief of Staff.
The reports which were normally made by me to the United Nations were subject to censorship by our State and Defense Departments. I had no direct connection with the United Nations whatsoever.
The controls over me were exactly the same as though the forces under me were all Americans. All my com-

munications were to the American high command here.

"Russell: Were any of your communications to the United Nations that went through that chain of command actually censored?"

"MacArthur: Yes, sir. The reports that I made, comments and suggestions - suggestions came back to me as to whether I would accept the changes. Many of those changes I accepted. There were at least in one case changes which I would not accept, changes that seemed to me to place a political slant upon a military officer's report, which were not warrantable. In that it created a degree of discussion between State and Defense Departments.
The Defense Department supported my point of view, and maintained that nothing should go in over my signature that I did not approve.

"Russell: What was the change to which you refer General, that you refused to make on the request of the Defense Establishment? You said there were

"MacArthur: I don't know whether the requests were from the State or the Defense Establishment."
The reports that I submitted were passed through both of them, but they made a number of changes in practically every report.
The general gist of it was, as I said, that it seemed to introduce a political slant which the State Department believed would be advantageous in its handling of the various nations of the United Nations at Lake Success."

e. Military Action in Korea by "The United Nations" is 90% American.

"Knowland: All the United Nations together have only put up as troops to fight aggression in Korea approximately 30,000 men..

"MacArthur: If you subtract the United States from the Korean effort, you have pretty nearly zero left." (May 4 testimony)
The subtraction of the other United Nations forces would have no material effect upon the tactical situation."

f. MacArthur's Military Actions Went Beyond The Directive of the United Nations.

"Marshall: At no time have the United Nations forces been given the task of unifying all of Korea by military action. In other words, the unification of North and South Korea has been set up as a political rather than a military objective." (Testimony May 4)

"MacArthur: Your (Jt. Chiefs of Staff) directive of January 9 (was) that I continue to defend in successive positions subject to my basic mission of protecting Japan." (Testimony May 21, 1951)

g. Marshall on "Soviet instigation" of the Korean War.

Same hearings, page 375:

"Sen Bridges: Do you think, General Marshall, that there was any ulterior motive or there was any planned procedure by the Soviet in having the Korean attack take place when they were absent from the Security Council? In other words, what I am getting at, do you think this was a long-range program on the part of the Soviet to start the Korean involvement when they were boycotting the Security Council because, if they had been there, they might have vetoed it or probably would have vetoed it in letting us become involved?"

"Sec. Marshall: I had not thought that true as you state, and the general reaction at the moment was it was rather fortunate they were not present on the Security Council at that time, and as I recall the return to the Security Council when the leadership automatically fell, the chairmanship fell, to them, they did everything in the world to obstruct what we were doing."

Thus, what Marshall pointed out implies what any sane person would realize, namely that if the USSR had organized a North Korean attack on South Korea, it would have gone back to the Security Council in advance to head off any possible U.S. blitz in that agency.

Acheson read a letter of "Instructions to United States Embassies Abroad" asking them to

inform "the Governments to which you are accredited that it may become necessary, at an early date, to permit United Nations aircraft to defend themselves in the air space above the Yalu River to the extent of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to two or three minutes flying time into Manchurian air space". "We are not asking the concurrance of Governments because we believe the highly limited application of hot pursuit doctrine in this situation would turn upon military necessity and elementary principles of self-defense, but we think it is important that Governments be notified of the problem".

"Saltonstall: As a result, they objected?"
"Acheson: That is correct." (Testimony June 5, 1951)

5. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY

In the face of the evidence presented the only conclusion is that this war was plainly desired, hoped for and counted on by Rhee; that Rhee was powerless to move without American sanction and as an American puppet; that he was restrained until and used at a time dictated by the cold war plans of Washington; that the Security Council acted in conflict with its own Charter and without evidence from both sides on the issue; and that the war in Korea is a war of the United States against the people of Korea.

III. "WHY DID THE NORTH KOREANS CROSS INTO SOUTH KOREA?"

An important question is sometimes asked, "Why did the North Koreans cross the 38th parallel? Why weren't they content just to resist the invaders from the South and not themselves 'invade' the South?" These questions serve to point up the nature of the struggle within Korea.

1. AN ALL-KOREA PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT HAS EXISTED IN KOREA SINCE 1945.

The basic fact is that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with its capital at Pyongyang, representing all sections of the country (nation-wide elections held in 1948) was a continuation of the Korean People's Provisional Government (already functioning when the Americans landed in 1945) which was rejected by the United States in favor of its own creation, the Rhee "Republic of Korea".

"In South Korea the task of setting up a Korean government was nursed through many vicissitudes by the US Army, Military Government, and State Department. The Army Commander, Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, started out by rejecting the newly-organized Korean Republic which had been set up before the American

entry into the country." (Korea Today by George M. McCune, Harvard University Press, 1950 Page 4, introduction)

"Upon their arrival, the Americans found in existence a de facto government which was apparently supported by a majority of the people." (American Military Government in Korea By E. Grand Meade, Columbia University Press, 1951 Page 8. Fuller details in Chapter 5)

"They (the Koreans-ed.) had demonstrated their ability to govern themselves in the weeks immediately following the surrender, and the Americans erred in not further encouraging this ability; probably this was a deliberate oversight prompted by the leftist views of the majority. At the very least it was an admission that civil affairs had failed in one of its primary objectives, that of indoctrinating the Koreans in Western democratic concepts; or further, that the Americans were unable to accept or understand democracy as conceived by the majority of the Koreans." (American Military Government in Korea, page 234)

"By suppressing the People's Republic and by identifying themselves with a minority group, the Americans distressed and antagonized the people; by providing a highly centralized government, they classified themselves with the Japanese." (Page 235, above)

The National Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at Pyongyang had 572 representatives; 260 of these were from and elected by voters in districts south of the 38th parallel; 212 of them were from and elected by voters in districts north of the 38th parallel, corresponding to the respective populations of the two areas; 20,000,000 in the south and 10,000.000 in the north.

2. THE PEOPLE'S EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A UNIFIED KOREA.

Though the United States succeeded in keeping one of the areas of Korea under a separate and puppet regime, the people all over Korea maintained their efforts towards peaceful reunification of their country - in contradistinction to Rhee's plans and pressure to unify Korea by military force. Abolition of the 38th parallel as a political boundary was a task to which every politically-minded Korean was committed. What Koreans were not agreed upon was the seating of duly elected Communists in a coalition government. The great majority, even in the South, favored such seating.

"Although South Koreans prefer democracy to Communism, they place a higher value on coalition than on any political ideology." (The Epic of Korea by A. Wigfall Green, Judge Advocate of AMG Public Affairs Press,

Champions of coalition in the South included Kim Koo, formerly Korea's Provisional President and head of the Independence Party, and Dr. Kim Kiusic who succeeded him as leader of the nationalist middle-of-the-road groups. In April 1948 these two participated in a Coalition Conference attended by 545 delegates from both North and South, at which resolutions were passed calling for union and for the withdrawal of both Russians and Americans. (Korea Today, page 262ff).

"Upon their return in late April and early May the delegates from South Korea who were outspoken in what they referred to as the moderate view and unquestionable patriotism of the North Korean leaders, reported favorably on conditions in North Korea. However, General Hodge, the American Commander, warned the people of South Korea against heeding the counsel of these men and suggested they were stooges who had been 'baited by the Communists'. Under the circumstances, the unity efforts of the North and South Koreans proved abortive." (The Korean Situation By George McCune, page 201 Far Eastern Survey, September 8, 1948)

"The Korean attitude on independence was demonstrated in December 1945 when an (American) group officer following a tour reported

> 'These people want neither us nor the Russians. They are extremely grateful at being liberated from the Japanese yoke, but now are anxious to bid us both Godspeed so that they may be left to their own salvation.'"

3. RHEE FORCIBLY OPPOSES PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION.

Rhee, as well as General Hodge, was opposed to peaceful efforts for reunification. On June 26, 1949 one of Rhee's officers assassinated Kim Koo; on the previous February he had denounced Kim Koo and Kim Kiusic as traitors. On October 7th, replying at a press conference to criticism concerning his opposition to the desire of certain members of the United Nations Commission for negotiation to avert war, Rhee said

> "The Commission must neither collaborate, exchange views, nor discuss anything with Korean Communist leaders...Had we intended to unite the country by talking things over with the Communist Party of North Korea, we could have done it without the United Nations. (Green: The Epic of Korea page 125f)

The Government of South Korea "has not only made it clear that they would not participate in official discussions with the North looking to uni-

fication, but has also indicated that it frowned on unofficial efforts in this behalf. It has made clear that it views any suggestions for north-south discussion, even of an unofficial and tentative kind, as a form of disloyalty." (United Nations Commission on Korea report)

"The people of Korea have a passionate longing for unity and independence and have a profound desire for a peaceful unification of their country." (UNTOK Report page 34 Vol. 1 under D)

4. THE CULMINATION OF UNIFICATION EFFORTS.

In 1949 a Korea United Democratic Fatherland Front was established to work for the peaceful unification of Korea. 71 political parties and social organizations participated in this Front. On June 7, 1950 the Front made a definite proposal for a meeting of legislators from Seoul (South) and Pyongyang (North) to plan for a unified election to an all-Korea Assembly; Rhee forbade participation in this decision by any South Korean legislators.

The UN Commission announced on June 10, 1950 that if the Rhee Government would not respond to the invitation to send delegates to the border to discuss the proposed peaceful legislative unification, it would send its own representatives across the parallel to receive the text of the proposals. Its representatives went across, received the text and conveyed the three Northern representatives to Seoul - where Rhee's police arrested them. On June 18 the Democratic Front leaders called for (1) the release of the three envoys from the North, (2) the convening of the Seoul and Pyongyang Assembles as a single all Korea legislative body, and (3) the intensification of the people's struggle against the traitorous Rhee.

On June 19 John Foster Dulles pledged Rhee that "the Communists will eventually lose their hold on North Korea" (UP from Seoul June 19).

According to Premier Kim Il Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Rhee's troops invaded all along the line of the 38th parallel (Pyongyang radio alleged that the South Koreans invaded at 1:35 AM on the 25th; Ambassador Muccio reported North Korean forces initiated action at about 4:00 AM.

This attack was immediately met by the strong counter-offensive which in the first days carried the People's forces well into the area South of the 38th parallel. That the people had their forces ready, after all the provocative statements and actions by Rhee and his American sponsors, should be appreciated as only realistic.

There had been hundreds of instances of fighting

across the 38th parallel for two and a half years.

"The boundary on the 38th parallel is a real front line. There is constant fighting...there are real battles, involving perhaps one or two thousand men." (Ambassador Jessup, in radio address, April, 1950 after return from trip to the Far East. In Department of State Bulletin April 24, 1950)

"I have at least 12 to 14 Americans with each division. They work with the Korean officers; they live right here with them at the front - the 38th parallel - and they stay with them in battles and in periods of rest." (General Roberts, Commander American Military Mission Press Interview June 5, 1950)

During 1949 the casualties of North Koreans were estimated at 19,006 killed, 3281 wounded, 9284 captured or surrendered; the South Korean casualties were set at 1247 killed, 2303 wounded, besides desertions to the North including two American-equipped battallions. (The Epic of Korea, A. Wigfall Green, pp.126f)

5. THE REAL INVADER IN KOREA.

The speed with which the People's forces moved in the early months of the war, through the area south of the 38th parallel is partially explained by MacArthur's testimony already quoted in this outline. It also confirms the nation-wide nature of the opposition to Rhee, as indeed did the admitted troubles which the guerrilla forces so constantly gave Rhee. Having been rejected at the polls in the May, 1950 election, Rhee was now being deserted by "his" foreign trained, foreign-equipped and foreign-armed army. MacArthur has testified (above) that by June 30th, within one week of the start of the war, Rhee's southern forces had disintegrated. A large percent of these Southern forces joined up with the People's army.

Rhee was the traitor, the expatriate brought back to Korea - not by the Korean people but by the United States - after forty years living abroad as a professional political exile, to become the puppet of a foreign invader.

The Korean people, at bitter cost, are now affirming their unity. "Operation Killer" knows no "south" or "north" but on MacArthur's orders is aimed at all Koreans - "kill everything that moves". No Koreans are invading Korea, but the Korean people once more thwarted in their long dream, hope and expectation of unity and national independence have risen up to repel the real invader, the United States.

IV. WHY DID THE UNITED STATES MOVE AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC?

The answer to this question touches on many aspects of current American foreign policy.

1. KOREA POLICY REPRESENTS A CONTINUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE ATTACK ON CHINA.

In spite of moving, after the end of World War II, fourteen of Chiang Kai Shek's armies from South and West China to North China and Manchuria, and in spite of having 50,000 American military personnel sent to North China, also after the end of the War, the United States failed in its attempt to acquire bases in Manchuria. North Korean area could be a substitute for those bases or an avenue toward those bases.

Testimony in the Congressional Enquiry over the dismissal of MacArthur amply indicates that the Korean Affair is an attack on China, an attempt to undo the results of the victory of the Chinese people's liberation struggle.

MacArthur: "If we had not gone into Korea, the military potential of China would have been available for other areas." (May 3, 1951)

Truman: Message to MacArthur January 12, 1951.
"Successful resistance in Korea would serve the following purposes:
"Deflate the dangerously exaggerated political and military prestige of Communist China which now threatens to undermine the resistance of non-Communist Asia and consolidate the hold of Communism on China itself..
"Afford more time for, and give direct assistance to the organization of non-Communist resistance in Asia, both outside and inside China."

Joint Chiefs of Staff "study" or "directive" to MacArthur January 12, 1951
"Continue and intensify now the economic blockade of trade with China.
"Prepare now to impose a naval blockade on China and place it in effect as soon as our position in Korea stabilizes or when we have evacuated Korea under circumstances then obtaining."
"Remove now restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.
"Remove now the restrictions on operation of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists."

Hickenlooper: I don't believe that anybody would advocate that we call off or that we quit

trying to defeat China in Korea. I think the basic theory we are going on we are out to defeat the Red Chinese." (May 23, 1951)

Marshall: "Our purpose is to inflict terrific casualties on the Chinese Communist forces, to break the morale of their armies, to destroy their best trained armies."

Long: "It seems to me that if we are going to attempt to punish the Chinese for their aggression with the least possible losses to ourselves, one of the most effective ways would be to carry fire bombs to their cities, simply ignite their cities and burn them, many of them, down. That would not entail a great loss of American lives, would it?"

Gen. Collins: "No sir, but it would certainly entail the loss of lives of many Chinese." (May 25, 1951)

2. KOREAN WAR SERVED TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE WORLD-WIDE "CONTAINMENT" POLICY OF THE US.

A. To secure and hold allies for future war.

Marshall: "Now as to allies - they have moved at a very slow pace until our reaction to the Korean affair - and that stimulated and accelerated, brought to a head in an effective manner, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization". Marshall went on to speak of "the extraordinary difficulty we had in lining up - having them all line up with us, where we had to have them, before the United Nations Security Council". (Congressional Hearing on MacArthur Dismissal May 12, 1951) "The advantage we could gain from the present method of fighting where we are is that we will retain our allies, bring them to a more satisfactory reaction before the UN as their confidence in our leadership in this delicate matter is increased." MacArthur's statement of March 24 to the Korean and Chinese military forces "was increasing our troubles with our Allies and making it more difficult to work a more harmonious and intimate accord with them." (Testimony on May 8, 1951)

Bradley: "Our Allies demobilized...got down to a low state of training and equipment. As time goes on we hope they are aroused by

the present happenings and that they will start to build up those defenses the same as we have." (Testimony May 22, 1951)

Marshall: "The general feeling has been that in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and myself and other agencies of the Government that if we restrain our activities to the Korean border and the seas alongside we can possibly carry on to a successful termination, to a limited war, and more particularly, one on which we can hold our allies with us." (Testimony May 12, 1951)

Bradley: "This is the first time we have had a United Nations field command and a United Nations Commander. We should be very careful to preserve such a command and the prerogatives of such a command and make it as effective as possible and do everything we can from breaking up a UN command and discouraging them from taking action in the future." (Testimony May 23, 1951)

Long: "How much do you think our Allies have increased their readiness, particularly the European Allies - since the Korean fighting broke out?"

Bradley: "Well, they have all speeded up their preparedness efforts - all the people of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization who have military obligations have increased their efforts by at least 50%." (May 22)

Bradley: "It is important to the future of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that maximum practical punishment be inflicted on Communist aggression and that Korea be not evacuated unless actually forced by military considerations." (May 15)

Lodge: "A really skilful and persuasive American diplomacy should hold our Allies together as regards a sound Asia policy?"

Marshall: "That would be my assumption." (Testimony May 8, 1951)

Johnson: "What is the value of Western European Allies to the United States?"

Bradley: "The man-power that would be available is something over 300,000,000. Their industrial capacity is very substantial. People in Europe are very capable allies as they can be maintained on our side and their security built up." (Testimony May 21, 1951)

Connolley: "How could we go it alone on two fronts, one in Asia and one in Europe?"

Bradley: "It would be pretty tough, because the more assistance you have both militarily and industrially, the better off you are in combating communism, or in fighting a war. If we ever lose them completely or be confined to the Western hemisphere we would have an utterly different situation and a different standard of living than the one we have at present." (May 31, 1951)

Kefauver: "Do you think we would lose any of our Allies in Korea and maybe in other places if we carried out MacArthur's suggestions?"

Collins: "There is every indication that we would lose some of our Allies. It would be very serious indeed because certainly with respect to the world situation as a whole not even this country can go it alone, as strong as we are industrially and as we are getting to be militarily."

Hickenlooper: "What is the source of your information about the clear indication that we might lose our Allies?"

Collins: "Primarily in our discussions with the State Department...their contacts with other members of the United Nations indicated clearly that they did not intend to support certain of these projected moves." (Testimony May 25, 1951)

MacMahon: "I appreciate that we can pay - we could pay - too high a price for having Allies; but within that limitation certainly the tighter we keep our Allies, the better off we are going to be mobilizing our strength." (Testimony May 22, 1951)

Gillette: "Is it reasonable to fear that our Allies would risk losing the United States great Economic and military aid by refusing to accept our views as to the bombing of Manchurian bases and blockading China's coast and using Chiang's troops against a Chinese mainland threat - if we presented these proposals with definite insistence?" (May 13, 1951)

Collins: "If we get into a major war we would need Allies. If we take unilateral action in Korea to broaden the war there we might well stand to lose the principal allies whom we would be dependent upon in the event of a major war." (Testimony May 25, 1951)

B. Korea War serves to Maintain and Increase Defense Preparations.

a. Appropriations

Long: "Since the aggression in Korea and because of the fight you are having to make there, the people have realized the necessity for a large defense establishment and they have been willing to see their Congress making large appropriations.
"Some of us had the impression that it is almost impossible, unless your men are actually fighting, to get the American people to keep an army, navy and air force that could beat a nation like the Soviet Union.
"In other words, the public does not like to pay taxes, but somewhere along the line we have to make them realize the dangers they are facing." (Testimony May 4, 1951)

Bradley: "We had better get busy and increase our security forces and I think Korea has not only had an effect on us to increase our own security forces but it has also had a very powerful effect on a lot of our friends in Europe with whom we are allied."

Long: "Prior to that time there were some of us who found it difficult to get our people in our home states to agree that we were justified in spending at that time on our armed services. I believe it was around thirteen billion dollars.

Bradley: "Now we are spending about sixty billion dollars annually in preparedness effort."

b. Got war procurement lines going

Long: "So roughly speaking, you might say that dollar-wise we are making about five times the defense effort we were making at the time the Korea aggression broke out."

Bradley: "Korea made it possible...Korea served a dual purpose. The ammunition being used up there made it necessary and requires us to set up certain ammunition procurement lines which were absolutely necessary and which had been worrying us very badly beforehand. (May 22, 1951)

Acheson: "The Americans and Allies fighting in Korea have given a powerful impetus to the military preparation of this country.
"We have doubled the number of men under

arms and the production of material has been boosted to a point where it can have a profound effect on the maintenance of peace."

c. Keeps a war economy going.

"The Korean war is really a made-to-order situation to keep business on a high level. It lays the ghost of the depression which has been haunting American business since the end of World War II." (US News & World Report August, 1951)

3. Korea Policy seeks to Make Korea an American Economic Colony.

In 1945 the American Military Government was set up in Korea, with headquarters at Seoul. It took over Japanese assets, among them the Oriental Development Company, worth $1,250,000.000, in farm lands, forests, mines, industrial establishments. This was renamed The New Korea Company and the J. P. Morgan Bank and the National City Bank of New York were named as fiscal agents. This meant that Americans would once more receive payment on the $40,000,000 worth of the Company's bonds sold on Wall Street prior to the War and opened up the possibility of rich investment in Korea for American interests. Another lucrative Korean asset taken over was the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company, owner of the richest gold mines in Asia, at Unsan in North Korea; this too was made available to Wall Street investors. But, before Americans could cash in on "their" assets, they had to get possession of these assets - most of which were above the 38th parallel! Here one can recall General Roberts enthusiasm (June 5, 1950) about training "100,000 people who will do the shooting for you" - "the army that is a fine watchdog over the investments placed in this country, a force that represents maximum results at minimum costs". Nor can one overlook more recent indications of American motive for a northward drive."

"One reason for the deadlock over the cease-fire line in Korea is that precious tungsten deposits are at stake in the juggling for position...The pie-shaped piece of land held by General Ridgeway's forces above the 38th parallel contain rich, untapped tungsten deposits. This is one reason why Ridgway has been ordered to hold firm. Furthermore the largest Tungsten mine in the world is located at Sangdon, less than 60 miles below the 38th parallel. This is another reason why Ridgway wants to hang on to his stronger defense line above the 38th parallel and keep the Communists as far from Sangdon as possible. The shortage of Tungsten is so desperate that we have rushed

mining equipment to Korea in order to step up production at the Sangdon mine and to reopen small mines above the 38th parallel. It is no secret that this country is over two million pounds short of tungsten for civilian requirements alone. Normally the US consumes about 14 million pounds a year...The most we can scrape up this year will be about twelve million pounds - unless the Korean mines can be rushed into full production." (Los Angeles Daily News August 7, 1951)

V. CONCLUSION

American policy in the Far East has as its objective to destroy or to delay the Asian peoples' movement for liberation from feudalism and colonialism. This policy is implemented by the support and use (and sometimes creation) of reactionary Asian domestic regimes which lend themselves to and associate themselves with the objectives of the American policy makers. This policy is also implemented by the American use of the United Nations, by pressures on other governments, and by direct and indirect American economic and military attacks on the peoples of Asia.

In Korea is revealed in all its cruelty, savagery, waste and ineffectiveness the nature, aims and acts of our Government's foreign policy. But the application of this policy is not confined to Korea. The more than a billion-dollars-a-week military appropriations in Congress, the world-wide string of American bases and military missions, the officially reiterated fear of peace - all are indications that more Korea's are implicit, if our Government's current foreign policy is not halted and changed.

The Committee For A Democratic Far Eastern Policy offers this documentary record on one question - "Who began the Korean war?" - in the hope that it will serve to help Americans see more clearly the nature of our Government's over-all foreign policy and understand more readily the disastrous and peace-threatening kind of world relations that policy is creating.

The American people, as well as Korean and Asian peoples, pay a heavy price for this policy. The energies of our people and the rich resources of our land are being diverted from needed schools, dwellings, hospitals, old-age and other social securities, maternal and child welfare, flood prevention and constructive water control into the wasteful and horrible channels of a war-economy; an increasing restriction on a democratic and civil rights accompanies even a cold war and chills the relation of neighbor with neighbor in an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. Ugly racism, now developing at an unprecedented rate in our land, is both a tool and a result of the war-making policy of our Government.

The American people have a responsibility to change this

disastrous war-making, costly, anti-democratic, interventionist policy into a realizable and constructive policy by a growing nation-wide demand upon our national government, our Congressional representatives, and our state legislators for a policy that respects other nations ' right to self-determination, that leads toward international cooperation in trade and mutually beneficial projects, that uses our people and national resources, for the satisfaction and enrichment of normal and peaceful living. This must be a policy that is formulated and implemented in terms of peace rather than of war.

As concrete steps toward such a peace policy we must call for:


1. A cease-fire in Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, leaving to the Koreans themselves the decisions about their national life.

2. The seating in the United Nations of the Peoples Republic of China.

3. A meeting of the Big Five powers.

4. Resumption of diplomatic and trade relations with China.

Only such a change in our Government's policy can bring peace and prosperity and only an aroused people can force such a policy change.


KOREA
MANCHURIA
SEA OF JAPAN
YELLOW SEA
USSR
38
SEOUL
Kyŏnggi-do
Kangwŏn-do
Hwanghae-do
P'yŏngan-pukto
P'yŏngan-namdo
Hamgyŏng-pukto
Hamgyŏng-namdo
Ch'ungch'ŏng-pukto
Ch'ungch'ŏng-namdo
Kyŏngsang-pukto
Kyŏngsang-namdo
Chŏlla-pukto
Chŏlla-namdo
CHEJU-DO
CHEJU-HAEHYŏP
TSUSHIMA
TSUSHIMA-KAIKYŌ
CHŌSEN-KAIKYŌ
HONSHŪ
KYŪSHŪ
ULLŬNG-DO
The boundaries shown on this map do not necessarily correspond in all cases to the boundaries recognized by the U. S. Government.
LEGEND
MINES
Iron
Gold
Alunite
Magnesite
Copper
Coal
Graphite
Tungsten
Zinc
Mica
INDUSTRIES
Iron and Steel
Aluminum and Magnesium
Copper, Lead and Zinc Smelters
Chemicals and Explosives
Refineries and Liquefaction
Cement
Textiles
Ship Building and Repairs–Pusan
Electric Power Plant(s)
Major Airfields
Major Ports
Railroads
Province Boundary (capitals underlined)

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