DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS
EXPOSING THE INSTIGATORS
of
THE CIVIL WAR IN KOREA

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS
EXPOSING THE INSTIGATORS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN KOREA

Documents from the archives of the Rhee Syngman Government

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
PYONGYANG 1950

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EDITOR'S NOTES

1. The documents included in this collection were found in the archives of the Rhee Syngman government which were captured by the Korean People's Army in Seoul.

   Besides these documents, the testimonies of two former high officials and one army officer of the South Korean puppet government are included.

2. In the place of a preface, is printed the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated September 28, 1950, in which most of the documents and materials included herein are referred to.

3. This collection is arranged into four parts according to their contents.

4. Documents not explained by footnotes as being in the Korean language are originally in English.

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Mr. President of the United Nations General Assembly,

Mr. Chairman of the Security Council,

The American armed intervention in Korea, organized under the banner of the United Nations, with the participation of a number of other countries, which under the pressure of the United States government have sent armed forces to invade Korea, has been going on for three months. In these three months, the blood shed by the Korean people is enough to fill a river, peaceful Korean towns and villages have been destroyed, and the people's property set up by the Korean people themselves has been reduced to ashes.

American intervention and the civil war started by American imperialists and their running dogs headed by Rhee Syngman have inflicted tremendous calamities and hardships upon the Korean people, for which the U.S. government is solely responsible.

Through its official representatives, the United States government supplied the traitorous bandits of Rhee Syngman with political, military and economic aid, and directed in the building and training of Rhee Syngman's army and in working out the aggressive plan for the invasion of north Korea. Such encouragement and aid spurred the Rhee Syngman clique to start a civil war in Korea.

The puppet regime of Rhee Syngman was set up and used by

American imperialists for the purpose of enslaving Korea and for turning it into a base for American aggression in the Far East. Like a slave, humbly obeying all commands of its American master, the Rhee Syngman government subordinated all its efforts to prepare for an armed invasion in north Korea on June 25, 1950.

In order to justify their aggression against the Korean people, the American invaders attempt now to place the guilt for the outbreak of war in Korea on the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, asserting that the events of June 25, 1950, were an unprovoked attack of the northerners on south Korea. This version on the attack of the northerners on south Korea was dictated by United States representatives to the United Nations Commission on Korea and, acting on its report, this version was also adopted by the majority of the Security Council, which fearing the exposure of this lie and the establishment of truth, barred representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from participation in the discussion of the Korean question.

However, facts and documents completely expose those who are guilty of unleashing the war—the American imperialists and their Rhee Syngman agents. In particular, documents from the Rhee Syngman government's secret archives captured during the liberation of Seoul by the People's Army irrefutably prove that plans for an attack on north Korea were hatched long since by the Rhee Syngman clique with the consent of the U.S. government and even of the United Nations high officials. In a letter to his "Ambassador Extraordinary" and personal representative in the United States, Cho Byung-ok, dated April 10, 1949, Rhee Syngman gave the following instructions:— ".....I think you should frankly discuss this situation in fullest confidence with high officials of both the United Nations and the United States. In a strictly confidential manner tell them what plans we have for the unification of north and south. As a matter of fact, we are ready for the unification now in every respect but one; namely, we lack arms and ammunition..... We have to be prepared with a sufficient military force so that we can proceed into the north to join with our loyal army there, and to

move the Iron Curtain from the 38th parallel up to the Yalu River, and there to guard it against infiltration from without".

On the testimony of ex-Secretary of Home Affairs, Kim Hyo-suk and other leaders of the Rhee Syngman regime who were taken prisoner by the People's Army, an attack on north Korea was fixed for July or August, 1949. However, the failure of the Rhee Syngman troops in incidents on the 38th parallel which they had provoked, the desertion of separate units of the Rhee Syngman Army to the side of north Korea and mainly the active operation of the people's guerilla movement against the Rhee Syngman puppet regime in the south forced American military leaders to revize their plans and temporarily to delay the attack of the Rhee Syngman bandits on north Korea in order to prepare the rear and army more thoroughly.

However, the Rhee Syngman clique had no patience. On September 30, 1949, Rhee Syngman wrote to Dr. Robert Oliver, pressing his American friend in this matter:—"I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join our loyal communist army in the north to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim Il-sung's men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position..... We will all quietly work together, you in Washington and in New York and our two Ambassadors and other friends, and we here in Seoul and Tokyo toward one end; that they agree to cleaning up and setting our house in order. Use the old phrase that Churchill used once, 'Give us the tools and we will do the job'. Convince the American statesmen and the general public and let them quietly agree that we go ahead and carry out our program and give us all the material backing we need. The longer we drag along the harder it will be."

In connection with this letter Cho Byung-ok, Rhee Syngman's personal representative in the United States sent the following

reply to Rhee Syngman on October 12, 1949:— "It was with great care and interest that I read your letter to Dr. Oliver with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet regime in the North. The proposals you expounded therein are, under the circumstances prevailing, the only logical and ultimate method of bringing about our desired unification. However after taking into consideration all the factors involved I am inclined to view that the time is not opportune as yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our preparedness, and the international opinion will not approve of such an action to be taken.....I have discussed it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that this matter should be regarded as the basic plan of our government that should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune."

In a letter of November 3, 1949 addressed to Rhee Syngman, Cho Byung-ok, referring again to Rhee Syngman's letter to Oliver, wrote :—"I am of the firm conviction that unification of Korea can be brought about only through exercise of the sovereign power of our Government. Any policy of compromise or conferences is out of the question.....The cold war cannot go on indefinitely like this. All these world problems could not be possibly solved without a third world war. Our plan of achieving unification must be mapped out in march with the developments of the world situation as a whole. In the meantime, our national preparedness in military power and economic strength is the most compelling task imposed upon our Government."

At a press conference December 30, 1949, Rhee Syngman stated frankly :—"In the coming year we shall all unanimously strive to regain the lost territory. Up to now, in connection with the international situation we carried out a peace policy in conformity with the peace policy of the U.S.A. and the United Nations. However, we must remember that in the coming year in connection with the change in the international situation, we must unite south and north Korea through our own efforts."

Thus, an attack on north Korea was already determined in 1949 and preparation for the campaign against the north was considered the main task of the South Korean government. Only the question of the time of attack was left open for discussion.

American official representatives and military specialists in Korea exerted all their efforts to intensify the preparation for war.

The Americans and the Rhee Syngman clique who were extremely worried about the situation in the rear, adopted unheard of outrageous repressive measures against the democratic movement and its participants. These repressions were carried out on the direct orders of American representatives. Thus, in the latter half of July, 1949, United States Ambassador Muccio called together General Roberts, Page, Secretaries Sin Sung-mo, Kwon Seung-yer and Kim Hyo-suk and gave them the following instructions :—"As we have already decided to carry out the campaign against the north in July and August, it is now essential to enforce the state security law and to carry out mass arrests of anti-government elements and members of the South Korean Worker's Party, so as to prevent internal disorders. I am convinced that such measures are of utmost importance, to which due attention must be given."

Tens of thousands of people in south Korea whose only 'guilt' was that they expressed their dissatisfaction with the Rhee Syngman terrorist regime and wanted the peaceful unification of their fatherland were thrown into prison, tortured and executed. Particular attention was paid to the suppression of the guerilla movement, which was the reply of the south Korean people to the brutal repressions by the Rhee Syngman government. According to Kim Hyo-suk's statement, General Roberts, chief of the American Military Advisory Group personally worked out a plan and led operations for the suppression of the popular guerilla movement. On his instruction in districts where the guerillas were operating 450,000 houses of peaceful residents, suspected of helping or simply of sympathizing with the guerillas, were burned down and devastated. As a result of these brutal measures hundreds of thousands of people were rendered homeless and left without means of subsistence.

Masses of innocent people were brutally annihilated by Rhee Syngman's men with the sole purpose of intimidating the people and to repress their will to struggle for freedom. The Americans and the Rhee Syngman bandits attempted at all costs to exterminate guerillas during February and March, 1950, in order to free their hands for the attack on north Korea.

In conformity with the plan of attack on the north, the intensified preparation of the South Korean Army was carried out, airpromes were built, the ports of south Korea were brought into war preparedness so that the American air, navy and groung forces could start military operations in the soil of Korea at any time. The training of the South Korean Army was completely under the control of the Amecican Military Advisory Group in Seoul. The Rhee Syngman government willingly proposed to use south Korean ports as American naval bases, and to convert former Japanese naval base in Chin Hai into main American naval base after having declared it a seeret zone.

After the visit of the American Fleet to south Korea, Son Won-il, chief of staff of the South Korean Navy, wrote in a letter to Admiral Radford, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, dated July 18, 1949: "We shall be glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchun, Pusan, Yosu, Mukko and the Naval Base of Chinhae as temporary Mobile Bases of any such unit of your Fleet."

Great attention was also given to raising the political reliability of the army, particularly after some units of the Rhee Syngman troops had deserted to the north in the summer of 1949. A ruthless purge of the army was carried out. American advisers personally took part in executions of soldiers and officers suspected of unreliability. Muccio, United States Ambassador in Seoul, instructed Rhee Syngman's ministers not to hesitate before the most brutal measures. "Some people might say that from t he point of view of humanity this is bad," he stated in January, 1950, "but in order to achieve the aim set such acts are fully admissible."

With the aim of creating tension and of preparing public opinion for the aggression which was being prepared, as well as for tactical training of troops, the Rhee Syngman government provoked numerous incidents along the 38th parallel. Although such are the facts, yet the south Korean authorities, the American representatives and the United Nations Commission for Korea blatantly proclaimed to the whole world that these incidents allegedly resulted from the attack of the northerners on south Korea.

The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in its repeated statements during 1949 and the first half of 1950 exposed the truth of these provocative attacks, which were directed to unleash an internecine war. Copies of these statements of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were accordingly forwarded to the United Nations' secretary-general with the request to make their contents known to all member nations of the United Nations.

The documents captured by the People's Army in Seoul fully confirm the correctness of these statements of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. For instance, the head of the American Military Advisory Group in Seoul, General Roberts, in his speech at a conference of division commanders of the Rhee Syngman Army on August 2, 1949 admitted that all incidents along the 38th parallel had been provoked by the South Korean authorities. Roberts declared: "My colleagues and I are fully convinced that all attacks on south Korea are measures of retaliation and that almost all incidents were provoked by the security forces of south Korea."

In October, 1949 at a conference of division commanders held at the army staff office, Roberts said: "The attacks on the territory north of the 38th parallel have been and will be undertaken only upon my instructions. But many military units have attacked the north unwarrantedly, wasting an uncountable number of shells without achieving any results and sustaining terrific losses. Attacks north of the 38th parallel may be

undertaken by the National Defense Army only on the instructions of the American Military Advisory Group."

In accordance with the instructions of the American representatives, an extensive scheme for espionage and subversive activity was made to facilitate the conquest of the north by the Rhee Syngman Army.

Rhee Syngman's Ambassador to the United States, Chang Myun, in a letter addressed to Rhee Syngman, dated April 6, 1949 wrote: "General Wedemeyer's personal and confidential advice is that highly trained, trustworthy and competent young men be sent to North Korea to infiltrate among the Koreans there, sow distrust in the communist cause and the People's Government and prepare the way for the Republic."

The plan for espionage and subversive activity found in the archives of the Rhee Syngman government provided for the organization of sabotage on railroads, transportations, industry, trade and state institutions. The plan envisaged the destruction of bridges, factories, power plants, warehouses, setting fire to buildings of state institutions, issuing forged notes, infecting rivers and reservoirs with bacteria. The plan also envisaged the organization of murders of political and civic leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and members of the People's Army.

Korea plays an important role in the aggressive plans of American foreign policy in the Far East. American imperialism sought to convert Korea into its colony and into a military strategic base in the Far East.

The failure of American imperialism's plans in China made the Korean base increasingly more valuable in the eyes of the United States government. On the other hand, Korea was regarded as the most convenient arena for developing aggressive actions with the aim of restoring the shattered prestige of the United States in the Far East as a whole.

In a confidential bulletin of the Office of Intelligence Research of the U.S. State Department, no. 4849, dated January 28, 1949,

it was recorded that "It is also an American desire to secure through a stable and friendly government in Korea a partial stabilization of the Far East, and to offset by success in Korea, diplomatic reverses suffered elsewhere in Asia."

The United States promised Rhee Syngman all-out military support in his campaign against the north. As testified by Kim Hyo-suk, MacArthur's chief adviser, Sebald, who visited Seoul in January 1950, assured Rhee Syngman that when the march on the north is started the American Fleet and Air Force based in Japan would fight on the side of the South Korean government.

In February, 1950, Rhee Syngman accompanied by the chief of the general staff of the South Korean Army made a trip to Tokyo, where he reached an agreement with MacArthur on the matter of intensifying the preparations for an attack on the north. According to a statement made by Rhee Syngman's ex-political adviser, Moon Hak-bong, MacArthur gave Rhee Syngman concrete instructions with regard to preparatory measures, pointing out that the military operations of the Rhee Syngman Army must be directed by MacArthur.

By May, 1950, the Rhee Syngman Army had completed preparations for an attack on northern Korea, according to the conclusion drawn by American experts. Military operations against north Korea were fully planned and entered on a strategic map which was captured by the People's Army at the time of the liberation of Seoul. As testified by a film discovered in the secret archives of the Rhee Syngman government, Dulles carefully studied the aforementioned strategic map during his visit to south Korea.

On May 9, the director of the Korean Division of E.C.A., Johnson, stated at the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress that the South Korean Army, 100,000 strong, equipped with American arms and trained by the American Military Advisory Group, had completed its preparations and can start war at any moment.

It was precisely at that time that Rhee Syngman on two occasions stated in the press that May and June would be the most critical months in the history of Korea. And it was not by accident that at the same time the United States Secretary of Defense Johnson, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff of the American Armed Forces Bradley and the adviser of the U.S. State Department Dulles, visited the Far East and held secret conferences with General MacArthur.

Dulles especially visited south Korea. As Ambassador Chang Myun reported in his letter to Rhee Syngman dated June 14, 1950, Dulles before leaving for Korea had assured him that the United States would not desert Korea and would help her. In south Korea Dulles, when inspecting the area of the 38th parallel, addressed Rhee Syngman's troops with provocative speeches extolling their combat power and calling for the intensification of war preparations. "No adversary, not even the strongest will be able to oppose you," he said to the Rhee Syngman soldiers. "The time is not far off when you will be able to display your strength."

In his speech made at the National Assembly of south Korea June 19, Dulles gave his blessings to the Rhee Syngman bandits for the armed adventure and stated that the United States was ready to render all necessary moral and material support to south Korea in its fight against communism. In his farewell letter addressed to Rhee Syngman, dated June 20, 1950, Dulles stressed the role assigned to Korea was to create incidents to kindle the flames of war. He wrote: "I attach great importance to the decisive role which your country can play in the great drama that is unfolding."

As pointed out by Rhee Syngman in his letter to his Ambassador Chang Myun dated June 18, 1950, Dulles fully agreed with his entire policy. As Kim Hyo-suk stated in writing, Dulles had told Rhee Syngman and Sin Sung-mo that although the situation in the country after the attack on the north would be unfavourable, it would be necessary to hold out at least one week in the course of which the United States would compel the United Nations to take

action in whose name land, naval and air-forces would be mobilized.

In the predatory plan for an attack on north Korea the United Nations was assigned a special place. The American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman clique reckoned that they would be able to cover up any of their aggressive actions in Korea with the authority of the Security Council.

It has been clearly revealed that the United Nations Commission on Korea which served as a screen for the tool of American aggressive policy in Korea based its reports on materials prepared by the American Embassy and American intelligence organs in Korea. The United Nations Commission on Korea in everything followed the instructions of American representatives and brazenly falsified the facts in the interests of the United States.

According to the statement of Kim Hyo-suk, ex-Secretary of Home Affairs of the Rhee Syngman government, in January, 1950, General Roberts, giving instructions to Rhee Syngman's ministers, said. "The plan for the campaign against the north is decided upon. Not much time is left before it will be carried into life. Although the attack will be begun by us, nevertheless a pretext should be provided to have a justifiable excuse. For this, most important is the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea. The United Nations Commission will naturally submit a report advantageous to the United States but at the same time you must pay attention to this question and win the sympathy of the United Nations Commission."

Available documents expose the ignominious role played by certain leading figures of the United Nations in the preparation of the internecine war in Korea. It has already been mentioned above that a plan for an armed attack on the north was in strict confidence discussed by American and Rhee Syngman representatives with leading figures of the United Nations who were thus fully aware of these aggressive plans. The composition of the last United Nations Commission on Korea and its secretariat was chosen so as

not only to have in the commission a quite reliable screen but also to ensure that it assists in carrying out plans for an armed attack on north Korea.

In his letter to Rhee Syngman dated November 3, 1949, Cho Byung-ok reported with satisfaction that under the pressure of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. delegation, the president of the General Assembly and the secretary-general of the United Nations began to pay due attention to the nomination of appropriate members of the Commission. He pointed out that Syria, who had formerly created some difficulties in the Commission would be replaced by Turkey, and that the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie had appealed to member governments on the Commission to nominate to the Commission representatives with "strong convictions". Cho Byung-ok further stated that Trygve Lie and Mr. Cordier (American), Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General, had assured him that the five officials of the former Secretariat of the Commission with whom the Rhee Syngman government had been dissatisfied, would be replaced, and that "an entirely new and sound secretariat would be constituted".

Preparing an attack on the north, the Rhee Syngman clique and its American masters expected an easy victory. In the aforementioned letter to Ambassador Cho Byung-ok Rhee Syngman asserted with confidence that military operations against north Korea would present no difficulties. This confidence in easy victory was repeatedly expressed in public by Rhee Syngman and other representatives of the South Korean government.

The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had long since known of the aggressive anti-people's plans of the Rhee Syngman clique and strove to avoid a fratricidal civil war and took all measures it could to achieve the peaceful unification of our fatherland. The majority of the Korean people rallied around the program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forth by the United Democratic Fatherland Front back in June, 1949. This program was fully supported by the government of the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea. A proposal for the peaceful unification of the country was again proposed by the United Democratic Fatherland Front early in June, 1950. Taking into consideration the Korean people's striving for the peaceful unification of the country and the wishes of democratic political parties and social organizations, the Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in June, 1950, put forward a proposal for the peaceful unification of the country by uniting the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the National Assembly of south Korea.

From the above facts it is quite obvious why the Rhee Syngman clique whose main plan was to undertake an armed attack on the north invariably opposed these proposals for the peaceful unification of the country.

As far back as May, 1950, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea received reliable information to the effect that the Rhee Syngman clique had scheduled the attack on north Korea for mid-June, 1950. This enabled the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take timely measures for repulsing the attack of the Rhee Syngman troops.

"An easy victory" was the miscalculation of the Rhee Syngman clique and its American masters. In reply to the attack launched by the Rhee Syngman troops, the People's Army dealt them a devastating blow.

Seeing the rapid and complete defeat of their puppets in Korea, the American imperialists under the banner of the United Nations, embarked an open armed intervention against the Korean people.

The attempt of the American government to cover up their intervention in Korea with the resolution of the Secretary Council has met with utter defeat.

This resolution was passed after Truman had proclaimed the beginning of armed intervention and after American armed forces had attacked Korea, thus this resolution was in violation of funda-

mental principles and provisions of the United Nations Charter and can therefore have no legal force.

Contrary to the requirements of the United Nations Charter for the unanimity of Security Council permanent members, the aforementioned resolution was adopted in the absence of two permanent members,——the Soviet Union and China.

The pro-American majority in the Security Council based its resolution on the one-sided falsified reports submitted by the representatives of the corrupt Rhee Syngman government who are sworn traitors to the Korean people and by the United Nations Commission.

Representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were denied participation in the discussion of the Korean question of the Security Council.

The aforementioned resolution which sanctioned American aggression in Korea post factum constitutes the crudest violation of the United Nations Charter because it envisages armed intervention in the internal affairs of Korea, whereas the United Nations Charter directly prohibits the United Nations to interfere in the internal affairs of any state. Internal conflicts are not under the jurisdiction of the Security Council and every nation has the right to settle its affairs at its own discretion.

American armed intervention has aroused in the Korean people due hatred toward the American invaders. Having rallied around the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Korean people to a man rose up to struggle against the invaders, for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

Having met a decisive resistance from the People's Army and all the Korean people, the American invaders in revenge for the defeats they suffered on the front resorted to barbarous criminal methods of prosecuting the war, shamelessly trampling upon the rules of international law and human morality.

The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in its statements of August 5 and September 7 of the current year

informed the Security Council of these numerous crimes of the American invaders in Korea. However, the pro-American majority in Security Council ignored the protest of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and prevented taking measures for putting an end to the aforementioned crimes.

American air force continues brutal raids on defenseless Korean towns and villages, destroys dwellings depriving people of shelter and property, demolishes schools, theatres and other cultural institutions and with unprecedented brutality annihilates innocent civilians including old people, women and children. There are innumerable cases registered when public hospitals, garrison hospitals, and ambulances bearing clearly visible identification marks of the Red Cross were subjected to deliberate bombing.

As a result of the raids by the American air force, the town of Nampo, Ch'ongjin, Wonsan, Taejon, Kunsan. I-ri, Namwon, Chungju, Wonju, Pyongtack, Ansong, Uijongbu, Chumunjin, Tongduchon and a number of others have been completely destroyed.

All villages and small towns in south and north Korea situated along the highways have been razed to the ground. The number of casualties among the civilian population of north and south Korea is tremendous.

Having set itself the task of destroying Korean economy and placing the Korean people in a desperate position, the U.S. Army Headquarters dispatches air forces to industrial centers to destroy enterprises that have no connection whatever with military industry. Thus, as a result of a raid of American aircraft Korea's largest plant producing fertilizers in Hungnam, the Hwangha Iron Works, the sewing and knitted goods factories in Pyongyang Sunan and Wonsan, soya bean sauce and edible oil enterprises in Nampo, Wonsan, Pyongyang, Chumunjin, the non-ferrous metals plant in Nampo and many other enterprises have been destroyed.

All larger industrial enterprises and most of medium-size and small enterprises in Korea have been completely demolished by American air forces.

In their war against the Korean people the American invaders are not averse to the most monstrous crimes. They are vainly trying to break by cruelty the Korean people's will to resistance, to suppress their striving for liberty and independence.

Representing the will of the Korean people, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea once again voices a protest against the armed intervention in Korea and appeals to the United Nations that it condemns the atrocities of the American armed forces in Korea and take measures for the immediate cessation of the foreign intervention and for the withdrawal of the interventionists' troops from Korea.

I hereby demand that the contents of this statement of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be made known to all member nations of the United Nations and to inform me of the measures that will be taken on this score. I am also sending to you by air mail photostatic copies of the documents referred to in this statement.

Signed

Pak Hun-yung,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

September 28, 1950.
Pyongyang, Korea.

PART I

No. 1

LETTER FROM RHEE SYNGMAN TO CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED APRIL 10, 1949[1]

April 10, 1949

Dear Dr. Chough:

I thought your radiogram inquiring as to the advisability of openly asking for military aid was very timely. However, I did not wish to proceed openly in the matter for fear it might spoil some confidential arrangements made by Mr. Muccio, who was reported to have secured "something."[2] When he came to see me with Mr. Drumright, I quietly asked him what had been accomplished, and he said this: "The military aid has been granted and the President has signed certain documents relating to it." I am not sure whether he referred to the President's signature on the military aid request or on the ECA agreement. He further said that the publicity regarding a direct request for further military aid

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. Copy.
2. The words "to have secured something" are underlined in ink in the original.

might hurt the plan. I thought he was right. There are lots of people who oppose giving arms to Koreans as they would oppose giving sharp knives to children. Our enemies have spread propaganda to the effect that the ignorant, thoughtless Koreans might attack the Soviet Union, thus bringing about a clash between Russia and the United States. This idea is prevalent among some Americans in Korea even now. For such reasons, the thought of giving military aid to Korea is considered dangerous to the United States.

What you and I are trying to do is to convince the world that we are not as foolish as we have been represented to be. We must make it known that we can manage our own affairs as well as any other well organized nation can. It is in this respect that publicity work is most important. The Americans are beginning to learn more about us and their estimate of our strength and capability is rising higher every day. But unless we can be sure of having the support of some of the leading newspapers in the United States, it would be too risky to make an open demand for arms and ammunition. This is why I have thought it best to keep your mission confidential.

Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity when we have the opportunity to make our sentiments on this matter known to the proper authorities. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and ammunition than any other nation, largely because of conditions imposed upon us by the Great Powers themselves. At the same time, there is more reason for the United States to arm us than to arm any other people, because of the obligation it owes us.

We have more justifiable grounds for demanding arms than any other nation in the world. It was the United States that invited the Soviet Union to occupy northern Korea, and it was the United States that prevented us for two and a half years from arming ourselves. Despite these facts, among the nations of Northeast Asia, Korea is the only one that has been fighting the Communists successfully.

While the United States as the Arsenal of Democracy was freely granting Lend Lease aid and military equipments to every Allied nation, we were the only people denied the privilege of securing any aid. During all the past years we have had to fight the common enemy alone and unaided. Now as the Americans are withdrawing their occupation forces from Korea, would it not be a gross crime to leave us alone and unaided, ill equipped for national defense, while the north Korean Communist force is armed and aidod by the Soviet Union ? If the northern army should invade our country and force us to accept a Communist rule, would not the United States be responsible for it?

Ever since the attack on Pearl Harbor we urged and begged the State Department to give us military and economic assistance, so that after the defeat of Japan we would have an army of our own to defend our own homeland against Communist attack. We told them plainly that if the Communists were allowed to occupy Korea a situation would be created disadvantageous not only to Korea but also to the United States. This statement was made repeatedly, both orally and in writing, as is fully evidenced in the contents of the State Department files. They turned a deaf ear to our appeals, and you know the result. Both the United States and Korea are paying the price for the mistakes made by the State Department at that time.

Now we are asking for arms both for our own defense and for the security of the United States. If they fail us again, both Korea and the United States will suffer. We might as well go on record to this effect, to show that we see in advance what is coming and to warn against a repetition of the earlier mistake. Whether our American friends realize it or not, it is up to us to make plain the warning and the appeal.

I think you should frankly discuss this situation in fullest confidence with high officials of both the United Nations and the United States. In a strictly confidential manner tell them what plans we have for the unification of north and south. As a matter

of fact, we are ready for the unification now in every respect but one; namely, we lack arms and ammunition. A large proportion of the Korean Communist Army is ready to mutiny and help us chase out of the country such Communist hirelings as Kim Il Sung and others. And the civilian population in the north will join with them in cleaning up and keeping under control all the terroristic Communist elements. They are all ready to do it without our aid. They have asked us to give them the signal by radio or by other secret message, setting the time and date. In fact they are urging us to do it.

However, we are urging them to wait for the simple reason that we do not have sufficient arms and ammunition for the next necessary step. Supposing we do clean up the north and settle everything quietly to our satisfaction? Who is there to keep the Chinese Eighth Route Army, the Yenan group, and the Siberian forces from moving in again? We have to be prepared with a sufficient military force so that we can proceed into the north to join with our loyal army there, and to move the Iron Curtain from the 38th parallel up to the Yalu River, and there to guard it against infiltration from without.

For this operation we need two naval vessels of 8,000 tons each, with 18 inch guns, for the defense of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. We need fast running patrol boats to guard against Communist underground movements along our coasts. We need 200,000 soldiers trained and organized for defense along the northern border. We need planes for defense and anti-aircraft guns. And we need them now.

Some Americans worry about the lack of technicians, but they do not know that we have ten or twelve aviators who were among the best in Japan, three of whom were accounted the best in the Orient. We have sea captains who can direct our merchant marine. For our army, we can organize a force of 200,000 men in a short time. We have several hundred thousand returned soldiers who were forced to join the conscript army during the war. They are,

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Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity when we have the opportunity to make our sentiments on this matter known to the proper authorities. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and ammunition than any other nation, largely because of conditions imposed upon us by the Great Powers themselves. At the same time, there is more reason for the United States to arm us than to arm any other people, because of the obligation it owes us.

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 1

in fact, veteran soldiers. They were put into the front lines by the Japanese, and many of them were killed in the South Pacific Island and Manchurian operations. Most of the officers were trained in Japanese universities. People do not know much about them for they keep quiet for fear they may be branded as pro-Japanese. They are loyal citizens and are ready to give their lives for their country. If we get sufficient arms, we can prepare them in no time.

This outline will show you why I wish you to keep the request confidential, and also suggests the line of approach you may find effective in your talks with United States and United Nations officials. Our need is great, and it will be disastrous for both Korea and the United States if it is not heeded. The mistake of withholding arms from Koreans must not be made again, as it was made during the war.

I shall expect your confidential reports on the reactions you receive from the high officials, and we shall try to help in all ways we can from here.

Sincerely yours,

[*Rhee Syngman*][3]

Dr. Pyung Ok Chough
Washington DC

Footnotes.

3. Inserted by the editor; in the original a blank was left for personal signature.

No 2

MEMORANDUM OF RHEE SYNGMAN TO CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, AND CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTANTIARY AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED JULY 18, 1949[1]

July 18, 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : Ambassadors Chang and Chough
From : President Syngman Rhee

Ambassador Chang's letters of 13th with the enclosures and the Korean letter, and Ambassador Chough's letters of July 7 and 12 have arrived. I will make my answer to you both in the form of a memorandum so that it will answer both of your letters.

Since Ambassador Chough represents this government to the UN with complete authority to take up any matter I wonder whe-

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Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. Copy.

ther it is necessary for you to get separate authorization in making membership application to various organizations belonging to the UN. If necessary, we will make separate credentials each time. But you have the authority to apply after being authorized by your government for memberships to UNWHO and UNESCO.

I feel that you should have someone to be in charge of the office during your absence. The young man you suggest cannot be adequate to act in your behalf. He is young and his qualifications are limited altogether. He is not the person for such a position. Roy Kim who was serving in AMG[2] as one of the officers in the Property Custody is now visiting with the Businessmen's Goodwill Party. We have used him in our office for some time and he proves himself very helpful and careful. He speaks and writes English very well and takes shorthand. If you care to use him, wire me at once and we will arrange to have him remain there to help you.

I am sure your trip to Canada will be highly successful and hope you will find it enjoyable as well.

Ambassador Chang's report on the interviews made together with Dr. Chough came together with Ambassador Chough's report covering the nearly same although your report is more in detail from which I gather more of the true aspects. I thank you for them.

I am so happy that our two Ambassadors in America are working in such complete cooperation. Very few representatives of other countries have shown such good spirit. I have nothing to worry about at that end and that harmony alone is sufficient to increase the prestige and solidity of our people and government.

As you will find my answer covering the general topics in my memorandum a copy of which will be sent to Dr. Chough, I am

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Footnotes.

2. **"American Military Government."**

answering several questions relating only to the matters of personal interest. I am sorry to disappoint you but the chancery building project is far beyond our limit. In the first place we have no money to meet this obligation. If we can pay in Korean Won we can meet it but since we have to pay in dollars we cannot pay $50,000 for the building with the equipments and the architect and all that. If you want to build it half a year or so later when we have some of our gold mines developed and some commodities exported we may be able to consider it, but at the present time it is a matter of physical impossibility. Why don't you make a temporary arrangement for the chancery to be accommodated in the Embassy building and get along as best as you can. The architects do not have to be so high-priced people. We can get some smaller companies 2 or 3 companies be invited to submit their bids and if their plan is satisfactory we agree to pay so much. I do not think we have to pay 10 per cent fee for the plan alone, and that building also need not be so complete. Please do all you can to minimize the obligation on dollar basis as much as you can.

It seems to me that J.J. Williams is taking more time in our service than I thought he could spare. If he keeps up as he is doing now please quietly ask him what his railroad fares are and we might grant him expenses on a diem basis if he is in Washington. I am afraid if we ask him to present his bills we might not be able to pay for it.

REGARDING STAGGERS.

We are not paying him anything for his service or even the time he spends. Ask him confidentially how much you should give him not as compensation but actually for the time he uses in serving us—if he does any important work you ask him to do. We do not want him to have a hand in everything but what you think is important. Everything should be itemized so that it will go on our files. All these things must be understood so that you are to decide what expense to pay and what not. That is to say, when you deliberately ask them to do certain things you

must clearly state that their carefares[3] and hotel bills you will pay. No one in the Embassy's service Korean or foreign should decide so much for one trip.

Sorry I had to take this paragraph out[4]. We received the papers for the SS Washington bought by the ECA.

About the Washington mail. We are still trying to make the ECA pay for it because the boat was not chartered by the Korean Government. Please do not pay unless you have direct orders from me.

REGARDING NATIONAL DEFENSE

We declare that our defense program consists of the following figures: 100,000 standing army; 200,000 reserve force and 100,000 police force; total of 400,000 are to be trained and equipped for our national defense. We have now 35,000 police and it will take a long time to reach that maximum number, but that is our aim. I do not think anybody can interpret it as militaristic expansion project.

The American officials in Washington are of the information that 50,000 fully armed, 15,000 lightly armed, and 35,000 police reasonably armed. These are the information furnished by General Roberts and we cannot give full credence to his reports. We are going to check these.

Since the beginning of the arms discussion I appointed our government representatives to sign the receipt of every item that we receive from the Americans and ask them to get the signature of the American officials showing what they are turning over to us and what we are receiving. There will be no disagreement in

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Footnotes.

3. As in the original, evidently misspelt.
4. The preceding paragraph (regarding the steamship Washington) has been crossed out in the original and is omitted here.

the reports regarding the quantities of arms and ammunition we receive.

You have already received one list of the materials turned over to us. As soon as we have another list we shall not fail to forward it to you.

MILITARY AID

The ECA bill should be passed before we take up the military aid. I am glad our Ambassadors and our friends have done so well that the ECA bill is progressing very nicely and I hope this will be adopted by the end of this month. However, the military aid is the most important one. If things come out as I hope I am sure we will get a large portion of the military aid appropriation of 1 billion 4 million dollars requested by President Truman for several European nations and Korea. These funds will be handled solely by President Truman, and I hope we can convince the President that Korea needs a lion's share, and I believe we deserve it. America's investment on Korea will pay more dividend to the United States than all the other receiving nations can yield. However, we must pave the way and if there is any obstacle we must leave no stone unturned until such obstacles are removed. General Roberts, head of the military mission was chosen by Gen. Hodge because Roberts' idea regarding Korea are just about the same. Roberts has no sympathy whatever for the Korean people or for the government. The best way to handle this question is to use Dr. Chough's suggestion that we ask for an official of a higher rank to head the mission. I am confidentially sending word to Gen. MacArthur asking him to appoint Gen. Coulter to head the mission. Whether Gen. MacArthur is in a position to do it or not is more or less uncertain. At any rate the presence of Gen. Roberts here at this time is not helpful to say the least, and if we can possibly get him out of Korea our case will be won hundred percent. Of course, we do not make this an open issue just as China did about General Stilwell. If we can succeed in quietly replacing him it would

all be the better. If not we may have to make open demand which we are trying to avoid.

It was very wise of you and friends in Washington to advise us against any attempt to purchase weapons of war or planes at this time. I was so mad when they said we had more weapons than necessary and we did not need planes or naval vessels since the United States planes could be here within four or five hours, and I told them that we are going to arm ourselves sufficiently for our protection either with or without United States aid. We inquired all around and we have offers of all kinds of weapons but we have postponed it. We are appointing competent men to survey the entire field of our defense program and make a complete list of things we need and let you have it as soon as we can.

LOAN PAYMENT

We have mailed you the minutes of my conversations with Ambassador Muccio. Please go over carefully the part covering the loan of $25,000,000 the payment for the U.S. war surplus materials as both of you know the circumstances surrounding the signing of this loan are highly questionable. Although the agreement was signed by the Representative Democratic Council and was also included in the financial settlement agreement, none of us ever thought that we would be asked to pay it and I had to be quite frank with Ambassador Muccio regarding it. They told me that we had to sign and I told them that we would rather pay it out of our aid fund and forget it. They can do as they please with the money which is supposed to be spent for the educational work of Americans. The Fulbright Act regulations are such that we have little voice in the matter. We are to spend money for the educational purpose in Korea and pay the expenses for American professors to come and lecture here and all that. They said that the Committee is composed of four Americans and four Koreans with the American Ambassador here as Chairman. That is not all.

They asked us to sell the Banto Hotel together with a number of some important buildings in Seoul. As a matter of fact we do not want to go on the record that the Korean government sold any of our properties to any foreign government and we would rather offer them as a gift with the understanding that when they are through with the buildings sooner or later they will give the Korean government the first opportunity to purchase it back according to the prevailing market price then. And we made the deeds including the words "free gift" and the paper was beautifully made and presented in a ceremony in presence of American and Korean officials. Now they told me that Washington declined to accept it as a gift. They want to deduct several million dollars as their price out of the $25,000,000 loan. I do not know if I should ask you to take it up with the State Department and find out their definite reply regarding this or let it go as it is. I am requested to sign the Fulbright proposition and as I do not wish to show my ugly face I am inclined to sign it whatever it is.

REGARDING OFFICIAL STATEMENT.

I know that the June 8th statement was meant to be the guarantee that we asked them to make but it was not at all sufficient and our newspapers make quite a headline. If such a statement has any value at all the publicity about it in America should make it worth any. Time and again we found out that any such statements regarding international situation does not mean much unless the American people are informed of the fact that their nation is commiting itself to certain obligations. Whether the State Department will make it known to America to that extent I do not know.

The treaty of commerce and amity is rather urgent. American businessmen are so anxious to open trade. We cannot afford to make an open door to everybody without any rules or regulations

and therefore we are very anxious to get this commerce treaty signed soon.

REGARDING CHINHAE BAY.

We had another visit by a unit of the United States Pacific Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Binford. We had a little conversation with him and he is so impressed of the Bay and of our situation in general that he suggested we address a letter to the commanding officer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to accept our offer of the privilege of using all our open ports as temporary mobile bases. That means they can visit and stop or stay anytime at our invitation, and I think it would be helpful for both countries in safeguarding peace and security of the Pacific. Such a letter will be sent soon.

Since no naval or air officer of high rank can be employed by the Korean Government as it being against the law of the United States—we may have to find some other way of securing the services of able, experienced United States officials. Whether we should ask President Truman or the State Department authorities I do not know. If you think it available please quietly call on Admiral Yarnel and give him the best regards from Mrs. Rhee and myself to him and Mrs. Yarnel. They are our good friends. I would like you to tell him that we should like him to come and visit us as our guest sometime in the near future, if he would accept our invitation. When he comes we could ask him to stay and he may suggest some plan. However, it should be done as top secret. Of course, we do not want to create any impression that we are giving any of our naval or air base to the United States or any other foreign power because that will create bad impression all around. You understand that, I am sure.

Noble's article seems to reflect the idea of the officials in the State Department. These are all the views of the pro-Japanese sentiment. We strongly object to the Japanese possession of Manchuria. If Japan had to have it she may be allowed to take

north of Mukden up to Harbin and Vladivostok. But from Mukden to south Korea we will not allow any other nation to occupy it even temporarily. We will fight to the nail, and this idea should be gradually made known, although at present people may misunderstand our motive and the result may be hurtful to us. We might as well let the world know that we are strongly opposed to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria or any other part especially the part adjacent to Korea. We will never allow Japan to occupy that part of Manchuria without our opposition.

From Noble's article in the Saturday Evening Post you will see that he is propagandizing that Japan should be included in the Pacific Periphery Alliance which each state is bound to defend Japan. If you would particularly read Page 82 you will see that arming Japan is the main purpose of this article and is sugar-coated enough to make the American people take it. Particularly on the second column of Page 84 he outlined that the first half of the Pacific Periphery Alliance should be strong precise military alliance. The second pact is the Asiatic Pacific Pact which includes Korea, should be etc. etc.

No. 3

LETTER FROM RHEE SYNGMAN TO DR. ROBERT T. OLIVER, AN AMERICAN PROFESSOR, DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1949[1]

September 30, 1949

To : Dr. Robert T. Oliver

From : President Syngman Rhee

I received your letters and thank you for them.

I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or anything of that kind. Please contact Mr. K.[2] and Mr. Mead in a very confidential way and find out all what is necessary. In case you think that it would not be advisable to employ Mr. K.[3] in regard to what Mr. W.[4] told you we may have to drop the matter. In my last letter I asked you to find out from the National Press Club more about K.[5] We simply cannot engage anyone who has not a good business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with this matter.

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. Copy.

2-5. As in the original.

There is some criticism about the work we are doing. But I wrote to them that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly terms with everybody and carry on your work at your best ability. The more I think of your work the more I feel convinced that you can be more helpful here in Korea. I need someone to take care of my important work and I am thinking seriously of asking you to come at the end of your term of service in the university. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep it in mind and as soon as you can get out I wish you would come and work for me right in my office. How often I wish we had you here.

I wish I had time to write out from time to time some of my thoughts relating to the changing events both here and in America. So far it has been impossible. I will try however. One thing is that I want to tell you briefly concerning our situation.

I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join with our loyal communist army in the north to clean up the rest of them in Pyengyang. We will drive some of Kim Il-sung's men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position. The natural boundary line along the river and the Paikdoo Mts can be made almost impenetrable with sufficient number of planes and two or three fast running naval vessels standing at the mouths of the two rivers with fighting planes defending all the coast lines including Cheju Island. What Koreans of old did repeatedly during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against great invasions of Emperor Tang, Emperor Soo, the Mongols and the Japs. I believe we are ready to repeat the successful defense of our nation against foreign invasions. All the Chinese, Japanese and the Korean communist army in Manchuria and Siberia may do all they want to but we will be able to fight them off. We want to do regardless of what outside nations may do against us. I believe the Soviet Union will not be foolhardy enough to start invasions at the present time. Our

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Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 3

people are clamoring for it. Our people in the north want us to let them do it now but we are doing everything we can to quiet them down and it is a mighty difficult task. I want you to express this situation very clearly and convincingly and show a copy to Ambassador Chang and Ambassador Chough. We will all quietly work together, you in Washington and in New York and our two Ambassadors and other friends, and we here in Seoul and Tokyo toward one end; that they agree to our cleaning up and setting our house in order. Use the old phrase that Churchill used once, "Give us the tools and we will do the job." Convince the American statesmen and the general public and let them quietly agree that we go ahead and carry out our program and give us all the material backing we need. The longer we drag along the harder it will be. Soviet's cold war is always a winning war. First they give the communist agitators money, weapons and propaganda literature to stir up the people to fight among themselves. Then later they get the communist converts into a gang of terrorists, assassins and robbers by killing, and burning and making the whole human society hell. So long as they continue robbing they have enough to support themselves. They do everything to make trouble for others. By so doing the communists are strengthening themselves and spreading wider and digging deeper all the time. The more robbery they commit the more money they get. With the money they carry on their killing and burning activities. But the nationalists everywhere have no one to count on for help. They have to use every means of their own to defend themselves and these sort of things continue herein hereout. They cannot keep fighting. They are forced sooner or later to give in and that is what happened in China and everywhere else. What the Americans are doing now in the so-called cold war is a losing battle and if we continue in this losing battle by sitting still and warding off these gangsters no human flesh and nerve can hold on very long. When the Koreans are willing to get up and clean them up once and for all it is the most psyshological moment to do it now. I am

sure we can settle this question within a reasonable short time if we are only allowed to do it.

Please put this whole story in a very convincing statement and quietly approach some influential people here and there and let us get their support. If you could get this story into President Truman's ear I think it will have some desired effect.

No. 4

REPORT OF CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PERMANENT OBSERVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED OCTOBER 12, 1949[1]

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 3-4420[2]

CABLE ADDRESS
KORUNMISON[3]

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Rd[5] EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 6010
350 FIFTH AVENUE . NEW YORK I.N.Y.[4]

October 12, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Heated discussions are going on now at Lake Success on such

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government.

2-4. Letterhead.

5. Marked in pencil by Rhee Syngman personally, presumably an abbreviation of "read."

important problems as the Greek problem, the Italian Colonies, Human Rights and Religious Freedom, the China question and Atomic Energy Control.

As for our problem it will probably come up before the General Assembly in the latter part of next week even though there may be usual delay tactics that will be employed by the Soviet Bloc. The resolution affecting Korea which had been adopted at the Special Political Committee will certainly pass through the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority.

AS REGARDS JOHNSTON

In compliance with your wishes, I had taken up the case of Dick Johnston with General Adler of The New York Times and he had assured me that he would not make an immediate change of position for Johnston, which fact was indicated also in General Adler's letter to me.

I have made an appointment with Mr. Sultzberger for today to deliver personally your letter to him.

YOUR LETTER TO OLIVER

It was with great care and interest that I read your letter to Dr. Oliver with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet regime in the North. The proposals you expounded therein are, under the circumstances prevailing, the only logical and ultimate method of bringing about our desired unification. However, after taking into consideration all the factors involved I am inclined to view that the time is not opportune as yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our preparedness, and the international opinion will not approve of such an action to be taken. It must be recalled that the Greek Government itself has been persuaded by the friendly powers from taking military steps against Albania.

I do not see what or how Oliver can do under the present circumstances in connection with this serious problem. I am sure he cannot publicize such a proposal as our fixed government policy. Nor do I think that it would be wise for him to make public such matters of secret import. I have discussed it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that this matter should be regarded as the basic plan of our Government that should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune.

Dear Mr. President, please forgive me for laying before you such outspoken views but I should like to assure you that I have felt that it is my bounding duty to be candid in order to be of loyal service to you.

PACIFIC PACT

Ambassador Chang and I have had a full exchange of views on the subject matter. In view of the situation existing, which was described in my last report, we do not see how the proposal you have in mind can be effected as a reality. The matter of the Pacific Pact is entirely entrusted by Quirino in the hands of Romulo and he in turn has a program somewhat different from that which you, Generalissimo Chiang and President Quirino had in mind. He has lined up already such important countries as India, Australia, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, etc. This Romulo plan is being backed by the United States. So long as the Chinese Nationalist Government cannot recover its prestige there is really no hope of carrying out the original plans of a Pacific Pact.

THE CHINESE SITUATION

We have been hoping that the Chinese Government will defend Canton but, alas, that refugee city is given up and the Central Government of China is being moved to Chungking.

The deteriorating of the Chinese situation creates indeed a world tragedy, especially affecting us. There is a great deal of talk reported in the press here about the possibility of recognizing the communist regime by such countries as the United Kingdom, India

and other commonwealth countries. Should the world situation develop in such a manner there will be confusion and discouragement within the entire plank of democracies fighting communism. If such nonsensical international policies should play a full sway the United Nations Commission on Korea itself will prove to be an embarrassing agency to our Government. I pray such things will not come true. I hope the American people will wake up to the real situation they are facing now.

With a sense of loyalty and esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Chough, Pyung Ok[6]

Ambassador Plenipotentiary, Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of Korea and Permanent Observer to the United Nations.

POC:fp

H.E. Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea

Footnotes.

6. Signed by Cho Byung-ok personally.

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 5-4480

CABLE ADDRESS
KOREMISSION

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 5010
350 FIFTH AVENUE - NEW YORK 1, N.Y.

October 12, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Heated discussions are going on now at Lake Success on such important problems as the Greek problem, the Italian Colonies, Human Rights and Religious Freedom, the China question and Atomic Energy Control.

As for our problem it will probably come up before the General Assembly in the latter part of next week even though there may be usual delay tactics that will be employed by the Soviet Bloc. The resolution affecting Korea which had been adopted at the special Political Committee will certainly pass through the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority.

AS REGARDS JOHNSTON

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I do not see what or how Dr. Oliver can do under the present circumstances in connection with this serious problem. I am sure he cannot publicize such a proposal as our Korean government policy. Nor do I think that it would be wise for him to make public such matters of secret import. I have discussed it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that this matter should be regarded as the secret plan of our Government that should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune.

Dear Mr. President, please forgive me for laying before you such outspoken views but I should like to assure you that I have felt that it is my bounding duty to be candid in order to be of loyal service to you.

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Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 4

No. 5

REPORT OF CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PERMANENT OBSERVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1949[1]

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 6010
350 FIFTH AVENUE—NEW YORK 1, N.Y.[2]

November 3, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to make a brief report covering the following subjects:

THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In view of the fact that I have made telegraphic reports at the

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Footnotes.

1: This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government.

2. Letterhead.

various stages of the deliberations, that you must have heard a detailed report from Harold Noble and that various official documents of the United Nations covering proceedings on the Korean discussion are to be sent to the Foreign Minister, I shall not dwell much upon details of the deliberations. I want only to point out that the Four Powers draft resolution was passed by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority; that is to say, 48 to 6, in spite of the opposition from the Soviet Bloc. It is gratifying to note those friendly nations which had supported Korea's case in Paris last year are still steady and strong in sympathy toward Korea, in spite of the continuous and tragic development in China since then.

THE NEW FEATURES OF THE RESOLUTION

The characteristic difference between the December 12th, 1948 resolution and the present Four Powers draft resolution lies in the fact that the present resolution emphasizes the urgency of observation on the security situation existing in Korea now, and in the future. That is the reason why military experts are to be attached to the United Nations Commission on Korea. With the unification of Korea as the ultimate objective, the Commission's chief function this year is to make observations on the security situation. The second difference is found in that the existence of the Commission is indefinite; it will continue its work until the problem of unification has been achieved.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMISSION

I am happy to report that as the result of strong presentation made by our Delegation, the United States Delegation and the State Department, the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the Secretariat seemed to have given due attention to the need of strenthening the Commission. Syria is dropped and Turkey is nominated in lieu of that former troublesome member country. Secretary-General Lie has further assured

me he had requested various member governments on the United Nations Commission on Korea to nominate their representatives from among persons of strong conviction and high experience and rank, with a view of having a system of permanent chairmanship that will insure steady and stabilized functioning of the Commission.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT

As I reported to you by radiogram, Mr. Bertil Renborg was appointed as the new principal secretary in lieu of Dr. Wertheimer. The Secretary-General and Mr. Cordier (American), Executive Assistant to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, have assured me that Mr. Renborg is a man of strong conviction and leadership. He is a Swedish citizen and has been in charge of the Division of Communications and Records. He had ten years' experience in the foreign service of the Swedish Government. They further have assured me that those five objectionable persons; namely Shahbaz, Katz, and three others will be changed and that an entirely new and sound secretariat will be constituted.

FACILITIES FOR THE COMMISSION

Both the Secretary-General and Mr. Cordier requested me to convey to our Government their wishes that our Government improve material facilities, especially hotel accomodations, which I did reply to you already by radiogram. As regards this point my attention was drawn even before this conference with the United Nations authorities by Dr. Liu and Noble. They all suggested that our Government should open Chosun Hotel to the members of the Commission and the principal secretary with reduced rate so as to enable them to live comfortably with their per diem allowances they receive from the United Nations. I personally agree with this suggestion. I now make a strong recommendation to the Foreign Ministry that such new arrangements be made as regards hotel accommodations.

REMAINDER OF AGENDA THAT IS OF CHIEF CONCERN TO US

The General Assembly is busy with the deliberations on various important problems but our delegation is principally interested in the question of membership impasse and the Chinese question. As I already reported to you, the Australian delegation submitted to the Special Political Committee the 9 separate draft resolutions requesting the Security Council to reconsider the membership applications of Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Republic of Korea and Nepal and a heated debate is going on at the present time on these Australian resolutions. In spite of Soviet opposition these resolutions will pass in the Special Political Committee and also will be passed by the General Assembly.

Our delegation is particularly interested in the Chinese problem because the opinion of the General Assembly expressed on the Chinese question will be of important consequences on the future status of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and will have great influence on some countries such as the United Kingdom, India, Australia, etc., who are said to be in favor of according some form of recognition to the Red Regime in China. I hope the Chinese delegation will be able to obtain a favorable decision of the United Nations General Assembly on their proposal. We have to do everything possible to check the growing tendency on the part of some important countries to grant recognition to the Chinese Communist Government, because if that should happen that will bring about confusion and disruption within the rank of the democratic countries fighting communism, and also our country will be directly effected since the Red China together with those countries that will recognize it will sit on the Korean Commission.

STATUS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES JOHNSTON

With regard to Johnston's case, I previously reported that I had a personal discussion with General Adler who then promised due consideration about Johnston's stay in Korea. And in compliance with further instructions from you, I conveyed your message

and had discussions with Mr. Sultzberger of The New York Times. Differing from Adler's attitude, he definitely told me Johnston had to be allowed to come back to the United States in view of the fact that he had been abroad for more than 3 years and he desired to join his family here in New York. However, he assured me that he would assign the best possible man to Korea. He told me that one Mr. Sullivan, who was stationed in Shanghai, might be assigned to Korea. Mr. Sultzberger's letter to you is enclosed herewith.

DEFENSE MINISTER'S STATEMENT AND ITS EFFECT

Defense Minister Shin's statement, which was published in Tokyo and appeared in the dailies here, is a source of grave misconstruction both at Washington and Lake Success. I am myself of the opinion that statement which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune under the date of November 1st is not timely and discreet in substance. For your reference a copy of that release is enclosed herewith. In connection with your letter to Dr. Oliver dealing with the same problem, I expressed my own frank view with a sense of loyalty to you. I am of the firm conviction that unification of Korea can be brought about only through exercise of the sovereign power of our Government. Any policy of compromise or conferences is out of the question, which truth has been demonstrated in our past bitter experiences by the habitual tactics that are used everywhere by the Soviet Union to obtain world hegemony. The cold war cannot go on indefinitely like this. All these world problems could not be possibly solved without a third world war. Our plan of achieving unification must be mapped out in march with the developments of the world situation as a whole. In the meantime, our national preparedness in military power and economic strength is the most compelling task imposed upon our Government. Such are the views I dare to express with utmost frankness which I beg you to give full consideration. I am sure Dr. Chang will make a report on his part. I am doing the same based on my discussions with some important delegates at Lake Success.

MR. KIM AND MISS MOH

Mr. Kim has been very helpful to me after his assignment to my headquarters. His charming personality, his command of good English and his wide acquaintances with the Press all have contributed to this. I am really grateful to you for assigning him for a further period. As for Miss Moh, I have changed my original recommendation for her return. This change has been influenced by the fact that Mr. Kim will be absent for at least 2 or 3 weeks on his mission to the South American countries and also that Miss Moh herself desires to stay here until after the adjournment of the Chinese question at the United Nations. I hope you will approve her stay through the month of November at least.

SOME OF MY FINANCIAL REQUESTS

Ever since my appointment to this country I have tried to manage my personal and official affairs within the boundaries of the budget. In spite of this my financial condition is not in good shape. I need a further allowance of at least $1000 to adjust the financial situation I am faced with. I made three special trips to Canada, Indiana (Yarnel), and to Virginia and South Carolina (Halsey). In connection with these trips I spent $650; Canada ($500), Indiana ($250), Virginia and South Carolina ($100). And Miss McIntyre began to send our rent here beginning the period July 1st. But, as you know, the Empire State Building office was contracted from the month of June. Therefore I need another remittance for $250 covering that period. So I should like to have another remittance of $1000 in connection with these items.

Further I request you to permit my wife to buy $1000 exchange. I need that amount for my personal use, for purchasing some books, personal effects and for additional dental treatment. Especially I have to buy books, old and new, in foreign languages. My library was gone during the days of my prison life and its aftermath under the Japanese regime. Some winter clothing is also

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 5-4620

CABLE ADDRESS
KORUNMISO

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 6010
350 FIFTH AVENUE - NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

November 3, 1949

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honour to make a brief report covering the following subjects:

THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

In view of the fact that I have made telegraphic reports at the various stages of the deliberations, that you must have heard a detailed report from Harold Noble and that various official documents of the United Nations covering proceedings on the Korean discussion are to be sent to the Foreign Minister, I shall not dwell much upon details of the deliberations. I want only to point out that the Four Powers draft resolution was passed by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority; that is to say, 48 to 6, in spite of the opposition from the Soviet Bloc. It is gratifying to note those friendly nations which had supported Korea's case in Paris last year are still steady and strong in sympathy toward Korea, in spite of the continuous and tragic development in China since then.

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H.E. Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 5

TELEPHONE
LONGACRE 3-4420

CABLE ADDRESS
KORUNMISON

PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING
ROOM 5010
350 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK 1, N.Y.

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With a sense of loyalty and esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours,

John M. Chang

Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary, Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of Korea and Permanent Observer to the United Nations.

POC:fp
Enclosures

Photostatic copy of the last page of Document No. 5

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With a sense of loyalty and esteem, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Chough Byung Ok[3]

Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary, Personal Representative of the President of the Republic of Korea and Permanent Observer to the United Nations.

POC: fp
Enclosures

Footnotes.

3. Signed by Cho Byung-ok personally.

No. 6

LETTER FROM CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED JANUARY 11, 1950[1]

Confidential[2]

KOREAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON. D.C.[3]

January 11, 1950

Your Excellency:

This letter is being prepared just before the pouch leaves for the airport so that I may give you some encouraging news which I have received confidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan, Korea will occupy an important position. I have every hope that we will get much more help, militarily speaking, as a result.

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government.
2. This is hand-written and under-lined in ink in the original.
3. Letterhead.

Confidential

KOREAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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I have had word from a confidential source in the State Department that President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant permission for armament for Korean ships and planes. Thus I am confident that there will be no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on the Bakdusan, for the President's order will remove the principal and important obstacle.

The Turkish representative on UNCOK has met with me and I found him to be a strong and sympathetic person. I feel sure he will make a good Commission member.

With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Respectfully yours,

John M. Chang

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea

Photostatic copy of Document No. 6

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With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Repectfully yours,

John M. Chang[4]

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea

Footnotes

4. Signed by Chang Myun personally.

No. 7

LETTER FROM YOON PEONG-KOO, ADVISER TO RHEE SYNGMAN ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED DECEMBER 3, 1948[1]

3568½ S. VAN NESS AVENUE
LOS ANGELES 7, CALIF.[2]

Dec. 3rd, 1948

President Syngman Rhee
Republic of Korea
Office of the President
Kyung Mu Dai, Seoul, Korea.

Dear President:

I received your radiogram this morning and I, hereby, thank you for your granting of the time to nurse my wound and to postpone my coming till early spring, to serve you and my country.

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government.
2. Letterhead.

Touching on the international affairs and of combatting the threat of Communism against Korea and China, I take the liberty of repeating what I had written you about before and that is: the die is cast that East Asia, like any other immediately threatened spots in the world, has either to submit to Communist conquest without resistence[3] or prepare to fight for survival, and that every true-hearted patriot in America, Korea, Japan, and China shall offer self, service and substance for the latter alternative. But to carry on the coming struggle to a victorious conclusion, the forces of defence such as the armies of America, Japan, China and Korea must be coordinated and led by a supreme Commander with triple objectives, namely: The Japanese push through North-eastward and pass Vladivostock; Korean and American armies, after liberating our Northern territory, march through Liatong penninsula and up to Harbin; and a re-viatlized[4] Chinese Nationalist army to recover China's lost territory including Shantong Province; and after such a victorious conclusion, the Korean and American armies hold Manchuria unitl[5] the cost of liberation by[6] fully repaid by means of the developments of the natural resouceses[7] of that part of East Asia by the combined capital and labor of Manchuria, Korea, and America and that until democracy and peace be furmly[8] established there.

In the next reshaping of Far East, Japan should be made to be content with the preponderant influence to be acquired over Vladivostock and a part of Siberia but never again over Korea and Manchuria for the simple reason that were Japan allowed to become an imperialistic nation again, her vengeful spirit shall kindle again and burn the heart and soul of every Japanese however much she may be witewashed[9] with American benevolence and democracy, and Japan shall prepare to redeem herself from the humiliating surrender that she had to offer on a U.S.S. battleship; and secondly, perhaps embarce[10] Russia as an ally and try to embark

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Footnotes.

3-10. As in the original, evidently misspelt.

upón a venture to conquer the world, again. The only way to nip such a pótential danger to become a reality, lies in making Korea and China as strong as Japan so as to have one and all serve as mutual check and balance, and in the event of Russia's attack, that the three, with America's cooperation, may serve as a united defender.

No doubt you have a better plan than what I have said herein above concerning the future destiny of Asia, but I repeat these viewpoints to the end that I, not you who are the supreme leader of thirty Million Koreans, may become the target of enemy's attack and ridicule in case our plans happen to be leaked out or intercepted by the enemy.

Faithfully yours

Peong Koo Yoon [11]

Footnotes.

11. Signed by Yoon Peong-koo personlly.

No. 8

LETTER FROM YOON PENG-KOO, ADVISER TO RHEE SYNGMAN ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED APRIL 18, 1949 AND ATTACHED DRAFT OF THE "U.S.—KOREAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE"[1]

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER
OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATIONS
AND
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT BUILDING
SEOUL, REPUBLIC OF KOREA.[2]

18 April 1949

President Syngman Rhee
Office of the President
Capital Bldg., Seoul.

Dear President:

This enclosure is the concluding portion of a rough draft of Korean-American treaty of alliance. In order to keep the content

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Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government.
2. Letterhead.

of this draft strrictly[3] secret, I, after drafting it, typed with my own hands. I request you to destroy it if you do not find it to be of any use. On the other hand, if you desire such a treaty, the first step tp[4] open a negotiation will be to discuss the feasibility with Mr. Muccio at a private dinner, quoting me as the one who had written about it to Mr. Dean Acheson while I was in Los Angels; you may add that the substance of the draft was brought to the attention of President Truman through a letter last December. To open the discussion in this way will free you from an embarrasing situation in case Mr. Muccio does not see the Korea-America-Russia problem as you or I do.

As your adviser on foreign affairs, I feel that I ought to express my opinion about Dr. Cho, your roving ambassador who is now in America. He seems to be ~~be~~ talking too much, thus putting not only you but also the leaders in the U.S. Government in embarrassing situation by[5] broadcasting such matters as of his requesting for arms aid. His asking for aid is one thing and getting what he asks is quite another but even before he knew anything about the fate of his request. Cho broadcasted about it. No diplomat of any grain of salt would do such silly thing.

As to the under-current of public opinion on internal politics, I will report later in a separate letter.

I add my grateful sentiment to you and to Mrs Rhee for her visitation during the few days of my confinement in a sick bed.

Respectfully yours
Peong Koo Yoon[6]

Footnotes.

3-4. As in the original, evidently misspelt.

5. The words "in embarrassing situation by" are insterted in ink.

6. Signed by Yoon Peong-koo personally.

ROUGH DRAFT OF TREATY OF ALLIANCE

His Excellency, the President of the United States of America, and His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea,

Whereas they desire to consolidate the friendship and to maintain and to perpatuate[1] the relations of good understanding between their respective countries; and

Whereas His Excellency, the President of the United States of America, and His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea consider that the relations which will exist between them as independent Sovereigns should be defined by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance and amity;

Have agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose on terms of complete freedom, equality and independence which will become operative following the ratifications, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries;

John Doe of U.S.A. and
John Doe of Republic of Korea

Who having communicated their full powers, found in due form, have agreed as follows: —

Article 1. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the United States of America and Republic of Korea; and there shall be established between the high contracting parties a close alliance in consecration of their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations and for the purpose of common defence, and there shall be full and frank consultation between the two Chief Executives in all matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests.

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to adopt including foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent

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Footnotes.

1. As in the original, evidently misspelt.

with the alliance or might create difficuties for the other party thereat.

Article 2. Each of the high contracting party will be represented at the Court of the other high contracting party by a deplomatic[2] representative duly accredited.

Article 3. Should any dispute between the Republic of Korea and a third State produce a situation which involves the risk of a rupture with that State, the high Contracting parties will concert together with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of United Nations Charter and of and other international obligations which may be applicable to the case.

Article 4. Should, notwithstanding the provisions of article 3 above, either of the high contracting parties become engaged in war, the other high contracting party will, subject always to the provisions of article below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally. In the event of an imminent manace[3] of war the high contracting parties will immediately concert together the necessary measures of defence.

The aid of His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea in the event of war or the imminent threat of war will consist in furnishing to His Excellency, the President of the United States of America on Korean territory all facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of railway, rivers, forts, aerodromes and means of communications.

Article 5. The aid of his Excellency, the President of the United States of America in the event of war or the imminent of war will consist of furnishing to His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Korea on Korean territory all the facilities in his power, including the armed forces of the United States of America,

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Footnotes

2-3. As in the original, evidently misspelt.

and arms and supplies. ships and airplanes on Lend-Lease basis and technicians and tacticians, as stipulated in annexure to equip and train and to activate the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea.

Article 6. It is understood between the high contracting parties that responsibility maintaining internal order in Korea and, subject to the provisions of Article 5 above for the defense of Korea from external aggression rests with his Excellency, the President of Republic of Korea. Neverthless,[4] His Excellency, the President of the United States of America recognozes[5] that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communication of American Armed Forces is in the common interests of the high contracting parties. For this purpose and in order to facilitate the discharge of the obligations of His Excellency, the President of the United States of America under Article 4 above, His Excellency, the President of Republic of Korea undertakes to grant to His Excellency, the President of the United States of America for the duration of the war, air bases to be selected by His Excellency, the President of the United States of America at or in the vicinities of..... and..... The President of the Republic of Korea further will authorize His Excellency, the President of the United States of America to maintain forces on Korean territory as well as on Korean waters for the duration of the war and in accordance of[6] the provisions of this treaty on the understanding that the presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereignty of Korea.

Article 7. It is further recognized and understood that should a war of liberation have to be carried on to Manchuria in retaliation to Chinese Communist Army's attack upon Korea, His Excellency, the President of the United States of America will assist His Excel-

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Footnotes.

4-5. As in the original, evidently misspelt.

6. As in the original, presumably "with".

lency, the President of Republic of Korea to bring the war of liberation to a victorious conclusion, and in return, the President of the Republic of Korea, except the reconstruction of North Korea which shall be the sole concern of the Republic of Korea, pledges to put the development of the natural resources of Manchuria and other parts of East China under a joint adminsitration[7] of the United States of America and Korea.

Article 8. Point-1. This treaty shall be executed in duplicate, in English and Korean languages, of which the former shall be recognized as the authoritative version. Point-2. Should any difference arise relative to the application or the interpretation of this treaty, and should the high contracting parties fail to settle the difference by direct negotiation, then it shall be dealt with in accordance with the decision of a court of arbitration to be composed with[8] three neutral and disinterested powers who shall be considered fair and impartial to both of the high contracting parties.

Article 9. The Annexure, stipulated in Article 5 is an integral part of this treaty of alliance.

Article 10. Point-1. This treaty shall be coming into force, subect[9] to the ratifications of the Congress of the United States of America and of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea and shall be in full force from the date of ratifications for twenty years. Point-2. At any time after twenty years from the date of the coming into force of this treaty, the high contracting parties will at the request of either of them conclude a new treaty which shall provide for the continued maintenance of the principles of friendship and of mutual security and defense of interests in East Asia as embodied in the present treaty.

Footnotes.

7. As in the original, evidently misspelt.
8. As in the original, presumably "of".
9. As in the original, evidently misspelt.

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Photostatic copy of the 4th page of the Draft of the "U.S.-Korean Treaty of Alliance"

Annexure:

(In the annexure, the type and quantity of guns, tanks, caliber, model, and the numbers of ships and types of ships and tonnages, the number, the type and model of airplanes and the quanity and types of supplies that our armed forces need, should be stipulated; and these can best be described by an expert ordnance officer.)

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals. Done at .... in duplicate this.... Day of.....1949

L.S. .....

L.S. .....

Notes to be followed on any subject concerning the said 10 articles.

No. 9

LETTER FROM YOON PEONG-KOO, ADVISER TO RHEE SYNGMAN ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED JUNE 18, 1949[1]

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER
OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATIONS
AND
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT BUILDING
SEOUL, REPUBLIC OF KOREA.[2]
18 June 1949

President Syngman Rhee
Kyung Mu Dai
Seoul.

Dear President:

I just returned from the American Embassy where I had a very cordial conversation with Mr. John Muccio on two subjects, namely-concerning my mission to South American States, and about U.S. aid with air and ocean fleets in case we have to fight.

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government.
2. Letterhead.

大韓民國公報處
大韓民國外務部 顧問

OFFICE OF THE ADVISER
OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC INFORMATIONS
AND
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GOVERNMENT BUILDING
SEOUL, REPUBLIC OF KOREA

李 承 晚
大韓民國政府中央廳內
顧 問 室 轉

18 June 1949

President Syngman Rhee
Kyung Mu Dai
Seoul.

Dear President:

I just returned from the American Embassy where I had a very cordial conversation with Mr.John Muccio on two subjects, namely-concerning my mission to South American States,and about U.S.aid with air and ocean fleets in case we have to fight.

On the ma tter of my visiting the central and South American States,Mr.MuccioRX said he would wire to State Department, requesting that Department to send word to the U.S.diplomatic representatives in Latin America about my contemplated visit so that they may help me in dealing with the Latin American States when I am there,besides Mr.Muccio himself will write to his coleagues in Latin America of my coming.

On the matter of aid to be given us with U.S.Air and ocean fleets in case we have to fight the North Bear,Mr.Muccio said he would do the cultivation work for the matter with his Government so that things shall be ready in case we need. Mr. Muccio's words are too good to believe but those are what he said to me this morning. Mr.Muccio said he regrets that I have to leave the important job of teaching the youths in the Army and the youths in general about loyalty and devotion to our Fatherland and to the sacred cause of democracy and of Christian civilization. I replied I will return and keep up the work which I have started.

We have to let Mr.Muccio know the countries that you want me to visit so that he may contact with the U.S.diplomats in those countries. Will report more fully when I see you next time. I enclose an extra copy so that you may give it to Mr. Cynn Sung Mo.

Faithfully yours

Peong Koo Yoon

N.B. Either due to their jealousy or something,both Lee Chul Won and Ben ,in certain respects,non-cooperative and dsicourteous. Lee Chul won made an announcement that he appointed Kim Kil Jun an adviser to OPI.

Photostatic copy of Document No. 9

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Faithfully yours


Peong Koon Yoon[4]

N.B. Either due to their jealousy or something, both Lee Chul Won and Ben, in certain respects, non-cooperative and discourteous. Lee Chul Won made an announcement that he appointed Kim Kil Jun an adviser to OPI.

Footnotes.

3. As in the original, evidently misspelt.
4. Signed by Yoon Peong-koo personally.

PART II



Photostatic copy of Strategic Map for Attack on North Korea

No. 10

STRATEGIC MAP FOR ATTACK ON NORTH KOREA

EXPLANATORY NOTES.

This is a U.S. military map found in the South Korean Army Headquarters, published by Army Map Service, U.S. Army in 1945. (Scale 1:1,000,000)

Lines, arrows and other conventional signs indicated in this map show the plan drawn up by the American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman clique for an attack on north Korea.

This map shows that there were to be two South Korean armies stationed along the 38th parallel for the attack on the north. The first army was to begin military operations against north Korea between the Yellow Sea coast and Kolangpo, north-east of Kaesung; whilst the second army was to begin operations between Kolangpo and the east coast.

The first army was to deal the main blow from its right flank in Kaesung area, directly opposite Pyongyang; whilst its left flank was to attack from Ongchin area on Sinchon and afterwards on Sariwon. In addition, a landing under air cover in Hanchon area was to be carried out from Inchon, and to advance towards Pyongyang.

The first army was to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was to be composed of the 1st. and 2nd. divisions and one

regiment, and the second echelon was to be composed of the 5th. division, three independent regiments and several A. A. gun companies.

The second army was to start an attack on the north from Tongduchon, Chunchon and Hanchi areas, and a landing under air cover in Dyengpyeng area was to be carried out from Chumunjin, to cut off communications between Pyongyang and South and North Hamgyeng.

The second army was also to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was to be composed of the 7th. and 8th. divisions, and the second echelon was to be composed of the 6th. division, independent regiments and A.A. gun companies.

In addition to the 1st. and 2nd. armies there were to be reserve units consisting of the 3rd. division (5 regiments) and mechanized divisions.

In the area along the 38th parallel, about ten divisions were to be concentrated for starting the offensive against north Korea.

No. 11

REPORT OF CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED JUNE 27, 1949[1]

KOREAN EMBASSY

Washington D.C.[2]

June 27th 1949.

H.E. President.

WEEKLY REPORTS.

On June 27th, at noon time, I called on President Truman at the White House, and in accordance with Your Excellency's instructions I expressed my deep gratitude for the kindness and efforts he had revealed in assisting our country this time. At the same time I emphasized the necessity of taking immediate measures

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. The original is in Korean, written in ink by Chang Myun personally.
2. Letterhead in English.

for military assistance, laid stress on the fact that it would be yet too early for the U.S. Forces to withdraw. that sufficient arms should be left in case of withdrawal and that assistance in the event of any emergency should be absolutely guaranteed. Further, I earnestly appealed to him that treaties for mutual amity and trade should be immediately concluded, and that the Pacific Pact was urgently needed. Mr. Truman listened to me with much concern, and he promised me that he would do his best for security and prosperity of our country, that regardless of the situation in China he would spare no effort in having the bill for the assistance of Korea passed by Congress during the current session.

I handed to him the resolution of the Grand Meeting of the Nation concerning national defence, and conveyed to him what our people cried for. He read it carefully, and said that he could see the real intention of it. He had a great sympathy for us, and in an energetic tone he spoke to the point of doing his utmost.

Dr. Chough, Mr. Staggers, Mr. Williams and I came together and had a thorough-going talk about the purchase of arms. We are unanimously of the opinion that at this moment when the bills of economic aid, military aid etc. are being discussed at Congress from every point of view it will unfavourably influence the adoption by Congress of the same bills, should our Government purchase aeroplanes and other arms from the American market, not to speak of its being unrealizable under the given circumstances. We all are also of the opinion that we should survey the possibility in secret and pull it through in due time.

Re: Emigration to Argentine.

Omitted.[3]—Ed.

Footnotes.

3. Three pages in the original are omited here in view of its unimportance.

Re: ECA Bill at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Omitted.—Ed.

Re: Arrival of Servants.
Omitted.—Ed.

Re: Arrival of Economic Mission.
Omitted.—Ed.

Re: Visa for Mr. Chei Jinha's trip to Mexico.
Omitted.—Ed.

Chang Myun

Seal[4]

Footnotes.

4. A square seal, "the seal of the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the U.S.A." in Chinese ideographs.

No. 12

REPORT OF CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED JULY 13, 1949[1]

Confidential[2]

H.E. the President.

WEEKLY REPORTS.

1. Regarding interview with Gen. Wedemeyer and Brig.-Gen. Timberman.

On July 8th, in the afternoon, I and Dr. Chough visited the War Department and had an interview with Gen. Wedemeyer and Brig.-Gen. Timberman, a member of his staff. We explained to them that at present our country is in urgent need of reinforcement of the armed forces on account of the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces, and asked them what measures the U.S. Military authorities would take. Brig.-Gen. Timberman[3] answered:

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. The original is in Korean, written in ink by Chang Myun personally.
2. "Confidential" stamp in Chinese ideographs.
3. In the original the name of "Gen. Wademeyer" was written first then crossed out and "Brig. Gen. Timberman" was inserted in its plerce.

"As far as we American authorities can see, Korea has nothing to worry about. Because:

1. Taking into account the international situation, the Soviet Union will certainly not attack Korea with her own troops,

2. The Chinese Communist Army, too, will not possibly invade Korea.

3. As the North Korean Communist Army is interior to that of South Korea in its numerical strength as well as in its equipments, it will certainly not itself start the expedition against the South.

4. The South Korean National Army is splendid in its numerical strength and in its equipments.

5. When the U.S. Forces pulled out, they left a large quantity of weapons; and munitions, too, must be sufficiently reserved.

6. As for further military aid to Korea, as soon as the sum of aid is fixed by Congress, we will decide on kinds and quantities of weapons to be delivered, taking account of the opinion of the Chief of the Military Advisory Group in Korea."

(Lieut.-Gen. Wedemeyer could not abide the interview very long as he did not have much time).

We said, we were told that we were very short of ammunition, and in the event of an actual warfare it would last only for a couple of days; and we asked him, if that was true. He answered: "We haven't received any such report from Brig.-Gen. Roberts, and we don't think you are short of ammunition" He said further: "It was a matter of course that the U.S. troops pulled out this time." He said, any how it was an established fact that the United States would militarily assist Korea; and after the decision by Congress, further aid would be itemized in accordance with the recommendations by the Military Advisory Group etc.

It is certain that American military aid in the future will depend a great deal on the will and attitude of Brig.-Gen. Roberts, Chief of the Military Advisory Group—a fact which Your Excellency will have to consider. It seems to be adequate to make a confidential proposal for the change of his post through Ambassador Muccio.

As for the ammunition, I also had a talk with Mr. Bond of the State Department. They say here that there are about fifteen million rounds in all, of which not the whole quantity will be handed over to the Korean National Army, but will be kept by the U.S. Military Advisory Group and delivered occasionally. We insisted that the whole quantity should be handed over to the Korean National Army so that we could use them as occasion demanded. Any way, for the sake of further negotiations, too, we need an itemized table of weapons and munitions we received when the last troops of the U.S. Forces withdrew. I hope Your Excellency will send me the table.

We asked both Generals to do their utmost for the military aid of our country. Mr. Staggers will have an interview with Mr. Wedemeyer this afternoon, and appeal to him again.

2. Regarding interview with Acheson, Secretary of State.

On July 11th, at 3.00 p.m., I and Dr. Chough made a call on Mr. Acheson. Dr. Chough conveyed to him the following three points as Your Excellency's message:

1. For the Korean National Army and the security forces, at least 100,000 standing army, 50,000 reserve force, 50,000 police force and 200,000 militia must be equipped and be ready for any emergency. The United States shall supply us with arms sufficient to meet this.

2. It must be clearly mentioned that in the event of invasion of foreign forces or of the North Korean Communist Army under command of a certain foreign power, the United States shall positively come to our military assistance or back us.

3. The United States shall take an active part in supporting a Pacific Pact or a similar union of Asiatic countries for their common security.

Thereupon, Mr. Acheson answered as follows:

1. As for the first item, it will be carried out by decision of Congress;

極秘

駐美大第 號
檀紀四二八二年七月十三日

大統領 閣下


大韓民國駐美國大使

件名 週間報告에 關한 件

一. 쉘드마이어 特使及팀버맨將軍(Brig. Gen. Timberman)과의 會談顚末

去七月八日午后 陸軍省으로 趙博士와 同伴하여 쉘드마이어 特使及其幕僚팀버맨准將과 會見하고 我國現下에 있어서 美軍撤退에 伴한 我軍備의 充實이 緊急히 要請되는바 美當局에서 如何한 對策이 있는가를 質問에 對하야

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 12



Photostatic copy of the 2nd page of Document No. 12

2. As for the second item, though no specific statement can be made concerning any individual state, we think measures for Korea, as was declared by the State Department on June 8th, can fully comply with the demands (Original enclosed) ;

3. As for the third item, for the time being, the United States cannot officially take part in it.

Though the United States hesitates in officially taking part in the matter of the 3rd item, we can gather from yesterday's statement of Mr. McDermott, official reporter of the State Department, that for the first time the United States is deeply interested in a union of Asiatic countries against the communist influence; and we can expect that in due time she will take an active part in it.

The press here published, a good account of Mr. Chang Kai-shek's interview with the President of the Philippines concerning the Pacific Pact as well as Your Excellency's statement. Herewith I enclose selections of them for Your Excellency's reference.

I made a statement concerning the so-called September Elections in North Korea, which I am also enclosing.

Mr. Staggers has just come back, having had a confidential talk with Gen. Wedemeyer for two hours concerning the situation in our country. Gen. Wedemeyer's attitude is through and through sympathetic and co-operative, by which we are very much enlightened. The talk includes Brig.-Gen. Roberts' case, question of establishing a Korean-American Joint Commission concerning the arms etc. . I cannot make reports on it this time; but, Mr. Staggers will make a detailed report by the next mail.

Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States of America.

Seal[4]

Footnotes.

4. **A square seal, "the seal of the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the U.S.A." in Chinese ideographs.**

No. 13

LETTER FROM CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED APRIL 6, 1949[1]

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON[2]

April 6, 1949

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to report to you on the recent developments and my activities at our Embassy in Washington.

On April second Dr. Chough and I had a long conference with General Wedemeyer of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. We presented to him a strong appeal for military aid to Korea, illustrating it by a detailed analysis of the Korean military situation and needs of the Korean defense forces. General Wedemeyer now has the report under consideration. His immediate and specific advice in regard to the Air Force is that it is expensive in up-keep and not more than a minimum force should be maintained. Bombers are likely to kill our fellow countrymen. Light planes

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Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government.
2. Letterhead.

with arms for reconnaisance and intelligence are the most valuable. In case of full-scale invasion we can apply for United States aid. The Navy's greatest need is for small fast ships as an efficient coast guard. The General's intelligence reports show that early estimates of the strength of the military force of north Korea were exaggerated both as to number and equipment and the prospects of an invasion from the north are slim at this time. General Wedemeyer's personal and confidential advice is that highly trained, trustworthy and competent young men be sent to North Korea to infiltrate among the Koreans there, sow distrust in the communist cause and the People's Government and prepare the way for the Republic. Meanwhile, the General will do his utmost for us and will consult with Secretary Acheson in our behalf.

Dr. Chough and I also visited Senator Knowland of California and made a similar appeal to him. He assured us of his sympathy and support.

Yesterday I enjoyed a lengthy conversation with Congressman Kee, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, stressing an appeal for ECA funds and military aid. He will do his best to help us. I have it on good authority that the ECA allocation for Korean aid, about $190 million, will pull through the Congress. I suggested to Congressman Kee that a Pacific Pact is the next step, and he agreed.

Since my presentation of credentials to President Truman on March twenty-fifth, I have been very busy making courtesy calls on the members of the diplomatic corps in the city. All the Ambassadors have offered their strong support. The Ambassadors of El Salvador, Egypt, Iran and Brazil are seriously considering the request for formal recognition of our government. Sr. Nabuco of Brazil suggests that Your Excellency write a letter to the President of his country informing him of the establishment of the Republic of Korea and your election as President and assuring him of the good will of our Government. A reply from the President of Brazil will constitute a recognition of our government. I told the Ambas-

sador of our population problems and he has assured me that he will take up the question of immigration of Koreans to Brazil with his Government for early action.

The signing of the Atlantic Pact was an impressive ceremony. As a member of the Diplomatic Corps I was formally invited to attend by the Secretary of State. There is little doubt about quick ratification by the Senate. The Near Eastern Ambassadors expressed personally the necessity for a Mediterrean Pact and the Far Eastern countries for a Pacific Pact. An expression of the urgency of such a Pacific Pact from the President of our Republic might do much good to expedite such an agreement.

Archbishop Yupin cordially invited me to dinner last week and informed me that he will come to Korea by way of Japan, to arrive in the latter part of May.

I am continuing my through search for an Embassy building. The house of the late Chief Justice Stone, located on Wyoming Avenue and 23rd Street near Massachusetts Avenue has been highly recommended by Mr. Staggers and Mr. Williams and appears to be suitable as to location, dignity and serviceability. However, I shall continue my negotiations with the realators.

Thank you for the appointment of Mr. Choi Woonsang as Third Secretary at the Embassy. He will be of great assistance here. Mr. Namkoong is still awaiting his formal commission and allocation of funds as Consul General in New York. Mr. Kim Sae Sun is doing good work in establishing the Purchasing Commission in Washington. However, he is without funds and very much needs further resources, retroactive to the date of his appointment, to carry on his work.

Following the instructions I have received, all passports presented at this office for Korean visas are held pending clearance from Seoul. The ECA has strongly protested the delay in the issuance of the visas for they interpret it as a violation of the ECA Aid Pact signed by the two Governments which assures unobstructed passage of ECA personnel to Korea and in Korea. Mr. Hoffman

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1949

Your Excellency:

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On April second Dr. Chough and I had a long conference with General Wedemeyer of the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army. We presented to him a strong appeal for military aid to Korea, illustrating it by a detailed analysis of the Korean military situation and needs of the Korean defense forces. General Wedemeyer now has the report under consideration. His immediate and specific advice in regard to the Air Force is that it is expensive in up-keep and not more than a minimum force should be maintained. Bombers are likely to kill our fellow countrymen. Light planes with arms for reconnaisance and intelligence are the most valuable. In case of full-scale invasion we can apply for United States aid. The Navy's greatest need is for small fast ships as an efficient coast guard. The General's intelligence reports show that early estimates of the strength of the military force of north Korea were exaggerated both as to number and equipment and the prospects of an invasion from the north are slim at this time. General Wedemeyer's personal and confidential advice is that highly trained, trustworthy and competent young men be sent to North Korea to infiltrate among the Koreans there, sow distrust in the communist cause and the People's Government and prepare the way for the Republic. Meanwhile, the General will do his utmost for us and will consult with Secretary Acheson in our behalf.

Dr. Chough and I also visited Senator Knowland of California and made a similar appeal to him. He assured us of his sympathy and support.

Yesterday I enjoyed a lengthy conversation with Congressman Kee, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, stressing an appeal for ECA funds and military aid. He will do his best to help us. I have it on good authority that the ECA allocation for Korean aid, about $190 million, will pull through the Congress. I suggested to Congressman Kee that a Pacific Pact is the next step, and he agreed.

Since my presentation of credentials to President Truman on March twenty-fifth, I have been very busy making courtesy calls on the members of the diplomatic corps in the city. All the Ambassadors have offered their strong support. The Ambassadors of El Salvador, Egypt, Iran and Brazil are seriously considering the request for formal recognition of our government. Sr. Nabuco of Brazil suggests that Your Excellency write a letter to the President of his country informing him of the establishment of the Republic of Korea and your election as President and assuring him of the good will of our Government. A reply from the President of Brazil will constitute a recognition of our Government. I told the Ambassador of our population problems and he has assured me that he will take up the question of immigration of Koreans to Brazil with his Government for early action.

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 13

is very disturbed and indignant about the situation, as are Dr. Johnson and Dr. Harriman. The State Department informs me that Mr. Muccio has taken the matter up at the Capitol in Seoul. ECA plans to send about two hundred fifty persons to Korea; about half are already there. Please advise further on this question.

The reaction here in America to the arrest of Dr. Ryang, the Methodist Bishop, and others, was very strong. Many protests have been received by Americans who have been staunch friends of Korea. I am enclosing a copy of one of these letters which illustrates the feeling here.

Accept Sir, the continued expression of my high esteem.

John M. Chang[3]

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul, KOREA

Footnotes.

3. Signed by Chang Myun personally.

No. 14

REPORT OF 971st C.I.C. DETACHMENT TAEJON DISTRICT OF THE U.S. ARMY, DATED JANUARY 27, 1949[1]

Confidential[2]

971ST COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
TAEJON DISTRICT OFFICE
APO 235[3]

File No. .....
27 January 1949

SUBJECT: Execution of Military Prisoners, Taejon (1040-1490).

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 271000 January 1949, execution of Military prisoners was to be held just outside Camp Taejon. Upon arrival at the scene a lack of preparation was noticed. At approximately 1030 20 prisoners were blindfolded and led to the post and tied. No Medical Officer

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Footnotes

1. This document was found in the headquarters of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in south Korea.
2. Stamp
3. Letterhead.

CONFIDENTIAL

971ST COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
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SUBJECT: Execution of Military Prisoners, Taejon(1040-1490).

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 271000 January 1949, execution of Military prisoners was to be held just outside Camp Taejon. Upon arrival at the scene a lack of preparation was noticed. At approximately 1030 20 prisoners were blindfolded and led to the post and tied. No Medical Officer was on the scene and only ten riflemen to fire on the twenty prisoners. The Advisor to the 2nd Korean Army Brigade immediately stopped the executions and advised to have a Medical Officer present and to either get ten more riflemen or execute ten prisoners at a time. Ten of the prisoners were untied and led to the rear of the firing point. A medical Officer and ten riflemen were summoned. At approximately 1130 final preparation was completed and the executions were started. B-2

The ten prisoners were then retied to the post and the riflemen were assigned a post to fire upon. Each fired the allotted rounds into the prisoners assigned. One clip of M-1 was used in each volley. When the Kun Ki Dai officer, in charge of the executions, went down the line and fire from one to three rounds in the bodies that showed signs of life. In some instances he had to fire on them the second time, making three time in all. After each group was pronounced dead by the Medical Officer, who merely went part of the way down the line and pointed to the dead and the live, the bodies were carried from the posts to the pit to the side of the execution scene. Firing was heard in the pit, evidently on those that still showed signs of life. B-2

Foursgroups were executed, the first group totaled 20, the second 18, the third 18 and the fourth 13. Totaling 69 in all. After the first group was executed at approximately 1130 the rest of the executions followed in order and at 1215 all were executed. B-2

All prisoners executed were from the 14th (YO3U) Regiment, from the Yosu-Sunchon area. They all appeared to be young and estimated overall average of eithteen years of age. Prisoners were shoeless and were clad in underwear and some in fatigues. B-2

After the first group which was led to the post from back

CONFIDENTIAL

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 14

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All prisoners executed were from the 14th (YOSU) Regiment, from the Yosu-Sunchon area. They all appeared to be young and estimated overall average of eighteen years of age. Prisoners were shoeless and were clad in underwear and some in fatigues. B-2

After the first group which was led to the bost[5] from back of the firing point, the rest were trucked to the posts, then tied by a detail prearranged. B-2

Footnotes.

4.-5 As in the original.

One very young prisoner tied to the post was singing the Communist Battle song, and the last group sang as they were trucked to the posts, they sang a Loyal Korean Army Song. Most all[6] prisoners were pleading that they were innocent. B-2

DISTRIBUTION

G-2, USAFIK[7] 2

File. 2

Footnotes.

6. As in the original.
7. "United States Army Force in Korea"

No. 15

TESTIMONY OF KIM HYO-SUK, EX-HOME SECRETARY OF THE RHEE SYNGMAN GOVERNMENT, DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 1950[1]

During my term of office as Home Secretary of the Rhee Syngman Government, I had rendered every possible assistance to the American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman clique in carrying out their measures for massacring the people and instigating a civil war in Korea. Being an unexcusable traitor, I have betrayed my country and people in a most shameful way. But now I bitterly repent of my past crimes against my country and my people. Now I see with my own eyes how my country is being trampled and destroyed by the unlawful intervention of the American imperialists; and how the innocent people are being slaughtered en masse; and I realize how serious the crime was that I had been a collaborator of the American imperialists and their lackeys, Rhee Syngman and his clique, who had been pursuing the policy of a whole-sale massacre of the people and of provoking a sanguinary civil war for the last five years—a policy which finally brought forth the present situation in Korea. Yet, I dare not give up the idea that I may be

Footnotes.

1. The original is in Korean

pardoned by my country and my people. And the only way to my redemption, I think, is to be thoroughly cleansed of my vicious past. Hence, honestly confessing my misdeeds, I am going to reveal the atrocious crimes which the American imperialists have committed in slaughtering the people and instigating a civil war.

With the purpose of colonizing Korea and enslaving the Korean people, the American imperialists have been pursuing, from the very day of their arrival in Korea five years ago, a policy for massacring the people and suppressing and rooting out the patriotic and democratic forces, and of instigating a fratricidal civil war. With the formation of the Rhee Syngman puppet government through the May 10th separate elections, which had been carried through at the point of the American bayonet and under brutal police terror, aggressive designs of American imperialists on Korea were getting all the more widespread. Having set up the Rhee Syngman puppet government, they ordered their agent, Rhee Syngman, to carry forward an unprecedented oppression of patriots and massacre of the people with a view to exterminating the democratic and patriotic forces which were opposed to their reactionary policy.

In April 1949, when I visited the American Embassy with Beird, American adviser for the police to the Rhee Syngman government, Ambassador Muccio said, after his usual diplomatic talks, "Politics is might. When two mights collide with each other, they stop at nothing, and resort to any kind of means. The strong wins and the weak loses. Good is the one who has won, and evil is the one who has lost. Therefore, in smashing the enemy forces for the preservation of your own power as well as that of the public order, you should think only of the result, and not of the means, no matter how good or evil they are. If you, as Home Secretary, want to preserve peace and order, you must completely wipe out elements of the South Korean Workers' Party; and for that you need definite oppression and draconic punishment. I, representing United States, am very much concerned about this matter."

In this, way, American imperialists allow Rhee Syngman and his clique to carry on the same policy of massacre and imprisonment for the realization of their aggressive aims in Korea, thus Rhee Syngman's regime took over the work of the U.S. Military Administration.

In April 1948, when the people of Chejoodo (Quelpart Island) rose against the South Korean Separate Election and the Separate Government, American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman clique resorted to most cruel means of putting down the resistance, slaughtering en masse, setting the whole mass of houses afire, banishing the masses or forcing them to compulsory labour. The American imperialists ordered Rhee Syngman to mobilize 3,000 picked men of the National Defence Army and 1,200 police auxiliaries for the suppression of the People's Resistance in Chejoodo.

About the 15th of February, 1949, Roberts, Beird, Hoffman (member of the Military Mission), Sin Sung-mo, Chae Byung-duck, Chung Il-gwon and I had a conference, in the room of the Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, for the suppression of the People's Resistance in Chejoodo. At that conference Roberts said: "A police unit must be immediately dispatched to Chejoodo for the subjugation, and the transport shall be carried out by means of American submarines and warships, so that you have nothing to worry about. Attend to other things, and just get ready." Accordingly, 3,000 picked men of the National Defence Army and 1,200 police auxiliaries were sent to the island as Roberts had ordered, and most of them were carried by American warships and submarines.

The operation plan for the suppression of the People's Resistance in Chejoodo was mapped out under Roberts' supervision, and the operation was carried out under joint command of Roberts, Beird and Sin Sung-mo, Secretary of National Defence, on the spot; and five American planes took part in it.

About the 20th of February 1949, when Muccio, Roberts, Sin Sung-mo, Rhee Syngman and I came together at Rhee Syngman's residence at Kyengmoodae, Muccio and Roberts emphasized that

Chejoodo is an extremely important strategical spot, that for the expedition against the north subjugation of Chejoodo is a sine que non, and that for the liaison with Japan too it is necessary to have the island. Thus, during the period April 1948—May 1949 over ten thousand houses were burnt down by the army and the police and over thirty five thousand people were massacred.

Also by the well known "Yusoo Incident" (the laudable revolt of the 14th Regt. of the National Defence Army), as they call it, upon the pretext of its suppression Rhee Syngman's bandits completely burnt up the cities of Yusoo, Soonchun, Koorye etc, and the country-side around them, and slaughtered innumerable patriots and innocent people.

In suppressing the upheaval in Yusoo, too, Roberts, Chief of the Military Mission, and Beird, adviser for the police, commanded the operation, and American aeroplanes and warships took part in it. In suppressing the "Yusoo Incident", they massacred the people in a most cruel way. For instance, detachments of the National Garrisons and police units arrested over 300 inhabitants of the city of Soonchun, detained them in a primary school building, and the next day over 200 of them were shot. At the end of November 1948, at a meeting held at the U.S. Embassy, in which Muccio, Roberts, Beird, Secretary of National Defence Li Bum-suck and Home Secretary Yoon Chi-yung took part, alluding to this Muccio said as follows: "It was sagacious that you got rid of the suspects so resolutely by such measures. The Yosoo Incident was not an ordinary affair, and it is rather laudable that you resorted to emergency measures for the suppression; you have done nothing wrong at all."

In this way, by order and instigation of the American imperialists, suppression of the "Yusoo Incident" was most brutally carried out. Even according to the curtailed figure given by the Rhee Syngman Government, over five thousand houses were burnt down and over six thousand were killed.

In order to achieve their aims of aggression on Korea, American imperialists had long been planning and preparing for a

sanguinary civil war in Korea, and provoking the so-called Expedition against the North as a way to it.

In May 1949 U.S. Ambassador Muccio, Secretary of National Defence Sin Sung-mo and I came together at the Chosen Hotel. At that gathering Muccio said, a little stimulated by the spiritus: "The United States stands behind you. Just have confidence in us, and carry out faithfully what we advise or instruct you. Might is what settles everything, above all the solution of the world problem—that can only be settled by the American might. Solution of this problem must be accelerated as far as possible. You must fully understand this situation as well as our designs, and get ready as best as you can, and launch the assault over the 38th parallel line as soon as possible." Aggressive scheme of the American imperialists for the instigation of World War III and of a civil war in Korea was clearly expressed by Muccio here. As a matter of fact, they thought of instigating a civil war in Korea in July or August 1949.

During the later part of April 1949, Roberts, Sin Sung-mo, Chae Byeng-duck and I met together in the room of the Secretary of National Defence. At that time Roberts said: "Aerodromes are urgently needed for the suppression of the guerillas and for the Expedition against the North; and you must pay a great deal of attention to it. First of all, you must build aerodromes in Yungjoo and Wonjoo right away. This is most urgent. You must start building them even at the expense of other works." That was but a step to the execution of their plan of the Expedition against the North, which they had mapped out for July or August. And in accordance with Roberts' order, Home Department of the Rhee Syngman government began building aerodromes in Yungjoo and Wonjoo.

Futhermore, as preliminary measures for the July-August north-bound expedition, early in June 1949 U.S. Ambassador Muccio summoned together Roberts, Beired, Sin Sung-mo, Khun Seung-yul (Secretary of Justice) and me at the U.S. Embassy, and gave us the following instructions: "At this moment, when we are going to

carry out the north-bound expedition in July or August, it is of utmost importance that the state security law be enforced draconically, and to arrest en masse forces opposed to the Government and the elements of the South Korean Workers' Party, and completely frustrate their veiled activities, though, of course, other preparations are also necessary. Round them up, that is the most important thing." Thereafter, on the eve of the would-be July-August expedition, there was a whole-sale round-up of the left wing campaign throughout south Korea.

On July 25th 1949, at dawn, Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, issued the order for the so-called National Defence Army to launch an attack on the region north of the 38th parallel line. A couple of days prior to it, he had said to Chae Byeng-duck, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Kim Sug-won, Commander of the 1st Division: "The expedition against the north, which we are going to carry out this time, will be a good experiment on the civil war we expect to provoke soon. Through contact with the enemy, we can acquire vivid knowledge of the enemy." And by orders of Roberts, the National Defence Army launched an attack from the sector of Kaesung, but encountered a fierce counter-offensive of the Constabularies of the People's Republic, and had to retreat with heavy losses.

According to the plan of the north-bound July-August expedition of 1949, under the command of Roberts the 1st Division was to be the main force which would be enlarged to a corps, with the peninsula of Ongjin and Kaesung as its bases. Under Roberts' command, Kim Sug-won was to be in charge of it. Attack was to be launched mainly by the west wing, and the east wing was to protect it. Should the operations be favourable, even garrison-headquarters were to be established in Inchun. It was mapped out that they should launch an attack from Kaesung and occupy Keumgyo, and from Ongjin they should advance to Haejoo, and if possible up to Pyongyang. In drawing up the plan of operations under the supervision of Roberts, Kim Sug-won, Commander of the 1st Division, and Hu Jung, Secretary of Transportations, took part

from the very beginning. In the plan of the north-bound expedition, it was provided by Roberts that the police force would be placed under the army.

Roberts promised Hu Jung and Kim Sug-won that should the July-August offensive be successful, Kim Sug-won would be appointed Secretary of National Defence. However, on account of the defeat of the July-25th offensive and the guerilla warfares spreading like wildfire, the so-called July-August expedition against the north had to be suspended, though for the time being only. But, since then Roberts had always been insisting that purification of the rear was necessary for the north-bound expedition.

In August 1949 I was suddenly ordered to the American Embassy, and upon my arrival I found Muccio, Roberts and Beird there. After some words of greetings, Roberts said in an angry tone: "Our trial of the Expedition against the North, so long mapped out, was ended in a heavy loss by the conflict at Kaesung. Of course, incompetence of the National Defence Army is mainly to answer for it, but the police is also responsible. If the police had been quicker in gathering intelligence and more accurate in getting hold of inside informations, we could have more materials for the operation. But, it wasn't so, and I regret it very much. As you can imagine yourself, the north-bound expedition shall be carried out anyhow, and for that it is absolutely necessary to hold the rear tight; and I have told you enough of it. But, the public peace is getting more and more disordered, and the guerrillas are lurking ever more ferociously; and for that the police is mainly to answer. From now on, you must pay more attention to round-ups and imprisonment of the elements of the South Korean Workers' Party and the military drill of the police. As for the suppression of the guerillas, I am drawing up a plan myself at present, of which I will let you know later on. Though the army is in charge of the suppression on the front, the police should not lack the military training for the suppression of the guerillas in the rear and for the

preservation of peace and order. Therefore, I hope you will pay special attention to the military drill of the police."

Since then, Roberts often told Rhee Syngman and me to subjugate the guerillas and preserve peace and order, while he himself was drawing up a plan for the suppression. According to the plan for suppression of the guerillas, the operation areas were divided into five sectors: Mt. Chiri, Mt. Taeback, Mt. Odae, the East Coast and the Middle Sectors, each with suppression-headquarters. The General Headquarters was to be set up in Taejon, which would draw up general plans for the suppression, and in command of the entire operations. In each sector-headquarters, 1 provincial governor-deputy, 1 police staff-officer and 1 judicial staff-officer were to be residing. It was also provided in the plan that American aeroplanes and tanks should take part in the operations. As to the season for the operations, they decided on winter, the most unfavourable season of the year for the guerillas. So the operation ~~tion~~was to begin in the middle of November, when the trees were bare of leaves and the weather was cold, and end at the end of February next year. And during actual operations against the guerillas, Roberts and Beird were personally commanding the warfares.

While commanding the operations against the partizans, Roberts alleged; "Resort to any means, and don't stop at anything, if that is of strategical necessity and effective for the suppression."

In the middle of October 1949, Roberts, Beird, Chae Byeng-duck, Sin Sung-mo and I met together, in the room of the Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, to deliberate on the operations against the guerillas. There, Roberts gave us the following instructions: "Villages in the mountainous districts within the guerilla areas, which can supply the partizans with clothes and provisions or can be robbed of them by the partizans, must be completely burnt down. Even though there is no immediate danger of such sorts, if the guerillas could possibly gain a footing in the village, it must be evacuated, so that the partizans can be isolated. Do your best in

expediting the subjugation." And the army and police authorities carried out his instructions.

About January 1950, at a gathering of Muccio, Roberts, Beird, Social Secretary Li Yoon-yung, Secretary of National Defence Sin Sung-mo and myself, held in the room of Home Secretary for the acceleration of the operations against the guerillas, Roberts said as follows: "Measures for evacuations have achieved substantial results in suppressing the guerillas. Losses suffered by the inhabitants of the districts in question are inevitable for the sake of the state. Give no thought to that sort of losses, and stick to the evacuations." And he ordered us to intensify the operations against the guerillas.

In accordance with such orders of Roberts, tens of thousands of houses were burnt down, and tens of thousands of families were "evacuated" from the guerilla areas by reason of their being necessary for the subjugation-operations. The figure amounted to forty to fifty thousand households in all; and hundreds of thousands of inhabitants were driven out of their homes and turned into destitutes.

During the winter operations against the guerillas innumerable innocent people were brutally slaughtered by the army and police. The following is an example: A company of the National Defence Army, operating in North Kyengsangdo, rounded up the whole population of over 50 men, women and children, in a mountainous village in the county Moon-Gyeng-Goon. Accusing them of being reds, the Rhee Syngman bandits dug a pit, placed them in front of it, strafed them with a machine-gun and buried them in the pit. One could witness such a plight everywhere in the guerilla areas.

In January 1950, at a gathering in the U.S. Embassy of Muccio, Roberts, Beird, Drumwright (councillor of the U.S. Embassy), Sin Sung-mo, Kwon Seung-yul and myself, Muccio, producing pictures of the massacre in Moon-Gyeng-Goon (snap-shots taken on the spot) said: "Judging from the humanitarian point of view, one may say, that is wrong. But, that is inevitable for the suppression of the

guerillas. Bear in mind that such things can happen any time, if you want to achieve your aims."

As a result of such measures of the American imperialists (who stop at nothing for the achievement of their aggressive aims) for the extermination of patriotic and democratic forces, over 250,000 have been slaughtered and over 600,000 imprisoned during the last five years since the August-15 Liberation.

It was precisely the American imperialists, who instigated the murder of the two communists, Kim Sam-yong and Li Joo-ha. On April 15th 1950, when I was at Kim Sung-soo's residence in Kedong, Seoul, Kim Sung-soo said to me as follows: "Muccio summoned Home Secretary Paik Sung-ook to the American Embassy, and told him that the arrest of Kim Sam-yong and Li Joo-ha was a great success. He strictly ordered Paik to inflict capital punishment on them and nip the danger in the bud."

Kim Sung-soo told me that he had heard it from Noble of the American Embassy.

With a view to keeping a tight rein on the rear, the American imperialists resorted to every possible bestial means in suppressing the guerillas and slaughtering the people. At the same time, they caused incessent conflicts along the 38th parallel line through the National Defence Army units. Whenever the units of the National Defence Army launched an attack on the north, they always encountered fierce counter-attack of the Constabularies of the People's Republic, and had to retreat with heavy losses. And every time, American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman clique cried out that it was the Constabularies of the People's Republic, who had started the attack first.

In the room of the Chief of the General Staff, with my own ears I heard from Chae Byeng-duck that from January 1949 till the outbreak of the civil war the National Defence Army had been launching attacks on the north for nearly a thousand times. On July 25th 1949 Roberts, had given orders to Kim Sug-won, Commander of the 1st Division, to start the Kaesung Incident as an

experiment on the Expedition against the North, and having inspected the front and seen the hopeless situation, ordered him on August 1st. to stop the combat. Roberts shifted the blame for the heavy losses of this conflict entirely on to the National Defence Army. They should have occupied at least Kwum-Gyo as had been the order, but were beaten back with heavy losses instead; and that was all on account of the incompetence of the National Defence Army, he grumbled. And at the conference of division-commanders, held in October 1949 at the Army Headquarters, Mr. Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group, spoke as follows: "It is true that many attacks on the region north of the 38th parallel line have been launched by my orders, and there will be still many in the days to come. But, in many cases the units have attacked the north of their own accord, and have spent a tremendous amount of ammunition with no effect whatever, but have suffered heavy losses. The U.S. Military Mission alone has the right to issue orders for the attack of the National Defence Army on the region north of the 38th parallel line. Up to the present, all the conflicts along the 38th parallel line have been caused exclusively by the invasion of the National Defence Army upon the north. From now on invasion of the National Defence Army upon the region north of the 39th parallel line shall be carried out by orders of the U.S. Military Mission only."

These facts eloquently testify that all of the thousand-fold conflicts along the 38th parallel line have been provoked by orders of Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, and started by invasions of the National Defence Army. Since the frustration of the July-August plan for the north-bound expedition, Roberts, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, had incessantly been telling the Rhee Syngman clique to be on the alert for the Expedition against the North, and had been doing his utmost in strengthening and reorganizing the National Defence Army.

As the prestige of the National Defence Army has been extremely shattered since the "Yusoo Incident", nobody wanted to join it, and its numerical strength had to be upheld by compulsory conscrip-

tion. About November 1949, Muccio, Roberts, Beird, Rhee Syngman, Sin Sung-mo, Li Bum-suck, Chae Byeng-duck and I met together at Rhee Syngman's residence at Kyeng-moo-dae to talk about the compulsory conscription as follows: "The National Defence Army must be strengthened, but nobody applies for the army; and in the army there are many unreliable elements. In order to make the National Defence Army strong, compulsory conscription must be carried out. Healthy young men with sound thoughts must be enlisted from the province to equip the army substantially and sufficiently for the future Expedition against the North."

Consequently, policemen were going around in the country-side, especially in the provinces North and South Chullado and North and South Kyengsangdo, rounding up young people on the alleged charge of their being "reds", slashing and torturing them, and making them enlist in the army by intimidation.

The Chief of the U.S. Military Mission Roberts, and the adviser to the police Beird, had been alleging that the fifty thousand men of the police would also have to get ready for the so-called Expedition against the North.

At meetings Roberts used to express his view that the entire police should have strict military drill and acquire the same combative power as the army. He then proposed to the Home Department that from each province a certain number of the police personnel should be selected in turn and receive vigorous military training. But, they were in dire need of police force for the operation against the guerillas, and it was not quite possible for them to select persons for the military drill. Therefore, they could not fully cope with the orders of Roberts and Beird.

In the middle of January 1950, when Sin Sung-mo, Roberts and I came together in the room of the Secretary of National Defence, Roberts said in an unpleasant tone: "Expedition against the North is an established plan, and the time of its execution is not so far ahead of us. The force, above all, the combative force must be fully

ready, if you want to achieve the aim. That is why I emphasize the military drill of the entire police force. But, much to my regret, under the pretext of being short of personnel, it hasn't been sufficiently carried out." He said further: "Of course, the northbound expedition will be started by us first. But, we must have, though formal, a reasonable excuse for doing so. In this connection, reports of the Commission to the UN Headquarters will be of great importance. The UN Commission will, of course, make reports in favour of America. But, you too had better pay attention to such points, and win the favour of the Commission."

To-day, everybody knows that the so-called UN Korea Commission is nothing but a body produced by the U.S. imperialists by means of their voting machine, a body which serves as a screen for veiling all the facts occuring as a result of the massacring policy carried out by the Rhee Syngman clique, and commanded by the American imperialists for the colonisation and enslavement of Korea. Reports which the so-called UN Korea Commission presents to the United Nations are no more than records of materials collected by the U.S. Embassy or other American intelligence organs. The so-called UN Korea Commission, which does everything in accordance with the instructions of American imperialists, is bound in duty, and it is its mission, to falsify facts and concoct distorted statements and reports upon request of the American imperialists.

The so-called UN Korea Commission has been incessantly hampering peaceful unification of north and south Korea. Early in June this year, when a proposal for peaceful unification of north and south Korea reached the south Korean "May-30th Parliament" from north Korea, following instructions of the American imperialists the Commission deterred it from being brought to the south Korean "National Assembly." It is an undeniable, plain fact that American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman clique are solely responsible for the instigation on June 25th, 1950 of the civil war, but the Commission fabricated a distorted, false report in accordance with instructions of the American imperialists, accusing

north Korea for launching the attack first. All these facts are sufficient to testify that the so-called UN Korea Commission is no more than a faithful agent and a marionette of the American imperialists.

As already mentioned above, prior to the north-bound expedition, American imperialists, Rhee Syngman and his clique had been busy with the suppression of the guerillas, and were fervently getting ready for the north-bound expedition.

In September 1949, U.S. Major-General Chennault arrived in Seoul, with the mission of strengthening the South Korean Air Force, and sojourned a couple of weeks. He suggested a plan for organizing an air force and emphasized that judging from Korea's geographical conditions air force would play the decisive role in warfares in Korea. He promised that upon returning to the United States he would have the plan materialized ; and with that promise he left south Korea. After that, a group of American Congressmen and many other leading figures of the American political circles visited south Korea one after another; and all that had of course only one aim, i.e. instigation of a civil war in Korea. Whenever they visited south Korea, they always had a review of the National Defence Army and inspected the 38th parallel line, and on each occasion they always spurred the army and the police on to provoke a civil war.

In November 1949, Knowland, a Republican senator and an influential personality in the American political circle, turned up. He emphasized the necessity of military aid to south Korea as the only "Bastion of Democracy" in the Far East, considerately inspected the 38th parallel line, and encouraged men of the army and the police to be always valiantly ready. Upon his return to Seoul, he preached a sermon to Rhee Syngman to be fully ready for the inevitable World War III.

In January 1950, Royal, Deputy-Secretary of Defence, and Sebald, Chief of the Diplomatic Section of MacArthur's Headquarters, visited Seoul. Sebald said to Rhee Syngman: "In the

event of the Expedition against the North, American warships and aeroplanes in Japan will take part in the battle on the side of south Korea; and as far as naval and air forces are concerned, you have nothing to worry about at all."

In February, Rhee Syngman visited Tokyo, where he signed a secret agreement on the so-called "northern expedition" with MacArthur, who directly ordered him to kindle the flames of a civil war. On June 17th, Dulles, adviser to U.S. State Department arrived in Korea, and carefully inspected the 38th parallel. Speaking before the National Defence Army he greatly encouraged the soldiers, and on two occassions he made the some emphasis. He said, "In the United States I have heard of your great courage and powerful strength, but it is not like coming here and to see for myself how vigorously and patiently you are all striving to overcome immense hardships and difficulties. It is only now that I have the opportunity to come into direct contact with you, and I am happy with what I have found. No enemy, however, strong, can opppose you. Yet I hope you will make further efforts, as the time for you to show your great strength is not far off." On his way, Dulles visited a police station where he encouraged the police and praised the South Korean Police for its courage and alertness. He said, "In view of the special situation in south Korea, the South Korean Police Force should not be limited; besides its original task of maintaining order, it should carry out military tasks as well. You must fully realize this point and specialize in combat training and military science. In case of emergencies you must consider yourselves as soldiers rather than policemen and not be inferior to soldiers." After his return to Seoul, Dulles gave Rhee Syngman and Sin Sung-mo final instructions to start an immediate attack on the north, as the time was ripe to do so, "Start the aggression against the north accompanied by a counter-propaganda on the grounds that the north has invaded the south first. If you can but hold out for two weeks, everything will go on smoothly, for during this period the United States, by accusing north Korea of attacking south Korea, will compel the United

Nations to take action in whose name land, naval and air forces would be mobilized," Dulles ordered.

At midnight, June 24th, Rhee Syngman in carrying out the orders of his American masters started the invasion to the north of the 38th parallel, and thus the current internecine civil war began for which he could never be forgiven by the Korean people.

The civil war instigators, namely the American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman clique vainly trying to place the guilt for the outbreak of the Korean civil war on north Korea, blatantly lied that the People's Army of north Korea had started an invasion along the 38th parallel at 1 a.m. But although the American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman bandits never hesitate in resorting to the most ignominious measures to distort facts, yet they fail to conceal from the Korean people and the world public opinion that they themselves are the instigators of the civil war in Korea, as they cannot cover up true historical facts.

Using the United Nations as a screen, the American imperialists are trying to justify their aggressive military intervention in Korea. After landing their mercenary troops on tbe soil of Korea the American imperialists destroy defenceless Korean towns and villages, and brutally massacred the Korean people.

Such illegal armed intervention and such bestialities committed by the American imperialists can never be justified. The American imperialists have neither grounds nor reasons for interfering with arms in the Korean civil war. The Korean question must and can be settled by the Korean people themselves.

The American imperialists should immediately withdraw from Korea. Hands off Korea !

No 16

RADIO BROADCAST OF MOON HAK-PONG, FORMER ADVISER TO C.I.C. AND RHEE SYNGMAN'S POLITICAL ADVISER, DATED JULY 21, 1950[1]

This is Moon Hak-pong, former adviser to C.I.C. and Rhee Syngman's political adviser, speaking to you from Pyongyang.

I am a traitor of the Korean people. Before I receive the people's verdict I wish to expose the crimes committed by the American imperialists and the Rhee Syngman clique who are the instigators of the Korean civil war.

After the August 15th Liberation, I erroneously thought that the hypocritical Rhee Syngman bandit was a good leader for the people of Korea.

Rhee Syngman returned to Korea with a suitcase and a European wife. Upon his arrival in Korea he pretended to be most patriotic and the only leader of the people, and coerced the Koreans to follow him. To consolidate his strength, Rhee Syngman forced the Korean people to respect him and pay tributes to him. At the end

Footnotes.

1. Abridged translation from Korean original.

of October 1945, I myself showed him my respects with a sum of five hundred thousand won.

Rhee Syngman hated the Hankook-Minjoo-dang (or the Korean Democratic Party) from the very beginning. Because, when he arrived in Korea, Hankook-Minjoo-dang members had bribed the Americans already, and had gained staunch American support.

Now what was the Hankook-Minjoo-dang (or the Korean Democratic Party) composed of? Its staff was composed of the clique of Kim Sung-soo, a south Korean plutocrat and a go-between for the Japanese exploiters and former vanguard officers of the Japanese colonial rulers. Furthermore, the party embraced big capitalists, best pro-Japanese elements, and American citizens of Korean origin, who have all been bribed by the south Korean plutocrats. The so-called Korean Democratic Party succeeded in filling up all the important positions in lucrative organs with its people by bribing the Americans, and thus the Military Government of the American Occupation Forces was actually in the hands of the same party. Of course, at the same time the Hankook-Minjoo-dang was a most loyal servant of the Americans. I hated this party from the beginning. It was a most cunning and hypocritical party. In the days of the Japanese imperialist rule they were most loyal servants of Japanese imperialism, but with the August 15th Liberation they suddenly turned out to be patriots and organized the party. Now this party, which had been serving the United States as its mother-country, saw its big enemy, Rhee Syngman, stick in his nose! And as I have mentioned above, Rhee Syngman, too, didn't like this party. The Hankook-Minjoo-dang, i.e. the Korean Democratic Party, went even so far as to say that there would be no Hankook-Minjoo-dang without America. The Hankook-Minjoo-dang had ostensively shaken hands with Rhee Syngman, but it used to molest him behind the scenes.

In March 1948 I assumed the position of adviser to C.I.C. upon Hodge's request. Hodge asked me to go to him once every day; and every time I went to see him, he always preached about American

democracy, and forced the Separate Government and Separate Elections upon me. At that time I always spoke in favour of Rhee Syngman and defended him.

I used to ask the Americans to give me a definition of democracy. But they always answered:—"If you want to see democracy, go to the United States." I asked them again:—"Is buying positions or open bribery American democracy?" But, the Americans gave me no answer.

Now, what was the American policy toward Korea at the time of their military administration? It was a policy whose aim was to split up our country and to crush the Korean people. It was a policy to prevent construction in Korea, to bring hardships and destruction upon her, and to use her as an experimental laboratory. The Americans looked down upon the Koreans as one of the most inferior people on earth, and with the Koreans they were making an experiment on the administration of inferior peoples. According to the American policy the best way of ruling inferior people is by means of splitting, antagonism, bloodshed and machination, and they tried to show the political impotence of the Koreans to the world. In fact, antagonism between Rhee Syngman and the Hankook-Minjoo-dang clique was also part of the American policy. So they supported Rhee Syngman in America, and backed the Hankook-Minjoo-dang in Korea. Regardless of political tendencies, the Americans were against any sort of unity of the Korean people, and having caused the split among the Koreans themselves, they implied that the Koreans were politically inferior and impotent.

In accordance with the American policy and Rhee Syngman's wish, separate elections were carried out, and the Separate Government was set up. The formation of the Separate Rhee Syngman Government, was aimed at (as the Americans put it) "harmonizing" the friction between Rhee Syngman and the Hankook-Minjoo-dang clique. But to them "harmonization" does not mean collaboration of both parties, but an intensification of the friction. So the American Government had the Separate Rhee Syngman Government

set up and made the enmity between the Hankook-Minjoo-dang and Rhee Syngman more severe.

At first Rhee Syngman was going to form his cabinet with no participation of the Hankook-Minjoo-dang. But, there came an order from America that two seats should be reserved—and that order was upon the request of Wedemeyer, Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in China at that time. Wedemeyer wanted to make Li Bum-suk one of his agents, prime minister as well as Secretary of National Defence. It was right after the refusal by Parliament of appointing Li Yun-yung Prime Minister, which Rhee Syngman had suggested. Thus, Li Bum-suk was made Prime Minister upon order from the United States. Now Li Bum-suk was a strong enemy to Rhee Syngman. Rhee Syngman was always cautious about a possible coup d'etat by Li Bum-suk. But, Li Bum-suk being engrossed in his rank, tried everything to suit Rhee Syngman's feelings, to show that he had no intention whatever to be against his boss. But Rhee Syngman never felt easy with Li Bum-suk. Li Bum-suk called Sin Sung-mo from England with the hope of obtaining a political solution through the opposition of the Marine. And Sin Sung-mo was very much welcomed by Rhee Syngman, because Rhee Syngman thought that he could drive out Li Bum-suk through Sin Sung-mo.

Li Bum-suk offered Sin Sung-mo the job of Marine Chief, which was under the control of the Secretary of National Defence. And Sin Sung-mo was ready to accept it; but Rhee Syngman promised Sin that he would give him a higher position, and thus Li Bum-suk's plan was crushed. Now the Hangkook-Minjoo-dang clique, having understood Rhee Syngman's tricks, began to make use of Sin Sung-mo. The Hankook-Minjoo-dang offered Sin funds for his political activities, just when he needed them. Having merged all the youth organizations into the Taihan-Chunguen-Dan, Rhee Syngman appointed Sin Sung-mo as its chief. Without hesitation Sin Sung-mo accepted the position. And at the time of Sin Sung-mo's appointment to this post, Rhee Syngman promised Sin Sung-

mo that later he would be made first Home Secretary and then Secretary of National Defence. Rhee Syngman was, of course, aware of the fact that Sin Sung-mo had an intimate connection with the Hankook-Minjoo-dang, but he tolerated it because he wanted to get rid of Li Bum-suk first.

Sin Sung-mo assumed the position of Home Secretary at last, and thus the Hankook-Minjoo-dang began to have a finger in the pie. Upon Kim Sung-soo's order, he made Kim Hyo-suk Vice-Secretary, who had been a member of the parliament. Sin Sung-mo did so, because he wanted to let Kim Hyo-suk become his successor when he would become Secretary of National Defence. And there, Rhee Syngman launched an open assault upon Li Bum-suk. The Hankook-Minjoo-dang stirred it up behind the scenes, and Sin Sung-mo urged Rhee Syngman on. Sin Sung-mo was most loyal to Rhee Syngman's European wife, Alice. He "mothered" her whenever he addressed her, and during their conversations he was often brought to tears by way of showing his sincerity. As Alice trusted him much, her husband also had much confidence in him. And at last there came a change in the post of Secretary of National Defence.

Thus Sin Sung-mo became Secretary of National Defence and Kim Hyo-suk Home Secretary. Those who had managed to hold positions as cabinet members in the Rhee Syngman Government under a false guise now began to act up to the directions of the party, unmasking themselves. The August 8 Club consisted of Sing Sung-mo, Yoon Bo-sun, Kim Do-yun and others, who were cabinet members of the Korean Democratic Party; and it is a well-known fact that they borrowed hundreds of millions of won from the bank for the party fund, driving it into bankruptcy.

Rhee Syngman was confronted with the offensive of the Korean Democratic Party. Besides, Li Bum-suk more than once annoyed Rhee Syngman, as his position had been guaranteed by Rhee Syngman at the time of the dissolution of the National Young Men's Association. Rhee Syngman was politically in a difficult situation.

The Korean Democratic Party launched a wild attempt, trying to place the entire government under its control. This, of course, was upon orders of the American Ambassador, Muccio. America tried to bring about a definite split within the Rhee Syngman government. The Korean Democratic Party proposed a revision of the constitution, following the instructions from America. The U.S. Department of State supported the Korean Democratic Party. Truman issued an order to MacArthur to support Rhee Syngman.

What does this mean? It meant only to disguise the aggressive policy of the American imperialists. Since last winter America has been pursuing a policy of victimizing Korea. America intended to enter upon World War III with the bloodshed of the Korean people. In order to carry out this policy effectively, the Rhee Syngman government had to be made impotent first. Then, it was necessary for them to split the Rhee Syngman clique, and in order to conceal their intrigues the American imperialists found it necessary to make the Rhee Syngman clique wrangle among themselves. In the U.S. State Department Acheson and Jessup pretend to be against the war, but that is only a show. As a matter of fact, World War III has been carefully prepared by Johnson and MacArthur upon Truman's order. They have decided that Korea should be the starting point of the World War III. According to the plan of actions of the Americans, Korea should be reduced to ashes and a pool of blood, thus exterminating the entire Korean people. The U.S. policy of victimizing Korea was already drawn up last winter and MacArthur seized the sovereign power of Korea at the beginning of this year. In MacArthur's war plan it was drawn up that a civil war should be instigated on the 38th parallel line by July this year.

The Chinese People's Liberation Army would launch an attack on Taiwan by July this year, they alleged. And a civil war would have to break out in Korea first, so that the United States could take military actions not only in Taiwan alone, but also in other regions in the Far East.

In February this year MacArthur called Rhee Syngman to Japan, and gave him the following instructions :

A. Rhee Syngman's entire armed forces should he placed under MacArthur's command.

B. Rhee Syngman's army should fight jointly with the Japanese army.

C. In the event of joint operations with the Japanese army, Li Eun, a royal member of the late Li Dynasty and ex-commander of the Japanese air forces, should be appointed general Commander under the "Command of MacArthur's Headquarters."

D. Rhee Syngman should ship to MacArthur's Headquarters by the end of June one million suk of rice as war provisions for the Japanese army.

E. Rhee Syngman's army should act as the provocator of a civil war.

F. Rhee Syngman should establish an arsenal in Japan under the supervision of the Japanese.

G. High officers of Rhee Syngman's troops should be trained in Japan by the Japanese officers at an early date.

H. A large number of Japanese officers should be employed in the Rhee Syngman Army.

I. Reinforcement of Rhee Syngman's troops should be stopped and a great number of Japanese soldiers should be employed considering that untrained soldiers are more of a nuisance than a help in battle.

J. MacArthur should guarantee Rhee Syngman's position during and after the war.

K. One million Japanese soldiers, arms and ammunition are ready for the war in Korea, which would suffice at least for half a year.

It is to be expected that without consideration Rhee Syngman immediately carried out the above-mentioned instructions of Mac-

Arthur, and on returning home he sent Chae Byung-duk and all the other high officers of his army to Japan, and he gave orders to the Secretary of National Defence to send rice to Japan immediately. After his return home Rhee Syngman had been intent upon seeking a chance to provoke a civil war. Rhee Syngman had received an order from MacArthur to provoke a civil war before July.

The Rhee Syngman regime was at the height of corruption and degeneration, and owing to the split and conflict among themselves political crisis was getting worse and worse.

The people were suffering extremely. The Rhee Syngman regime was drawing nearer to ruin more than ever. Things turned out to be extremely bad since this spring. MacArthur's order, that a civil war should be instigated by July had incessantly been lingering in Rhee Syngman's mind. With the opening of the new parliament as a result of the May 30 elections, Rhee Syngman was faced with an extremely critical situation both politically and socially. As a means of tiding over such a situation, the "conquest of north Korea" seemed to him indispensable.

And since the 20th of June this matter had been seriously considered by the war instigators. The central figures here were Chae Byung-duk, Sin Sung-mo and Kim Sug-won. They divided the front in sections and each of them had a task as follows: The western front under Kim Sug-won and the eastern front under Chae Byung-duk. In order to find a way out of political and social difficulties, Rhee Syngman made up his mind to provoke a civil war by the end of June, the time limited by MacArthur, and at last he carried it out on the night of June 24.

No sooner had Rhee Syngman's troops provoked a civil war than were they driven back and routed; so great was the diference in the capacity of both armies. Indeed the United States anticipated this, and it was her only aim to avail herself openly of the pretext and opportunity of invading Korea. The Americans mapped out plans to start World War III at the cost of the blood of the Korean people. As was prearranged by the Americans, the

civil war was provoked by Rhee Syngman and developed into an open fight between the Korean people and the Americans.

Rhee Syngman, who had provoked the civil war, fled with Alice to Japan by aeroplane on June 26. Being a political adviser to Rhee Syngman since April this year, I tried to rid the Rhee Syngman regime of its corruption and degeneration, and organized the Minjok-Gookka-Dang or the Nationalist State Party as my political background. But soon it became clear to me that reconstruction and renovation were not possible without radical changes, and that renovation in word alone meant to deceive others as well as myself.

Corruption and degeneration of the Rhee Syngman regime were beyond description. The price for the rank of a Secretary in Rhee Syngman's cabinet was fixed at 30 million won, that of a provincial governor at 20 million won, and that of a department chief at 10 million won. Every government post was a matter of bargain in money. Some 59 or 60 thousand won was needed to obtain the post of a policeman. A chauffeur had to spend some 30 thousand won for his job. For a week before the liberation of Seoul by the People's Army, two thirds of the whole population of that city had been starving.

It goes without saying that the U.S. policy towards Korea is by no means of a constructive nature; America wanted to make Korea the starting point of World War III. America, therefore, made it her point to demoralize the Rhee Syngman regime.

Split, corruption and degeneration,—such was the U.S. policy towards the Rhee Syngman regime. As for Rhee Syngman himself, he was engrossed in money-making, and cabinet ministers in their turn did everything in their power to bring a quick return for what they had invested in getting the position. Rhee Syngman's regime was a body of undisciplined rascals assembled together for money-making and their policy was nothing but money-making. They sought every means of earning money with no consideration whatever of the livelihood of the people, and abused every right in

violation of the law. Every government official, high and low, found his own way of money-making. Corruption and degeneration of Rhee Syngman's regime were still greater than those of the Chiang Kai-shek government.

Members of the parliament, who had spent each as much money as 10 to 100 million won in their election campaign, wanted to get back the money they had invested, and attacked the government in various ways. When the government was attacked by any member of the parliament, it came to terms with him, and granted him some rights of making money.

As for his army, no officer of any troops of the world could have led a more extravagant life than those of the Rhee Syngman troops. They swindled their men out of their clothes and provisions for their own pockets. The officers took their men to their own houses aud forced them do all kinds of things for them.

The officers were indulged in merry-making every night like princes of old days, while their hungry soldiers were guarding them outside.

But their hour had come. They will be sentenced by the court of history. All their crimes will be punished.

The present war is a war between the Korean people and the Americans. I swear before my country and the people that I will fight till I make the Americans take their blood-stained hands off Korea.

Long live General Kim Il-sung, leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

No. 17

TESTIMONY OF LIEUT. HAN SU-WHAN, FORMERLY OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 17TH REGT. OF THE SOUTH KOREAN NATIONAL DEFENCE ARMY, DATED JUNE 29, 1950[1]

I think I know more thoroughly than anyone else of the inside stories of the present war, as I have served the Rhee Syngman puppet clique as an operation instructor and political officer in the 17th Regt. Hqts. of the National Defence Army. What I want to say, first of all, is that the war had not been prepared for in a day or two. Even the conflicts along the 38th parallel line since May, the conflict in Mt. Eun-Pa, and all other innumerable provocations along the 38th parallel line had been part of the war preparation.

Particularly in May this year, there was a Conference of Division-Commanders, in which also the regiment-commanders took part; there they deliberated on operation plans, of which three were drawn up—Plan A, B and C, all for an expedition against the north.

Thus, since May previous plans for command of the battalions had been given up, and the so-called "Headquarters Measures" was

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Footnotes

1. Abridged translation from Korean original.

established for the control of the entire National Defence Army. In accordance with this policy, we were trained solely for the offensive.

As the 38th parallel line had been considered by the National Defenee Army as the front, we garrisons were to take turns in every six months to station there. But, even when our term of service was over for two months, Headquarters did not transfer us, but gave us a strict order to remain on the spot instead. At the same time, Headquarters personnel began to visit and inspect the front more frequently.

The 17th Regt. was stationed in a locality called Kwang-San, one and a half kilometers north of Ongjin, and was placed on a war footing under the direction of American military advisers, Maj. Straggie and seven others.

With a view to elevating the morale of the soldiers, they clamoured around Headquarters everyday, saying that the Korean National Defence Army was the best army of the world, equipped with most up-to-date weapons; and they bragged that by occupying the north we would get back our lost land, including even Manchuria, since it had once been part of our territory in the old days.

Five or six days prior to the outbreak of the war, the so-called UN Military Observers made an inspection tour through the areas along the 38th parallel line, and went back on June 23rd. Since that time the atmosphere of the front was getting more tense, and we thought something unusual would happen.

Though the 24th was a Saturday, officers of the regiment were not allowed to go out; they were ordered to be on the alert. We all stayed up that night in a tense mood, and by daybreak of the 25th a secret order reached us from Headquarters to launch an attack on the region north of the 38th parallel line.

All the units, which had launched the sudden attack from the Ongjin Area, broke through the 38th parallel line, and their advance covered from 1 to 2 kilometers. The 1st battalion of the 17th Regt. marched towards the central area near Kachun, Pyek-

Sung County; the 3rd battalion to Mt. Ka-Ji; and the 2nd battalion, which had been held for reserves, was later arrayed on the central front.

Soon after we had launched our attack, we were confronted with a fierce counter-offensive of the Constabularies of the People's Republic. The 38th parallel line conflict at that time was the fiercest of all the hostilities we ever had.

In the area two kilometers north of the 38th parallel line we met with a stubborn resistance of the Constabularies, and while we were moving back and forward an urgent news reached us—the news that the 3rd Bn., which had debouched to the Mt. Ka-Ji area, was engaged in battle. Thereafter, all the communications were completely cut off. We received then orders only through a few wireless connections or motorcar messengers; and the situation was already helplessly unfavourable to us.

Having received the report on the battle in Mt. Ka-Jin at 10.00 a.m. the Regt.-Commander announced that he would lead in all future warfare. But at that moment, news reached the Regt. Hqts. that the 1st and 3rd Bns. in the central area were also in a critical situation. By that time all connections among the fronts were completely cut off.

The company formations were also shattered, and platoons and squads were all in a confusion—the front turned out to be a mere chaos. The battalion in the Mt. Ka-Ji sector began first to retreat to Mt. Nok-Kal in the rear, and in the central area, too, there began an all-out retreat.

We, who had been so proud of being equipped with American arms of ultra-modern type, collapsed completely everywhere before the Constabularies of the People's Republic; even the 53 rocket guns we had were of no use. By 11 o'clock in the morning part of our regiment was completely encircled in the town of Sagosi, not far from Ongjin. In short, the counter-offensive of the Constabularies and the People's Army of the People's Republic was like a sweeping landslip which came over us.

Prior to its debouchment to Ongjin, the 17th Regt., known as the best unit of the National Defence Army, had been escorting Rhee Syngman as the Metropolitan Guards, and used to enjoy the by-name of "Twin Tigers Unit".

They used to hammer into our heads the idea that it would be a very easy matter to occupy the northern half of the Republic; and we took it seriously. A proverb says that a romping puppy is not afraid of the tiger, and that was precisely the case when Rhee Syngman and his clique provoked the current war.

I honestly think that I have committed crimes which can never be forgiven by the Korean people. Death is what I deserve, but, the People's Army has been lenient towards me and renders me a helping hand, leading me to a new life.

No. 18

SCHEME (A) OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS[1]

(STRICT MILITARY SECRECY)[2]

SCHEME OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950.

Section III, Intelligence Bureau,
Army Headquarters.

Policy :

In consideration of the tense international situation at home and abroad fundamental policy of the intelligence work shall hinge upon execution of matters of importance. Extermination of puppet organizations of north Korea shall be aimed at by means of secret

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Footnotes.

1. This document was found in Section III, Intelligence Bureau of the South Korean Army Headquarters. The original is in Korean. This document is divided into A and B Sections by the editor in view of the difference in their contents.
2. Stamp.

warfares, and with might and main successful intelligence works shall be carried out for a rapid frustration of the said organizations for the restoration of lost territories.

INTELLIGENCE:

TARGETS:

I. Military intelligence:

1) Formations and equipments of the stationed units;
2) Movements and defence of the 38th parallel line;
3) Ideological tendencies of the People's Army officers;
4) Attitude of the Army towards the government and the people;
5) How far the Army participates in politics;
6) How much the population has confidence in the Army;
7) Relations between the Army and political parties and social organizations;
8) Morale and discipline;
9) How far the Soviet military advisers have a hand in the north Korean affairs;
10) Relations with the Eighth Route Army in Manchuria;
11) Operation plans;
12) Hostility of the Army personnel against the war;
13) Military finance and funds;
14) How the Army is supplied;
15) Military intelligence work versus the south.

II. Political, economic and ideological intelligence:

1) Popular rumours about the lower administration officials;
2) Collections, labour service, requisitions, taxes;
3) Complaints of the civilians against the officials;
4) Political co-operation of the people;
5) Industrial conditions;
6) Rehabilitation of bnsiness and industry;
7) How far the communist regime is understood;

8) How transportation facilities are being operated;
9) Foreign trades;
10) How far the international situation is understood;
11) Propagandas at home and abroad;
12) Education and culture;
13) Ideological tendencies of the students;
14) Materials delivered to the Soviet Union.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

Main points of the intelligence work:

I. The main point of the intelligence work lies in getting the mainstay of secret agents as follows, and equipping them with the qualifications of best workers through a thorough-going training:
   1) One who has knowledge of military affairs, is interested in getting wind of secrets, and predisposed to adventure;
   2) One who is clever, has sound judgement and knows the art of social intercourse;
   3) A quick witted, bold and self-possessed person;
   4) A shrewd person with a wealth of common sense and is skilled in trickery;
   5) One who has a strong lust for fame and money;

II. Together with the permanent secret agents, liaison agents shall also be used, and through their intimate connections informations shall be transmitted; liaison agents shall be selected as follows:
   1) One who is skilled in feigning a pedlar, also skilled in arts and techniques;
   2) Beggars who hang about the taverns, and give performances of dancing, singing and musical instruments;
   3) Barbers, photographers, train conductors and engineers;
   4) Pedlars of miscellaneous goods, motorcar drivers, fishermen etc;
   5) Cooks, bar-maids, waitresses and day-labourers.

Powerful nets of intelligence service shall be laid with the above-mentioned permanent and liaison secret agents; they must assume an ever-growing dimension, and at the same time they shall have cells as follows:

III. Cell organizations:

1) Cells, up to 5 in number, shall be organized around a leading agent; each cell shall consist of 3 to 5 persons, and they shall incessantly bring in informations;
2) In each cell, the person who is in charge shall have direct contacts with the permanent agent, and other cell members shall work by themselves;
3) One who is in charge of the cell shall give only partial orders to the agents under him, and the full account of an affair shall not be revealed;

IV. To bribe persons in important positions in various organs:

1) To make use of officers and men of the Army, who are prone to conversion, and pilfer confidential documents;
2) To infiltrate into important organs such as police stations, Counter-Intelligence Bureaus etc., and steal confidential documents or obtain secrets;
3) To buy off workers and purveyors of prohibited military areas for sketches of important buildings.

INTRIGUES:

TARGETS:

I. Intrigues for Destructions:

1) Concerning railroads:

a) To destroy bridges and tunnels;
b) To derail and overturn military trains;
c) To destroy freight cars and station buildings;
d) Collision;
e) To destroy main railway factories.

2) Heavy industry, firms and factories:

a) Munitions factories of the People's Army;
b) Various important factories of the Army;
c) Public buildings;
d) Aerodromes;
e) Power plants and transformer stations;
f) Broadcasting stations;
g) Cylinder-press of newspapers.

II. Incendiarism : To set afire

1) Public buildings,
2) Dwelling houses,
3) Public halls,
4) Military barracks and school buildings,
5) Buildings of political parties and other organs,
6) Aerodromes,
7) Power plants and transformer stations,
8) Broadcasting stations,
9) Various factories of the Army,

III. To infect with bacteria :

1) Army kitchens,
2) Dining rooms of the police,
3) Banquet halls of the Army, government, party etc.,
4) City resevoirs, rivers,
5) Houses of the leaders of the Army, government and the party.

IV. Propaganda :

1) To distribute leaflets;
2) To post wall newspapers;
3) To scribble on walls ;
4) To circulate sensational rumours ;
5) To inspire liberalistic ideas ;
6) To stir up people against the war, against military service;
7) To instigate anti-communist ideas ;
8) To provoke revolts and nationalistic desertions ;

9) To instigate strikes ;
10) To instigate sabotages ;
11) To propagandize the might of the National Army of the Republic of Korea ;
12) To instigate migration to south Korea ;
13) To propagandize freedom in south Korea.

V. Economic intrigues:

1) To corner in and hold back main goods;
2) To waste daily necessities;
3) To counterfeit north Korean bank notes;
4) To hinder collections of provisions.

VI. Assassination:

1) The biggest ringleaders of north Korea;
2) Higher officers of the People's Army;
3) Higher officers of the Home Ministry;
4) Leaders of the political parties and social organizations;
5) Persons in charge of cultural organizations;
6) Highest cadres of the ministries;
7) Highest cadres and those of middle rank in charge of intelligence work on south Korea;
8) Bad elements in the intelligence service, policemen and officials;
9) Previous officers of the National Army who have deserted to the north, and the ringleader in the desertion of s/s Smith to the north.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

1) Bold and valiant persons shall be selected from the agents in service,and they shall receive sufficient remunerations; at the same time orders shall be given in accordance with their specific characters;
2) Agents shall personally and secretly take up the execution of destroying main buildings; at the same time they shall pick up adequate collaborators on the spot of their actions;

3) Prior to destroying the objects, a thorough-going study of the situation shall be done;
4) In setting buildings afire, employees in the buildings shall be bribed, but the agents shall personally make a careful survey of the matter beforehand;
5) In assassinations, cell members shall bribe waitresses or kitchen workers, and have them poison the persons in question;
6) Skilled agents shall manage to be near the leaders, and poison them during meals or at drinking parties;
7) Employees at the city resevoirs shall be bribed into poisoning the water;
8) Kitchens of the Army and public organizations shall be poisoned;
9) Purveyors and pedlars who regularly visit the Army or main organs shall be utilized for mixing poisons in food supplies;
10) In propaganda intrigues, circulations of leaflets and northbound broadcasts, which have already been in use, shall be intensified;
11) Students who harbour patriotic ideas shall be utilized for posting wall newspapers or scribbling on walls;
12) Propaganda leaflets shall be dispatched to youth organizations through mails;
13) In the main cities secret senders shall be set, and counter-propaganda shall be broadcasted as occasion allows;
14) Songs in praise of the Republic of Korea shall be propagated among the primary school children;
15) Dynamite etc. shall be buried at aerodromes or main bridges.

MAIN POINTS OF COMMUNICATING INTELLIGENCE:

1) Secret ink-cloth shall be used if there is no wireless set;
2) Colourless letters shall be used in newspapers or magazines;

3) Ciphers shall be used in disguised mails;
4) Bacteria shall be disguised as ordinary drugs;
5) Other tools and materials, mentioned in the instructions, shall be obtained from the spot if possible, and shall be sent over only when they are not obtainable there.

UTILIZATIAN OF ENEMY SPIES:

TARGETS:

1) North Korean secret agents who have reliable guarantors in south Korea;
2) Members of the South Korean Workers' Party, who are disposed to conversion;
3) To select adequate persons from converted captives;
4) To select adequate persons from businessmen who trade between the north and south;
5) To utilize spies who live permanently in south Korea;
6) To utilize north Korean ships now in south Korea for smuggling;
7) R.H. special service (Lim Ho); R.C.K. special service (Pak Chang-geun); N.N. special service (South Korean Workers' Party); R.I.W. special service (Lo Myeng); K.W. special service (Kim Il-pa).

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

1) To take advantage of criminal acts, i.e. weaknesses of the person in question, pretend to pardon him leniently, fully protect him and utilize him;
2) To double the pay, when employing spies of north Korean intelligence organs, and try to get accurate informations;
3) To train north Korean spies for not less than a week how to give false informations, when sending them back;
4) The person who manipulates an enemy spy must be very careful that the latter does not know that the southern authorities are aware of his double-dealings. He shall keep his eye on the enemy spy in strict secret.

WORK FOR CONVERSION:

TARGETS:

1) On officers and men of the People's Army;
2) On officers and men of the Police;
3) On leading cadres of various political parties and social organizations;
4) On technicians in heavy industry;
5) On leading railway cadres as well as engineers and assistants;
6) On officers and men of the Air Force;
7) On officers and men of the Marines;
8) On cadres in freight vessel service;
9) On leading intelligentsia in the organs and magazines of communist hordes;
10) On higher officials in administrative bodies.

ESSENTIAL POINTS:

1) To send back patriotic young men from the north, and send them to the People's Army, to influence those who are prone to ideological conversion or those who have joined the army by force, and to persuade them to desert or revolt;
2) To praise incessantly the might of the south Korean National Army by means of leaflets;
3) To allure the person in question into conversion through his relatives, schoolmates and other friends.

REMARKS

I. Agents on Special Service to and from the north;

1) Preliminary investigations for the acquisition of persons for Special Service;
   a) Preliminary investigation is the first step to acquiring such persons—they must be persons with sound patriotic ideas,
   b) The work shall hinge upon county people's organizations or youth organizations of the people who have left the north;

c) By preliminary investigations the person in question shall be imbibed with aspirations and curiosities for our aims and schemes, and his patriotic morale shall be inflamed;

2) Selection of persons for Specinl Service:

a) The person shall be selected upon his application or through suggestions in accordance with the preliminary investigations;

b) At least for two months his behaviour, above all his ideological background, shall be strictly observed, and when he is proved to be a staunch patriot, he shall be selected;

c) One who is fit for the service is:—a person who has left the north, concretely and thoroughly knows the military, political and economic situation in the north, and is interested in adventure;

d) One who has intimate friends and relatives in north Korean puppet organizations;

3) Examination of persons for Special Service:

a) If possible he shall be examined for several times, and his mentality and circumstance shall be of primary consideration; trifle weak points should also be of little consideration for the service;

b) As a rule, person in charge of the manipulation of the candidate shall examine; but officers concerned, who fully knows his mentality, shall also examine him;

c) It is required of the examiner to assume dignity and be erudite so that the person in question can have respect for and confidence in him;

4) Training of persons for Special Service:

a) Persons for Special Service shall be trained per month, per week or occasionally, but always in a secret place;

b) In training, applied psychology should be understood and specific character of the person in question should

be adequately estimated for the service; in consideration of human nature, no personal connections among themselves shall be tolerated;

5) Orders to person on Special Service:
   a) Orders shall be given within the limit of possibility: Prior to the issue of orders, their contents as well as its limit in time shall be thoroughly and philosophically studied, i.e. those orders which can be carried out.
   b) Not to issue too much orders to a single person; the order must be simple and clear, and the target must be definite, so that the ordered can have full self-confidence;

6) Dispatch of persons on Special Service:
   a) Agents shall be dispatched by ones or twos; they must be persons who are well acquainted with customs and landscape of their destination; they shall make use of their relatives, friends and schoolmates;
   b) When dispatched, he shall be escorted to the border by officers or non-commissioned officers, thus guaranteeing his crossing;

7) Activities at the destination:
   a) The service shall be carried out in accordance with the order and circumstances, best methods with regard to time and space shall be applied, and confusions shall be avoided;
   b) He must always be ready for the worst, and actions shall be taken after careful preparations;

8) Way home:
   a) The route home shall be the same as the route out;
   b) The person on Special Service shall speak with nobody on his way home, and shall not be in touch with the organ concerned near the border;

9) Reports of the person on Special Service:
   a) Besides written or oral reports, reports through secret ciphers, colourless letters or secret ink;

10) Estimation of reports:

a) Grades A, B and C shall be used as regards origin and accuracy of the reports;

b) When intelligence has come from person A on Special Service, it shall be compared with that of another person, who is not on Special Service, from the same place, and thus accuracy can be ensured.

11) Education of persons on Special Service:

a) When a person on Special Service has returned, his service shall be highly praised, regardless of his success or failure; his errors shall be immediately corrected through education, and thus success shall be guaranteed for the days to come;

b) A person, who hands in informations of 90% accuracy, shall be remunerated with a sum beyond his expectation, and due respects shall be paid him.

MEASURES FOR BEREAVED FAMILIES OF VICTIMIZED AGENTS, AND COUNTER-MEASURES FOR DESERTED AGENTS.

I. Livelihood of bereaved families of agents arrested in the field of their activities shall be guaranteed, and they shall be safeguarded morally and materially.

II. Families of those who were not killed, but imprisoned, shall be supported till they return.

III. A satisfactory solatium shall be paid to the family of the agent who has been executed or exiled, and cannot return forever; at the same time some adequate occupation shall be arranged for its members.

IV. A person of this Section, who arrives at his destination at the expense of the Section's fund, but tries not to come back, or has fawned on the enemy and becomes a convert, shall be allured by another person in the same service to come back and shall be executed, or he shall be assassinated by somebody else.

PERSONNEL AND EXPENSE FOR OUTSIDE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN VARIOUS PLACES

Permanent Secret Agents :

Place	Personnel	Expense per person in won	Expense per month in won	Expense per year in won
Pyongang	15 Per	50,000—	750,000—	9,000,000—
Sinijoo	10 ,,	50,000—	500,000—	6,000,000—
Haejoo	10 ,,	50,000—	500,000—	6,000,000—
Nampo	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Namchun	3 ,,	50,000—	150,000—	1,800,000—
Sunchun	3 ,,	50,000—	150,000—	1,800,000—
Sariwon	4 ,,	50,000—	200,000—	2,400,000—
Hamheung	10 ,,	50,000—	500,000—	6,000,000—
Chungjin	10 ,,	50,000—	500,000—	6,000,000—
Wonsan	8 ,,	50,000—	400,000—	4,800,000—
Heungnam	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Chulwon	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Sungjin	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Najin	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Hoeryeng	5 ,,	50,000—	250,000—	3,000,000—
Total	103 per	750,000—wons	5,150,000—wons	61,800,000—wons

LIAISON SECRET AGENTS:

Place	Personnel	Expense per person in won	Expense per month in won	Expense per year in won
Pyongyang	5 per	30,000—	150,000—	1,800,000—wons
Sinijoo	4 ,,	30,000—	120,000—	1,440,000—
Haejoo	5 ,,	30,000—	90,000—*	1,080,000—
Sariwon	4 ,,	30,000—	90,000—*	1,080,000—
Namchun	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080 000—
Nampo	4 ,,	30,000—	90,000—*	1,080,000—
Sunchun	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Hamheung	5 ,,	30,000—	150,000—	1,080,000—
Chungjin	5 ,,	30,000—	150,000—	1,080,000—
Wonsan	4 ,,	30.000—	120,000—	1,440,000—
Sungjin	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Chulwon	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Najin	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Heungnam	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	1,080,000—
Hoeryeng	3 ,,	30,000—	90,000—	0,080,000—
Total	57 per.	450,000—wons	590,000—wons	16,920,000—wons

*This is precisely the figure given in the original.—Ed.

FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AT HOME


IN SEOUL:				
District	Personnel	Expense per person in won	Expense per month in won	Expenses per year in won
Mapo	3 per.	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Yungdeungpo	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Yongsan	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
West Gate	3 ,,	15,000—	45.000—	580,000—
East Gate	3 ,,	15.000—	45,000—	580,000—
Choonggoo	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Sungdong	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Sungbook	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Chongno	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
In the Province:				
Inchun	5 per.	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Poosan	5 ,,	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Pohang	5 ,,	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Yusoo	5 ,,	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Koonsan	5 ,,	15,000—	75,000—	900,000—
Choonchun	3 ,,	15,000—	45,000—	580,000—
Total	55 per.	185,500—wons*	825,500—wons	10,300,000—wons

* As in original.—Ed.

FOR UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES

Classification	Target	Name of Agent	Expense per month in won	Expense per yr. in won
R.H.	Special Serv.	Lim Ho	500,000	6,000,000
N.N.	South Korean Workers' Party	Kim Yung-sook	200,000	2,400,000
R.C.K.	Kang Soon, deputy to Supreme People's Assembly	Pak Chan-geun	200,000	2,400,000
R.U.N.	Counter Intelligence Bureau	Lo Myeng	100,000	1,200,000
K.I.K.	Special Service	Kim Il-pa	300,000	3,600,000
Total			1,300,000--wons	15,600,000 wons

GRAND TOTAL: ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR MILLION AND ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND WONS.



Photostatic copy of the cover of Document No. 18

No. 19

SCHEME (B) OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, SOUTH KOREAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS[1]

(STRICT MILITARY SECRECY)[2]

SCHEME OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR OF 1950

Section III, Intelligence Bureau,
Army Headquarters.

POLICY:

This Section is going to inflict, by March this year, epoch-making destructions, intrigues and provocations upon the North Korean hordes, and lay a complete net of intelligence service around the puppet army as well as political, economic and cultural spheres

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Footnotes.

1. This document was found in Sertion III, Intelligence Bureau of the South Korean Army Headquarters. The orginal is in Korean.
   In this document, the general plan of intelligence work against north Korea which had already been planned out in the previous documeut No. 18 is more concretely elaborated here and specifically divided up for each quarter of the year of 1950.
2. Stamp.

and also in adjacent countries, and frustrate the March move of the puppet hordes. At the same time, the Section is going to accurately grasp the movement of the puppet hordes, especially of the puppet army, nip it in the bud, and from being defensive we change into the offensive, and by safeguarding our leading position stir up revolts within the Northern territory for the annihilation of the puppet hordes.

THE FIRST QUARTER: JANUARY — MARCH.

MILITARY AFFAIRS UNIT:

Intelligence:

I. Collection of military intelligence:
   1) On the People's Army;
   2) On the Police Force;
   3) On the Volunteers;
   4) On the Special Units;
   5) On the Coast Guard;
   6) On relations with the Soviet Army;
   7) On relations with the Chinese Communist Army;

II. Nets of Permanent Intelligence Service:
   1) To obtain at least 2 permanent secret agents for a division;
   2) To station at least 2 permanent secret agents each in Pyongyang, Nanam, Hamheung, Sinijoo, Wonsan and Heungnam;
   3) To station permament secret agents in Hongkong and Shimonoseki.

III. Utilization of enemy spies:
   1) R.H. special service (Lim Ho);
   2) R.C.K. special service (Pak Chang-geun);
   3) N.N. special service (Kim Yung-sook);
   4) R.I.M. special service (Lo Myeng);
   5) K.P. special service (Kim Il-pa);
   6) R.T.K. special (Li Don-gyoo).

IV. Work on the Chung-Oo-Dang (Party):

To organize cells.

Intrigue;

I. Destructions:

1) Railway (Seoul-Sinijoo Line);
2) Bridge (Hamgyeng Line);
3) Tunnel (Pyongyang-Wonsan Line);
4) The Soopoong Dam;
5) Pyongyang Broadcasting Station.

II. Infection with Bacteria:

1) In Nampo;
2) In Najin:
3) In Wonsan;
4) Kitchens of various Division-Headquarters.

III. Incendiarism:

1) Arsenal at Kanni;
2) Arsenal at Supo.

Asssination:

I. In political circles

1) Pak Hun-yung (Vice-Premier);
2) Kim Chack (Vice-Premier).

II. In military circles

1) Pang Hak-se;
2) Wang Ryen.

Conversion:

I. 5 officers of the Home Ministry.
II. 5 officers of the People's Army.
III. 5 officers of the Volunteers.

Underground Cells:

I. In Pyongyang;
II. In Sinijoo;

III. In Chunǧjin ;
IV. In Hoeryeng ;
V. In Yunchun ;
VI. In Kanggye.

SCOUT UNIT:

Transportation:

I. Railroads:

1) Double gauge;
2) Rails;
3) Number of wagons;
4) Coal supply;
5) Maintenance of railway tracks;
6) Ware-houses;
7) Electric railroads;
8) Stations;
9) Water supply;
10) Depots;
11) Machineries.

II. Roads:

1) Length, width, height, soil, conditions of the vicinity, pass, tree-lined streets, hills, plains etc.

III. Bridges:

1) Length, width, height, material, solidity, age, soil, river conditions.

Topography:

1. Mountainous regions:

1) Height, (width), kinds of forests, distance, steepness of the roads, mountain ranges, rocks, soil.

II. Rivers:

1) Length, width, depth, swiftness, light vessels, transportation facilities, tides, etc.

III. Coasts:

1) Conditions of sea water, coast line, coming-and-going of ships and fishing boats, depth etc.

IV. Harbours:

1) Situation, depth, tides, scale, water-breakers, protection of the beach, light-house, pier.

Military Establishments:

I. Fortifications:

1) Enemy trenches, batteries, tochkas, tank trenches, watch-towers etc.

II. Naval ports:

1) North Korean naval bases, harbour equipments, bridge-heads, dockyards etc.

III. Fortress:

1) Fortresses, military establishments and buildings, mobilization equipments etc. of the North Korean enemy.

IV. Munitions Factories:

1) Output of the munitions industry, raw materials, mobilization, reserves, buildings etc. of the enemy.

INSPECTION UNIT

Military Affairs:

I. Inspection of informations received on various North Korean military affairs.

II. Inspection of operation of intelligence nets laid in North Korea.

III. To make a statistical table of secret assaults.

IV. To make a statistical table of informations on military affairs etc.

V. Inspection of operation of the cells.

In Politics and Economy:

I. To intensify strategical propaganda against North Korean politics, economy, culture and industry.
II. To smuggle our agents into North Korean political circles.
III. To propel anti-communist measures to the utmost.
IV. To intensify the exaggeration of South Korean administration to the North Koreans.

Adjustment:

I. To inspect and adjust informations received.
II. To examine the preservation of secret documents.
III. To get hold of secret ink and other chemical stuff.
IV. To study how to get hold of machines for destructive works.
V. To purchase special materials for the destruction of North Korea.

THE SECOND QUARTER: APRIL—JUNE

MILITARY AFFAIRS UNIT

Intelligence:

I. Collection of military intelligence:
As before.

II. Nets of Permanent Intelligence Service:

1) To obtain at least 2 permanent secret agents for a brigade;
2) To station permanent secret agents in Chungjin, Nanam, Hoeryeng, Chulwon, Haejoo and Sariwon;
3) To station permanent secret agents in Shanghai and Tsuruga.

III. Utilization of Enemy Spies:
As before, plus detection of North Korean spies.

IV. Work on the Chung-Oo-Dang (Party):
To intensify the cells.

Intrigue:

I. Destructions:

1) Railway (Pyongyang-Wonsan Line);
2) Bridge (Seoul-Sinijoo Line);
3) Tunnel (Hamgyeng Line);
4) Power Plant of Changjin;
5) Wonsan Broadcasting Station.

II. Infection with Bacteria:

1) In Sinijoo;
2) In Oonggi;
3) In Pyongyang;
4) Kitchens of various brigade-headquarters.

III. Incendiarism:

1) Ministry of National Defence;
2) National Theatre of Pyongyang;
3) People's Assembly hall of the puppet hordes.

Assassination:

I. In political circles:

1) Kim Il-sung (Prime Minister);
2) Pak Ir-oo (Home Minister).

II. In military circles:

1) Choe Yong-gun;
2) Kang Gun.

Conversion:

I. 6 officers of the Home Ministry.
II. 8 officers of the People's Army.
III. 4 officers of the Volunteers.

Undergrounds Cells:

I. In Wonsan.
II. In Hamheung.
III. In Heungnam.

IV. In Najin.
V. In Kimchun.
VI. In Manpo.

SCOUT UNIT

Transportation:

I. Railway station establishments:
   1) Buildings;
   2) Accommodation capacity;
   3) Compound equipments;
   4) Warehouses;
   5) Area;
   6) Awaiting wagon numbers;
   7) Traffic frequency, etc.

II. Projected railway lines and roads:
   1) Aim of establishment;
   2) Kinds;
   3) Mobilization ;
   4) Topography ;
   5) When?
   6) And other items.

III. Tunnels :
   1) Length, width, height, construction material, age, topography, traffics, guards etc.

Topography :

I. Plains :
   1) Size, length and width, soil, products, rivers, cultivated areas, forests, ox and horse carts numbers, etc.

II. Weather :
   1) Difference in temperature, temperature, wind velocity, rain and snow, (fog), tide, intensity of sun and moon shine etc.

III. Cities a d towns :
   1) Area, population, house numbers, buildings, transportation facilities, schools, parks, sanitation facilities, barracks.

IV. Lakes :

1) Size, depth, width, length, perimeter, boat production, how utilized, irrigation etc.

Military Establishment :

I. Barracks :

1) Barracks, buildings, kinds, roof numbers, floor space, equipments etc, of the North Korean puppet army.

II. Power Plants :

1) Power houses, transformer stations, amount of electricity, electric supply etc. in North.

III. Broadcasting Stations :

1) Establishments of broadcasting stations, wireless stations etc. in North Korea.

IV. Telephone :

1) Everything about the telephone equipments of the guards.

INSPECTION UNIT

Military Affairs:

As before.

In Politics and Economy:

I. To find out how far the masses participate in politics and their relations with the political parties, and to expose their war aims.

II. To find out and propagandize organizations of the North Korean puppet hordes, and characteristics of leading political parties.

III. To dispatch patriotic envelopes.

IV. To find out things about the issue of bonds and bank notes, their amount and credit.

Adjustment:

I. To put the material in order and hand in for the strategy of our army.

II. Task during this period, as mentioned above.

THE THIRD QUARTER: JULY—SEPTEMBER.

MILITARY AFFAIRS UNIT

Intelligence:

I. Collection of military intelligence:
   As before.

II. Nets of Permanent Intelligence Service:
   1) To obtain at least 2 permanent secret agents for a regiment;
   2) To station permanent secret agents in Namchun, Sinmak, Sungjin, Najin and Oonggi;
   3) To station permanent secret agents in Amoy and Maizuru.

III. Utilization of Enemy Spies:
   As before, plus detection of North Korean spies.

IV. Work on the Chung-Oo-Dang (Party):
   To stir up against the Party policy.

Intrigue:

I. Destructions:
   1) Railway (Hamyeng Line);
   2) Bridge (Pyongyang-Wonsan Line);
   3) Tunnel (Seoul-Sinijoo Line);
   4) Whachun Power Plant;
   5) Hamheung Broadcasting Station.

II. Infection with Bacteria:
   1) In Hamheung;
   2) In Chungjin;
   3) In Chulwon;
   4) Kitchens of various regiment-headquarters.

III. Incendiarism:
   1) Engineering Plant at Pyongchulli;
   2) Headquarters of the North Korean Workers' Party.

Assassination:

I. In political circles:
   1) Choe Chang-ik (Minister of Finance);
   2) Li Seung-yup (Minister of Justice).

II. In military circles:
    1) Kim Pa;
    2) Suck San.

Conversion:

I. 5 officers of the Home Ministry;
II. 7 officers of the People's Army.
III. 6 officers of the Volunteers.

Underground Cells:

I. In Sunchun.
II. In Nampo.
III. In Chungjoo.
IV. In Sungjin.
V. In Aoji.
VI. In Kaechun.

SCOUT UNIT

Transportation:

I. Air Lines—Military and Passenger Planes:
    1) and 2) are too blurred to be legible—Ed.
    3) Regular service;
    4) Meteorology, topography, atmospheric current etc.;
    4) * Routes of war vessels and merchant ships;
    5) Destinations; 6) Number of ships; 7) Kinds of ships;
    8) Number of crew and passengers; 9) Depth of the route;
    10) Tide; 11) Light house, weather.
    (* It should be II. instead of 4; figures following it are all erroneous, but here they are given as in the orginal—Ed.)
III. Warehouses on the railroads:
    1) Situation, building, floor space, number, usage, material, how guarded.

Topography:

As before.

Military Establishments:

As before.

INSPECTION UNIT

Military Affairs:

As before.

In Politics and Economy:

I. To intensify anti-communist broadcast.

II. To distribute leaflets against communism and war.

III. To reveal economic relations with foreign countries.

IV. To reveal and exaggerate the slavish character of the North Korean administration.

V. To propagandize artfully the reason why the Soviet Union will collapse after World War III.

Adjustment:

As before.

THE FOURTH QUARTER: OCTOBER - DECEMBER.

MILITARY AFFAIRS UNIT

Intelligence:

I. Collection of military intelligence:
As before.

II. Nets of Permanent Intelligence Service:
1) To obtain at least one permanent secret agent for a battalion;
2) To station permanent secret agents in Sunchun, Chungjoo, Anjoo, Kaechun, Sinpo, Changyun, Tongchun;
3) To station permanent secret agents in Dairen and Nagasaki.

III. Utilization of Enemy Spies:
As before, plus detection of North Korean spies.

IV. Work on the Chung-Oo-Dang (Party) :
To start a revolt.

Intrigue:

I. Destructions:
1) Railway (Manpo Line) ;

2) Bridge (Seoul-Wonsan Line);
3) Tunnel (Seoul-Wonsan Line);
4) Power Plant at Yungwol;
5) Broadcasting Station of Chungjin.

II. Infection with Bacteria:
1) In Haejoo;
2) In Heungnam;
3) In Sungjin;
4) Kitchens of various battalion-headquarters.

III. Incendiarism:
1) Heungnam Chemical Manure Factory;
2) Headquarters of the Minjoo-Dang (Democratic Party).

Assassination:

I. In political circles:
1) Kim Doo-bong (Chairman of the People's Committee); (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly—Ed).
2) Kang Yang-ook (Secretary-General of the People's Committee).
(Secretary-General of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly—Ed.)

II. In military circles.
1) Moo Jyeng;
2) Choe Hyen.

Conversion:

I. 7 officers of the Home Ministry.
II. 8 officers of the People's Army.
III. 8 officers of the Volunteers.

Underground cells:

I. In Sariwon.
II. In Haejoo.
III. In Chulwon.
IV. In Namchun.
V. In Anjoo.
VI. In Myengchun.

SCOUT UNIT

Transportation:

As before.

Topography:

As before.

Military Establishments:

As before.

INSPECTION UNIT

Military Affairs:

As before.

In Politics and Economy:


I. To reveal real abilities and activities of North Korean political parties.
II. To propagandize artfully the weak foundation of the Government.
III. To carry out special plans regarding leading figures of the North Korean Hordes.

Adjustment:


I. To put in order, inspect and report on information received of North Korea.
II. To make a table of the situation of the Norean Korean Army, and inspect.
III. To make various statistical tables concerning the situation of the North Korean Army, and inspect.
IV. To put in other special informations.

Remarks:

I. Besides this scheme, intelligence campaign concerning the North Korean Forces shall be undertaken according to an extra plan.
II. This scheme may undergo alterations in the sequence as circumstances require.



Photostatic copy of the 1st part of Document No. 19



Photostatic copy of the 2nd part of Document No. 19

No. 20

SCOUT UNIT SCHEME FOR MARCH — MAY, 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS[1]

STRICT MILITARY SECRECY[2]

SCOUT UNIT SCHEME FOR MARCH—MAY, 1950,

SECTION III, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in Section III, Intelligence Bureau of the South Korean Army Headquarters.
2. Stamp.

I FIRST SPECIAL SERVICE

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To set up permanent cells in important places of Manchuria. 2) To set up permanent cells in main cities of Peking-Shanhaikwan area. 3) To prepare for the setting up of permanent cells in Formosa, Hongkong and Japan.	1) In Mukden.....(not clea editor). To set up permane cells in Dairen. 2) To prepare for the setting of permanent cells in Peki Shanhaikwan area, Formos Hongkong and Japan.
Work for March:	1) To get in touch with Kuomintang Chinese in Korea, and work in setting up cells in main cities of China. 2) To get in touch with those returned from China. 3) To conduct a strict examination of communist-circle or pro-communist Chinese in Korea.	
Work for April:	To continue the work of March.	
Work for May:	To continue the work of March.	

low to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
dispatch agents. select persons out hose who have re-ned from Peking-nhaikwan area l those who have ations with For-sa, Hongkong and pan, and prepare organizing cells; the same time, to te measures for re-ions with under-und cells of Kuo-ntang.	(Expenses for Special Service).	130,000.— wons	
essant contact.	(Expenses for Special Service).	30,000.— wons	
As March.	(Expenses for Special Service).	50,000.— wons	
As March.	(Expenses for Special Service).	50,000.— wons	Preparations finished.

II SECOND SPECIAL SERVICE

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To set up organic permanent cells in various places in North Korea. 2) Intelligence through those coming over the 38 par. line. 3) Scout service by special orders.	1) To set up organic permanent cells in main cities of North Korea. 2) To take measures for spreading out nets of intelligence through those coming over the South.
Work for March:	1) To prepare for organizing intelligence nets in cities along the 38 par. line. 2) To prepare for setting up permanent cells for intelligence from the North.	
Work for April:	To continue the work of March.	
Work for May:	To continue the work of March.	

ow to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
dispatch agents.	1) Agents for Special Service—(aggregate) 3 persons.	1) 30,000.—wons	
be in contact with D, and collect materials.	2) To dispatch agents to the North — (aggregate) 3 persons.	2) 90,000.—wons	
dispatch agents to 38 line, and organize intelligence cells adjacent villages.			
set up permanent lls for intelligence m North Korea.			
dispatch agents on ecial Service.	1) 1.	1) 10,000.—wons	
dispatch agents the North.	2) 1.	2) 30,000.—wons	
As March.	1) 1. 2) 1.	1) 10,000.—wons 2) 30,000.—wons	
As March.	1) 1. 2) 1.	1) 10,000.—wons 2) 30,000.—wons	Preparations finished

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate the status quo of railway establishments. 2) To investigate railway conditions and operations. 3) To investigate transportation capacity. 4) To investigate matters appertaining to railways. 5) To work on setting up cells and on conversion of cadres.	1) To investigate the location station districts. 2) To investigate the seats depots, overhaul district communication districts, co struction districts, works di tricts and electricity distric 3) To investigate water supp facilities (to be continued ti June). 4) To investigate the cranes. 5) To investigate railway-factor establishments (to be continu till September). 6) To investigate the maximur transportation capacity (to b be continued till September). 7) To investigate the status qu of locomotives, freight car and carriages. 8) To investigate into existin materials. 9) To work on setting up cells and on conversion of cadres.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate the seats of station districts. 2) To investigate the seats of cranes. 3) To investigate the status quo of locomotives, goods wagons and carriages. B 1) The seats of depots, overhaul districts, communication districts, construction districts, works districts, elect- (*continued next page*)	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
To lay nets of cells in transportation lines (to intensify existing cells - informations shall be collected through contact with the White Dress Youth Association and liaison through dispatched agents). To dispatch secret agents. To utilize traders between North and South. To utilize Transportations Special Branch of Chosun - Minjoo - Dang or Chosun Democratic Party - (North Korea Railway Comrades Association). To utilize immigrants from the North, and collect necessary materials. Work on conversion: (To work on conversion of cadres in transportation organs and the Planning Commission).	1) Residing agents — (aggregate) 7 persons. 2) Dispatched agents — (aggregate) 8 persons. 3) Agents for conversion work—2 persons.	1) 210,000.—wons 2) 240,000.—wons 3) 60,000.—wons	
1) To utilize Transportations Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoc-Dang. 2) To dispatch agents. Same as A. 1) To utilize the Communications Department. 2) To dispatch agents. 1) To utilize the Com- *(continued next page)*	A 1. Residing agent—1 person. 2) Dispatched agent —1 person. B Dispatched agent — 1 person. C Residing agent — 1 person. D 1) Residing agents in the Comm. Dept.— 2 persons. *(continued next page)*	A 1) 10,000.—wons 2) 30,000.—wons B 30,000.—wons C 10,000.—wons D 1) 20,000.—wons 2) 10,000,—wons 3) 30,000.—wons E 60,000.—wons	

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	ricity districts and repair districts. 2) To investigate railway materials. C To investigate water supply establishments. D 1) To investigate establishments for railway works. 2) To investigate maximum transportation capacity. E To work on conversion of leading cadres of the Ministry of Communications.	
Work for April:	A To continue previous work. B ,, C ,, D ,, E To survey the work of dispatched agents and take measures.	
Work for May:	A Finished. B To continue previous work. C ,, D ,, E If possible to dispatch agents again.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
munications Department.) To utilize Transportations Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang.) To dispatch agents. To dispatch agents.	2) Residing agent in the Transportations Party Branch — 1 person. 3) Dispatched agent— 1 person. E Dispatched agents— 2 persons.		
As before.) To utilize Transportations Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang.) To utilize Communications Department. To utilize Communications Department.) To utilize Communications Department.) To utilize Transportation Party Branch.	A 1) Residing agents — 1 person. 2) Agents—2 persons. B Residing agent in Communications Branch of Chosun-Minjoo - Dang — 2 person. C Residing agent — 1 person. D Residing agent in the Communication Department—1 person. E	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 60,000.— wons B 10,000.— wons C 10,000.— wons D 10,000.— wons E	
..... To dispatch agents.) To utilize Communications Department.) To dispatch agents.) To utilize Communication Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang.) To utilize Communications Department.) To dispatch agents.	A ..... B Agents - 2 persons. C Residing agent - 1 person. D 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) ditto - 1 person. E Agents-2 persons.	A ..... B 60,000.— wons C 10,000.— wons D 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons E 60,000.— wons	A ..... B Finished. C Preliminary investigation to be finished by the end of June. D To continue till September. E .....

2. Overland and Maritime Traffic

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate by districts capacity of transportation mobilization (trucks). 2) To investigate sources of supply of fuel and the maximum transportation capacity. 3) To investigate into distribution of ox and horse carriages and mobilization capacity by districts. 4) To investigate into status quo of harbours and bays.	1) To investigate into the capacit of truck-mobilization in Chul won, Wonsan, Hamheung Haejoo and Pyengyang as wel as adjacent cities, and th sources of supply of fuel. 2) To invcstigate into the dis tribution of ox or horse car riages in the counties, sub counties and towns in nortl Kangwondo and Whang haido, and the mobilization capacity by districts. 3) To investigate pier establish ments. 4) To investigate war vessels, merchant ships and their routes.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate into capacity of truck-mobilization, and into how substitute fuel is being supplied in Chulwon and in the vicinity. 2) To investigate into the same items in Sinmak, Sariwon, Haejoo. B 1) To investigate capacity of mobilization of ox and horse carriages in Chulwon and surroundings. 2) To investigate the same items in Kimchun, Sinmak, Sariwon, Haejoo and the vicinity. C To investigate pier establishments of Wonsan. D To investigate routes on the east coast of North Korea.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
a. To dispatch agents. b. To utilize immigrants from the North and collect materials. a. To dispatch agents. b. To utilize the Communications Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. c. To utilize immigrants from the North.	1) Residing agents - (aggregate) 15 persons. 2) Dispatch agents - (aggregate) 6 persons. 3) (Communication expenses.)	1) 150,000.— wons 2) 180,000.— wons 3) 30,000.— wons	
1) To collect materials from the Overland Transportations Bureau of the Communications Department. 2) To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 3) To dispatch agents. 1) To collect materials from the Cattle Breeding Bureau of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry. 2) To collect materials from the Overland Transportations Bureau of the Communications Department. 3) To collect materials from immigrants from the North. (*continued next page*)	A 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) (Communication expenses). 3) Dispatched agent - 1 person. B 1) Residing Agent - 1 person (Agriculture & Forestry Department). 2) Residing Agent - 1 person (Communications Department). 3) (Communication Expenses). 4) Dispatched agents. C 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) Dispatched agent - 1 person. D Residing agent - 1 person.	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 5,000.— wons 3) 30,000.— wons B 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons C 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons D 10,000.— wons	

2. Overland and Maritime Traffic

	Tasks to be carried cut:	Targets for the period:
Work for April:	A To continue previous work. B ,, C To investigate pier establishments of Chungjin. D To continue previous work.	
Work for May:	A 1) To investigate into capacity of truck mobilization, and into how fuel is being supplied in Wonsan, Kowon and surroundings. 2) The same in Pyengyang and in the vicinity. B 1) To investigate into capacity of mobilization of ox and horse carriages in Yangyany, Kosung, Wonsan and vicinity. 2) In Whangjoo, Sin-ge, Ichun and surroundings. C To investigate pier establishments of Oonggi and Najin. *(continued next page)*	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
4) To dispatch agents. 1) To collect materials from Overland Tran. Bureau of Comm. Dept. 2) To dispatch agents. To collect materials from Overl. Trans. Bur. of Comm. Dept.			
1) As March. 1) ,, 1) To collect materials from the Maritime Traffic Bureau of the Comm. Dept. 2) To dispatch agents. 1) As March.	A 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) (Communication expenses.) B 1) Residing agent - 1 person (Agri. & Forestry Dept.). 2) Residing agent - 1 person (Trans. Dept.) 3) (Communication Expenses.) C Residing agent - 1 person. D Residing agent - 1 person.	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 5,000.— wons B 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons C 10,000.— wons D 10,000.— wons	
1) To collect materials from Overl. Trans. Bureau of Comm. Dept. 2) To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 3) To dispatch agents. 1) To collect materials from Cattle Breeding Bureau of Agri. & Forestry Dept 2) To collect materials from Overl. Comm. Bureau of Comm. Dept. 3) To collect materials from immigrants (*continued next page*)	A 1) Residing agent - 1 person. 2) (Communication expenses.) 3) Dispatched agent - 1 person. B 1) 1 residing agent (Agri. & Forest. Dept.). 2) 1 residing agent (Comm. Dept.). 3) (Communication expenses). 4) 2 dispatched agents. C 1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 dispatched agent. D 1 residing agent.	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 5,000.— wons 3) 30,000.— wons B 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons C 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons D 10,000.— wons	The first two items for May are to be continued till June.

2. Overland and Maritime Traffic

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for May:	D To investigate navigation routes of the West coast of North Korea.	

3. Roads.

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate conditions of highways and byways as well as their changes. 2) To investigate seasonal influence as well as that of the soil upon highways and byways in relation to local operations. 3) To investigate into conditions of the bridges and their changes with relation to operations.	1) To investigate into conditions of highways (Seoul-Hamheong, Seoul-Pyengyang,)highways in north Gangwondo and in Whanghaido, as well as their changes. 2) To investigate how seasonal changes and their soil would influence our operations. 3) To investigate into conditions of bridges in north Kangwondo and Whanghaido with relation to operations.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate conditions of highways (Kimyoon - Hoeyang-Wonsan-Hamheung). 2) To investigate the Kaesung-Pyengyang highway. 3) To investigate the Soonchun-Pyengyang highway. 4) To investigate the Choonchun-Kosung highway. 5) To investigate the Kangneung-Wonsan highway. (*continued next page*)	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
from the North. 1) To dispatch agents. 2) To collect materials from the Comm. Dept. 3 To dispatch agents. To collect materials rom Overl. Comm. Bur. of Comm. Dept.			

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1 To collect elementary materials in co-operation with the Home Department. 2 To utilize the Communications Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. 3 To collect materials from immigrants from the North. 4 To dispatch agents. Same as 1). Same as 1).	1) Residing agents-(aggregate) 6 persons. 2) Dispatched agents-(aggregate) 3 persons. 3) (Communication expenses).	1) 60,000.— wons 2) 90,000.— wons 3) 15,000.— wons	
To collect materials rom the Constructions Bureau of Home Department. To utilize Communication Sp. Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. To collect materials rom immigrants from he North. To dispatch agents. (continued *next page*)	1) 1 residing agent in the Constructions Bureau. 2) 1 residing agent in the Communications Sp. Branch of Chosun Minjoo Dang. 3) (Communication expenses). 4) 1 dispatched agent.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons	

3. Roads

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	6) To investigate the Haejoc-Pyengyang highway. B 1) To investigate Whachun-Yangyang byways. 2) To investigate Tongdoochun-Yunchun-Hoeyang byways. 3) To investigate Yunchun-Ichun-Moonchun byways. 4) To investigate Kaesung-Pyengyang byways. C To investigate bridges on these roads.	
Work for April:	To continue previous work.	
Work for May:	To continue previous work.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
As March	1) 1 residing agent in the Constructions Bureau. 2) 1 residing agent in the Communications Party Branch. 3) (Communication expenses). 4) 1 reserve agent (dispatched).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons	
As March	1) 1 residing agent in Constructions Bureau. 2) 1 residing agent in Communications Party Branch. 3) (Communication expenses). 4) 1 dispatched agent.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 5,000.— wons 4) 30,000.— wons	Preliminary investigations finished.

IV TOPOGRAPHY 1. Cultivated land, narrow pass and plateau

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate important spots from the standpoint of operation. 2) To collect and investigate strategic materials concerning cultivated areas, passes and plateaus. 3) To investigate into areas which can influence operations through seasonal variations or peculiarities of soil.	1) To investigate important spots along high-roads and byways in north Kangwondo and Whanghaido. 2) To collect strategic material concerning cultivated areas, narrow passes and plateaus in Kangwondo and Whanghaido according to 1/50,000 maps. 3) To investigate areas which can influence military operations through seasonal variations or peculiarities of soil.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate spots, as well as their soil, in the cultivated areas on the River Imjingang (up to Ichun), which can impede operations during rainy seasons. 2) To investigate spots, as well as their soil, in the cultivated areas on the River Yesunggang (up to Sin-ge), which can impede operations during rainy seasons. 3) To investigate spots, as well as their soil, in the plain between Haijoo-Sariwon-Whangjoo, which can impede operations during rainy seasons. *(continued next page)*	

How to Work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
a. To dispatch agents. b. To utilize Home Dept. & Communications Special Party Branch. c. To utilize immigrants from the North. a. To dispatch agents. b. To collect materials in co-operation with reclamation bodies and irrigation co-operatives. c. To collect materials in co-operation with five provincial governments. d. To utilize immigrants from the North.	1) Residing agents-(aggregate) 6 persons. 2) (Expenses for communications and works.) 3) Dispatched agents-2 persons.	1) 60,000.— wons 2) 45,000.— wons 3) 60,000.— wons	
To collect materials from the Constructions Bureau of the Home Dept. To collect materials from Cultivation Bureau of Agri. & Forestry Dept. To utilize County People's Associations and collect materials. To utilize immigrants from the North.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	

IV TOPOGRAPHY 1. Cultivated land, narrow pass and plateau

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for March:	B 1) To investigate soil along the byways between Yunchun - Chulwon - Pyengyang - Yangyang, and spots which can impede operations during rainy seasons. 2) To investigate soil along the byways between Yanggoo - Malwhiri - Tongchun, and spots which can impede operations during rainy seasons.	
Work for April:	To continue previous work.	
Work for May:	To continue previous work.	

2. Rivers and lakes

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate rivers and lakes from the view-point of operation. 2) To investigate rivers and lakes from the strategical point of view.	1) To investigate conditions of rivers and lakes in north Kangwondo and Whanghaido (hinging upon river-crossing operations). 2) To investigate how the puppet army is making use of the rivers (*continued next page*)

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
As March.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	
, 2), 3) and 4)—the same as March. To dispatch agents to the North.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.) 5) 2 dispatched agents.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons 5) 60,000.— wons	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
2) a To dispatch agents. b Preliminary investigations in cooperation with Home Dep. Constructions Bureau. (*continued next page*)	1) 6 residing agents. 2) (Expenses for communications and works.)	1) 60,000.— wons 2) 45,000.— wons	

2. Rivers and lakes

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
		and lakes in Kangwondo and Whanghaido,
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate into ferries, water-volume, depth and swiftness of the River North Han-Gang and its tributaries. 2) The same with the River Imjin-Gang & tributaries. 3) The same with the River Yesunggang and tributaries. 4) The same with riverlets in Whangjoo, Sariwon and Haejoo. 5) The same with rivers in Yangyang, Kosung and Tongchun on the east coast. B 1) To investigate into seats and conditions of reservoirs in Whanghaido. 2) Of reservoirs in north Kangwondo.	
Work for April:	To continue previous work.	
Work for May:	To continue previous work.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
c. To utilize immigrants from North. d. To utilize reclamation bodies and irrigation cooperatives.			
To collect materials from Home Dept. Constructions Bureau. To collect materials from Cultivation Area Bureau of Agri. & Forest. Dept. To collect materials from Marine Trans. Dept. To utilize irrigation associations and collect materials. To utilize County People's Associations and collect materials. To utilize immigrants from North.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communication expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	
As March.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works). 4) (Communication expenses).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	
As March.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works). 4) (Communication expenses).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	

3. Harbours, coasts and their weather

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To look for and investigate into harbours needed for landing operations. 2) To investigate into seasonal variations of weather of main harbours on the east and west coasts.	1) To investigate into coast-line and harbours on the east coast (up to Hamheung) and west coast (counties Kangsu, Pyengwon and Anjoo) from the stand point of landing operations. 2) To investigate into seasonal variations of weather of harbours of Wonsan, Hamheung, Nampo and Anjoo.
Work for March:	A 1) To investigate east coastline up to Wonsan. 2) To investigate west coastline between 38-39 parallel lines. B 1) To investigate seasonal variations of weather of Wonsan Bay. 2) The same with Nampo Bay. C 1) To investigate accomodation capacity and harbour conditions of-----(blurred-editor). 2) The same with Changjun, Taedong Bay and Monggeumpo.	
Work for April:	To continue previous work.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
To dispatch agents. To do preliminary investigations in co-operation with Home Dept. Constr. Bur. & Communi. Dept. Maritime Traf. Bureau. To utilize immigrants from the North. To dispatch agents. To carry out preliminary investigation in co-operation with the Central Meteorological Observatory. To utitize immigrants from the North.	1) 6 residing agents. 2) (Expenses for communications and works).	1) 60,000.— wons 2) 45,000.— wons	
o collect materials om Commun. Dept. aritime Traf. Bur. rom the Central Me- or. Obser. hrough County Peo- e's Associations. hrough immigrants om the North.	1) To dispatch 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works.) 4) (Communications expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	
As March. ontinued next page)	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works). 4) (Communication expenses).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	

3. Harbours, coasts and their weather

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for May:	To continue previous work.	

V MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS

1. Fortifications, fortres

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate fortifications of North Korean Puppet Army. 2) To investigate fortresses within the region of North Korean Puppet Army. 3) To investigate barracks in North Korea. 4) To investigate navigation facilities. 5) To organize and intensify intelligence-nets. 6) To work on conversion.	1) To investigate long beaches an upheaved lands in the regio north of 38 par. line. 2) To investigate fortresses North Korea. 3) To investigate arrangement barracks and inquire into ho matters stand with revolts i North Korea. 4) To investigate air ports an mili ary as well as civilia navigation facilities in Nort Korea. 5) To intensify cells of intelligen nets in Whangjoo, Pyengya and Sinijoo. 6) To work on conversion of captain of the People's Arm and 1 sub-lieutenant of t police.
Work for March:	A Work on conversion of 1 People's-Army captain and 1 police sub-lieutenant. B Work on organizing nets of intelligence in Whangjoo, Pyengyang and Sinijoo.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
As March.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 residing agent. 3) (Expenses for communications and works). 4) (Communication expenses).	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons 3) 10,000.— wons 4) 5,000.— wons	I. II. and III. to be finished by June.

acks and air force establishments

How to Work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
3) a. To dispatch agents to the North. To collect materials from immigrants from the North. To collect materials from the HID Detachment of Section I. To dispatch agents to the North. To utilize communications Special Branch of Chosun-Minjoo-Dang. To collect materials from immigrants from North. dispatch agents to ie North.) dispatch agents to ie North for conver-on works.	1) 3 dispatched agents. 2) (Special Service expenses).	1) 90,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	
o dispatch agents to ie North.	1) 1 dispatched agent. 2) (Special service expenses).	1) 30,000.— wons 2) 10,000.— wons	

V MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS

1. Fortifications, fortre

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for April:	A Investigations into military establishments: 1. Conditions of aerodromes (Wonsan). 2. Establishments of Navy-headquarters (Wonsan). 3. Establishments of 2nd Division of the People's Army, 4. Establishments of the naval base in Wonsan.	
Work for May:	A Investigations into military establishments: 1. Sariwon area (how units of the People's Army, the police and the Volunteers are stationed, and their establishments). 2. Sinijoo area (ditto). B Work on conversion.	

2. Munitions factories, power plants, broadcasting stations

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
	1) To investigate establishments of North Korean munitions factories, their output, mobilization ot raw materials and stocks. 2) To investigate North Korean broadcasting stations and power-houses. 3) To investigate city establishments. 4) To investigate North Korean communication facilities.	1) To investigate munitions fact ies in the districts of Heungna Wonsan, Haejoo, Madong a Pyengyang. 2) To investigate the Performa Hall of Pyengyang Broadcasti Station and the equipments broadcasting stations of Wo san, Hamheung, Chungjin a Chulwon. 3) To investigate military es ablishments in Haejoo, Sariwo Pyengyang and Sinijoo. 4) . . . (Too blurred to be legible editor).

cks and air force establishments

How to Work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
utilize immigrants n (the seats of) 5 vincial governits. dispatch agents to North.	1) (Special Service expenses) 2) 1 dispatched agent.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	
To investigate documents of the HID letachment of Section I. To dispatch agents. To dispatch agents.	1) (Special Service expenses.) 2) 1 dispatched agent.	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	

munications

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expeneses required:	Remarks:
To dispatch agents to the North. To collect materials in cooperation with the Taehan-Bowidae. (Taehan Defence Guard). To dispatch agents to the North. To collect materials in connection with general affairs section of Informations Bureau and ntinued *next page*)	1) Residing agent — (aggregate) 1 person. 2) Dispatched agents— (aggregate) 5 persons. 3) (Communication expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 150,000.— wons 3) 75,000.— wons	

2. Munitions factories, power plants, broadcasting stations

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for March:	A Broadcasting station-establishments: 1. Performance Hall of the Broadcasting Station of Pyengyang, and the vicinity. 2. Haejoo Broadcasting Station. B City establishments: 1. Haejoo. 2. Sariwon 3. Pyengyang 4. Sinijoo 5. .....(blurred-editor) } Military Establishments of cities.	

How to work:	Personnel required :	Expenses required:	Remarks:
Broadcasting Station. To base upon preliminary investigations of the Military Affairs Unit. To dispatch agents to the North. To examine immigrants from (the seats of) 5 provincial governments. HID Detachment of Section I. To dispatch agents to the North. To carry out preliminary investigations in cooperation with the Tele-Bureau of Communications Dept. ..... (Illegible — editor).			
o utilize general affairs section of Information Bureau & roadcasting Station. o send to the North gents on Special Service.	1) 1 residing agent. 2) 1 dispatched agent. 3) (Special Service expenses.)	1) 10,000.— wons 2) 60,000.— wons 3) 10,000— wons	

2. Munitions factories, power plants, broadcasting stations

	Tasks to be carried out:	Targets for the period:
Work for April:	A To investigate broadcasting station establishments: 1) Wonsan Broadcasting Station. 2) Hamheung Broadcasting Station. B To investigate munitions factory establishments: 1) Munitions Factory of Heungnam, Ponkoong Chemical Factory. 2) Wonsan area (Leather Factory, Petroleum and Gasoline Factories, Dockyard). C City Military Establishments: 1) Wonsan. 2) Sungzin. 3) Chulwon. 4) Heungnam. 5) Hamheung. 6) Chungzin.	
Work for May:	A To investigate broadcasting station establishments: 1) Chungjin Broadcasting Station. 2) Chulwon Broadcasting Station. B To investigate munitions factory establishments: 1) Haejoo Chemical Factory, Mechanical engineering house. 2) Madong Cement Factory. 3) Pyengyang Chemical ~~Fac-~~ Factory. C To investigate power plant establishments: Power plants and transformer stations.	

How to work:	Personnel required:	Expenses required:	Remarks:
1) To utilize general affairs sections of broadcasting stations. 2) To dispatch agents to the North. 1) To utilize Taehan-Bowi Special Units. 2) To dispatch agents to the North. 1) To utilize Home Dept. Constructions Bureau. 2) To utilize Taechan-Bowi-Dae. 3) To utilize immigrants from (the seats of) 5 provincial governments. 4) To dispatch agents to the North.	A 1) (Special Service expenses) 2) 1 dispatched agent. B (Special Service expenses). C 1) (Special Service expenses) 2) 1 dispatched agent.	A 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons B 10,000.— wons C 1) 20,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	
1) To utilize Information Bureau, Broadcasting Station. 2) To dispatch agents to the North. 1) To utilize Taehan-Bowi Special Units. 2) To dispatch agents to the North. 1) To utilize Power Generation Section & Power Section of Commerce & Industry Dept. 2) Electric Business Section of Seoul Electricity Co. 3) To dispatch agents to the North.	A 1) (Special Service expenses). 2) 1 dispatched agent B (Special Service expenses). C 1) (Special Service expenses). 2) 1 dispatched agent.	A 1) 5,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons B 10,000.— wons C 1) 10,000.— wons 2) 30,000.— wons	

PART III

No. 21

REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A., DATED JANUARY 28, 1949[1]

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 85 [2]

FACTORS SIGNIFICANT FOR OR CONDITIONING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A U.S. INFORMATION PROGRAM
VI FAR EAST

OIR REPORT No. 4849
January 28, 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

VI-72 [3]

Confidential [4]

c. KOREA

1. Political and Strategic Importance of Korea [5]

Today, as throughout its history, the peninsula of Korea is an area where the competing interests and ideologies of

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Footnotes.

1. The original is a mimeographed pamphlet, consisting of three parts. Part A regards China, Part B regards Japan and Part C regards Korea.
2. The original bears stamps of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, U.S.A., dated March 3, 1949, and of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul dated March 25, 1949.
3. Page number in the original. This chapter begins from page VI-72 and ends in page VI-73.
4. At the beginning and end of each page the word "confidential" is inserted.
5. Only chapter 1 of Part C is reproduced here.

other powers condition and overshadow the country's domestic issues. Because of Korea's geographic position in Northeastern Asia, control over Korea and over the minds of its people is advantageous to any power with Far Eastern interests, whether or not it is considered essential to the United States as a military base, the peninsula would be of value to a potential enemy and the effect of its possession under such circumstances on the American position in Japan would be considerable.

Politically, Korea's importance to the United States is open to less dispute. As one of the signatories of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, the United States has pledged freedom and independence to Korea. Through membership in the United Nations and through cooperation with that body in its handling of the Korean question, the United States has accepted the commitments attendant upon UN membership.

These international commitments merely support, however, American national policy toward Korea, a policy springing from the traditional friendship between the two countries, their early treaty relationship, the role of the US in the liberation of Korea, and the announced American policy of seeking a united and sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and established upon a sound economic base. It is also an American desire to reduce as soon as possible the finances and manpower allotted to the achievement of these objectives, to secure through a stable and friendly government in Korea a partial stabilization of the Far East, and to offset, by success in Korea, diplomatic reverses suffered elsewhere in Asia.

It cannot be assumed that Korea would automatically be found in the American camp in a world-wide alignment of states. With the country at present divided into zones under the influence of the US and the USSR, with rival

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 35

FACTORS SIGNIFICANT FOR OR CONDITIONING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A U.S. INFORMATION PROGRAM

VI. FAR EAST

OIR Report No. 4849
January 28, 1949

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MAR 2 5 1949
SEOUL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

CONFIDENTIAL

Photostatic copy of the cover of Document No. 21

native regimes, the only generalization that can be made is that, assuming continued American support to the government exercising *de jure* control up to the 38° parallel, each zone would on any issue align itself with the views of its sponsor.

VI-73

No. 22

REPORT OF CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED JUNE 7, 1949[1]

June 7, 1949

H.E. President :

Report on Interview with Director of Far Eastern Affairs Office of the U.S. State Department and other items.

Upon request I paid a visit to Mr. Butterworth, Director of the Far Eastern Affairs Office of the U.S. State Department on June 2, and had a talk with him, the gist of which I hereby report to you.

Mr. Butterworth said: "According to to-day's papers, a resolution similar to a non-confidential bill requesting the general resignation of the present cabinet members is reported to have been passed at the National Assembly of Korea. Isn't this a fact which gives impression[2] that the present cabinet is not backed by the

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Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. The original is in Korean, hand-written by Chang Myun.
2. In the original the words "Isn't this an evidence that...." are crossed out and replaced by this expression.

National Assembly, an organ representing the nation? And isn't it also a great scandel that Im Yung-sin, the present Secretary of Commerce and Industry, is said to have been prosecuted for various disgraceful cases?

"It is a great pity that all these unfortunate incidents lower the prestige of the present cabinet and influence the situation a great deal just at the time when the United States is furthering assistance to Korea.

"Besides, it seems that Mr. Cho Byung-ok is constantly in contact with the U.N. delegates of various countries and other personages, and according to what I have heard of the contents of the conversation he had with Mr. Austin the other day, it is evident that the former is making a false propaganda that only 30,000 Koreans are armed and the rest have nothing but their naked fists, in spite of the fact that there are now in Korea over 70,000 soldiers, over 50,000 policemen, and over 5,000 coast guards who are properly armed.

"Such careless talk giving false information with regard to the real quantity of arms transferred to the Korean Army by the American Forces immensely impairs the good will of the United States which has been and is rendering every possible assistance to Korea.

"Moreover, your President has more than once declared that the Korean Army is insufficiently equipped with arms at present and that there is a certain apprehension of the communist troops invading south Korea.

"Statements like these will only bring about an unfavourable effect on south Korea, weakening the morale of the general public and increasing their fear by exposing the inferior forces therein, thus facilitating the wicked propaganda of the communist clique. All this is a matter of great regret. I think at the present stage, it is advisable for Korea to inspire the feelings of reliance and security in the public and at the same time intimidate the communist party by exaggerating the strength of the National Defence Army instead of propagandizing its insuffiency in armament, and on

the other hand to make secret negotiations with our country (viz. United States) through adequate diplomatic channels. It would be erroneous to appeal to the American public at large in the manner of an open request without taking any normal diplomatic measures. Any design to influence the policies of the United States Government by force of public opinion, roused up through newspapermen, would be extremely wrong, and such methods will not only end in a failure, but will also bring about the reverse result by spoiling the friendship between our two countries.

"It is perhaps difficult for you to imagine that we are exerting our best efforts, with the intention of helping Korea in every possible way, and plans are already steadily under way, thus we warn you in a cordial and stern manner not to issue such statements as mentioned above hereafter, but to have confidence in us. Our policy on Korea in future will depend very much on the attitude of the Korean government, and now is the most important turning point. China is another instance of ultimate failure of such a trick. I sincerely hope that Korea will not follow this example, and that she will carry out all matters with the spirit of reliance and cooperation through normal diplomatic channels. I am sure such a path leads to success.

"I hope that you will transmit these points to your Government."

Hearing these warnings as mentioned above, I, on my part, replied that your Excellency's statement was by no means a strategy nor was it a design to put pressure upon the State Department, but it was only intended to appeal to the American people, who are our friends with the urgent situation in Korea, and to awaken them to the fact that the United States has to assume a moral responsibility towards our country. And I added that if the United States wanted to help us and was determined to carry it out, it was a necessary step, in my opinion, for the U.S. Government to announce it to the world and to sweep away any doubt and uneasiness which the public have. Then Mr. Butterworth told me that in connection with

the question of military assistance it was certain that the present occupation forces in Korea were to leave all the arms behind when they should withdraw, and that further aid would be carried out through the resolution of Congress, adding it to the budget of the coming fiscal year. As the time was up, I ended the talk with Butterworth, and continued to talk to Mr. Bond who promised in a mild and sincere manner to do his very best for Korea.

With regard to the above-mentioned interview, I had a long discussion with Dr. Cho and then it was decided that, for an elucidation of misunderstandings about him he should send a letter, of which a copy is enclosed, to Butterworth, and at the same time he should call on him personally some time next week.

There has been a daily conference on the Korean question during the past few days in the State Department among the high officials, and serious discussions have been made on the question of assistance to Korea. Taking into consideration our urgent request and the public opinion at home and other situations concerned, it is clearly observed that considerable efforts have been made to take necessary measures to solve the said problem. As I already informed you by cable yesterday, President Truman, in a long message requested Congress to approve the budget on the economic assistance to Korea, the which was widely reported in the press. Besides, today, the acting Secretary of State Mr. Webb and Mr. Hoffman spoke at Congress (House Foreign Affairs Committtee), and urgently requested that the aid bill to Korea be passed; then Mr. Webb declared separately that the United States Government should announce its policy on Korea to the world and render Korea economic, cultural and military assistance in a positive way. Although there are some unsatisfactory expressions in his statement, I believe, it is really fortunate that his statement has cleared up the dark clouds hanging over us these days and has cast a bright sunshine upon us, and that as a result of this, the apprehension and gloom of our people will melt away.

Although the Bureau of Budget has recently decided to curtail the ECA funds to 125 million dollars, revision has been made

at the minimum of 150 million dollars as a result of reconsideration, thanks to strong insistence of the ECA officials together with Butterworth, and Webb, while the dollar fund is said to have remained 10 million dollars as before. As the present curtailment has been made in proportion to the fall of prices in the United States, the ECA personnel are optimistic, believing that they will be able to carry it through satisfactorily without much deviation from the original program, if Congress should pass it without any further curtailment.

Mr. Williams returned home safely and I have had several talks with him. We had a joint discussion with Dr. Cho on the question of Chinhai naval port, in connection with which I am going to visit some high officers of the Navy through the kindness of Mr. Williams and I shall have a close consultation with them.

Concerning Chinhai naval port, I would like to know more closely about the details of the installations and other suggestive items, and therefore I am waiting for your instructions.

When I sounded Mr. Bond of the State Department regarding the appointment of Mr. Williams as adviser, he did not seem to agree, saying: "I have not seen him yet; so we are strangers. But according to what I have heard of him, he doesn't seem to be a very good person."

Furthermore, Mr. Williams said that he would certainly do his utmost to help Korea but since his livelihood was an urgent problem he would like to be paid regularly from June on, as it had been agreed upon. He also expressed his desire for matters to be managed in a business-like way, and that he wanted to be paid every month without failure. Therefore, I reverently hope that Your Excellency would either supplement the Embassy estimates or directly send him his pay; in any case, I hope you will send the money, so that I shall be able to pay him by the end of June.

As for the credentials you have sent to be presented to the presidents of various countries, I shall visit all the embassies and convey them personally to their ambassadors from tomorrow, and

request them to recognize Korea at the earliest possible date, and I am of the opinion that it is advisable for me to request the non-member nations of the United Nations also such as Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland and others.

I attended the graduatiug Exercises of George Washington University, and received official commendation of honour, the certificate of which together with the photograph and letters exchanged on that day I am now enclosing for Your Excellency's inspection.

Our good will mission is now on its tour round many places, and is warmly welcomed everywhere. It is achieving immense successes about which I am sure you are happy to hear.

On June 5, at the request of Georgetown University, I delivered a radio address for half an hour introducing the Korean situation through the radio station installed at the same university, after which I have received friendly compliments from many places. With such an experience I intend henceforth to speak through many other radio stations.

It is not necessary to send Whang Si-yon immediately on commercial affairs, as Mr. Kim Se-sun is attending to the business at present; there would be no harm in reserving this matter until necessity arises again. Mr. Choi Un-sang has been doing his business very earnestly since he took up his new post here, so please feel at ease.

As to the bills of the ECA budget and the military aid, I am, in recent days, keeping daily contact with eminent personnel of the Government and the newspapermen with a view of having the bills passed as they had been drafted at first; so quite a lot of expenses are needed, no matter how modestly I arrange the entertainments. But, the reception allowances have unexpectedly been reduced to half in the new budget, which puts me in a difficult position. It will be absolutely impossible for me to meet the need with the new budget on the reception allowances, as the scope of society and acquaintance

is gradually expanding. Therefore I sincerely hope that you will reconsider it and make it the same as before.

As regards the Los Angeles rebels, I have negotiated with FBI, and the matter is being thoroughly investigated. In connection with this affair, Mr. Han in Mexico has asked Consul Choo for information.

I heard the discussion on the assistance bill to Korea at the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning; however, it is hard for me to foretell the future course as there are many cons as well as pros of the bill.

I nevertheless hope that the bill will be passed, and I will do my utmost to work towards this end.

Chang Myun,
Ambassador to the U.S.A.

Seal[3]

Footnotes

3. A square seal, "the seal of the South Korean Ambassador to the U.S.A." in Chinese ideographs.

檀紀四二八七年六月日

駐美大使張

大統領 閣下



國務省極東局長 雪謀 氏과 會談한 結果 左記事項을 閣下께 報告하는 바입니다

記

一. 今日 國務省極東局長 雪謀 氏를 訪問하여 會談한 結果 同氏로부터 左記와 같은 要旨의 說明이 있었음을 報告하는 바입니다

一. 今日 新聞報道에 依하면 韓國을 含한 現在 國連에 加盟하고 있는 國家의 代表로 構成된 國連 韓國委員會에서 總選擧에 依한 韓國統一政府樹立을 決議하였다고 하는데 이것은 事實인가 하는 質問에 對하여 雪謀 氏는 그러한 決議는 없었으며 다만 現在 國連 韓國委員會에서 國連監視下에 總選擧를 實施하여 統一政府를 樹立하는 問題를 論議하였을 뿐이라고 答하였음

一. 이것은 現在 國連이 韓國問題에 對하여 어떠한 態度를 取하고 있는가 하는 質問에 對하여 雪謀 氏는 國連은 韓國의 統一과 獨立을 願하고 있으며 韓國의 獨立을 保護하기 爲하여 軍事的 援助를 韓國에 提供하고 있다고 答하였음

一. 이것은 韓國에 對한 美國의 援助를 繼續하겠다는 意味로 解釋하여도 좋은가 하는 質問에 對하여 雪謀 氏는 그렇다고 答하였음

一. 이것은 韓國에 對한 美國의 援助를 繼續하겠다는 意味로 解釋하여도 좋은가 하는 質問에 對하여 雪謀 氏는 그렇다고 答하였음

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Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. :

No. 23

MEMORANDUM OF JAY JEROME WILLIAMS, ADVISER TO THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, DATED JUNE 17, 1949[1]

June 17, 1949

MEMORANDUM

TO : AMBASSADOR JOHN M. CHANG
FROM : JAY JEROME WILLIAMS
SUBJECT: CHIN-HAI NAVAL BASE

As per your direction of today I went to see Admiral L.E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations and the Navy's member on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The appointment was obtained for me by Secretary Hassett of the White House and I saw Admiral Denfeld in his office in the Pentagon Building.

I told him of the desires of President Rhee regarding the future of the one-time secret Japanese Naval Base in Chin-Hai, Korea, and how he was very anxious to obtain the services of a

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. Copy.

distinquished Navaf Officer. I said President Rhee had sent me to see General MacArthur at Tokyo to get his advise and General MacArthur's recommendation, if possible, of former Vice-Admiral J.L. Kauffman and that I went to Philadelphia and called on Admiral Kauffman, but unfortunately he had just accepted the presidency of the Jefferson Medical College and his commitments were such in this institution that he regretfully was compelled to decline this offer.

I implied that General MacArthur had feared that Admiral Kauffman might not be available and had indicated that Admiral Denfeld would be the proper man to see in our search for an officer to serve as Naval Advisor to the Korean Government.

Admiral Denfeld was most sympathetic and keenly interested. He asked me questions about the Base, whether it possessed a dry dock, etc., and because, as I explained to him, I had only a layman's conception, I suggested his own ONI Reports would give him all the information he needed. He said he would send for these immediately.

He told me confidentially that the Navy would dispatch to Korean waters some Cruisers and other vessels so that this force would be in evidence at the time the American Ground Forces were leaving Korea and, quite to my amazement, he said the Navy was doing this at the request of the State Department. I salute you Mr. Ambassador for your achievement!

He asked me what I had heard about the military forces of northern Korea and I told him that the figure I had most constantly impressed upon me while in Korea was that the Russians had adequately armed and trained, as well as adequately equipped with air support, a force of 200,000 men. I pointed out to him that the northern forces had made more than 200 furays into southern Korea.

He told me that the Korean problem had been up many times before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was still being discussed. I said

that I hoped some definite action would be taken soon to insure to Korea receipt of arms and munitions and planes to safeguard its very existence. I said I could not help but recall when I saw Admiral Kauffman in Philadelphia how it was that very day, the fifth anniversary of our landing in Normandy and how the Navy played such a tremendous role in this achievement which had, however, cost thousands upon thousands of American lives and I said "Here is our Asiatic beachhead, Admiral, offered to us by a man who has long shown his admiration and friendship for the American people and if we take advantage of this opportunity it may save thousands and thousands of American lives".

He said I would hear from him within the next three or four days.

No. 24

LETTER FROM JAY J. WILLIAMS, ADVISER TO THE SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO ADMIRAL LOUIS E. DENFELD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY DEPARTMENT, DATED JULY 7, 1949[1]

Strictly Confidential[2]

Sandy Hollow Farm
Route 6
Norwich, Connecticut

July 7th, 1949.

Dear Admiral Denfeld:

Since my visit with you in June, through the courtesy of White House Secretary Hassett, I have anxiously awaited some word regarding my request.

The long Fourth of July holiday has, I know, intervened but I am under the spur of a chief of state, who has assigned this mission to me and regards it as urgent.

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. Copy.
2. "Confidential" stamp in Chinese ideographs

極秘

Sandy Hollow Farm
Route 6
Norwich, Connecticut

July 7th, 1949.

Dear Admiral Denfeld:

Since my visit with you in June, through the courtesy of White House Secretary Hassett, I have anxiously awaited some word regarding my request.

The long Fourth of July holiday has, I know, intervened but I am under the spur of a chief of state, who has assigned this mission to me and regards it as urgent. To recapitulate:

President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea wishes the Government of Korea to retain the best qualified American Naval officer available to serve the Republic of Korea for these purposes:

1. To maintain, at the expense of the Republic of Korea, the one-time secret Japanese naval base at Chin-Hai, Korea, at maximum efficiency for the sole purpose of its immediate utility to us, a friendly power.

2. To do this so that the Republic of Korea may, within its limitations, make what it believes to be a substantial contribution to peace and security in Asia and evince in some measure its gratitude to the United States of America for our country's military might in freeing the Korean people from their long period of bondage under the Japanese.

3. To make this extraordinary base actually a potential foothold for us on the Asiatic mainland because President Rhee knows that Russia covets it and it is now ours, for future and effective use, if you deem it necessary, in this distraught world, to the security of the United States.

As I told you when I had the privilege of seeing you, an important military man of our nation suggested I see Vice Admiral James L. Kauffman and offer him what I believe to be a vitally important post. For I have seen Chin-Hai and was greatly impressed by its natural and man-made fortifications, its underground reservoirs for millions of gallons of fuel oil, its ship repair installations, deep water advantages and--above all--its location on the land of a people who possess an almost child-like faith in American integrity.

Unfortunately, Admiral Kauffman, upon his retirement, had made commitments from May 1st on of this year which he considered unbreakable. The man who originally suggested Admiral Kauffman had told me this might be the case and I inferred that if it were I should turn to you.

I saw Admiral Kauffman, not by design but accidentally, on the fifth anniversary of our establishment of the Normandy Beachhead. The coincidence made an indelible impression upon me. I know the unforgettable part our Navy had in this tremendous achievement and I thought, as I talked with him, how this offer of President Rhee might, under other circumstances, save thousands of American lives whereas in Normandy, because we lacked a beachhead, many thousands of American lives had had to be expended.

Before I left Washington last week, I talked on the telephone with your aide, Commander Miller, and said that if you had any suggestion or recommendation (of an American Naval officer, retired or active) he could call me collect at Norwich, Connecticut, 5647 J-1; also that my address was "Sandy Hollow" Farm, R.F.D 6, Norwich, Connecticut.

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 24

To recapitulate:

President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea wishes the Government of Korea to retain the best qualified American Naval officer available to serve the Republic of Korea for these purposes:

1. To maintain, at the expense of the Republic of Korea, the one-time secret Japanese naval base at Chin-Hai, Korea, at maximum efficiency for the sole purpose of its immediate utility to us, a friendly power.

2. To do this so that the Republic of Korea may, within its limitations, make what it believes to be a substantial contribution to peace and security in Asia and evince in some measure its gratitude to the United States of America, for our country's military might in freeing the Korean people from their long period of bondage under the Japanese.

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As I told you when I had the privilege of seeing you, an important military man of our nation suggested I see Vice Admiral James L. Kauffman and offer him what I believe to be a vitally important post. For I have seen Chin-Hai and was greatly impressed by its natural and man-made fortifications, its underground reservoirs for millions of gallons of fuel oil, its ship repair installations, deep water advantages and—above all—its location on the land of a people who possess an almost child-like faith in American integrity.

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My Washington office is Suite 4,08, 1700 Eye Street, Northwest, and the telephone number is District 2116.

I shall be back in Washington the latter part of this week or the early part of next.

I am most grateful for the appointment you gave me and only because President Rhee—and I, too, after seven weeks in Korea—believe time is of the essence do I risk the impression of being importunate.

May I hear from you, please?

Sincerely yours,
Jay Jerome Williams.

Admiral Louis E. Denfeld,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Department of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

P. S. Because of the confidential nature of this letter I am sending it by registered mail.

No 25

LETTER FROM REAR ADMIRAL SOHN WON-IL, SOUTH KOREAN CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO ADMIRAL RADFORD, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, U.S. NAVY, DATED JULY 18, 1949[1]

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE[2]

Washington Embasy
Muccio
Tokyo
Admiral Sohn[3]

Office of Chief of Naval Operation

July 18, 1949

My dear Admiral Radford:

The Government of the Republic of Korea desires to express to you its sincere appreciation for the friendly visit made by a unit of your fleet consisting of the Cruiser Manchester and the auxiliary destroyers under the command of Admiral T.H. Binford.

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. Copy.
2. Letterhead.
3. These four lines were inserted in ink, presumably for distribution.

This visit has greatly enhanced the already existing good feeling between the United States and Korea. We particularly appreciate this significant manifestation of your friendship for us, and we are desirous to express our gratitude in return. We have learned to respect and admire the noble spirit shown by Admiral Binford and by the officers and enlisted men under his command. This Government hopes that this unit, in its present form or enlarged grouping, will call on us again and often. Indeed, we shall be glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchun, Pusan, Yosu, Mukho and the Naval Base of Chinhae, as temporary Mobile Bases of any such a unit of your Fleet.

Such an arrangement as this will not only further solidify the friendly relationship between our two nations but also be a source of encouragement to all the peace-loving democratic nations, in and around the Pacific. We cannot convey this suggestion to the Secretary of the United States Navy. We may not be able to offer you all the conveniences and facilities for the comfort of our visitors but we shall strive to be genial hosts.

I take this opportunity to convey to you the high esteem of our President, Dr. Syngman Rhee, and the hope that you will also honor us by a personal visit in a near future.

Most sincerely yours,
Won Il Sohn
Rear Admiral
Chief of Naval Operation

Admiral A. W. Radford
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
United States Navy

1: Washington Embassy
Manila
Tokyo
Admiral John

REPUBLIC OF KOREA
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

Office of Chief of Naval Operation

July 18, 1949

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Most sincerely yours,

Won Il Sohn
Rear Admiral
Chief of Naval Operation

Admiral A. W. Radford
Commander-in-Chief
United States Pacific Fleet
United States Navy

Photostatic copy of Document No. 25

PART IV

No. 26

LETTER FROM CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED JUNE 14, 1950[1]

Confidential[3]

KOREAN EMBASSY
Washington. D, C.[2]

June 14, 1950

Your Excellency,

I arrived in Washington June 10 (Saturday) with my family, and I am happy to report that my wife's condition is good. She stood the strain of the trip better than I expected, and is now under the care of a heart specialist here. We are both most grateful to Your Excellency for the many kindnesses extended to us, and for your graciousness in arranging our trip.

On the day of my arrival, I arranged a small dinner party in honor of Mr. Dulles. It was necessary that we have the party

Footnotes

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government.
2. Letterhead.
3. In the original this is hand-written and underlined in ink. There is also a "confidential" stamp in Chinese ideographs.

that day, because Mr. Dulles is leaving Washington today, and Saturday (June 10) was the only possible opportunity he had to meet with us. We had Mr. and Mrs. Dulles, Mr. Dean Rusk (Mr. Rusk has succeeded Mr. Walton Butterworth as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Mr. & Mrs. Niles Bond, and Mr. and Mrs. Allison. Mr. Allison is in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and will go with Mr. Dulles on his tour of the Far East. I had ample opportunity for a full discussion with Mr. Dulles, and was asked many questions. This visit Mr. Dulles is about to make is most important in view of the fact that he has a strong voice in preparing decisions of the State Department concerning the Far East. I am confident that his visit may bring about a change in the Department's policy with regard to the Far East. I impressed upon him how much our people are looking forward to his visit, in the hope that it will bring about a firmer stand in the State Department on the anti-Communism issue. I summed up the hopes of our people and our Government as to Mr. Dulles' part as follows:

1. He should make a strong statement, assuring Koreans that the United States will stand behind Korea both in peace and in trouble, both economically and militarily. His statement should declare that Korea should be placed within the United States' line of defense in the Pacific. (Mr. Dulles said at this point that the United States had never made an official commitment with respect to military support with any country, except under the Atlantic Pact, and there were qualifications even in that agreement. He said that not even the Philippines had any such agreement with the United States. But, he added, he was certain that the United States would not abandon Korea, and that he is even now preparing a statement to the effect that Korea would be backed by the United States. He said he would assure the Korean people that the United States would assist them).

2. We want more planes and long range guns in order to render our defenses more effective.

3. Korea should participate in peace treaty negotiations with Japan, because we have fought the Japanese longer and more than any other country.

4. Korea should take an active part in the formation of a Pacific Pact, if such a Pact ever comes into being, and we would like to see the United States take an active part in the formation of the pact. (I regret, I told Mr. Dulles, that Korea was left out of the Baguio meeting, despite the specific promise of an invitation from the President of the Philippines himself. Dulles comment was "You didn't miss much.")

5. We want to see that Formosa will be protected by the United States because of its invaluable strategic location.

In conclusion, I told Mr. Dulles that his visit would, we believed, mean a general revision of the Far Eastern policy of the United States, and that we look forward to his precise and accurate powers of observation to effect a drastic change in the American Far Eastern policy. I told him that his coming to Korea would be regarded as the visit of an angel of peace, trying to impress upon him the importance of his presence in the eyes of our people, and also the responsibility that our hopes place upon him. I urged him to visit the 38th parallel and see for himself the situation. He is leaving today at 6 p.m. to go directly to Korea. I will see him off at the airport. He is accompanied by Mrs. Dulles. I hope Your Excellency will give him a big reception, and I am confident that you will do all you can to make his short stay pleasant. I would recommend that he be invited to a military review.

In this connection, I might add that yesterday (June 13) I had a long talk with Mr. Carl McCardle, who is going to the Far East with Mr. Dulles. We sent you a factsheet on Mr. McCardle's backround last week. Mr. McCardles put many questions to me regarding Your Exeellency, and I answered him specifically and with the purpose of clearing up the rumors and reports regarding you which have not been favorable. At the end of our conversation, which lasted more than an hour, he seemed to understand much more

clearly. I gave him a copy of "Japan Inside Out" which he said he would read on the plane, together with some material we furnished him. He told me that he was most anxious to see you, and that he wants to go to the 38th parallel. He also would like to attend the opening session of the Assembly. He promised me that he would do his utmost to bring an accurate picture of conditions in Korea to the people of the United States, and told me that he shares most of Mr. Dulles' political views. I hope Your Excellency will show him such courtesies as you deem proper. As for an exclusive interview, there are some disadvantage inherent in granting it, because, as has been pointed out to us, if one newspaperman is permitted to interview Your Excellency exclusively and to quote you directly, the other correspondents in Seoul will have immediate queries from their superiors as to why they have not succeeded in securing such interviews. As a result, some ill feeling might develop. I am confident, however, that Your Excellency's judgement in this matter will be considered and correct. Together with Mr. McCardle, Mr. William Matthews, who is editor-publisheor f the Arizona Daily Star, at Tuscon, Arizona, will accompany Mr. Dulles' party. We were informed here that Mr. Matthews passport could not be sent to us in time for a visa and returned to the West Coast (he is joining the Dulles party in Seattle tomorrow) and upon this advice from Mr. Dulles office, we cabled His Excellency the Foreign Minister requesting a waiver of visa in Mr. Matthews' case. He is recommended by Mr. Dulles.

With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Respectfully yours,

His Excellency
Dr. Syngman Rhee
President of the
Republic of Korea

John M. Chang[4]

Footnotes

4. Signed by Chang Myun personally.

Confidential

KOREAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 14, 1950

Your Excellency,

I arrived in Washington June 10 (Saturday) with my family, and I am happy to report that my wife's condition is good. She stood the strain of the trip better than I expected, and is now under the care of a heart specialist here. We are both most grateful to Your Excellency for the many kindnesses extended to us, and for your graciousness in arranging our trip.

On the day of my arrival, I arranged a small dinner party in honor of Mr. Dulles. It was necessary that we have the party that day, because Mr. Dulles is leaving Washington today, and Saturday (June 10) was the only possible opportunity he had to meet with us. We had Mr. and Mrs. Dulles, Mr. Dean Rusk (Mr. Rusk has succeeded Mr. Walton Butterworth as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Mr. & Mrs. Niles Bond, and Mr. and Mrs. Allison. Mr. Allison is in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, and will go with Mr. Dulles on his tour of the Far East. I had ample opportunity for a full discussion with Mr. Dulles, and was asked many questions. This visit Mr. Dulles is about to make is most important in view of the fact that he has a strong voice in preparing decisions of the State Department concerning the Far East. I am confident that his visit may bring about a change in the Department's policy with regard to the Far East. I impressed upon him how much our people are looking forward to his visit, in the hope that it will bring about a firmer stand in the State Department on the anti-Communist issue. I summed up the hopes of our people and our Government as to Mr. Dulles' part as follows:

1. He should make a strong statement, assuring Koreans that the United States will stand behind Korea both in peace and in trouble, both economically and militarily. His statement should declare that Korea should be placed within the United States' line of defense in the Pacific. (Mr. Dulles said at this point that the United States had never made an official commitment with respect to military support with any country, except under the Atlantic Pact, and there were qualifications even in that agreement. He said that not even the Philippines had any such agreement with the United States. But, he added, he was certain that the United States would not abandon Korea, and that he is even now preparing a statement to the effect that Korea would be backed by the United States. He said he would assure the Korean people that the United States would assist them)

2. We want more planes and long range guns in order to render our defenses more effective.

3. Korea should participate in peace treaty negotiations with Japan, because we have fought the Japanese longer and more than any other country.

4. Korea should take an active part in the formation of a Pacific Pact, if such a pact ever comes into being, and we would like to see the United States take an active part in the formation of the pact. (I regret, I told Mr. Dulles, that Korea was left out of the Baguio meeting, despite the specific promise of an

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. 26

No. 27

LETTER FROM JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SUPREME ADVISER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A. TO RHEE SYNGMAN, DATED JUNE 20, 1950[1]

June 20, 1950

My dear President Rhee:

I am happy to hand you herewith an inscribed copy of my recent book, *War or Peace*[2]. I think it shows you that you and I have much the same ideas about the nature of the struggle in which we are engaged and you will see that in my book I frequently mention Korea. I attach great importance to the decisive role which your country can play in the great drama that is unfolding.

Sincerely yours,
/s/ John Foster Dulles

The following is the inscription written on the book:
To President Syngman Rhee:

An outstanding and victorious leader in the world-wide struggle for peace and justice with whom I am honored to confer on the occasion of my mission to Korea.

John Foster Dulles.

Footnotes

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. Copy.
2. Underlined in the original.

No. 28

LETTER FROM JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SUPREME ADVISER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A. TO LIM BYUNG-CHICK, SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN SECRETARY, DATED JUNE 20, 1950[1]

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON[2]

American Embassy,
Seoul, Korea.

June 20, 1950

My dear Colonel Limb:

I have so much for which to thank you that it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to do so adequately.

The dinner which you gave in our honor last night was something I shall always remember. The setting was really glorious, the company distinguished, the entertainment most interesting to us, and last, but not least, the food was delicious.

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the South Korean Foreign Department. The original bears a stamp of the "South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs," dated June 22, 1950.
2. Letterhead.

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

American Embassy,
Seoul, Korea.

June 20, 1950

My dear Colonel Limb:

I have so much for which to thank you that it is difficult, and indeed impossible, to do so adequately.

The dinner which you gave in our honor last night was something I shall always remember. The setting was really glorious, the company distinguished, the entertainment most interesting to us, and last, but not least, the food was delicious.

Your address at the Seoul National University on the occasion of my reception of an honorary degree was an eloquent tribute, which I shall long cherish and pass on to my children and grandchildren.

You may be sure that my faith in the future of Korea is strengthened by my visit here, and I hope that our two countries can continue along the way of mutual support.

The antique celadon vase and bowl will grace Mrs. Dulles' living room in New York and always keep fresh the memory of our visit with you.

Above all, I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you and with President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, problems that will require courageous and bold decisions.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

His Excellency Colonel Ben C. Limb,
Seoul,
Korea.

392

Photostatic copy of Document No. 28

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Above all, I appreciated the opportunity of discussing with you and with President Rhee some of the hard problems that we face, problems that will require courageous and bold decisions.

I am,

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles[3]

His Excellency Colonel Ben C. Limb,
Seoul,
Korea.

Footnotes.

3. Signed by Dulles personally.

No. 29

LETTER FROM RHEE SYNGMAN TO CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, DATED JUNE 18, 1950[1]

June 18, 1950

Confidential—no copy on file
To : Ambassador Chang Myun
From: President Syngman Rhee

Thank you for your letters of June 14.

Mrs. Rhee and I are very glad to learn that Mrs. Chang is feeling well and is under the care of a good specialist there.

I am very glad that you had a chance to entertain Mr. Dulles and his party before he left. By now you have no doubt a copy of his speech at the Assembly. He went to the SD[2] and told them that he wanted to say and they fully approved.

What you wrote in your letter that Mr. Dulles said that the United States has never made any official commitment not even the Philippines etc. I wish to point out to you that all those who are in the perimeter are automatically included in the defense line. Even if there is no pact signed it is the policy of the United States

Footnotes.

1. This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Rhee Syngman Government. Copy.
2. U.S. State Department.

to supply these countries. Besides, the psychological effect of being in the defense line is already a moral commitment.

I had several conversations and an hour's talk today and he fully agreed that the Southeast Asia pact does not mean anything. He also agreed that Communist China should not be admitted to the UN. It would be an act of appeasement toward the Soviet Union. He agreed with all my policy and no doubt will do his best after his return.

There is one thing I want to tell you. When a party like this comes the next time you have to try to find out why some of the people are attached to it. Mr. McCardle went along to other conferences and he is filing his report in an official way in the White House to give his impression about the things he observes as an unofficial guest. Mrs[3]. Matthews was sent by the White House in particular to report to the President and it is said that his report will count just as much as the report of Mr. Dulles if not more. These are valuable information I should get through your office. Fortunately we were tipped of the purpose of his presence in the party.

Miss Louise Yim is leaving for the States tomorrow and I asked her to take this letter along. She is trying to get a final settlement of the Pfeiffer Foundation which will amount to $140,000 for the construction of her school buildings. It might be that you get inquiries from different sources and I know you will do all you can to help her in getting this endowment. This endowment granted to her will do a great deal for Korean education. As you know there is no other school in that part of our city and it would be of great advantage if this school could be developed in such a manner as to enable all the students in that area to be taken care of. As you know the school facilities are inefficient and the great need for new buildings is the most essential one particularly since the compulsory school system has been adopted by the Legislature. We are in a great dilemna[4] as there are not enough schools to accept

Footnotes.

3. As in the original, evidently it means "Mr."
4. "Dilemma" misspelt.

students. Everything could be done so that the construction work of new buildings can begin. Therefore, do all you can and also ask Mr. Namkoong to help her in every way possible.

In regard to the Los Angeles question. I have received several letters from both parties and it still seems the best to let the resignation of Mr. Min stand with the understanding that he returns to Korea. If there is any possibility for Mr. Min to obtain a position with the U.S. Army in Monterey the Government will consider an extension. By now you will be already in the clear if that can materialize otherwise, tell him the Foreign Office is unable to retract the former request for Mr. Min to return at the end of the month.

I cannot understand what is meant by saying that Chang and his family have no funds for returning. As I explained to you in Seoul our Government has already deposited his and his family's passage to the American Steamship Co. I cannot understand why he has not conted[5] them as requested before he complains about his inability to pay his passage. We have wired KORIC[6] several times that his passage was deposited for May and then transferred for the June sailing. I also understood that you were authorized to inform the new clerk to pay his railroad fare from Los Angeles to Seattle.

It is up to you to settle the affairs of the office of the consulate. It is certain that you will have to give the secretary at least a month's notice. Miss Park has to be clearly instructed as to her office hours and her duties. She must keep the books and other things. We should be very sure that she is doing her best in the office.

I intended to give these instructions through the Foreign Office but as Miss Yim is leaving I may not have time to get the orders out on time.

Footnotes.

5. As in the original, evidently misspelt.
6. Cable address of the South Korean Embassy in Washington.

APPENDIX

LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS*

Acheson, Dean G. : Secretary of State of U.S.A.

Bond, Niles Woodbridge : Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs of the Department of State, U.S.A.

Butterworth, W. Walton : Director of the Office of the Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State, U.S.A.

Chae Byung-duk : Former officer of the Japanese Army ; Chief of General Staff of the South Korean Army.

Chang Myun (John M. Chang) : South Korean Ambassador in Washington.

Cho Byung-ok (Peong Ok Chough) : Former Chief of Police Department of U.S. military government in south Korea; Ambassador Plenipotentiary, Personal Representative of the president of the Republic of Korea and Permanent Observer to the United Nations.

Denfeld, Louis E. : Admiral; Chief of Naval Operations, Department of Navy, U.S.A.

Drumright, Everett Francis : Councillor of the U.S. Embassy in South Korea.

* The data given in the list, as a rule relates to the period when the given person is mentioned in the documents.

Dulles, John Foster : Supreme Adviser to the Department of State, U.S.A.

Hodge, John R. : U.S. lieutenant general; ex-Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces in South Korea.

Hoffman, Paul Gray : Administrator for Economic Cooperation of U.S.A.

Kee, John : U.S. Congressman; Democrat; Chairman of the House Foreign Relation Committee.

Kim Hyo-suk : Ex-Home Secretary of the South Korean puppet government.

Kim Sug-won : Former officer of the Japanese Army; Commander of the 1st Division of the South Korean Army.

Kim Sung-soo : Big landlord and capitalist in south Korea; Head of the Hankook Minjoodang (Korean Democratic Party)

Knowland, William Fife: U.S. Senator from California; Republican; member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.

Lim Byung-chick (Ben C. Limb) : Foreign Secretary of the South Korean puppet government.

MacArthur, Douglas : U.S. General of the Army; Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army in the Far East; Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan.

Muccio, Joseph : U.S. Ambassador to the South Korean puppet government.

Moon Hak Bong : Former adviser to C.I.C. and Rhee Syngman's political adviser.

Noble, Harold Joyce : Political Attaché to the U.S. Embassy in South Korea.

Oliver, Robert T. : Professor of the University of Pennsylvania; editor of "Periscope on Asia" ; personal adviser

and quasi-official spokesman of Rhee Syngman in Washington.

Radford, Arthur William: Admiral; Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Rhee Alice (Francheska); Rhee Syngman's wife, Austrian origin.

Rhee Syngman: President of the South Korean puppet government—(Republic of Korea).

Ri Bum-suk: Secretary of Defence; Prime Minister of the South Korean puppet government.

Roberts, W.L: Brigade general; Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in South Korea.

Sebald, William Joseph: Chief of the Diplomatic Section of MacArthur's Headquarters.

Sin Sung-mo: Secretary of Defence of the South Korean puppet government.

Sohn Won-il: Rear admiral; South Korean Chief of Naval Operations.

Timberman, Thomas S.: Brigade general; member of the U.S. Army staff.

Truman, Harry S.: President of the United States of America.

Wedemeyer, Albert Coady: Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

Williams, Jay J.: American; Adviser to the South Korean Embassy in Washington.

Webb, James Edwin: Under-Secretary of State of U.S.A.


Yoon Peong-koo: A Protestant Minister by profession; adviser to Rhee Synman on foreign affairs.


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AP 24 '74			
NO 6 '75			
MY 12 '76			
AG 21 '85			

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