U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR

IN THE KOREAN OPERATION

A Study of Their Treatment and Handling by the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Forces

ARMY SECURITY CENTER
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
November 1954

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F O R E W O R D

The Joint Services team which produced this study is of the unanimous opinion that the analysis herein is not and must not be permitted to become the final effort on the subject. The problems of policy and training for U.S. military forces which are raised in this study are now limited to any particular area of future operations or restricted to any one potential enemy. The material contained in this report deals only with the limited period of 1950 to 1953 and with the Communist Chinese as well as North Korean aspects of a complex, diversified and extremely vital topic.

The vastness of the military forces which may be employed in future wars will, almost inevitably, result in correspondingly large numbers of prisoners of war. As indicated by the activities of the U.S.S.R. in World War II and as underscored with starkness and clarity in the Korean Operation, the POW in Communist hands is, and will continue to be, the hapless victim of exploitation in the fields of intelligence and psychological warfare. In addition, when economic and industrial demands exist, the use of POWs as Soviet-style captive labor forces must be anticipated.

The ultimate end of wartime operations - the domination or destruction of the opposing force - may remain unchanged, but weapons and tactics of war undergo continuous modification and revision. A comparable truism is that, while prisoners of war will undeniably be

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exploited, the aims and techniques of exploitation will be subject to innovation and refinement. The study and evaluation of POW interrogation, indoctrination and possibly many other kindred fields is not, therefore, static in nature but must be a continuing inquiry.

It is the Joint Services team's belief that in both the civilian and military mind, certain ideas have become implanted as absolutes; these include the views that there is no successful defense against "brainwashing" and that "every man has his breaking point." While these two concepts may be somewhat generally true, neither is entirely true. The press and writers of semi-fiction, however, have created an aura of inevitability in regard to these two matters. The team further believes that this feeling of inevitability will, if unchallenged, in itself reduce the resistance capabilities of future POWs. While history has shown that some POWs will unwittingly aid the enemy, and further, that some men through fear, cupidity or weakness will intentionally co-operate with their captors, it is also believed that steps can be taken to reduce these inherent military weaknesses. These steps may well include the information and training necessary to counter and combat these weaknesses and should be predicated on a careful, comparative and continuing inquiry into the subjects. This report offers one factual foundation for such study.

U.S. Prisoners of War in the Korean Operation, despite certain

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limitations, has produced sufficient detailed and diversified information to substantiate sustained research in this field. This study has delved into the methods of but a small segment of our potential enemies. In addition, it has been accomplished at a comparatively early date after the repatriation of the POWs from Korea, and the determination of any long range effect of the incarceration on their mental, moral and physical well-being cannot yet be determined. Future study and inquiry should provide for a critical coordinated examination of selected U.S. repatriates from every variety of enemy military or political confinement. Such a program would include plans for the preliminary (or qualifying) interview; selection for and conduct of the detailed interrogation; examination by experts in the pertinent fields; long range observation; and, finally, evaluation and recommendations. The semi-technical or specialized aspects of restraint, care and exploitation of POWs would require that personnel assigned to this project should be thoroughly schooled in both the history and in the current application of these topics.

Although the training of U.S. military personnel in resistance to enemy interrogation and indoctrination is perhaps the most readily apparent use for the long range research effort recommended herein, it by no means represents the sole advantage to be gained. A knowledge of the methods used by various nations in devising and guarding POW compounds, for example, would be of value to Escape and Evasion personnel. Psychological Warfare agencies, if provided

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beforehand with information regarding enemy propaganda exploitation of POWs, would have an advantage in their preparation of plans to refute or discredit activity in this field. A study of the methods used by detaining powers to subvert POWs would provide legal authorities with better insight into the judicial and disciplinary problems to be faced subsequent to the repatriation of U.S. POWs. The efficiency and effectiveness of POW repatriation programs might well be aided by an analysis of the administrative, medical, intelligence and investigative procedures utilized in earlier efforts. Provost Marshal personnel, concerned with the containment of enemy prisoners of war, would undoubtedly profit by research into the restraint and control methods of other countries. U.S. intelligence personnel would be provided with reference material in their study of prisoner of war interrogation techniques. Diplomatic representatives of the United States, briefed in the then current methods of other countries, would have factual data for international discussion of the Geneva Convention and other agreements relative to prisoners of war. While there are undoubtedly other profitable corollary fields of interest, the instances cited above are believed to be evidence that the recommended continuing research would provide concrete information for researchers in many branches of the service and for policy determination on many vital and recurring topics.

Experience gained in the Korean Operation has shown that U.S. military personnel - regardless of their branch of service - were generally subjected to the same type of treatment and exposed to the

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some type of experiences. Personnel from the various branches were interrogated by the enemy on subjects pertinent to their service, but the interrogation methods employed were almost identical. The exceptions to this were the Bacteriological Warfare "confessions" (procedures which are considered on the Korea (and to some extent, Malaya Force) basis). There is every reason to believe, however, that many officers and enlisted men who have been subjected to this same physical and psychological pressures, if the enemy's purposes had so demanded. In the case of North Korea it seems apparent that U.S. military personnel, with comparable background and comparable situations, reacted almost identically, regardless of their branch of service. The study of enemy methods of debriefing, interrogating and indoctrinating POWs is, therefore, of equal interest to all of the services. Further exploration of this field, it is felt, should be a Joint Service endeavor or, at least, provide for a full and complete exchange of information, co-ordination in the development of operational and training data, and co-ordinated planning in the several fields which are the subject of this study.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONTENTS

Chapter	Title	PAGE
	SUMMARY	i
1	INTRODUCTION	67
	I Scope and Purpose	67
	II Intelligence Value	67
	III Authority	68
	IV Research Material Utilized	69
	V Limitations	70
2	THE POW IN COMMUNIST HANDS PRIOR TO 1950	73
	I Introduction	73
	II The POW in History	73
	III The Soviet Union and World War II POW's	75
	IV The Chinese Communist POWs	77
	V The Soviet Union and International Agreements (re POWs)	78
	VI Soviet Reservations to Geneva Conventions	79
3	DEVELOPMENT OF THE POW CAMP SYSTEM	83
	I Introduction	83
	II The Stages of Development	83
	III The First U. S. POWs	84
	IV The Temporary Camp Period	90
	V The Permanent Camps of the Yalu	95
	VI Comparison of the Three Periods of Internment	97
4	INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE POW CAMPS	104
	I Introduction	104
	II Internal Camp Organizations	104
	III Internment Under the North Koreans	107
	IV Internment Under the CCF	108
	V Temporary Camps	108
	VI Permanent Camps	110

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NND 867210
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CONTENTS (continued)

Chapter		Title	Page
9 (cont)	III	Capture and the Temporary Camps	294
	IV	The Permanent Camps	302
	V	Escape Attempts by Returned POWs	332
10		JUDICIAL AND DISCIPLINARY MEASURES	338
	I	Introduction	338
	II	Judicial Procedures Under Korean Civilians	339
	III	Judicial and Disciplinary Procedures Under the North Korean Army	340
	IV	Judicial Procedures Under the CCF	34
	V	Disciplinary Procedures	345
	VI	"Kangaroo Courts"	348
	VII	General	349
11		CAMP LIFE AND ROUTINE	352
	I	Introduction	352
	II	Camp Life and Routine in the Non-Permanent Camps	354
	III	Camp Life and Routine in the Permanent Camps	364
	IV	POW Reactions to Daily Life	383
12		FOOD	391
	I	Introduction	391
	II	Food Issued En Route from Point of Capture to Areas of Permanent Confinement	391
	III	Organization of Cooking Staffs and Personnel	395
	IV	Preparation of Food	398
	V	Distribution, Ration Breakdown and General Supply Procedure	404
	VI	Cooking and Eating Utensils	406
	VII	Sanitation	407
	VIII	Procuring Food from Outside Sources	409
	IX	Food On Special Holiday Occasions	412
	X	Use of Food for Indoctrination and Propaganda Purposes	414
	XI	General	416

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONTENTS (continued)

Chapter		Title	Page
13		CLOTHING	421
	I	Introduction	421
	II	Confiscation of U.N. Uniforms	422
	III	Clothing Shortages and Comparisons With CCF Uniforms	424
	IV	Distributions of Uniforms and Accessories	426
	V	General	431
14		MEDICAL TREATMENT	435
	I	Introduction	435
	II	Treatment During Evacuation	437
	III	Facilities and Treatment Within Major POW Camps	447
	IV	Medical Aspects of the Failure of Discipline	466
	V	General	468
	VI	Recommendations by Medical Officer Repatriates	470
15		CORRESPONDENCE	472
	I	Introduction	472
	II	Outgoing Correspondence	473
	III	Incoming Correspondence	497
	IV	The Mechanics of Exchange	504
	V	Relation of Correspondence to the Propaganda and Indoctrination Program	506
16		RADIO BROADCASTS	511
	I	Introduction	511
	II	Circumstances of Recording	512
	III	Type and Content of Recordings	514
	IV	The "Peace Fighters"	518
	V	Radio Broadcasts and Correspondence	521
	VI	Propaganda Effects of Radio Broadcasting	523

Appendix	Title	Page
I	Letter of Explanation to Returned POWs Debriefed at the Army Security Center, Fort George G. Meade	527

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONTENTS (continued)

Appendix	Title	Page
II	Organizational Charts, Camp 1 through 5	538
III	Aerial Photographs and Sketches, Camp 1 through Sketch of Camp 2	542
IV	List of Reference Material Available to CCF During Interrogations	577
V	Specific Questions Asked by Enemy (NK & CCF) Interrogators	579
VI	An Outline of a Typical Autobiography as Required of the POW by the Communists	584
VII	Reading Material Available in One or More of the Camp Libraries	587
VIII	Propaganda Films Shown to POWs in One or More of the Camps	589
IX	Themes of Indoctrination Lectures Given in the POW Camps	590
X	"Portrait of a Progressive"	591
XI	An Outline of Material Discussed In Reference to Bacteriological Warfare "Confessions"	602
XII	Charts Indicating the Physical and Mental Pressure Applied to POWs while Undergoing Interrogation Concerning Their Participation in Bacteriological Warfare	603
XIII	Interrogation Charts	609
XIV	Breakdown by Grade of USAF Personnel Interrogated on BW	619
XV	Organizational Chart and Armament of CCF Guard Company	620

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/86

CONTENTS (continued)

Appendix	Title	Page
XVI	Punishable Offenses in the POW Camps	611
XVII	Prisoner of War Camp Rules	624
XVIII	Daily Schedule For Camps 1 through 5	626
XIX	International Committee of the Red Cross and Medical Supplies	632
XX	U S Army POWs Surviving Internment	633
XXI	Communist Personalities	635

GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES 683

INDEX 687

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

SUMMARY

The main body of the following report, U.S. Prisoners of War in the Korean Operation, is the result of many months of exhaustive study on the subject. The full utilization of material available has resulted in sixteen highly detailed chapters. While these detailed analyses will doubtless prove valuable to specialists in the fields discussed, it is obvious that many others having a wide general interest in the subject will have neither the time nor the desire to read each lengthy chapter individually.

This summary has been prepared for people in the latter category. Those who read only the summary should be cautioned, however, that, although every effort has been made to cover all of the major points of the study, some significant meaning may have been lost through necessary omission of detail. It should be noted, further, that, although neither the illustrations nor the appendix material are referenced in the summary, the table of contents and the index will indicate the source of such information.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Scope and Purpose: This study is presented as an historical review of the experiences undergone by U.S. military personnel interned by the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Forces during the Korean Operation. For three years, beginning in July 1950, these two Communist-bloc nations in the Far East had absolute control over several thousand U.S. soldiers, airmen, seamen and marines. During these months, information as to the existence and activities of

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible]

have [illegible] made of the [illegible] [illegible] propaganda [illegible]. It was only [illegible] release of the P[illegible] to U.N. control in [illegible] spring and summer of 1953 that [illegible] of their intern- [illegible] prison camps of North Korea became available. Based on the data thus obtained, this study [illegible] the techniques [illegible] methods utilized by the Communists [illegible] certain [illegible] exploit U.S. POW's.

[illegible] Army Security Agency, a [illegible] Service Agency at Fort [illegible] (Maryland), was assigned the project of debriefing selected [illegible] prisoners of war at Department of Defense level on 17 September 1953. Although authority to implement the program was issued by [illegible] G2, [illegible] approval had been given by the Departments of the Air Force and Navy. One basic instruction to ASA for these debriefings was "[illegible] to exploit to the maximum the positive intelligence obtained by these personnel while under enemy jurisdiction."

[illegible] Value: While the information contained in this dis- [illegible] might have no further intelligence value with respect to [illegible] to those having responsibilities in the appropriate fields [illegible] if the following assumptions are accepted: [illegible] That the handling and treatment of U.S. POWs in Korea will be repeated in any future conflict with Asiatic forces supported by [illegible] Chinese or Soviet influence. (b) That American military personnel, captured by such Asiatic forces, [illegible] comparable to those who

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

were imprisoned in the ROK area of south Korea, will react similarly.

Research Material: Material used in the preparation of this study falls into five categories. (1) Records of interviews conducted in FEC, by shipboard teams and Field Interrogators, over 7,100 documents of this type have been secured, and the pertinent information has been extracted and collated. (2) Fifty-four selected reference, representative publications ranging from current popular "best sellers" to Communist propaganda, were brought to the Army Security Center for study and abstracting. In addition, thirty-six references were specially available for short periods. The early interrogations (FEC and shipboard) established the broad pattern of experience, but details could rarely be obtained except through personal interviews. (3) Various studies prepared by other agencies and technical branches were used to a limited degree for reference purposes. (4) A number of counter-intelligence reports prepared by the U.S. provided additional information. (5) To broaden the framework of knowledge on IGF and IMT doctrine, a small number of enemy documents captured in Korea and a few pertinent interrogation reports of enemy personnel were consulted.

Limitations: (a) No attempt has been made at ASC to develop counter-intelligence information or to collate specific war crimes data. Personnel interviewed by ASC were informed that only positive military information was being sought; depositions and affidavits were

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By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

neither requested nor obtained. (b) Economic and technological intelligence is not reviewed in this report. POWs of the Korean War, unlike the German and Japanese prisoners held by the Soviet Union in World War II, were not required to work in enemy mines, industry or military installations. Their knowledge on such topics has therefore proved negligible. (c) The general picture of POW treatment and existence reflected in this review is believed to be accurate. Many minor details, however, were largely based upon the limited number of interviews conducted at ASC and upon certain detailed CONUS interrogations developed by the services; for this reason, this report should be considered neither final nor definitive.

Chapter 2 The POW in Communist Hands Prior to 1950

Introduction: The historic march of humanitarianism relative to the treatment of POWs culminated in the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949. The Communists, although rendering lip-service to these general international agreements concerning prisoners, have actually accorded prisoners treatment far below the minimum standards provided by the Geneva Convention.

The POW and the Soviet Union: During and after World War II, the Soviet Union exploited to the maximum the military, economic and political value of their POWs. Militarily, the prisoners were

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

useful as sources of information about the enemies of the Soviet Union, and, although torture was not generally necessary to force a POW to reveal the desired information, extreme mental and physical duress was applied in cases where POWs refused to co-operate with their interrogators. Economically, POW manpower and technical knowledge were exploited by the Soviets and proved of great value to Soviet industry and reconstruction work. Politically, the POWs were considered valuable as potential converts to communism and, as such, a means of extending Soviet political power over the nations the prisoners represented. Therefore, political interrogation and intensive indoctrination played a major role in the POW routine. Additionally, the prisoners proved valuable during World War II as vehicles for propaganda in the Soviet psychological warfare program.

The Soviet Union and International Agreements (In Re POWs): The Soviet Union, although it had taken no part in the framing of the Geneva (POW) Conventions of 1929, actively participated in the Convention of 1949. With fifty-seven other nations (plus the Holy See and the principalities of Monaco and Liechtenstein), the Soviets signed this document concerning the proper care and treatment of prisoners of war. The importance of this, however, is not in the fact that the signature was made but rather in the reservations which were noted by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites.

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Soviet Reservations to the Geneva Conventions: Along with the other eight signatories in the communist-bloc countries, the Soviet Union took exception, as a part of its signing, to Article 85 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. It is probable that this reservation is indicative of the actual attitude of the Soviet Union in regard to POWs and will be the keystone of their policy in any future conflict. In view of the importance of this fact, Article 85 and the Soviet reservation, which was parroted in essence by the communist satellites, are quoted below.

Article 85

> "Prisoners of War prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention." (Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949)

The reservation to this article, signed by General SLAVIN, head of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reads as follows:

> "Article 85: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by the obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend the application of the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in accordance

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with the principles of the Nuremberg trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of such crimes must be subjected to the conditions obtaining in the country in question for those who undergo their punishment.'"

As may readily be seen, the unscrupulous application of this reservation, of which we already have numerous examples, would, behind a facade of legality, completely negate the purpose of the Geneva Convention. If the retention of prisoners should be desired for political, intelligence or economic reasons, the term "war criminal" need only be expanded and the prisoner would be deprived of his rights under the Convention.

Based on Soviet examples during World War II and the actions of the Chinese and North Koreans in the Korean Operation, it may be assumed that communist nations will render lip service to the principles of international agreements in regard to prisoners of war but will continue to base their actions in this regard on a policy of maximum exploitation as time and situation demand.

Chapter 3 Development of the POW Camp System

Introduction: The various aspects of life in the POW camps in Korea are treated topically in this report. Since this may result in some loss of continuity on the part of the reader, this chapter has been indluded to present a general picture of the period of

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[illegible] of the [illegible] of the [illegible] because of its geographical configuration. There, [illegible] were held. POWs died.

[illegible]: In March 1951, the POWs at the [illegible] were moved [illegible] and settled in an old Japanese camp called Camp 7. Conditions were miserable and another 200 died. Around the middle of March, the camp was disbanded and the POWs were transferred [illegible]. The officers and Class I, Camp 5, [illegible]; the enlisted men were sent to Camp 3.

[illegible] the camp was [illegible], the CCF captured a [illegible] and [illegible] to an unidentified location known as "Death Valley," and then brought them to [illegible] 10 miles south of PYOKTONG. There they handed them over to the NKA for guarding. Approximately 1,000 POWs arrived at the "Valley" over a period of several weeks, and 500 to 700 died. From here the remainder was moved to PYOKTONG.

The bulk of the POWs captured at SUNU-RI in late 1950 were taken to "Death Valley," 30 miles southeast of PYOKTONG. Conditions were at the lowest level, and, of the estimated 2,000, only 1,200 survived. The camp was under NKA control, but the CCF were present in a supervisory capacity. The majority of the internees were moved to PYOKTONG on the 22nd of January, and the sick and wounded followed at intervals until 25 March 1951.

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The POWs captured around the CHOSIN Reservoir in December 1950 were taken to the KANGCYE area and settled in what became known as "Peaceful Valley." In the group were approximately 300 U.S. and 20 British POW's, and all were subjected to intensive indoctrination. Newspapers were started and propaganda rallies were held. The camp was under the complete control of the CCF, and the "Lenient Policy" was their announced code. Only 15 to 20 deaths occurred at this location. The "Gun-So-Yen" or "Workers," who were to operate for a brief period at a collecting point near the front, were an outgrowth of this indoctrination period. These U.S. POWs helped the CCF process newly captured personnel and initiate them into the ways of camp life.

Two other camps were established near the city of SUNN in January 1951 to serve as collection points near the front. About 1900 U.S. POWs passed through them, and 500 are reported to have died there.

Starting in January 1951, the majority of the POWs began to be gathered in the city of PYOKTONG. By the end of March, there were only two permanent locations: Camp 5 (PYOKTONG) and Camp 7. At first, the mortality rate at Camp 5 was comparable to "Death Valley," but during that summer conditions improved and only three men died after that date.

Camp 12 was set up by the CPVA in February 1951 as a center for the preparation of pro-Communist speeches and broadcasts, and the

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[illegible] was the first permanent camp for POWs in N. K. to be established [illegible] area of 4000 sq. mi. The Central Committee located here, and [illegible] was the most notorious features of the camp. When the site [illegible] was established in August 1951, all of the POWs - between 30 and [illegible] were brought to Camp 5.

A CCF interrogation center was established 30 miles from "Death Valley" in December 1950, and was used for the detailed interrogation of around 30 POWs at any one time. Conditions were comparable to "Death Valley." The center was in operation for about one month.

"Pak's Valley," formed in April 1951, was used by the NKA throughout the war for the detailed interrogation of groups of 30 to 40 U.N. POWs. Those interrogated were mostly officers, primarily U.S. Air Force.

Permanent Camps: Camp 1, established in March 1951, and Camp 3, started in September 1951, were set up to take care of the overflow from Camp 5. Camp 2 was established in October 1951 [illegible] officers' camp. Camp 4 was opened in August 1952 to house sergeants, and Camp 6 was opened after "Little Switch" for newly captured POWs.

General: Confinement in the POW camps of North Korea may be considered in three phases: (1) from July 1950 to November, when the CCF entered the war; (2) the winter of 1950-51, with the three temporary camps and the "Valleys" and (3) the permanent camps. The NKA was in sole charge during the first period and conditions

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were severe. During the second period there was joint control; the majority of the cruelty occurred during this time. In the third period, after the spring of 1951, the Chinese were in sole charge (with the exception of "Bloody Valley" and Camp 12). Conditions began to improve during that summer and continued to do so until the end of the internment period.

Chapter 4 Internal Organization of the POW Camps

Introduction: The POWs were segregated according to nationality, rank, race, and in some cases, on the basis of their susceptibility or resistance to indoctrination. The indoctrination program was consequently aided, because it could be directed at small, homogeneous groups. The POWs were divided into squads, platoons, and companies, as a matter of convenient control, but there was no corresponding assignment of POW rank within this conventional military structure. The Communists strove to subordinate the concept of rank, insisting that the POWs were "civilians drafted to fight Wall Street's war" and were now "liberated."

Internment Under North Korea: NKA handling of U.S. POWs exhibited an apparent lack of policy, and, for the first five months of the war, no internal camp organization existed. After the INCHON landing, the POWs were moved from place to place, still without any semblance of organization and still under the control of the Security Police.

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Internment Under the CCF: The first winter was chaotic for the prisoners. Large numbers of POWs were taken, but precautions for handling them were not in evidence. Housing, food, and medical care (with the exception of "Peaceful Valley") were extremely primitive.

Temporary Camps: Practically all of the POWs captured from November 1950 to January 1951 were held for a time at either the "Valley," "Death Valley," or "Peaceful Valley." (a) The "Valley" - When first organized in November 1950, it was under NKA jurisdiction, but control passed to the Chinese in mid-December. Officers, EM and wounded were segregated. The enlisted men were beginning to be assigned to squads when the camp was disbanded and the POWs were brought to PYOKTONG. (b) "Death Valley" - Organized in December 1950, it was divided into an Upper Camp, consisting of ROKs, and a Lower Camp, which held the other U.N. POWs. The occupants of each hut (or room in the larger huts) were considered a squad; POW squad leaders were appointed by the NKA. Both NKA and CCF troops were on hand, but the Koreans were responsible for the administration of the camp. (c) "Peaceful Valley" - After December 1950, approximately 300 U.S. and 20 British POWs were held here under the CCF, and were organized into two companies of equal size, each with three platoons. Spanish-speaking POWs were placed together in one squad. The CCF command structure was the most highly developed up to that point. In addition to the camp commander, it consisted of company commanders,

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platoon leaders, and instructors.

Permanent Camps: The chief administrative units were the companies--from three to seven per camp--which contained an average of 200 men, but ranged in size from 60 to 350 POWs. There were usually three or four platoons to a company, and the squad was the basic unit. The command structure was divided along political and military lines. The camp commander exercised both functions, but he had little direct contact with the POWs. The company commander was concerned chiefly with administration, and was seen most often when punishment was being meted out. His political counterpart, the company instructor, played the most important role in company affairs as far as the POWs were concerned. He lectured, interpreted, had the power to excuse POWs from work details, assisted in sending them on sick call, and administered punishment. The platoon leader was restricted to assigning details and verifying headcounts; his assistant supervised the distribution of food to the squads. The platoon instructor conducted political affairs and indoctrination at platoon level. Chinese-appointed POW squad leaders handled the distribution of food and supplies to the squads, chose members for details, checked the count of the squads, and saw to it that they were properly formed at platoon formations.

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Chapter 5 POW Groups and Organizations

Introduction: During their three-year internment in Korea, various POWs banded together to form overt groups for recreational and entertainment purposes or clandestine organizations for purposes of resisting the Chinese. It is notable that the POWs were unable at any time to form any company or camp-wide organizations which achieved solidarity. The groups which did appear were small, short-lived and in some cases ill-defined as to purpose. In the latter stages of internment, an effort was made among the officers to operate under the control and guidance of a senior officer. Even this attempt, however, was not completely successful.

Informers: Returned POWs place the blame for the failure of the resistance groups and of any possible control by the POWs on one primary factor: the informer. U.S. military personnel are reported by returnees to have been active as informers for the CCF in every camp and company. Informers reported the leaders of the clandestine anti-communist groups, the individual "reactionaries," the planned escape attempts and, in general, created a condition of fear and suspicion among all the prisoners. There was apparently no organized cellular net of informers in the camps; probably the individuals involved reported directly and independently to the Communists. Suspicion fell on many of the prisoners, but direct proof could rarely be obtained, and the POWs were completely unable to control

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

this internal danger. The POW informer and the lack of cohesive, self-imposed subordination among the prisoners to their senior officers and non-commissioned officers provided the Chinese with two powerful weapons in their control over their captives.

Entertainment and Recreation Groups: With the improvement in camp living conditions, beginning in the spring and summer of 1951, the POWs became interested in forming singing, acting and athletic groups. The Chinese imposed no restrictions on the formation of such organizations unless they suspected them of being a "cover" for resistance movements. Plays presented by the dramatic groups, however, were often slanted by "progressive" POWs to parrot communist themes.

Anti-Communist Resistance Groups: Reports of returnees from the permanent POW camps reflect the existence of such sub rosa resistance groups as the "Ku Klux Klan," the "Circle," the "True Americans," the "Golden Cross," the "Black Diamond," etc. Generally speaking, the purpose of these organizations was to block the indoctrination program, harass the Chinese, and prevent the collaboration of POW "Progressives." Founded at Camp 1 in the spring of 1952, the "Ku Klux Klan" was perhaps the best known and most highly organized of these resistance movements. To prevent compromise, the members were divided into two or three-man cells, with one man from each cell in liaison with other cells. Estimates as to membership vary from 30 to 200, but the lower figure is probably more nearly

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

correct. There was little overall co-ordination of the activities of the members, and, aside from considerable discussion and conversation, the tangible results appear to have been limited to sending anonymous notes to some of the better known "Progressives" and to verbally threatening "Pros" with reprisal after repatriation. Eventually, the KKK suffered the fate of the other resistance groups. Uncovered by the Chinese through the aid of informers, the leaders of the group were either transferred to other camps or sentenced to confinement for "founding a secret society."

There are no indications of any real or permanent achievements by the POW anti-Communist groups. Their very existence did, perhaps, constitute an annoying harassment to the captors, but the Chinese apparently had little difficulty curbing and eliminating these threats to their authority. A review of these groups discloses two important factors: the insidious and persistent activities of the POW informers, and the inability of the prisoners to cope with this internal problem.

Chapter 6 Interrogation

Introduction (a) Tactical Interrogation: Enemy doctrine, as outlined in captured documents of both the NKA and the CCF, called for a thorough exploitation of prisoners for tactical intelligence. Despite this fact, few returned prisoners reported that such interrogations occurred immediately after capture. Two factors must be

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

borne in mind, however, in assessing this fact. The first is a possible reticence on the part of returned POWs to admit having supplied information of tactical value to the enemy. Secondly, the large number of POWs captured in the brief period of November 1950 - February 1951 would have prevented enemy intelligence personnel from interrogating more than a sampling of prisoners from each large group. Results were not completely satisfactory from the enemy viewpoint, however, and captured documents indicate that, in the spring of 1951, instructions were issued to CCF units stressing the importance of tactical intelligence. In addition, bi-lingual questionnaires were provided to compensate for the lack of English-speaking interrogators in forward areas. (b) Strategic Interrogation: A thorough search of the debriefing reports of returned U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel fails to reveal any former prisoner who claims to have provided the enemy with only his name, rank, and serial number. A review of the topics on which U.S. personnel were interrogated indicates a diversified and extensive interest on the part of the enemy in personal, political, sociological and military fields. These two facts indicate that, while the intelligence value of the tactical information gained by the Chinese and the Koreans cannot be assessed, their strategic interrogation of U.S. military personnel was successful. (c) Enemy Interrogation Techniques: A review of Communist interrogation methods reveals nothing new or unusual in this field. Whether by intent on

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the part of the enemy or through logistical ineffectiveness, many of the POW's were suffering from malnutrition and disease during periods of intensive interrogation. Neither drugs nor mechanical devices were reported to have been used. Physical discomforts including kicks, slaps, and sometimes blows were somewhat routinely applied. Beyond this, actual physical torture (as opposed to mental) was reported only in rare cases. There are no reports which substantiate the death of any POW occurring as a direct result of his resistance to interrogation, and, although it is possible that some of the more than 2600 men who are officially listed as having died during captivity may fall into this category, such cases have not been brought to light. Threats accompanied all interrogations but were often vague or indirect and were rarely, in themselves, sufficient to make a POW fear for his personal safety. (Note: the Bacteriological Warfare "confessions" were not the product of ordinary interrogations designed to obtain information but resulted from the application of duress used to extract false statements. They are therefore discussed separately in Chapter 8 and are not covered here.)

NKA Interrogation: Although a wide gap existed between policy and practice, the NKA possessed an established plan for interrogation of captured U.S. personnel. Military information (tactical and strategic) was developed but was stressed less than information of a personal-political nature. A captured document outlines the plan

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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for evacuation [illegible] in the early stages of [illegible] number of U.S. POW's [illegible] initial processing, w[illegible] ducted at the temporary camps. An intensive interrogation program was established at the "Valley," near Yo[illegible], in November 1950, but [illegible] been a sociology and [illegible] established a [illegible] in April 1951. Selected [illegible] personnel or [illegible] brought in for [illegible] boards conducted [illegible] noted for the [illegible] pated and [illegible] positive [illegible] atchence. [illegible] rule, although physical [illegible] encourage the [illegible] moniously placing [illegible] mon practice. Drugs, liquor and [illegible] inducements, although cigarets [illegible] course of interrogations. [illegible] early interrogation [illegible]

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

appeared to be fairly competent linguists.

CCF Interrogation: The Chinese Communist Forces in Korea approached the POW interrogation problem with more thoroughness and with more extensive interrogation aids than did the North Koreans. Their emphasis on tactical and strategic military information was on a level comparable to that of the NKA, and the same desire to obtain personal-political information from the POWs was manifested. Captured CCF documents disclose that the instructions issued to front-line troops emphasized the importance of POW interrogation. They also indicate that it was the practice of CCF intelligence personnel to carefully study and analyze the results of such interrogations. In practice, initial interrogation by the CCF was devoted more to "processing" than it was to extracting information. Greater stress was later placed on this initial questioning, with the publication of a questionnaire that was to be filled out by each POW immediately after capture. This form was not published, however, until after the great majority of U.S. POWs had been captured. Its effectiveness has not been determined, but it is perhaps representative of future methods of interrogation. The first so-called "CCF Interrogation Center" was established in December 1950 near "Death Valley" and was utilized to interrogate selected personnel (usually officers). The questioning here was intense but often varied as to time and method. Much of the interrogation had a strong indoctrinal slant

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

and included long harangues against President TRUMAN and General MACARTHUR. Little physical violence was used, but implied threats were common. Most of the interrogations were carried out at Camp 5, since this was the largest of all the permanent camps. Much of the information sought here was of a personal history nature, including the financial background of the POW and his family, and his religious and organizational affiliations. At Camp 2 (commonly called the Officers' Camp), a different technique was employed, in that the selected POWs were called from the main compound and actually lived with their interrogators in almost complete isolation from the rest of the camp. These interrogations were carried out for periods of days and sometimes weeks. All types of information (personal, political,aand military) were sought. Physical violence was rarely used in the interrogations at the permanent camps. Physical discomfort, such as forcing a prisoner to stand or sit at attention, was common. Threats against the life of a prisoner or statements that he would not be repatriated were part of each interrogator's routine, and there were some threats against the lives of the prisoner's family in the United States. No POW is known to have died in any of the camps as the direct result of mistreatment in connection with interrogation. Drugs were apparently not used, although one POW believes that he was drugged before each interrogation. There are no reports of women having been offered as inducements. Cigarettes were usually proffered, as was an occasional cup

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of hot tea. Women were used as interrogators in only a few instances. A small group of U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force personnel was interrogated for a few days in ANTUNG, Manchuria, but enemy actions reflect the presence of curiosity and an interest in propaganda exploitation other than any serious intelligence effort. A B-29 bomber crew was held for eight months at MUKDEN and underwent a searching interrogation program. Their place of internment resembled a permanent interrogation center. None of the returned POWs detected the use of any mechanical or electronic recording devices in connection with their interrogations.

Soviet Interrogation: Soviet (Russian) interrogation is reported in a few instances but was never intensive or continuous for any POW. Nearly all of the Russian interrogations occurred in the early stages of the conflict and appeared to be motivated primarily by curiosity.

Interrogation of U.S. Intelligence POWs: The NKA and the CCF were very much interested in questioning men suspected of being CIC or CID personnel. On one occasion, threats were used that, if such people did not identify themselves, capital punishment would be inflicted. One POW who was suspected of being a member of a U.S. CIC unit was starved and beaten numerous times. Many questions asked of the POWs by the Chinese were directed toward the activities of the various intelligence agencies and the FBI. In fact, questions

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

about these agencies were asked of a very great number of POWs, without any inference that the particular POW was suspected of being a member of an intelligence agency.

Chapter 7 Indoctrination

Introduction: The Communist quest for control over men's minds was very much evident in the POW camps in North Korea. U.S. POWs in the hands of the Communist forces were subjected to a wide variety of indoctrinal experiences. The motivation and purpose behind this indoctrination program cannot be established with certainty, but the following three aims are advanced as possible explanations for this activity: (1) the development of propaganda (peace appeals, broadcasts, etc.); (2) control over the prisoners during their internment; and (3) the conversion of the POWs to communist ideology.

It may be assumed that, from the standpoint of gaining propaganda favorable for dissemination throughout the world, the program was eminently successful. In addition, if the spawning of POW informers may be considered a product of the indoctrination effort, the enemy undeniably gained a powerful weapon for controlling the POWs during their internment. The success of the third possible aim, however, is more difficult to guage. The prolonged confinement undergone by the majority of the POWs, coupled with the indoctrination programs and the propaganda which pervaded the camps,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

might appear to have created a favorable situation favorable to the acceptance of communist indoctrination. The records of the returned POWs, however, indicate a belief that the prisoners who appeared to have been affected were ideologically [illegible] to communist theory than simply possessed with a desire to exist with as little personal discomfort as possible. Former POWs believe that opportunism was the basic motivation behind the actions of the "Progressives" and the members of the study groups. It should be noted, however, that the apparent material benefits gained by these "opportunists," such as occasional portion, relief from work details, and a few extra cigarettes, were comparatively minor in nature. There are no indications that POWs who followed the communist line were able to enjoy any obviously higher standards of living than those experienced by the average internee.

It is notable that some of the earlier "Progressives" later became known to their fellow prisoners as anti-Communists and apparently fell out of favor with the Chinese. The source material available for this study does not provide any basis upon which to evaluate the sincerity of these individuals at either stage. Care should be exercised, however, to avoid placing too much emphasis on this as an indication that the Communists were unable to retain any of their "converts." Normal agent handling would dictate that a man, after having been recruited, would then be given the opportunity to regain the trust of his comrades, thereby increasing both

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the value to the people of the area and enemy activity. However remote the [illegible] of evidence [illegible] make this possibility, it should not be ignored.

It is not within the capabilities of this report to estimate the number of converts to communism or the number of agents, both immediate and potential, if any, which the enemy gained upon the U.S. POWs in Korea. In view of the intensity of the indoctrination program during the compulsory attendance period (spring 1951 through spring 1953), and the persuasive propaganda and indirect indoctrination which was present throughout, the possibility must be considered that, aside from any actual converts, there may exist certain residual effects in the minds of some ex-POWs, which may some day give rise to actions or affect situations in a manner favorable to the Communists.

The "Lenient Policy": Although the phrase "Lenient Policy" was never clearly defined by Chinese authorities, its nebulous fruits were continually dangled before the eyes of U.N. POWs. A typical approach is demonstrated in this [illegible] speech delivered by a CCP officer to newly captured U.N. personnel:

> "American and British [illegible]; you don't have to be afraid. The Chinese People's Volunteers forces guarantee you safety as long as you have laid down arms. Our [illegible] policy contains (1) No killing of POWs. (2) No corporal punishment. (3) No confiscation of personal property. Now [illegible]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] of his masters
[illegible] displayed by
[illegible] for those
[illegible] of the "Lenient Policy"
[illegible] according to the Communists.

Early Indoctrination Efforts: These included propaganda meetings, broadcasts from [illegible] during the summer of 1950, an intensive indoctrination effort at K[illegible] (December 1950 to March 1951), the return to U.N. control of 18 Marines who the Chinese hoped would spread propaganda and induce other U.N. troops to surrender, and, finally, the formation of permanent camp peace committees and of a supra-camp Central Peace Committee at Camp 12, where delegates labored from June to December 1951 in the promulgation of peace petitions, newspapers, and radio recordings.

Indoctrination Practices and Procedures: During the period from March through November 1951, compulsory indoctrination was inaugurated at Camps 1, 3, and 5. A series of personal history questionnaires were filled out by the POWs. Lectures, delivered to entire companies and read from prepared mimeographed texts or published works, generally lasted the entire morning. Squad conferences followed every lecture and reviewed the major topics. In the spring of 1952, compulsory indoctrination gave way to voluntary

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] by means of [illegible] record [illegible] reading [illegible] discussion [illegible].

Special Techniques:

(a) Study Company: In August 1951, Company 5 of Camp 5 was designated a "study company," and two experimental six-week sessions were held in an effort to indoctrinate specially selected personnel (both "progressive" and un-co-operative elements) in advanced communist theory. The project met with no noticeable success, and the dissolution of the study company in March 1952 coincided with the general cessation of forced indoctrination at Camp 5.

(b) Libraries: Libraries were provided in each camp, and POW librarians were appointed by the CCF.

(c) Newspapers: There were a great many camp and company newspapers managed and staffed by the POWs. The most widely read, Toward Truth and Peace, was written, edited and published by "Progressives" in Camp 5 who were sometimes rewarded for their contributions by chits redeemable at the Chinese PX. Other newspapers included New Life, the KAPOWE camp publication, and the Peace Fighters Chronicle, official organ of the Central Peace Committee.

(d) Correspondence and Broadcasts: Full use was made of the POWs' personal correspondence and of recordings for radio broadcasts by the forced inclusion of propaganda material.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

(c) Motion Pictures: An American anti-semitic movie, [illegible] Chinese movies were shown, but the language barrier detracted from possibly indoctrinal value.

(d) Self-Criticism: The practice of demanding "self-criticisms" was widely utilized. [illegible] statements were used both in indoctrination lectures [illegible] weaknesses of capitalist society [illegible] accused of crimes against the War Authorities.

Indoctrination Courses: The following three courses were conducted: "The South has been attacked [illegible] plotting of war for the profit of the ruling clique." "The American Negro is, economically and socially, a second class citizen [illegible] deliberately sacrificed in order to carry out a war." "The Chinese entered the war because [illegible] utilization of North Korea as a base [illegible] Liberation of Manchuria."

General: It is reasonable to assume that the communist indoctrination effort was designed to serve a [illegible] fold purpose: (1) It afforded an opportunity for the Communists to test the efficacy of their indoctrination efforts upon Anglo-American personnel as they had previously done on German, Spanish, Japanese and Chinese internees. (2) The program attempted to extend the depths of each prisoner's

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

personal doubts in the democratic process and, if possible, to place in him the seeds of [illegible] dissatisfaction.

Although it is apparent that the combination of long isolation in the form of [illegible] and a failure to sustain an exposure to communist [illegible] has succeeded in winning a few converts, the majority of the [illegible] believe that other factors are the basic motivation behind the actions of those who have been known as "progressives." (For a detailed [illegible] of the so-called "progressive" use "Portrait of a Progressive," p. 1.)

Chapter 6 The Brainwashing Myth "Confessions"

Anti-propaganda: The most successful and basic of the Communist propaganda lines developed by the Communists during the Korean Operation was the charge that U.N. forces were employing bacteriological Warfare (BW) bombs [illegible]. As "proof" of this charge, the Communists exhibited "confessions" which were signed by U.S. airmen. During the period [illegible] obtaining the BW confessions, 231 USAF [illegible] personnel) are known to have been available to the Communist [illegible] interrogators. The debriefing reports of these [illegible] examined in detail to determine the methods and techniques used by the Communists in obtaining the "confessions." It should be stressed that the information contained in this chapter is [illegible] debriefing reports and is based solely upon the stories told by the airmen after their return to U.N. control. Since the Chinese were the only witnesses to the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

interrogations, the verbatim reports must be taken at face value at this time. In addition, some inaccuracy in reporting has made it difficult in a few instances to determine the exact periods and types of pressure involved in obtaining the "confessions." Despite these qualifications, it is believed that sufficient comparative evidence is on hand to substantiate the following summation.

Exploitation of the "Confessions": (a) By mid-March, 1952, BW charges emerged as a dominant theme in Red propaganda when the accusations were brought before the U.N. Attempts by the U.S. delegation to institute an impartial investigation were vetoed. (b) BW allegations reached their climax during October 1952, with the transmittal to the U.N. of a Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Facts Concerning BW in Korea and China. The commission, of course, was staffed and sponsored by Communists. (c) On 12 March 1953, two more "confessions" were added to the four already published. On 1 December 1953, "confessions" of 19 captured pilots were published by the communist press. (d) All charges against those who had "confessed" were dropped on 1 September 1953, and the men were repatriated.

The Historical Record: The first BW interrogation occurred on 1 February 1952, and the subject was a USAF pilot shot down the month before. On the 25th of February, Chou En-lai officially launched the BW campaign in a NCNA broadcast. In March, the pilot referred

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] made a broadcast [illegible] and [illegible]. On 21 June 1952, signed a confession. On the 12th of March, two more USAF officers were forced to undergo intensive interrogation and finally "confessed." On the 4th of May, a NKA broadcast announced that the two had confessed to dropping "unexplosive germ bombs" on 13 January 1952. As of 30 August 1953, almost 50 officers and enlisted men had been interrogated and pressured, and 15 had submitted BW "confessions." From May to October 1952, each of the four more widely known "confessors" was extensively interviewed by British representatives of the communist press, and the interviews were recorded and photographed with still and motion picture cameras. Articles by these four "confessors" appeared in the POW camp newspaper, Towards Truth and Peace. On 3 August 1952, the four appeared before the International Commission and admitted their "sins." On 20 October 1952, one of the officers made a speech before 200 POWs at Camp 5. On the 18th of December three of them were taken to NOK Camp 7 where they addressed 300 to 400 South Korean POWs. The BW campaign continued until repatriation. When it was over, the Communists had interrogated 84 USAF personnel; seventy-six had been subjected to some kind of duress and a total of 38 had "confessed." In addition, two marines and an Army corporal had signed "confessions" after interrogation and pressure.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Physio-Psychological Interrogation: The following is a generalized but representative description of a BW interrogation. At the beginning of the first interrogation, the accused would be told that he would be denied the status of a POW unless he "co-operated." Evidence of his co-operation was to take the form of a BW confession. His second interrogation would consist of "soft talk" and an explanation of the "Lenient Policy." The next step included complete isolation and incessant interrogation. This pattern of intimidation, deprivation of basic needs, isolation and mental torture, with the occasional "soft approach," was almost always the same, but the techniques varied with the response of the individual. The pressures were essentially psychological, although there was usually no hesitation about resorting to physical violence, once it became apparent that the mental pressures were without promise of early success.

"Confessions" - Practices and Procedures: Once a man had agreed to write a "confession," he was given no rest until the deed was accomplished. There is evidence of efforts to eliminate conflicting testimony, at least in the case of men who had been attached to the same unit. This became more difficult as the number of confessions increased. Some confessions were discarded as "contradictory," and the remainder were arranged and distorted to fit a predetermined outline.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The "Confessors" and the "Non-Confessors": Of the 70 U.S. airmen who were subjected to pressure for the purpose of obtaining "confessions," 38, or almost one-half, admitted participation in Bacteriological Warfare. Of the "confessors," eight repudiated their confessions while still in the hands of the enemy. It is notable that these eight, generally speaking, suffered substantially no greater punishment after their repudiation than they had received before. Retraction, it must therefore be concluded, was possible. Of the 30 airmen who "confessed," wrote statements, and finally signed their "confessions," seven acquiesced to the demands of their interrogators after less than 10 days of interrogation. Two of these signed after only four days of duress. On the other extreme, one officer was questioned and pressured continuously for almost a year before he "confessed." In seeking refutation of the theory that "brainwashing" techniques are always successful, a study of the reports of the 40 "non-confessors" indicated that these men, as a group, underwent the same types of pressures, both physical and psychological, as the "confessors." At least three airmen, for over a year, successfully withstood the full gamut of communist pressure, including severe physical torture, isolation, doubt as to their continued existence, threats of immediate death. Generally speaking, it can be stated that for every "confessor" who gave up after a specified amount of duress, there were corresponding "non-confessors" who withstood the same amount of pressure.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] could, or would have, resist interrogation; it merely lists that duty successfully carried out for the period in which they were subjected to the varying pressures involved.

"Confessions" - Indoctrination and Rehabilitation: The primary cause for submission to enemy demands, as described by the "confessors," appears to have been the extreme mental and physical duress to which they were subjected. There is, however, one common complaint from the returnees: intelligence briefings prior to missions are described as completely inadequate. U.N.C. personnel, they state, should be better prepared for the ordeal of enemy interrogation. Many POW's in this group claim that, because of inadequate briefing, they assumed that they had been given the prerogative of deciding what to tell the enemy

Chapter 9 Escape and Evasion

Introduction: A fairly sizeable number of POW's (approximately 10 per cent in the case of Army personnel) escaped from their captors in Korea. The outstanding disclosure of this chapter is that all of these escapes were made shortly after capture and from enemy tactical troops or front line holding points, primarily during the confusion of fluid battle conditions. This disclosure is heightened by the realization that apparently not a single POW of the U.S.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRR NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] from the [illegible] Y [illegible] or even [illegible] the [illegible] publish[illegible] [illegible] ("[illegible] Mail [illegible] Wing," "Camp," etc.).

Reorganization Enroute: [illegible] the [illegible] distance from the YALU camps to [illegible] [illegible] was [illegible], over the high mountains, deep gorges and [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible]. It through central Korea. [illegible] the west [illegible] a crisis but presented problems of [illegible] [illegible] for [illegible] the rainy season, flooded [illegible] fields and numerous swollen [illegible].

Capture and the Temporary Camps:

(a) Capture and Movement to the Rear: Early search procedures were erratic and often superficial, and small articles in inner pockets were often overlooked. When numerous prisoners had been captured, they were collected into groups and moved to rear areas. Guarding was apparently conducted by line or support troops, with one guard for every three to four POWs. Movement over MSRs took place at night. Escape from the columns of prisoners was possible, but enemy front line troop concentrations and an extensive civilian populace made return to U.N. lines difficult.

(b) The Temporary Camps and the Winter of 1950-51: Temporary camps were established in the valleys of the NORTHERN TAEBAEK Range. Enclosures or fences were not used, and guarding was accomplished by roving sentries and outlying guard posts. Head counts and roll

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] [illegible] successful [illegible] was made difficult, however, by the physical condition of the [illegible], which had deteriorated through malnutrition, disease and [illegible] wounds, together with the severity of the winter, the terrain, and the attitude of the Korean civilians. None of the POW successfully escaped from any temporary camps and managed to return to U.N. control.

The Permanent Camps:

(a) General: The permanent camps were grouped along the YALU River in an area 70 miles long; each camp was located in a Korean village. Wire fencing, although it existed in some camps, was the exception and was not part of the standard security measures. Dogs and searchlights were not used. Chinese troops served as guards, with a ratio of one to every five or six POW in the larger camps and one to every two or three POW in the smaller camps. A few guard towers and sentry boxes were built, but guard posts and roving guards were used more commonly. Guards were neither particularly friendly nor belligerent and displayed no susceptibility to bribery.

(b) Head Counts, Roll Calls and Bed Checks: Head counts or roll calls were conducted during formations in the mornings and evenings, with the squad leader (POW) reporting to the assistant platoon leader (POW), who reported to the platoon leader (CCF). "Covering" for an absentee was [illegible] possible in these formations. Roll Call was not held on Sunday during the later stages of internment.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Led check-ups [illegible] to be ground personnel, photo-interpreters or political instructors.

(c) Labor Details Outside the [illegible] Camps: Wood details were the most frequent chore. A company of POWs would be marched out five or six miles to wooded areas under a guard detail of one guard for every 10 to 15 prisoners. Additional guards preceded the party and were stationed (unseen) on high ground. POWs were counted when they left the camp and when they returned. Escape from the guards was difficult, due to the sentries on the high ground and the problem of smuggling out food and material, but was accomplished in some instances.

(e) Communication: Communication was forbidden between companies in each camp but was surreptitiously carried out through notes thrown to the POWs or by the use of latrines as "mail boxes." Information was passed between camps by traveling POW athletic teams or recreational groups, and the main hospital at PYOKTONG was also used for this purpose. Contact with civilians was forbidden but carried on (mainly for trading purposes) either during work details or when civilian laborers entered the camps. Clandestine radio broadcasts were received in at least one instance via the radio receiving portion of an enemy load-speaker system.

(e) Contact with Korean Civilians: In many instances, Korean civilians offered to assist POWs in escaping, but none of these efforts culminated in success. Although a kind face was shown

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible]
[illegible] however, con-
[illegible] was reported,
[illegible]

[illegible] a few groups and individuals [illegible] planning escape efforts, there was no firmly established well-organized escape [illegible]. The informers, who [illegible] in all camps largely prevented [illegible] escape.

(c) Preparation for Escape: [illegible] necessity for escape, was usually collected with [illegible] personnel. Stored or improvised escape equipment was stolen from the Chinese or made by the prisoners and usually included maps, compasses, and knives.

The Escapes That Failed: [illegible] escape attempts is [illegible] by all returnees, less than 30 actual attempts can be documented. The majority of these were attempted during the months from May to September, and each involved two or three men. Some escaped from wood details, but the greater portion crept out of camp at night. On the average, they avoided recapture for less than two and a half days. Most of the escapees planned to reach the west coast and contact U.N. air or sea craft. In 15 per cent of the known attempts, the POW's were captured as they left camp, and three groups were told that informers had betrayed them. Travel, after escape, was made

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] properly the subject of war crimes [illegible] and [illegible], including the application of duress, in securing [illegible] confessions or documentation of an intelligence nature, also excluded. The forced claims given POWs by the CCF were usually political in nature or seemed to have been arranged for purposes other than the infliction of punishment for actual offenses.

Under Korean Civilians: There were many cases, both documented and rumored, of action by Korean civilians who held trials and meted out punishment to Americans falling into their hands; usually, the situations involved American fliers who had landed safely some distance from Communist military personnel. The trials, which were held under purely local auspices, reflected local views of the POWs as war criminals, since in their apparent intent to avenge the destruction of their villages, the townspeople concentrated their interest on U.N. flyers. The trials, if any, were conducted rather informally, usually without benefit of any translation to English. In almost every known instance, after their existence became known, captured personnel were soon surrendered to the communist military authorities.

Under the NKA: Very little information is available concerning the infliction of punishment on POWs by the NKA (war crimes aspects excluded). Usually any measures that were taken came as a result

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

of summary action by [illegible] for the purpose of enforcing discipline. A trial was reportedly held at Camp 12 in which POWs were required by the camp commander to try one of their number for an alleged attempted rape.

Under the CCF:

(a) General: There is considerable information available describing trials and punishments undergone by POWs while they were under CCF control. These are grouped into three categories, i.e., summary infliction of punishment, trials and "kangaroo courts."

(b) Summary Infliction of Punishment: The CCF more often than not inflicted punishments in disciplinary cases in a summary manner, with little or no opportunity given the POWs to defend or explain their actions. In almost all of these cases, self-criticisms were required of the POWs; sometimes the self-criticisms were obtained and permitted to accumulate until enough were on hand to justify (to the CCF mind) substantial punishments; sometimes the POWs were required to read their self-criticisms to the assembled prisoners. The punishments, thus summarily rendered, involved both mild and harsh measures.

(c) Trials: Trials were usually commenced by the service upon selected POWs of formal charges, which were usually grossly exaggerated and sometimes entirely false. The selected POWs were then required to confess the truth of the charges in detail,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] would [illegible] would be drawn [illegible] been extracted. There [illegible] were [illegible] to resist the [illegible] pressure to confess. In many cases, after the confessions had been obtained, the formality of trial was omitted, and the case proceeded immediately to the rendition of sentences. When the trials were held, however, much formality was displayed; the courtrooms were carefully prepared and heavily guarded; the courts consisted of from three to five officers (usually only CCP but sometimes both CCP and NKA). Trials involving multiple defendants were common (one documented case had [illegible] three defendants); and the charges and confessions apparently did not have to be identical. The prisoners had their own guards in addition to the courtroom guards. The courtroom procedure usually adhered to the following pattern: an opening speech by the prosecution (given in Chinese, and translated to English and sometimes Korean); a reading of the charges by the prosecution; a reading of the confessions by the prosecution; an arrival at a verdict of guilty by the court; and a pronouncing of sentence. Defense counsels were always appointed and present but took absolutely no part in the proceedings; there was never any objection or real plea [illegible] on behalf of the prisoners. The verdict was always "guilty."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRC NARS, Date 4/11/90

(d) Kangaroo Courts: [illegible] understood to be hearings which are conducted by persons on behalf of or of their own number. In the POW camps maintained by the CCF, there were two types of kangaroo courts: i.e., those conducted with the knowledge and under the monitorship of the CCF, and those conducted by the POWs on their own initiative. The former were by "Progressives," assembled in private, for the trial of "reactionaries"; the latter were by "reactionaries" assembled clandestinely for the trial of "Progressives." Both types rendered judgements and inflicted punishments, which varied from warnings to beatings of the invariably convicted defendants. The trials were primarily political in nature and reflected the degree of each defendant's collaboration with or resistance to the Communists.

Chapter II. Camp Life and Routine

Introduction: In the first year of the Korean Operation, in all camps except "Peaceful Valley," food, shelter, medical facilities, and the other necessities of life were available in extremely inadequate quantities. Between July 1950 and May 1951, 42 per cent of those captured died; in the spring of 1951, the rate dropped to about 3 per cent. During the next two years, conditions gradually continued to improve. In general, every aspect of daily life was permeated with propaganda, a fact [illegible] kept in combination

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] as well as general living conditions, effected a situation in which both mental and physical independence was reduced to a minimum.

Camp Life in the Non-Permanent Camps:

(a) "Death Valley" and the "Valley" There was no regular pattern for daily life in either of these camps; and, aside from sporadic wood details and burial details, the energies of the POWs were devoted primarily to the task of staying alive. Housing was primitive and crowded; rations, inadequate; and the attitude of the cantons was apparently one of almost complete indifference. There were no thorough-going interrogation or indoctrination programs in evidence.

(b) "Wooded Valley" The emphasis was on indoctrination; old study, now work, was the main occupation. Necessary work was delegated in reasonable amounts and for very short periods. Food for the POWs was apparently on a par with that served the CCF.

(c) "Bean Camp" and "Mining Camp" At "Mining Camp," 800 POWs were crowded into one of the two buildings which comprised the camp. Officers were separated from EM; no interrogations were held; by summer, indoctrination, including lectures and study periods, had become part of the regular routine. "Bean Camp" contained some 50 buildings and, at one time, housed approximately 1,000 POWs. Segregation between EM, officers, and Turkish prisoners was enforced.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] of the [illegible] in general, [illegible] building of the [illegible] the [illegible] and [illegible] the prisoners were led to believe otherwise, [illegible] living conditions there were slightly inferior to those [illegible] in the permanent camps. The usual wood, water, [illegible] to [illegible], and the general [illegible] appear to be of an special [illegible] preferential nature.

(e) [illegible] Interrogation - [illegible] were assigned to those [illegible] were quartered in one building, [illegible] to [illegible] each room. Living conditions were [illegible] good, although individual treatment depended [illegible] upon the [illegible] of interrogation. Food was adequate [illegible] for washing. [illegible] in the morning.

(f) [illegible] conditions were slightly superior to those at [illegible] were still sub-standard. While [illegible] approached adequacy, the general [illegible] sanitation remained a [illegible] sore. Segregation [illegible] PW's were

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] to be as to the [illegible]

[illegible] Because of the similarity of subject matter in the several camps, camp life is treated topically in this section.

(a) Living Conditions The POWs were usually quartered in Korean houses or in old Japanese barracks. The heating was accomplished by building a fire under the floor. In some instances, prisoners constructed home made stoves from mud and bricks. In the early stages, most of the camps had no electricity; but, later, power lines were generally installed. There was usually never more than one weak light bulb in each room.

(b) Personal Hygiene Improvements such as the construction of latrine facilities were accomplished by the POWs. Unless Korean farmers appropriated the contents for use as fertilizer, POWs cleaned and emptied their own latrines. The Chinese periodically inspected the POW quarters, checking personal cleanliness in the process. In some camps inspections were held at regular intervals, sometimes weekly, but sanitary conditions always remained below average American standards. For washing facilities the POWs used the nearest stream or spring. Toilet articles were scarce until the spring of 1953, although occasional issues of soap, towels, toothbrushes, and tooth paste had been furnished prior to that time. Razors were

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

activity, included wood gathering, prison breakdown, construction work, burial parties, water carrying, KP, and (rarely) harvesting of local crops and road repair. Work details were sometime assigned as punishment, in which case the work was the same, but the hours were longer and the work continuous. Conversely, certain "Progressives" were reported to have been allowed greater freedom from labor than the average PW.

(d) Recreation. Gradually the camps acquired equipment for most sports common to America. Baseball, basketball, football, volleyball, softball and soccer were played in the field, while cards, chess, checkers, ping-pong and pool were enjoyed in the clubrooms. Swimming in the YALU River was often allowed. From 15-26 November 1952, the Inter-Camp Olympics were held at PYOKTONG, and each of the main camps, plus ROK Camp 7, dispatched a contingent of athletes. There were also moving pictures, stage shows, bands, dances, bingo and broadcasts of music. The POWs were encouraged to present amateur theatricals, but interest in these waned when camp authorities and "Progessives" began to influence the character of the shows.

(e) Sex, Perversion, Narcotics and Liquor. There was almost no contact with local women. There were some instances of homosexuality and various other forms of perversion. In most camps, after

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the discovery [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible]. The Chinese lecturers against prostitution, [illegible] attempt to control the use of marijuana [illegible] camp, a [illegible] with a product termed "Re-Heliem" by one of the [illegible], operated for a short time.

POW Reaction to Internment: The period up to the summer of 1954 was characterized by great apathy. Together, those who had survived the hostile began to recover mentally and physically. As the indoctrination program became intense, some tried to evade the issue by withdrawing into sports, non-political group, and religious pre-occupation; but in order to insure non-interference, one had to manifest an attitude of tolerance to the Communist programs. Others, for the sake of efficiency and POW welfare, co-operated with the CCF in the mechanics of running the camps. Still others planned and participated in escape attempts and joined subversive anti-communist groups. However, the Communists, using an assortment of control techniques, were fairly successful in preventing subversive planning; and no activities dangerous to Chinese control ever developed a significant degree.

Chapter 12 Food

Introduction: As in the cases of medical care and the housing of POWs, there are certain questions raised in the discussion of food

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

which earned [illegible] in Korea as well. The role that food played in the overall plan of the Communists is unknown. Some returnees believe that one of the CPV intentionally withheld food from the prisoners to weaken them and make them pliable for interrogation or indoctrination, or weakened them incapable of resistance and escape. Others believe that, at least during the period from the spring of 1951 until repatriation, the food ration was generally comparable to that issued to the North Korean soldiers and was superior to the food available to the North Korean civilians. Whether through intent or through logistical incapability, food during the winter of 1950-1951 was completely inadequate, and malnutrition, in combination with disease and cold, reduced the economic capability of the POWs and placed them at a serious disadvantage when resisting the enemy indoctrination and interrogators, in addition to claiming many lives.

Movement to North Korea: Accustomed to Chinese and Korean food, American POWs found it unpalatable and repugnant. Most describe the provisions received during this period as thoroughly inadequate in quantity and quality. The diet consisted mainly of small amounts of millet, whole corn, rice, and hot water, and was the same for both the prisoners and the guards. Some of the POWs were successful in stealing food from the North Korean farmers. The Chinese confiscated these foods if the farmers discovered them, but apparently did not [illegible] on these occasions,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

groups of POWs fit [illegible] population by the civilian population. The political advisor of each camp had a choice to requisition the food and pay for it. These meals, consisting generally of cracked corn, millet and about three-fourths of a common cup of pork broth, were considered quite edible. At Death Valley the food supply dipped below even the minimum standard experienced on that much to that location. The cooking was done at first by the forces, but soon the POWs were permitted to cook for themselves. The diet consisted of from 400 to 500 grams of grain a day, consisted of corn, millet, sorghum, soybeans, and bean paste, served twice daily, as a rule.

Organization of Cooking Staffs and Personnel: During the initial stages of internment, the KPA directed the cooking, but soon the tasks of preparation and serving were transferred to the POWs. The mess details were either selected on a volunteer basis or appointed by the captors, and they usually worked under the supervision of an appointed mess sergeant. In Company A of Camp 5 it is reported to have been the deliberate policy of the Communists to appoint unskilled people to kitchen work, which undoubtedly contributed to the prevalence of dietary diseases. Beginning in July 1952, however, more experienced cooks were permitted to work in the kitchens of Camp 5. The appointed mess sergeants supervised the preparation of food, drew rations from the Chinese QM officer, and assured equitable distribution to the squads. Men either volunteered for KP duty or were selected from

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] be proud to have had a position [illegible]. They received no recommendation or increase in diet for performing these tasks.

Preparation of Food: The majority of the [illegible] that much of the misery was caused by improper preparation. Rice was not always properly boiled, nor were the vegetables [illegible] before serving, [illegible], or boiled to death, and, on the other hand, the rice was at times boiled too much, thus depriving the POW of much-needed vitamins. In Camp 5, Company 1, the food was usually cooked in broth form, the fresh vegetables having been chopped up and immersed in the broth. Implements used for baking were often [illegible] two iron pans and oil drums. Ovens were also constructed from [illegible] oil drums and a brick fireplace. Brushes for oiling the pans were made from the bristles of slaughtered pigs.

Distribution, Ration Breakdown and General Guard Procedure: The distribution of rations was accomplished at top level in most of the camps by representatives of each squad who reported to the kitchen to collect the victuals. The rations were drawn from bonds which had been issued individually. After November 1951, sugar was also issued individually, approximately five seconfuls twice a month. POW mess sergeants or officers worked with Chinese PW specialists in administering ration breakdown at company level. Vegetables, seasoning and canned meats were drawn on the morning of the day in which they were to be used. Most of the food was transported to the camps on barges

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible]

Conditions [illegible] camps, [illegible] hands, most of the [illegible] more than [illegible] ladles, meat cleavers, [illegible] vehicles.

Sanitation: [illegible] Communist interference, [illegible] of the POWs [illegible] the early days. [illegible] were never prosecuted [illegible].

Procuring Food from Outside Sources: The POWs were handicapped by a scarcity of [illegible] in their [illegible] trading with the civilians. [illegible] and sweaters were acceptable and items of clothing were sometimes [illegible]. A black market in food existed among the POWs themselves to some extent. After the winter of 1950-1951, the [illegible] of [illegible] by the POWs was permitted and encouraged [illegible].

Food On Special Holiday Occasions: On many holidays, both U.N. and communist, special meals were provided; on [illegible], special rations were distributed. Even [illegible] on certain occasions. There

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Clothing: Clothing was frequently in short supply. The shortage of clothing in the camps, although generally not as pronounced as the shortage of food, was a major source of discomfort for the POWs. By the spring of 1951, when the first general issues were distributed, POW clothing had deteriorated greatly. Eventually both winter and summer clothing was issued, with summer uniforms sometimes used as underwear in cold weather. Any U.S. Army sweaters, field jackets, or overcoats which the POWs had managed to retain were highly prized since they were considerably warmer than their Oriental apparel. The uniforms issued by the Chinese Communists were apparently superior to those provided by the North Koreans. The latter garments were similar in style to those worn by the CCF, but inferior to them in quality and warmth. POWs exchanged their clothing for CCF uniforms, including shoes, whenever possible. Diaries found in one camp in the middle of 1951 lacked bitter complaints, but the Chinese issued no new clothing until the end of 1952, and the colors, discrepancies (from blankets, overcoats, rags, etc.) became necessary. The clothing issued to POWs by the CCF was reported by returnees as superior to that of North Korean civilians, somewhat inferior to that of the NKA, and equal to or only slightly inferior to that worn by the CCF.

Distributions of Uniforms and Accessories: The first complete set of North Korean uniforms was issued in June 1951 and included a khaki shirt, underwear, trousers and, tennis shoes. Shoe sizes were

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible] issued in the winter of 1953. The winter uniforms were cotton padded. By 1953, in contrast to the early stages of the war when clothing issue was rather haphazard, the POWs were generally receiving clothing two or three times a year, and by the time of repatriation the POWs in most camps were uniformly clothed.

Chapter IV. Medical Treatment.

Introduction: Out of every ten U.S. Army POWs captured by the Communists in Korea, four died while in the hands of their captors. While this figure cannot be correlated with absolute certainty to medical treatment, returnees are almost unanimous in attributing the high death rate to uncheckd disease and untended wounds, in

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

addition to or aggravated by malnutrition and cold. It should be noted that during two periods - the first prior to November 1950 and the second extending from the summer of 1951 until repatriation - medical care was fairly adequate and generally comparable to that given by the enemy to their own sick and wounded. During the intervening months (October 1950 - August 1951), however, when the majority of the POWs were captured, medical care was almost non-existent, and the mortality rate was at its highest.

Treatment After Capture and During Evacuation:

(a) July 1950 - October 1950: Medical care rendered U.S. personnel captured early in the war by the North Koreans, while limited in all respects, can be considered basically adequate. POWs were generally treated with the same facilities and on a comparable basis with enemy wounded.

(b) October 1950 - August 1951: The near annihilation of the North Korean Army and the intervention of the Chinese Communists marked the beginning of a period during which little or no medical care was initially provided for the large POW groups assembled in November and December 1950. In addition, prisoners who had been previously captured suffered from a marked deterioration in treatment. Except for one group of POWs held at "Peaceful Valley," where the Chinese "Lenient Policy" of indoctrination was being conducted, medical care at the temporary camps ("Death Valley," "Mining Camp,"

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the "Valley," etc) was grossly inadequate by any standard. POW doctors and aid men administered to the sick and wounded but lacked facilities, equipment, medication and even bandages. Although a few enemy medical personnel were in evidence, their help was negligible.

Medical Facilities at Permanent POW Camps:

(a) General: Treatment initially available at the first of the permanent camps (Camp 5) was insufficient to cope with the high incidence of disease and illness among POWs who had been interned at "Death Valley" and the "Valley." The death rate reached its peak at Camp 5 in February - March 1951. By August of that year, however, the supply of medicines and drugs had increased and the death rate dropped rapidly. Medical care within Camp 5, and in the other camps which were subsequently established, improved for the summer of 1951 until repatriation.

(b) Medication and Techniques: The administration of medicines and drugs by enemy medical personnel generally followed accepted western medical practice, the greatest exception being in the insufficient amount of medicine available for even those cases for which it was prescribed. Surgical techniques, however, were often primitive, and prior to August 1951, the performance of surgery without anesthesia was common. Innoculations and immunizations of the POWs were often performed with out-dated vaccines and serums under procedures which neglected basic sanitary measures.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/95

(c) Medical Supply: [illegible] maintained an overall control over the dispensation of medicine. [illegible] medical treatment for those [illegible] or indefinitely [illegible]. [illegible] of any [illegible] lack of medical care [illegible] of [illegible].

(d) Enemy Medical Personnel: Although enemy medical personnel exhibited varying degrees of skill, repatriated U.S. medical officers report that very few were professionally competent according to Western standards.

(e) Special [illegible]: [illegible] (chicking [illegible]) [illegible] enemy medical personnel [illegible] the POW camps. [illegible] and [illegible] by the Chinese [illegible] the Western [illegible] liver transplants." [illegible] the beneficial effects of this [illegible] almost any disease. POW doctors state, however, that this treatment has gained little if any acceptance among Western medical personnel.

(f) Dental Treatment: Very little attention was given by the enemy to the dental requirements of the [illegible] during internment. The sporadic nature of the dental treatment and the crude techniques and equipment of the enemy prompted most POWs to extract their own teeth.

(g) Sick Call and Hospitalization: Dispensary facilities for sick call were available within each of the POW camps. Prisoners

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible]

Policies Concerning [illegible]:

(a) Frequency: In the early stages of the war the [illegible] manifested no [illegible] concern [illegible] the problem of POW correspondence. It was not until the beginning of [illegible], when the Chinese began [illegible] of the POW camps, that the problem of correspondence was given any [illegible] attention. The [illegible] captured [illegible] the first [illegible] but they were not allowed to write [illegible] until they had reached one of the permanent camps. The privilege [illegible] during the first part of 1951 [illegible] suspended shortly thereafter. By July or August of that year it had been generally [illegible] and the privilege was completely withdrawn. The opportunity to write was [illegible] or twice a month, but, by early 1952, the Communists had become more "lenient" and the average became generally [illegible] per month. There were some exceptions to the limitation on frequency. On special holidays, when the treatment and [illegible] improved somewhat, POWs were urged to write an unlimited number of letters about the "good" conditions.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] to satisfy the [illegible] for anyone who hoped to have [illegible] at least a modicum of praise.

Frequency: The frequency [illegible] be accurately determined since the [illegible] was not offered in any consistent pattern. [illegible] usually presented at Christmas-time and whenever [illegible] purposes of the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Section I - Scope and Purpose

This study is presented as a historical resume of the experiences undergone by U.S. military personnel interned by the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Forces during the Korean Operation. For three years, beginning in July 1950, these two Communist-bloc nations in the Far East had absolute control over several thousand U.S. soldiers, airmen, seamen and marines. During these months, information as to the existence and activities of the prisoners of war was almost entirely dependent upon enemy propaganda media. It was only after the release of the POWs to U.N. control in the spring and summer of 1953 that the full story of their internment in the prison camps of North Korea became available. Based on the data thus obtained, this study presents a preliminary review of the techniques and methods utilized by the Communists to contain and exploit U.S. POWs.

Section II - Intelligence Value

It is realized that, as of this date, the information contained in this report will have limited intelligence value with respect to Korea itself. On the other hand, the methods and procedures displayed by the NKA and the CCF during this period should not be

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

examined with mere academic interest for a fait accompli, but as they apply to and affect future military planning. Research personnel with areas of interest such as interrogation, indoctrination, escape and evasion, prisoner of war behavior, etc., will find pertinent topical data in this study. In addition, because of the racial and ideological characteristics of the enemy in Korea, there is a more localized and definitive value for the material contained herein. In this latter concept, military sections and individuals having authority in the appropriate fields will find basic usefulness in this study if the following assumptions are accepted: (1) that the actions and procedures used in handling U.N. POWs in Korea may be repeated in any future conflict with Asiatic forces supported by or operating under Red Chinese or Soviet influence, and (2) that U.S. military personnel, captured by such Asiatic forces, if possessing only the background and training of the forces employed in the Korean Operation, will react similarly.

Section III - Authority

On 17 September 1953, Army Security Center, a joint service agency at Fort George G. Meade, Md., was assigned a project which included debriefing selected repatriated prisoners of war at Department of Defense level. Approval having been obtained from the Departments of Air Force and Navy, authority to implement the program was issued by OACofS, G2, Department of the Army. One basic

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

instruction to ASC in the debriefing of returned POWs was "....to exploit to the maximum the positive intelligence obtained by these personnel while under enemy jurisidiction."

Section IV - Research Material Utilized

Army Security Center, having conducted pertinent debriefings and with access to the additional material listed below, prepared this study, U.S. POWs in the Korean Operation; copies have been submitted to the Departments of Army, Air Force, Navy and to the Central Intelligence Agency. Research materials utilized in the preparation of this report fall into the following five categories: (1) Copies of the debriefings conducted in FEC and by shipboard teams and CONUS investigators were available to ASC. Over 7,000 documents of this type were scanned, and pertinent information was extracted and collated. These reports had a twofold value: first, they established the broad, general picture of POW experience and, second, they provided an indication as to which returnees were either generally knowledgeable or had information on particular fields of interest. (2) Selected on the basis of the early interrogations, 34 returnees were placed on TDY with Army Security Center for five-day periods. Representative of all the POW camps containing U.S. personnel in North Korea, these former prisoners, ranging in rank from private first class to lieutenant colonel, were given an intensive debriefing at ASC. These reports were published under the title "Army Security

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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Center Interrogation Reports" and will appear as citations under the abbreviation ASCIR. Much of the detailed information contained in this study is based on data thus obtained. In addition, 36 returnees who were available locally for brief interviews prior to separation from the Army furnished a limited amount of information. (3) During the preparation of this report, topical studies prepared by other agencies and technical branches have been reviewed and used within the limits of their pertinence and value. (4) Counter-intelligence reports prepared in the CONUS, although investigative in nature and conducted to develop CI information, have been found to contain considerable data within the scope of this study. (5) Since the exigencies of a military operation often result in activities which are at variance with normal or standard procedure, an attempt has been made in this study to compare NKA and CCF doctrine against the actual techniques they displayed in Korea. For this purpose, enemy documents captured during the Korean Operation and a few pertinent interrogation reports of enemy personnel were consulted.

Section V - Limitations of Present Study

Although the general picture of POW treatment and existence reflected in this study is believed to be accurate, it is not advanced as a final or definitive report. Many minor details are principally supported by the limited number of interviews conducted

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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et ASC, and by certain detailed CCNUS interrogations developed by the services. This general qualification should be kept in mind in reviewing the material contained herein. In addition, three fields of interest, which might be expected to appear in a study of this type, have been excluded. These are: (1) Counter-intelligence: Counter-intelligence information has not been sought or developed at ASC either during the course of its interviews or in the preparation of this report. In line with the basic directive, ASC informed personnel reporting for interview that they would not be questioned in regard to ".....information with which to prosecute or judge any of your fellow POWs." (App. F) (2) War Crimes: War crimes data of a specific nature has not been sought as such for inclusion in this report. (3) Economic, Industrial and Technological: Economic, industrial, and technological intelligence pertinent to enemy or potential enemy areas is not contained herein. Prior to the repatriation of prisoners from Korea, detailed questionnaires were prepared by U.S. intelligence sections along these lines. Debriefing of ex-POWs, however, soon disclosed that they had only negligible intelligence information of this type. Unlike the German and Japanese POWs held by the Soviet Union in World War II, U.S. personnel were not required to work in enemy mines, industries or military installations. The U.S. POWs were kept in enclosures far removed from any major industrial installations, and, therefore, their opportunities for observation

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

were extremely limited. (This should not be interpreted, however, as an indication of a humane attitude on the part of the enemy or of any desire to adhere to international agreements. It is more likely the result of the general lack of industrial activity in North Korea and the availability of an adequate native Korean manpower pool. Note should also be made that this does not necessarily forecast future policy at variance with Soviet procedure; the POWs of the Korean Operation were not, it is true, used for slave labor, but their exploitation in the fields of propaganda, indoctrination and intensive interrogation closely followed the World War II Soviet pattern.)

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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CHAPTER 2

THE POW IN COMMUNIST HANDS PRIOR TO 1950

Section I - Introduction

The treatment accorded U.S. POWs in the hands of the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Forces, while it may be studied solely from the factual evidence of the period 1950-1953, should be reviewed in the light of two prior evolutionary movements. The first of these is the historical role of the military captive in warfare, and the second involves the birth and propagation of communist ideology. It is realized that to place either of these movements in complete and proper perspective would require volumes of written material. Nevertheless, some of the more salient aspects of POW treatment and the place which prisoners of war have played in the past in the communist plan will be noted in this chapter.

Section II - The POW in History

1. Ancient Warfare

Early recorded history of warfare indicates that the capitulation of the state meant the loss of the individual's possessions, liberty and honor. Captives were killed, tortured and often disfigured. With the introduction of slavery during the Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilization, a new value was acquired by the captives, since their conquerors began utilizing them as chattels. With the progression of Greek civilization, principles of human dignity were applied, but

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

only to members of the Greek race. Economic self-interest caused an improvement in the lot of the captives of Rome, and Roman law forbade the killing of slaves by their masters without good reason.

2. The Middle Ages

The impact of Christianity on European thought and philosophy resulted in a corollary improvement in the treatment of prisoners of war. Their utilization as slaves was replaced by a system of ransoming which eventually became so common that the scale of prices for various classes of prisoners became fixed by custom. However, the 17th and 18th centuries saw the practice of exchange and parole gradually replacing the ransom system.

3. Modern Era

The third phase of POW treatment may be said to have commenced with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This agreement, which terminated the 30 Years' War, provided for the release of prisoners without enslavement or ransom. In the decades which followed, the humanitarian ideals of MONTESQUIEU and ROUSSEAU added impetus to the movement towards improving the treatment of prisoners of war. The American Civil War gave birth to a code of instructions advocating humane behavior toward POWs which, named after its author, became known as the Lieber Code. The principles of this code were embraced by the first Hague Convention in 1899

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

and were later expanded in the Hague Convention of 1907.

The historic march of humanitarianism on behalf of prisoners of war culminated in the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949. These conventions established a humane and liberal code for the treatment of POWs. Forty-one nations signed the early covenant, and fifty-eight, some with reservations, as will be noted later, signed the Convention of 1949.

Section III - The Soviet Union and World War II POWs

During and after World War II, the Soviets utilized POWs for military, economic and political value. Militarily, the POWs were useful as sources of information about enemies of the U.S.S.R. Economically, prisoner manpower and technical knowledge proved of great importance to Soviet industry. Politically, POWs were valuable as potential converts to communism, and, as such, a means of later extending Soviet political control over the nations they represented. Additionally, POWs proved valuable during World War II as vehicles of propaganda in the Soviet psychological warfare program.

Prisoner life and treatment in the Soviet Union during and after World War II may be generally divided into four periods, as follows: (1) June 1941 - December 1942. Few prisoners were taken alive, and of those who succeeded in reaching a permanent POW camp, all but a few died during the six to seven years of internment.

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By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

(2) December 1942 - May 1945. After the German retreat from Stalingrad numerous POWs fell into Soviet hands. Because of a great need for manpower in the U.S.S.R. at the time, many prisoners were literally worked to death. The POW interrogation system was in effect, and indoctrination was carried out through lectures, political meetings, and compulsory attendance at discussion groups. Anti-fascist movements were organized among the POWs. (3) May 1945 - Autumn 1947. During this period thousands of Japanese POWs were massacred upon capture and thousands of others, Japanese and German, subsequently died from overwork, starvation and disease. Propaganda against the U.S. and Great Britain was initiated at this time. (4) Fall 1947 - early 1952. Although repatriation began in this period, thousands of selected POWs were convicted as war criminals, often on the flimsiest pretext, and therefore remained in Soviet hands. It is to be noted that the prisoners with technical skills were generally the last to be repatriated.

Although some prisoners were interned in special camps where living conditions were often fairly decent, almost 95 per cent of all the POW camps in the Soviet Union were labor camps, and living conditions here were poor. Housing was inadequate and there were almost no heating facilities. The camps swarmed with vermin and the food rations were insufficient, poorly balanced and monotonous. Medical facilities were very poor, and because the POWs were occupied with labor quotas, interrogation, and indoctrination, there

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

was little time left for recreation or sports. The general nature of POW treatment in the U.S.S.R. was directly related to the indoctrination and interrogation programs. Harsh treatment, poor food and hard work were used as an active technique to make the POWs more susceptible to the propaganda and more amenable to furnishing the Soviets with the information they desired.

A brief mention of the Soviet interrogation system is necessary to complete the picture of POW life in the Soviet Union. There were four main agencies which engaged in the interrogation of captured personnel. They included military intelligence, counter-intelligence, political sections and the NKVD. Before prisoners were evacuated to POW camps in the U.S.S.R., the NKVD, which had complete control over the POWs, determined who among them were scientists, technicians and other specialists. These individuals were sent to special camps to be interrogated by experts in these fields. Because the Soviet interrogators were generally very capable and because most prisoners were afraid of the NKVD, the Soviets seldom were obliged to use duress to gain the desired information. However, in cases where POWs refused to co-operate with the Soviet interrogators, extreme mental and physical duress was applied.

Section IV - The Chinese Communist Attitude Toward POWs

Communist propaganda and indoctrination probably reached its peak of success during the recent Chinese Civil War. The Chinese

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Communists considered their enemies as "innocent victims of bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism" and generally treated their captives well. This policy proved so successful that entire Chinese Nationalist Armies turned against their former comrades.

Section V - The Soviet Union and International Agreements (re POWs)

In 1921, when the International Red Cross circulated, for comment and criticism, a code for the treatment of POWs, the Russian Red Cross produced a code of its own as a counter project. The Soviet code was not in basic conflict with either the Hague Rules of 1907 or the Geneva Convention of 1929. Nevertheless, Russia was not among the signatory nations to the 1929 agreement and, as was the case with Japan, entered World War II without having declared its intention to follow these principles and procedures. In February 1940, however, the Deputy People's Commander for Defense issued instructions on the capture, collection and evacuation phases of POW handling. The forty-nine articles in these instructions were not at variance with the generally accepted rules of warfare but, as will be noted in Section VI, were freely ignored and violated by Soviet troops. In January 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued Order No. 001, which prescribed humane treatment for prisoners of war and listed numerous defects which had been observed in the conduct of Soviet troops with regard to prisoners. Conditions improved notably after 1942, but the instructions were still ignored

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NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

in numerous instances.

The Soviet Union, although it had taken no part in the framing of the Geneva (POW) Conventions of 1929, actively participated in the Convention of 1949. With fifty-seven other nations (plus the Holy See and the principalities of Monaco and Liechtenstein), the Soviets signed this document concerning the proper care and treatment of prisoners of war. The significance of this event, however lies not in the fact that the signature was affixed but rather that several reservations were noted by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites

Section VI - Soviet Reservations to Geneva Conventions

The Soviet Union, along with the other eight signatories among the Communist-bloc countries, took exception, as a part of their signing, to Article 85 of the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. It is probable that this reservation is indicative of the actual attitude of the Soviet Union in regard to POWs and will be the keystone of their policy in any future conflict. In view of the importance of this fact, Article 85 and the Soviet reservation, which was parroted in its essence by the Communist satellites, are quoted as follows:

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NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Article 85

"Prisoners of War prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention." (Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949)

The reservation for this article, as signed by General SLAVIN, head of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reads as follows:

"Article 85: 'The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not consider itself bound by the obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend the application of the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of such crimes must be subjected to the conditions obtaining in the country in question for those who undergo their punishment.'"

As may readily be seen, the unscrupulous application of this reservation would, behind a facade of legality, completely negate the purpose of the Geneva Convention. If the retention of a prisoner should be desired for political, intelligence or economic reasons, the term "war criminal" need only be expanded and the prisoner would be deprived of his rights under the Convention.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Communist activity along these lines is not a remote or dubious possibility.

Repatriated German prisoners of World War II have provided details of their personal experiences which may be used as indications of the fantastic extremes to which the Soviet Union has gone in this direction in the past. Though many were later "pardoned," originally sentences ranging from 5 to 25 years were meted out to German POWs who had committed "war crimes" such as follow: The Wehrmacht cobbler who was convicted for having shod the shoes of German soldiers (they could not have marched so far and violated the Soviet Union as badly as they did without repaired shoes); the Luftwaffe doctor who used his skill to nurse German bomber pilots back to health (the pilots thereafter bombed defenseless Soviet cities); the Wehrmacht musician who played music to German troops (the music inspired the martial spirit which caused the "fascist beasts" to commit greater atrocities as they marched through the Soviet Union); and the German soldier who blew up a bridge during a retreat (the bridge was the property of the Soviet State). These examples may be viewed almost with incredulity because of the absurd lengths to which the Soviets have gone to maintain a fiction of legality, but the complete cynicism of the procedure they represent must be assessed with deadly seriousness.[1]

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Based on Soviet examples during World War II and the actions of the Chinese and North Koreans in the Korean Operation, it may be assumed that Communist nations will render lip service to the principles of international agreements in regard to prisoners of war but will continue to base their actions in this regard on a policy of maximum exploitation as the time and the situation demand.

REFERENCES

1. These examples are taken from the many and varied case histories developed by the USAF Wringer Project in Europe and available in the files of D/I, USAF.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT OF THE POW CAMP SYSTEM

Section I - Introduction

The primary purpose of this chapter is to describe the evolution of the POW camp system in North Korea from the chaotic inadequacy of its beginning to its final form and organization as reflected in the complex of camps along the YALU River. A secondary purpose is to present, in one chapter, a generalized chronological review of the period from July 1950 to August 1953 in order to establish a frame of reference for the topical chapters which follow. Wherever applicable, events outside the narrow confines of the POW inclosures and compounds have been introduced to relate the happenings in the camps to the military and political developments in Korea.

Section II - The Stages of Development

The source material for this chapter, as for the study as a whole, is almost exclusively derived from the reports of repatriated U.S. POWs. This factor makes it possible to trace and report the events of the period but does not provide a definitive knowledge of the motivation and capabilities of the CCF and the NKA. It is not within the scope of this study, therefore, to determine whether the lack of physical facilities, food and medical care which marked

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NND 867210
By NARS, Date 4/11/90

the first year of the Korean Operation was the result of failure in enemy planning, logistical incapability or - simply - callous indifference.

The transition from the wretched huts in improvised holding points which marked the winter of 1950-1951, to the established, well organized internment compounds along the YALU River was evolutionary in nature. It can, however, be broken down into three general periods for review purposes. As discussed in the following section, the first of these eras deals not only with the treatment of early captured POWs during a specified period of time but, in addition, with their experiences for some months thereafter. This overlap in time is necessitated by the fact that the prisoners captured prior to the CCF intervention were kept as a separate group and were not merged with other captives for a full year. The other two periods are reasonably definitive as to time and are discussed in sections IV and V.

Section III - The First U.S. POWs

Six days after the crossing of the 38th Parallel by the North Korean Army on 24 June 1950, President TRUMAN announced that U.S. ground units would be utilized to aid the air and naval forces already committed against the enemy. "Task Force Smith," hastily organized from units of the 24th Division in Japan, went into action on 4-5 July and, almost immediately, some members of the U.S. military

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

forces were captured by the North Koreans. The story of the U.S. POWs in Korea began at this point. By 7 July, the day on which General MacARTHUR was named commanding general of the unified forces in Korea, 72 U.S. POWs were huddled in a small house in SEOUL, already feeling the effects of hunger and inadequate treatment. The senior officer among the prisoners, an Army captain, was isolated, first bribed and finally threatened in an effort to make him participate in a propaganda broadcast. The message demanded by the enemy called for him to denounce American intervention in Korea and to exhort U.S. troops to throw off the leadership of their "corrupt officers" and to cease fighting. The threats increased in intensity and he was finally told that his continued refusal would result in the summary execution of the other POWs. On 9 July, the officer "gave in," and his speech, carefully edited by the Communists, was broadcast across the battleground of Korea.

The ranks of the POWs continued to grow in size, and the group was moved by train to PYONGYANG. Upon their arrival at the capital of North Korea, the prisoners were paraded through the streets at a fast cadence, despite the intense summer heat. Several of the weakened POWs fell from exhaustion before they reached a large school building which was to be their quarters for the next two months. By 19 July the 24th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division had been rushed to Korea from Japan in an attempt to stem the advance of the North Koreans. Far north of the

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
battlelines, the group of U.S. POWs in the school building in P'YONGYANG reached the number of 751. Without a semblance of organization, these prisoners were crowded into the schoolrooms, 30 to 40 men often sleeping in an area 10 feet square. Propaganda exploitation was the order of the day for these prisoners, and the North Koreans persuaded several officers - apparently without recourse to direct physical violence - to record communist-line broadcasts. Meetings were staged on such themes as "POWs for Non-Intervention in the Korean War." (fig. 1 and fig. 2)

By early September, 65 civilian internees of various nationalities had joined the POWs and on 5 September, ten days before U.S. soldiers and marines staged the amphibious landing at INCHON and launched the drive which resulted in the near destruction of the North Korean Army, the prisoners and civilian internees were crowded into trains and sent to the town of MANPO, on the banks of the YALU River. Here they remained, shunted from place to place but never more than 15 miles from MANPO, for the next month and a half.

By the end of October, elements of the U.N. command had pushed forward to the vicinity of the CHOSIN Reservoir, had taken KANGGYE and were approaching the city of MANPO itself. At times the POWs could hear the distant rumble of explosions and hope began to grow for early liberation from their captors. These dreams were dispelled on 31 October, however, when the prisoners, now reduced


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Propaganda Meeting of POWs sponsored by North Korean Army and held in P'YONGYANG, August 1950. FIG. 1

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Propaganda Meeting of POWs sponsored by North Korean Army and held in P'YONGYANG, August 1950. FIG. 2

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to 651 by a mounting death rate, were handed over to the custody of a major of the North Korean Security Police. This officer, whose brutality soon earned him the sobriquet of the "Tiger," drove the weakened prisoners over some of the most formidable mountains of North Korea in a forced nine-day trek, which the survivors grimly named the "Death March" and during which 80 to 100 POWs died. Men too weak to maintain the pace dropped to the ground and were either kicked and beaten into staggering onward or were pushed over cliffs. As the column moved forward, leaving fallen comrades behind, shots were often heard, which the POWs believed indicated summary execution by the North Korean guards. In an incident which was later told and retold in the POW compounds and inclosures along the YALU, the "Tiger," infuriated at the straggling line of prisoners, singled out a POW section leader and summarily shot him through the head as an object lesson to the others.

On 9 November the survivors of the "Death March" arrived at the village of CHUNGGANG-JIN and settled in an area called the "Apex," because the North Korean boundary wedges into Manchuria at this point. Crowded into bare Korean huts with caked-mud floors and almost no heat, the POWs remained at this point until March 1951. By that date an additional 150 had died.

In March they were moved some twelve miles to the south to an area which became known as Camp 7. By October 1951, when Camp 7 was abandoned and the prisoners moved to Camps 2, 3, and 5, not

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

more than 300 of the 751 U.S. POWs who had left PYONGYANG the year before remained alive.

Section IV -- The Temporary Camp Period

The first offensive of the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea was launched in November 1950, and one result of their drive southward was the capture of several thousand U.S. soldiers and marines. The reports of personnel captured during the Chinese offensive do not indicate that the Chinese were any better prepared or displayed any more interest in the welfare of their captives than had the North Koreans. The handling of the POWs captured during the winter of 1950-1951 was accomplished in a group of interment areas which served as temporary camps. It should be stressed that these improvised holding areas were not part of an organized evacuation process or comparable to the division or army POW cages utilized by U.S. military forces. The prisoners were not processed through the temporary camps but remained in them until permanent camps had been established along the YALU River. Generally speaking, when the inmates of a temporary camp were evacuated northward, the camp was simply abandoned.

The period of the temporary camps may be said to have begun in November 1950, when a number of U.S. troops were captured by the Chinese near UNSAN. They were held for a few days of interrogation and then moved to a location approximately 10 miles south of

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

PWCAMPONG. This camp became known as the "Valley" and existed until January 1951. From the original group of 400 to 500 captives, the number of prisoners at the "Valley" increased until an estimated 1,100 had been brought in from the battle fronts. Many, emaciated, ragged and suffering from wounds and disease, died of exposure, and a number escaped. At one time or another in the two-month period during which the camp was open,

POWs captured in the vicinity of KUNU-RI in mid-October and of November 1950, mainly from the 32nd Infantry Division, were marched to a location some fifteen miles northwest of the AN-NU-SIM-NI area and interned in what became known as "Death Valley." Sub-standard conditions at this camp, the first in an estimated mortality of 40 per cent of the approximately 1,100 POWs brought into the camp in the short month of its operation.

In strong contrast to the grim story of the "Valley" and "Death Valley," where frozen bodies awaiting burial were reportedly stacked on the hillsides like cordwood, was a small but unique internment point known as "Peaceful Valley." This, the third of the major temporary camps, was located at MANPOJIN and in it were held approximately 45 marines and 20 infantrymen. These POWs were captured in the first week of December 1950, during the fighting in the CHOSIN Reservoir and KOTO-RI sector. The four months which they spent in "Peaceful Valley" were marked by reasonably good living conditions and an intensive indoctrination program. The

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 3/11/86

Chinese, who were in charge of the camp, welcomed the POWs as liberated "brothers-in-arms," launched a camp newspaper, held rallies and conducted classes in communist theory. The group of POWs from the camp were designated "The Workers" or "Con-So-Tai" (POW pronunciation) and were detached from "Peaceful Valley" in March 1951. They were then taken south toward the battlefront to orient newly captured personnel and to explain to them the Chinese "Lenient Policy." Nineteen of this group, consisting of 18 marines and an army corporal, heavily laden with propaganda material, were eventually brought close to the front lines where they were permitted to "escape" and return to U.N. control. In the four months of their occupancy, "Peaceful Valley" POWs suffered a mortality of less than 10 per cent. Some returnees report the possibility that this camp was a "pilot" for the indoctrination procedures which later marked the permanent camps. While this fact cannot be established with any degree of certainty, the isolated contact with the "Valley" and "Death Valley," and the similarity to later indoctrination techniques, lend considerable credence to this possibility.

Two other camps which were in operation during this period were known as "Mining Camp" and "Bean Camp." Conditions in these two internment areas were comparable to those which existed in the "Valley" and "Death Valley" and resulted in an estimated mortality of 25 per cent among the approximately 2,900 POWs. Located farther south than their counterparts, "Mining Camp" and "Bean Camp"

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

continued in operation from January to October 1951 as transit internment points after the other temporary camps had been disbanded. During these months, therefore, these two camps were used as part of a loosely organized evacuation process for POWs and thus formed a minor exception to the temporary camp system previously described.

Conditions in the temporary camps did not show any trend toward improvement during the period of their operation which might indicate a desire to stem the death rate. Admittedly, the logistical capabilities or limitations of the North Koreans and Chinese during this period cannot be determined. Lack of supplies, however, cannot be accepted as a reasonable excuse, since returnees do not report any corresponding death rate among their guards, and since enemy forces fighting far to the south, and over an even more extended supply line, had the logistical capability of mounting major offenses in November 1950, January 1951 and in April 1951.

This era of the temporary camps must be viewed as a holding period. Thousands of POWs were herded into improvised camps which were first inaugurated in January 1951.

Section V - The Permanent Camps of the YALU

The village of PYOKTONG is located on a peninsula in a backwater of the YALU River. A portion of the town was converted into the first of the permanent camps by the simple expedient of evacuating the Korean civilians and installing the POWs. In mid-January

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

1951 the Chinese began gathering U.N. POWs (excluding ROK) from the various temporary camps and moving them into PYOKTONG. The first to arrive were the 400 to 600 survivors of the "Valley." Then the bulk of the prisoner population of "Death Valley" and "Peaceful Valley" were brought in. By the end of March of that year the Communists had completed the process of evacuating the temporary camps and U.S. POWs were concentrated into two areas - PYOKTONG and Camp 7. "Bean Camp" and "Mining Camp" continued to operate for some months, but only as processing stations for prisoners whose ultimate destination was PYOKTONG. The inception of this new camp on the peninsula, which became known as Camp 5, did not mark a change from inadequacy to adequacy, since the death rate at Camp 5 during the first months of its existence was comparable to that which had existed at the "Valley" and "Death Valley." It was not, in fact, until the spring of 1951 that conditions began to improve. Subsequently, the death toll dropped to approximately 3 per cent, as compared to 50 per cent for the first few months.

At Camp 5 a semblance of organization was introduced, with companies, platoons and squads making their appearance. Gradually, the food increased and the prisoners were able to improve their physical facilities. As the POW population at Camp 5 increased, the Chinese established other camps and, eventually, a group of eight camps or separated "companies" holding U.S. prisoners stretched

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

for fifty miles along the YALU River. However, Camp 5 remained the center of POW activity. It was the scene of the heaviest indoctrination effort, and was reportedly the location of the headquarters for the Chinese POW Command. Camp 1 (established in March - April 1951), and Camp 3 (started in September - October 1951), were overflow camps from PYOKTONG. In October 1951 the officers were moved to Camp 2. Camp 4 was founded in August 1952 to house the non-commissioned officer POWs. With the founding of Camp 5 at PYOKTONG in January 1951, it may be said that the Chinese began the process of establishing a semblance of organized, logistically supported internment camps for the U.S. POWs and of exercising some effort to meet at least the minimum requirements insofar as sanitation and medical care were concerned.

Section VI - Comparison of the Three Periods of Internment

The first phase in the development of the POW camp system concerns the POWs captured from July 1950 until October 1950. These men were under the control of the North Koreans, and their reports indicate that none of the steps were taken which would ordinarily be necessary for the protracted detention of a sizeable number of captured personnel; no permanent location was established, no clothing was issued, and no attempt was made to organize the large contingent into squads, platoons and companies. Living conditions initially, at PYONGYANG, were adequate, but food was


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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

scarce and gravely reduced the POWs' capability for survival when they were later faced with forced marches, bitter weather and submarginal existence. The time element and the tactical situation may well account for the two major moves made by this group: from PYONGYANG, just prior to the INCHON landing, and from HAMHO, under the threat of the U.N. offensive.

The significant event that ushered in the second period was the entry into the war of the CCF. Whereas only a handful of U.N. troops were taken during the months of August, September and October 1950, during the next three months more than 5,000 were captured (fig. 3). The Chinese, advancing rapidly and having made, apparently, little preparation for the handling of large numbers of POWs, seemed to be satisfied to turn the problem and the prisoners over to the North Koreans. (The exception of "Peaceful Valley" has previously been noted) The North Koreans, a beaten and disorganized army, with little regard for human decencies, herded the POWs into makeshift locations and fed them whatever could be obtained locally or from an occasional cart load of supplies. The death rate soared to approximately 50 per cent (fig. 4).

The consolidation of the POWs in PYOKTONG in January - March 1951 marked the beginning of the permanent camp era and may have been brought about by a desire to facilitate the proper care of the prisoners, but initially there was little noticeable improvement. By March, when over half a million Chinese troops were already in

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


SOURCE BATTLE CASUALTIES OF THE ARMY (CTO 39), DATED 30 JUN 1954; OACOFS, G-1, DA.

ARMY SECURITY CENTER FT GEO G MEADE MD
U S ARMY PERSONNEL CAPTURED IN KOREAN OPERATION —CHARTED BY MONTH OF CAPTURE—
INFO DATE 30 JUN 1954 | FIG. 3

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TOTAL U S ARMY PERSONNEL CAPTURED IN THE KOREAN OPERATION




LEGEND
- DIED
- REFUSED REPATRIATION
- ESCAPED
- REPATRIATED

TOTAL CAPTURED – 6628

DIED – 2634 REFUSED REPATRIATION – 21
* ESCAPED – 647 REPATRIATED – 3326


JUL '50 - DEC '50



TOTAL CAPTURED – 4134

DIED – 1966 REFUSED REPATRIATION – 16
* ESCAPED – 375 REPATRIATED – 1778


JAN '51 - JUN '51



TOTAL CAPTURED – 1996

DIED – 648 REFUSED REPATRIATION – 5
* ESCAPED – 259 REPATRIATED – 1083


JUL '51 - DEC '51



TOTAL CAPTURED – 206

DIED – 15 REFUSED REPATRIATION – 1
* ESCAPED – 9 REPATRIATED – 181


JAN '52 - JUN '52



TOTAL CAPTURED – 50

DIED – 1 REFUSED REPATRIATION – 0
* ESCAPED – 1 REPATRIATED – 48


JUL '52 - DEC '52



TOTAL CAPTURED – 76

DIED – 3 REFUSED REPATRIATION – 0
* ESCAPED – 2 REPATRIATED – 71

JAN '53 - JUL '53



TOTAL CAPTURED – 166

DIED – 0 REFUSED REPATRIATION – 0
* ESCAPED – 1 REPATRIATED – 165

* PERSONNEL SHOWN AS HAVING ESCAPED WERE IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME AND HAD NOT BEEN TRANSPORTED TO EITHER THE PERMANENT POW CAMPS OR TO ANY OF THE MAJOR TEMPORARY CAMPS. NO SUCCESSFUL ESCAPES WERE EFFECTED FROM CAMPS OF EITHER OF THESE TWO TYPES. SEE CHAPTER 9 IN THIS REPORT FOR ESCAPE AND EVASION DATA.

SOURCE:

(1) BATTLE CASUALTIES OF THE ARMY (CTO 39), DATED 30 JUNE 1954; OAC of S, G-1, DA.

(2) ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF PERSONNEL RETURNED TO MILITARY CONTROL FROM A MISSING IN ACTION OR CAPTURED STATUS DURING THE KOREAN OPERATION; THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, STATISTICAL AND ACCOUNTING BRANCH; 16 MARCH 1955.

ARMY SECURITY CENTER
FT GEO G MEADE MD

STATUS OF U S ARMY PERSONNEL CAPTURED IN THE KOREAN OPERATION

INFO DATE 30 JUNE '54 | FIG. 4

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[illegible] the spring [illegible] [illegible] [illegible],
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible],
Improvements [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible], D.C. [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
returned repair [illegible] [illegible] became [illegible]. Medical
facilities, if not completely adequate, were at least sufficient
to prevent any further large scale loss of life. The indoctrination
program was begun and for some time continued to be a arousing
and irritating aspect in the POWs' daily life, but the compulsory
aspect of the program ceased in the spring of 1952. Even in the
closing months of the internment period, however, it must be remem-
bered that many POWs were being prosecuted for self-criticism, some
were under severe duress to supply Bacteriological Warfare "con-
fessions," some were periodically removed for interrogation, and
all were plagued by night blindness, beri-beri and dysentery. The
POWs in camps in North Korea had by then felt the full impact of
Communist victimization -- they had experienced the pendulum's
partial swing from indifference to human life and callous brutality
to a minimum standard of existence and continous exploitation for
communism's purposes. The pendulum was never to complete its swing
toward normal civilized treatment and respect for individual or
collective rights and dignity that would follow from an adherence
to the basic Articles of the Geneva Conventions.

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CHAPTER 4

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE POW CAMPS

Section I - Introduction

This chapter will deal with the internal organization of the POW camps in North Korea. The two principal areas to be covered are the structure of the various administrative organs and a description of the job functions of the members of the organizational structure. Communist personnel will be considered as functionaries, not as personalities. Internal organization will be analyzed from the viewpoint of the individual camps (both Chinese and North Korean administered) and of the chief camp administrative units, i.e., companies, platoons, and squads. Their officials will be considered topically, inasmuch as their duties varied little from camp to camp.

Section II - Internal Camp Organization

Although generally obscure and confused in the early days of the Korean Operation, the internal organization of the POW camps in North Korea finally evolved into a reasonably standardized arrangement. Once the prisoners were ushered into a permanent camp or fixed location, whether a former village or a specially-constructed installation, certain typical organizational problems arose and rather typical procedures were instituted to solve them. Although the organizational framework established by the Communists in their

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POW camps was generally in accord with the accepted practices of other nations, there were fundamental differences, particularly in the degree of forbearance exhibited toward prisoners of war, between the camps in North Korea and those maintained by the United Nations. It should not be inferred, however, that Communist practices ever became completely uniform or standardized. Each of the two enemy forces opposing the U.N. in Korea, although both were Communist and both oriental, possessed its own particular racial and environmental characteristics. This variance, resulting from similar but not identical backgrounds, was apparent not only on the battleground but in the attendant duality of attitudes and treatment of POWs.

The outstanding feature of the Communist organization of POW camps in North Korea was the tight compartmentalization of captured U.N. soldiery. In addition to segregating prisoners according to nationality (in accordance with Article 22, Chapter I, Section II, Part III, Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War), rank, race, and, in many cases, political leanings were also determining factors in the assignment of prisoners to different camps, and, within the camps, to certain companies and platoons. This careful sifting of prisoners into small units brought with it a certain definite advantage accruing to the Communists; the Communist indoctrination program (chiefly Chinese) was aided because it could be directed with greater effectiveness at relatively small, homogenous groups of prisoners.

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By placing prisoners of similar background together, the Communists did not violate any letter of the Convention, but they most certainly circumvented its spirit. The pattern of prisoner segregation was probably a calculated adjunct of the indoctrination program, for it seemed continually to change, subject to the exigencies of the Communist propaganda themes.

In addition to the strict segregation of prisoners, another characteristic feature of the camp organization was its semi-military structure. Although the POWs were divided into squads, platoons, and companies, the numbers of men in each of these units varied widely. Another striking aspect was that no corresponding assignment of PW rank existed to accompany this more or less conventional military structure. As part of the enemy's propaganda theme, captured military personnel were officially "civilians who had been drafted to fight Wall Street's war," and were to be treated as "liberated brothers," rather than as non-combatant members of an opposing army. In support of that theme, the Communists made firm efforts to subordinate the concept of rank among their prisoners; for example, even though the prisoners were soldiers and were placed in these semi-military units, they heard themselves addressed as "Comrade" and "Student," or simply by their names.

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Section III - Internment Under North Koreans

During the four and a half months of the conflict when the North Koreans alone were waging war against the U.N. forces, no permanent POW camps were in existence. Although they took many Americans among their prisoners, the North Koreans set up no camp for them, but, instead, moved them northward at a leisurely pace, stopping at SEOUL and P'YONGYANG to regroup. Finally, on 11 September 1950, some 750 American prisoners of all ranks (plus 65 civilian internees of several nationalities) arrived at MANPO, deep in northern Korea. It was to be still another six months before the North Koreans moved these prisoners into a permanent camp.

The North Korean disposition of American prisoners exhibited a basic lack of guiding policy. Although facilities for handling and interning POWs in North Korea were less than adequate, due to the exigencies of the war, the conclusion seems inescapable that the North Koreans did not care enough about their prisoners even to utilize them for propaganda purposes, except on a makeshift basis, until the Chinese entered the battle. The prisoners were not organized; they were merely held under guard.

After the U.N.'s successful amphibious landing at INCHON on 15 September 1950, and the rapid thrust of the U.N. forces to the YALU River, the North Koreans reacted by moving their prisoners further north to CHUNGGANG-JIN, but still there was no change in policy. North Korean personnel with whom the prisoners came into

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contact during this period were security police of the North Korean Army.

Section IV - Internment Under the CCF

With the entry of the Chinese Communist Forces into the war in November 1950, most of the former conditions prevailed, but on a larger scale. Once again large numbers of prisoners were taken, and, as before, no preparations had been made to handle them. Facilities for housing prisoners, attending to their wounds, and feeding them scarcely existed. This first winter of captivity (1950 - 1951) was undoubtedly the most chaotic and wretched period endured by the U.N. prisoners.

Section V - Temporary Camps

Almost every American prisoner captured by the Chinese during this period spent some time in at least one of three temporary camps set up by the Chinese. Some captives remained at these sites for only a day or two, while others lingered for three or four months in the temporary camps before they were transferred to a permanent one. The three temporary camps were all located in valleys, and that word predominates in the titles given these camps by their POW inhabitants. They were called the "Valley," "Death Valley," and "Peaceful Valley," the last named being the only camp under exclusive Chinese control.

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1. The "Valley"

The "Valley" came into being about the middle of November and was populated mostly by U.S. prisoners from the 1st Cavalry Division captured at UNSAN during the first week of that month. At its peak, more than 1,000 POWs were interned in the "Valley," before they were transferred to PYOKTONG, 15 to 25 January 1951. When first organized, the "Valley" was under North Korean jurisdiction; however, the Chinese assumed control in mid-December. Segregation of POWs within the camp was only general; officers, EM, and wounded constituted the three divisions. Rudimentary squad affiliations were assigned to the enlisted prisoners and squad leaders were appointed, but the POWs were transferred before any further organization was effected.

2. "Death Valley"

"Death Valley" held between 1,000 and 2,000 POWs; most of the American prisoners came from the 2d Division and had been taken captive while trying to run the Chinese gauntlet between KUNU-RI and SUNCHON after the battle of the CHONGCHON River. The prisoners were housed in Korean huts strung out for about two miles along the road through the valley. Because of a slight difference in elevation at either end of the valley and the 3/4 mile separation between the two main POW areas, "Death Valley" was divided into "Upper" and "Lower" camps. ROK troops formed the

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bulk of the prisoners held in the Upper Camp; the Lower Camp held the other U.N. prisoners. Each hut (or room in the larger huts) was considered a squad, and, although leaders were appointed by the North Koreans, no effective organization existed. Both North Korean and Chinese troops were present in "Death Valley," but the North Koreans were responsible for the administration of the camp.

3. "Peaceful Valley"

"Peaceful Valley" was set up in late December 1950 and contained prisoners captured on the eastern sector of the front. The camp was located at KANGGYE and stretched for about a mile and a half along the MSR between MANPO and PYONGYANG. Some 300 Americans and about 20 British were held here, under Chinese control. The prisoners were organized into two companies of equal size, each having three platoons. Spanish-speaking POWs were placed together in one squad. The command structure was more highly developed at "Peaceful Valley" than at either of the other two temporary camps. The administrative personnel included a camp commander, company commanders, platoon leaders, and instructors; all were Chinese. The camp was closed in March 1951.

Section VI - Permanent Camps

1. General

The chief administrative units of the permanent POW camps were the companies. These varied in number from 3 to 7, depending

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on the camp and ranged in size from 60 to 350 prisoners, with the average company containing about 200 men.

Platoons varied in size and number, usually three or four to a company. In turn, the squad was the basic unit in the camp organization, with most of the routine aspects of camp life transpiring at squad level. Six to fifteen POWs normally composed a squad.

The camp command structure was of dual politico-military nature, with the exception of the camp commander, who executed both functions himself. The camp commanders had very little contact with the prisoners themselves. They gave introductory speeches when some of the camps were first opened and occasionally lectured the prisoners (through an interpreter) on camp regulations and discipline. The camp commanders, often referred to by the POWs as the "Commanding General(s)," although their ranks were not definitely known, were personages seldom seen by the POWs.

A Chinese company commander was in charge of each POW company. The returnees have referred to the company commanders by rank, which varied from lieutenant to colonel, depending on the company composition. Normally, however, they held positions comparable to those of a company-grade officer. The company commander was concerned chiefly with the administration of the company, and usually did not speak English. He was seen only a trifle more often than the camp commander, most often when punishment was being meted out

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to a POW. His deputy, the assistant or vice company commander, assumed the duties of the company commander when he was absent. The assistant company commander was of minor importance, however, and many men were rotated through the position.

The political counterpart of the company commander was the company instructor who, as the highest English-speaking authority at this level, gradually assumed the dominant role in company business. The instructor's functions were not limited to interpreting, or delivering indoctrinatory lectures. On the contrary, after a very short time in camp each POW became aware that his company instructor was a very powerful individual. He held the authority to excuse an internee from work details, to facilitate going on sick call, to administer punishment, and, in general, to make the prisoner's lot either pleasant or difficult. In order, perhaps, to make the Americans more amenable to the indoctrination program, the Chinese enlarged the basic role of the company instructor so that he might appear to the POW as the "fountain from which all blessings flowed." The instructor, therefore, carried out the functions usually associated with such diverse branches in the U.S. Army as T.I. & E., the Inspector General, the Chaplain, and Special Services.

At the platoon level, the military half of the command chain was embodied in the platoon leader. Usually speaking no English,

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the platoon leader was restricted to assigning prisoner details and verifying the head count at platoon formations. Most platoon leaders were neither feared nor respected by the PWs. The assistant platoon leaders, both PWs, held positions entailing administrative duties under the control of the platoon leader. They would allocate work details to the squad leaders, count the prisoners at platoon formations, and supervise the distribution of food to the squads.

Political affairs and indoctrination at the platoon level were in the hands of the platoon instructor. His task was to transmit communist study materials to the platoon and its squads, and to otherwise assist the company instructor. The platoon instructor spoke English, attended all formations (even going on work details), and attempted to establish a close rapport between himself and the prisoners. Most of the company committees for recreation, food, sanitation, and other aspects of daily life were assigned platoon instructors and advisors.

Chinese-appointed POW squad leaders commonly handled the distribution of food and supplies among the various squads, chose squad members for details, and were required to be with their squads at all times. It was the squad leader's task to see that his squad was formed properly in platoon formations, and he normally counted it to check for absentees. (For aerial photographs and sketches of the permanent camps, see figs. 27 through 43, app. III).

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Camp 5

Shortly after New Year's Day 1951, the Communists began to move blocks of prisoners to PYOKTONG: the first group arrived from the "Valley" and was followed within a few days by other U.N. prisoners from "Death Valley" and "Peaceful Valley." Koreans occupying the western end of the town were dispossessed to make room for the POWs, who were then billeted in the freshly vacated huts. The only permanent camp in existence during this period, Camp 5, was filled up rapidly and held approximately 3,500 U.N. prisoners (but no ROKs) at this time. The POW death rate, however, was quite high, and the number of prisoners decreased continually.

As soon as the prisoners had been quartered in PYOKTONG, POW squad and assistant platoon leaders were appointed by the North Koreans, who administered the camp under Chinese direction until March 1951, after which the Chinese assumed complete control. A vaguely-defined compound organization existed while the camp was in the process of receiving prisoners from the temporary camps. By February - March 1951, however, the organization of Camp 5 was as follows:

1st Company	U.S. Negro EM, some Spanish-speaking U.S. and U.N. EM.
2d Company	U.S. White EM, Turkish EM.
3d Company	U.S. White EM, U.K. EM.
4th Company	U.N. sergeants
5th Company	U.N. officers

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The subordinate platoon and squad organizations were still not well-defined, due to the numerous deaths and the many minor shiftings of prisoners within the companies. (fig. 24, app. II)

The first major reorganization at Camp 5 occurred in October 1951. At that time the U.S. EM from 2d Company and some U.S. sergeants from 4th Company were transferred to Camp 3 (a few had already been sent to Camp 3 in August and September). Those transferred had been causing the Chinese no little trouble by balking at the indoctrination program and being generally unco-operative, from the Chinese point of view. Also, in October, the officers from 5th Company were moved to the newly-established Camp 2, which became the Officers' Camp. A few officers were in Company 5 as late as March 1952. After the departure of the U.S. personnel of 2d Company, only the Turkish POWs were billeted in this area. From October to December 1951, 5th Company housed a special "study company," composed of "Progressives" of all nationalities undergoing intensive indoctrination. In December 1951 the U.K. EM were moved into 5th Company. From October 1951 until August 1952 Camp 5 was organized as follows:

1st Company	U.S. Negro EM and some Spanish-speaking U.S. and U.N. EM.
2d Company	Turkish EM.
3d Company	U.S. White EM and U.K. EM (Until December 1951).

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4th Company	U.N. sergeants.
5th Company	study company (October - December 1951) U.K. EM (after December 1951)

The prisoner population of Camp 5 dropped constantly throughout 1951, and by December the number of POWs interned there had dropped to 1,400. This figure remained relatively stable thereafter. (fig. 25, app. II)

In August 1952 the sergeants from 4th Company, Camp 5 were transferred to Camp 4. As a group they had exhibited more solidarity and displayed firmer resistance in the face of Chinese demands than had younger, lower-ranking enlisted men. The Chinese undoubtedly felt that with the NCOs removed, the other EM would be more pliant. With the NCOs gone, 4th Company was vacant and the Chinese took this opportunity to segregate their prisoners even further. Soldiers of various U.N. nationalities - French, Dutch, Greeks, Filipinos, and Spanish-speaking Americans - made up this polyglot company.

The final change in the organizational structure of Camp 5 was the addition of another company - 6th Company - in March 1953. The Chinese interned about 50 newly-captured Colombians in this company, which was not located within the camp confines, but was in the town of PYOKTONG itself (fig. 26, app. II). Otherwise, the camp did not change during its final year until August 1953, when the repatriation of prisoners took place. In August 1953 the camp

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population was about 1,250 Although Camp 5 was not the largest POW camp in North Korea, it was one of the most important. It was the scene of an intensive Communist indoctrination effort and the Inter-Camp Olympics were held here in November 1952. In it also occurred many of the unhappy event connected with the false confessions regarding Bacteriological Warfare signed by American airmen. In addition, it housed the Communist headquarters for the entire POW camp system in North Korea.

3. Camp 1

In March 1951 the Chinese established their second camp for the internment of U.N. prisoners. It received the title of Camp 1 and was located in the North Korean village of CHANGSONG (CH'ANG-NI on AMS). About 2,000 British and American officers and enlisted men were initially confined here in three large companies (fig. 14, app. II). In October - November 1951, the officers were removed to Camp 2 and in August 1952 all the sergeants were transferred to Camp 4 and U.S. Negro privates and corporals to Camp 5. A few other U.N. POWs were interned at Camp 1 while in transit to their permanent camps. After August 1952 the camp contained U.S. and British privates and corporals in seven numbered companies, the U.S. occupying 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Companies and the British 5th, 6th, and 7th. (For platoon and squad structure, see fig. 15, app II) When the armistice was signed, Camp 1 held more POWs than any other camp - 900 Americans and 500 British.

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4. Camp 3

The first contingent of prisoners arrived at the site of Camp 3 in August 1952, but it was after the arrival of the group from PYOKTONG in October 1951 that Camp 3 was organized on the usual company, platoon, squad basis. Initially, the prisoner population resembled that of Camp 1, as it was composed of American and British enlisted men and some American officers, divided into three companies totaling some 870 POWs (fig. 20, app. II). During the summer of 1952 the camp was reorganized so that it finally held only American caucasian privates and corporals. In July the sergeants were removed and sent to Camp 4; the British privates and corporals were transferred to Camp 1; and the American Negro privates and corporals were sent to Camp 5. Two new companies had been formed in 1952, one in February and one in July, making a total of five companies in the camp, numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9 (fig. 21, app. II).

In August 1952, 9th Company ceased to exist, since it was absorbed into 2d Company. In the same month a third company was formed by removing prisoners from 1st and 2d Companies and regrouping them. In May 1953, 3d Company was de-activated and its members were reassigned to 1st and 2d Companies. Shortly thereafter an unsegregated company of USAF and Army EM, captured in the beginning of 1953, was located halfway between Camps 3 and 5. This new company, although well beyond the physical confines of Camp 3, received the title of 3d Company, Camp 3, and was also known as Camp 3,

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Branch 2 (fig. 22, app. II, ultimate organization of Camp 3). In August 1953 Camp 3 held approximately 850 POWs.

5. Camp 2

Camp 2 was formed in October 1951, after the arrival of U.N. officers from Camps 1, 3, and 5. The Chinese officer who had commanded the officers' company at Camp 5 accompanied them to the new camp, where he became camp commander. The officer POWs in Camp 2 were divided into three platoons, with three squads to each platoon. In December 1951 the camp contained 283 prisoners, about three-fourths of whom were American officers (fig. 16, app. II). There were no changes in the organization of the camp during 1952, except that in October the camp was divided into two companies.

6. Camp 2, Company 2

Company 2, Camp 2 was formed in October 1952 to provide a separate camp for U.N. field-grade officers, with officers of company grade remaining in Company 1, Camp 2. Physically removed from Company 1, Camp 2, although less than a mile away, Company 2 was really a separate camp. About 150 U.N. officers were interned in this area, most of them of field-grade rank. They were divided into three platoons, and each platoon had three squads. Company 2 remained in existence until August 1953 (fig. 17, app. II).

7. Camp 2, Company 3

In August 1952, Company 3, consisting of three platoons, was

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formed under the jurisdiction of Camp 2 (fig. 18, app. II). This was a "hard labor" camp, composed of about 130 American and British EM who, for various reasons, had caused the Chinese trouble. The company was disbanded in June 1953.

8. Camp 2, Company 4

In May 1952 another company-camp, which like Company 3 was some miles distant from the headquarters of Camp 2 in Company 1, had been established and named Company 4, Camp 2. Company 4 was composed mainly of USAF officers, plus a few Air Force enlisted men, and a few other U.N. officers. The camp contained about 140 POWs organized into three platoons (fig. 19, app. II).

9. Camp 4

In August 1952 the Chinese established Camp 4. Into it they gathered all the sergeants theretofore held in other camps, with the exception of those doing hard labor in Company 3, Camp 2. Located at WIWON, Camp 4 was farther up the YALU than any other Chinese-administered camp. It was divided into three companies; for example, all the American Negro sergeants were quartered together in one platoon of 3d Company. In all, the camp held about 600 POWs, most of them American and the remainder British, Turkish, and French (fig. 23, app. II).

10. Camp 6

At Camp 6, established in March 1953, the Chinese interned about 100 U.N. enlisted men and a few officers captured in the closing

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stages of the conflict. Since it was July before the camp received any considerable number of prisoners, only squads and platoons had been formed when the armistice was signed.

11. Camp 7

Camp 7 was organized in September 1950, to house approximately 800 POWs and civilian internees at MANPO, who were still under control of the North Koreans. After much shifting about, the group settled down at the APEX, a point at the very tip of the Sino-Korean border, and remained there until March 1951. At that time the group was moved twelve miles southward to the site of some old Japanese barracks. This spot became Camp 7, and they remained there until October 1951. No camp organization was instituted by the North Koreans, who did very little to ameliorate the hardships their prisoners suffered. By the time the camp was dissolved, the number of surviving prisoners had dropped to about 300. The remaining officers were transferred to Camp 5 and then to Camp 2; most of the remaining EM were sent to the Chinese at Camp 3.

12. Camp 12

The other North Korean POW camp, Camp 12, was established a few miles east of PYOKTONG in February 1951. It functioned not only as an internment point for prisoners, but also as the seat of the Central Peace Committee. Camp 12 never held more than 80-100 prisoners and was disbanded in December 1951.

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CHAPTER 5

POW GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS

Section I - Introduction

The U.S. prisoners of war in the Korean camps, composed of all ranks from private to colonel, probably represented a reasonable cross-section of American educational, economic, and social life. Subjected to interrogation, indoctrination, and sub-standard living conditions, it was inevitable that, from this heterogeneous group, there should appear numerous clandestine resistance movements. It would also seem logical that, since the prisoners were military personnel, a semblance of military order and discipline would be imposed by the POWs on themselves in order to regulate their lives insofar as possible and to present a solid front to their captors. Perhaps one of the most notable aspects of the POWs in Korea was their inability to form lasting resistance groups and their failure to organize themselves on a camp or company basis and achieve solidarity.

Section II - Informers vs. POW Organization Efforts

The CCF, following normal procedures in the handling of prisoners, segregated the POWs by rank. In addition, they refused to recognize or negotiate with any senior officer or enlisted man as a representative of a camp or company. However, returned POWs

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place the blame for the failure of the resistance groups and of any possible camp control by the POWs on the primary factor - the PCW informer. U.S. military personnel are reported by returnees to have been active as informers for the CCF in every camp and company. They faithfully reported the leaders of clandestine anti-communist groups, the individual "reactionaries," the planned escape attempts, and, in general, created a condition of fear and suspicion among all the prisoners. Most ex-POWs do not believe that any formal cellular net of informers existed in the camps but rather that the individuals involved reported directly and independently to the communists. Suspicion fell on many of the prisoners, but direct proof apparently could not be obtained and the POWs were completely unable to cope with this internal danger. Although the activities of the informers handicapped the formation of resistance groups and undoubtedly deterred the assumption of command by groups of individuals in the camps, another factor should also be considered in this regard. Less frequently reported by the POWs, but apparent in any detailed study of the camps, is the fact that the lower-ranking enlisted men, deprived of their officers and non-commissioned officers, demonstrated no capability to organize themselves or select a leader. Even in the non-commissioned officers' camp (Camp 4), there are no indications of a senior NCO or group of NCOs making a determined attempt to establish the discipline and cohesion of a military group. Among the officers, in the latter stages of

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internment, an effort was made to operate under the control and guidance of a senior officer. Even this attempt, however, was not completely successful nor was it accepted by all officers.

The importance of these two factors - presence of POW informers and the prisoners' inability to organize themselves effectually - provided the Communists with two powerful tools for the control and containment of U.S. military personnel in the Korean POW camps, and this should be kept in mind in the discussion of the POW groups which follows. In addition to the resistance groups, there were other groups which were purely social in nature. Still another more limited category of individuals grouped themselves together for personal gain, and, through acts of vandalism and terror, added to the confusion and distrust in the camps. Such groups were, however, rare among the POWs.

Section III - Organizations in the Permanent Camps

1. Camp 1

a. KKK (Ku Klux Klan)

The best-known prisoner organization in Camp 1 was the KKK. This name, with its familiar connotations, must have seemed to the POWs a "natural" for adoption by an organization whose aim was to combat the "progressives;" every permanent camp except Camp 2 had its own KKK - in rumor if not in fact. Whether the prisoners adopted the name after hearing Communist lectures

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on the activities of the KKK in the U.S., or whether the Chinese gave the organization its title is not known.[1] In a sense the name may not have been too advantageous, since both the prisoners and the Chinese tended to ascribe all forms of subversive or anti-Communist activity to the KKK, which consequently makes it difficult to place KKK functions in their proper perspective.

The KKK was founded in the spring of 1952.[2] To prevent compromise of the organization its members were divided into two or three-man cells;[3] one man from each cell was to maintain liaison with other cells.[4] Estimates of membership vary widely, from 30[5] or 40 to 200,[6] but it is likely that the lower figure is more nearly accurate. There was little overall direction given this organization, and co-ordination of planning was rarely if ever attempted. One source, however, tells of attending meetings held during camp blackouts where verbal orders were received.[7]

If there is some question as to the actual workings of the KKK, there is no doubt as to its aims.[8] Members of the KKK strove: (1) To disrupt camp routine and harass camp authorities in any way possible. (2) To block the Chinese indoctrination effort. (3) To prevent fellow POWs from collaborating with the Chinese.

In order to achieve this last objective, anonymous warning notes were placed on the bunks of known 'Progressives' and those with collaborationist leanings. 'Progressives' were also threatened verbally with reprisal after repatriation.

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The Chinese discovered the KKK's existence very shortly after it had been formed. In April 1952, one of the leaders of the KKK was placed in solitary confinement[9] and was not released to stand trial until October of that year. After his trial, he received a 33-month jail sentence for spreading rumors, "instigating," undermining camp authority, and founding a secret society.[10] Other members of the KKK were transferred to Camp 2, Company 3, during the fall of 1952. Despite their efforts, the Chinese did not succeed in stopping all anti-communist activity that went on under the KKK label. In November 1952, some former members of the KKK resumed their earlier efforts on a smaller scale. In June they formed a group called the SHADOW, whose objective was to physically punish informers and collaborators.[11]

The 4th Company of Camp 1 also had an anti-Communist organization among the POWs. It was called the TRUE AMERICANS and may have been an offshoot of the KKK. One source states that three-fourths of the 4th Company belonged to this organization, but this estimate is probably high.[12] Recognizing the propaganda implicit in the many photographs taken of the POWs by the Chinese, the TRUE AMERICANS attempted to have prisoners refuse to be photographed. In December 1952, some members of this organization set fire to the camp recreation room. Three of the arsonists were put in solitary confinement from January to June 1953, at which time they were given eight-month jail sentences retroactive to January.[13]

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b. Other POW Organizations

Another anti-Chinese organization was known by the initials FHA, which were variously interpreted as standing for FREE HEARTS OF AMERICA, FAITHFUL HEARTS OF AMERICA, FEDERATED HEARTS OF AMERICA, and FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY. FHA was formed in 1952 and had 16 to 20 members. Its aim (which apparently met with little success) was to stop "Progressives" from informing and writing pro-communist articles in the camp paper.

Several other small short-lived anti-Chinese and anti-"Progressive" groups were in existence at Camp 1. The BLACK DRAGON comprised some twenty men who (it is claimed) attended to burn Chinese supply points and camp buildings. They also planned to discipline "Progressives," but no concrete actions along this line took place. The leader of this group was apprehended by the Chinese and placed in solitary.[14] The NON-BENEDICT ARNOLD CLUB,[15] the CANNIBAL CLUB,[16] and the UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE[17] were also founded to combat the authorities and their prisoner helpers. A similar organization among the British POWs in the camp was the TRUE GOVERNMENT.[18]

c. Informer Net

One source states that a Chinese-sponsored INFORMANT NET functioned for a time in Camp 1. The chief of the NET was the company commander of 3d Company. Since he spoke no English, a CCF interpreter was present at all meetings. One of the camp's

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NND 867210
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leading collaborators was the main POW representative. He personally recruited other members for this group from among the camp's "progressive" element. No inducements or threats were made to enlist their co-operation. The first meeting of the INFORMANT NET, a planning session, was held in January 1953. Members were told that information was wanted concerning prospective escapees and those POWs who threatened "Progressives." The informers were instructed how to make out reports. Thereafter meetings were held weekly, and the informers vied with each other in turning in derogatory reports. Plans were also discussed by the informers for confiscating all prisoners' personal possessions, i.e., wallets, pictures, notebooks, to see whether any coded messages were entering or leaving the camp, but this project was never realized.[19]

2. Camp 2

a. Old Soldiers' Home

At Camp 2, Company 1, there arose a social group known as the FAR EASTERN BRANCH OF THE OLD SOLDIERS' HOME, or simply the OLD SOLDIERS' HOME. In December 1952, seven officers began to congregate near their barracks and spend their free time in conversation.[20] Initially, to be a member of the group, a POW had to be at least 32 years old and have 12 years of active service; but these requirements were soon waived, and anybody so inclined could participate in the group's discussions.[21] Usually those in the group

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talked about their past lives and future plans, with the obvious intention of keeping their spirits up. Occasionally, however, they discussed the problems of camp life and of maintaining a militarily correct attitude while a prisoner. The Chinese took no steps to disband the OLD SOLDIERS' HOME and it continued meeting until repatriation.

b. Other Organizations

An informal group of anti-communist prisoners known as the CAGE MEMBERS also existed at Company 1. In Company 4 of Camp 2, under the leadership of some British POWs, a LITTLE THEATRICAL GROUP was formed. Some 25 prisoners joined the group, whose activities centered about staging skits and plays. The camp authorities did not ban this group, but a Chinese monitored all scripts.

3. Camp 3

a. The Circle

In Camp 3 the best-known anti-communist organization was the CIRCLE. Formed in March 1952, the organization was composed almost entirely of the members of one squad in the 1st Company, about 15 POWs. As a group, they: (1) Helped prospective escapees gather material. (2) Warned and advised fellow POWs not to engage in "Progressive" activity. (3) Devised and encouraged individual and collective resistance to Chinese rule.

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The organizational planning was carried on in a democratic fashion, with decisions arrived at by a majority vote of the members.

In order to carry on their activities without being observed by informers, they requested the Chinese that the squad be permitted to move to a more remote section of the company area. Eventually the request was granted, and the CIRCLE squad was allowed in the main company area only for food and formations. The Chinese recognized the squad's anti-communist attitude and soon had it performing the more arduous, unpleasant details. Even on these details, the Chinese tried to keep the squad away from the other POWs.

While recognizing the squad's participation in anti-communist activities, the Chinese also realized its usefulness as a source of information on POW thinking. On occasion, when a new project or policy was being contemplated, the squad members would be sounded out on their reaction to the new program. As a group they seemed to have earned some measure of grudging admiration from the Chinese. They were often told that they were the number one squad because they did their work well; and the Chinese also maintained that because of the length of time they spent resisting communism they would become "the best Progressives" if they were ever converted.

As a group the CIRCLE harassed their captors in numerous small ways. They overslept and deliberately missed formations; they

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NND 867210
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knowingly entered parts of the company area forbidden to them; they cursed their instructors to their faces; they even went so far as to throw rocks at the Chinese. Correctly or not, all company-wide anti-Chinese activity was imputed to this group.

The most ambitious undertaking of the CIRCLE was its attempt to discourage fellow POWs from associating with the Chinese and from enlisting in their study program. When one of its members succeeded in stealing some pro-communist articles written by a POW, the group took further action. The accused "author" was asked to visit the squad and was directed to the center of the barracks floor. He was then surrounded by the members of the squad, whence arose the name the CIRCLE. After hearing the evidence, members of the group beat the collaborator. One or two more "Progressives" were manhandled in this fashion. In July 1952 the Chinese decided to put an end to the activities of the CIRCLE, and in August the squad was broken up, some men going to different companies, others to jail.

b. Other Organizations

An escape and anti-"Progressive" group at Camp 2 was known as the SHOW, since it doubled as an amateur stage group to conceal its real purpose. It collected food and equipment, evaluated previous escape attempts, made plans for future attempts, conducted survival and map-and-compass training, and made and stole maps. Other minor, ephemeral anti-"Progressive" groups in the camp

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were the EIGHT BALLS,[27] the BEB PS in 1st Company,[28] and the KANGAROO COURT,[29] which reputedly whipped some "Progressives." A small social group with half a dozen members had the descriptive title of CHICKEN, PORK, & GEESE; members of this group on occasion stole food from the camp warehouses and sometimes swam together.[30]

Camp 3 was also the scene of organized thievery carried on by some of the POWs. This organization was known as the BENJO GANG, from its custom of waylaying prisoners in the latrine ("Benjo" in Japanese). Although a member of this band claims that their purpose was only to "rough up" POWs who stole food and personal belongings from other prisoners,[31] the evidence belies this assertion. The BENJO GANG was formed in 1951 and existed in varying strength (seven members according to one source) for at least a year, stealing food, tobacco, and personal goods from the weaker and smaller POWs. The organization had no political leanings.

4. Camp 4

In Camp 4 a dozen prisoners of Polish descent in 2d Company organized a social group, the POLISH FALCONS.[32] The group was mildly anti-Chinese in its activity and advised other prisoners not to collaborate with the camp authorities.[33] In addition, the group attempted to glean information regarding the progress of the truce talks from the Chinese. The camp authorities were aware of the group's existence, but tolerated it.

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NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

An anti-communist group was formed in 3d Company under the name of WAR COUNCIL in November 1952.[34] With 7 to 10 members, this group sought to deprive the communists of their POW converts by persuading 'progressives' to cease collaborating with the Chinese. This group was in being until July 1953. Also in 3d Company was the WAR CAMP, an anti-'Progressive' group of 10 prisoners. They harassed the "progressives," but did not resort to violence.[35] A KKK is mentioned as functioning at Camp 4, but this may have been merely a transference of the well-known name from another camp.

5. Camp 5

Camp 5 proved to be extremely fertile in generating prisoner organizations and groups.

In the 1st Company, the two most formal organizations were the BLACK DIAMOND and the GOLDEN CROSS (or GOLDEN EARRING). The BLACK DIAMOND was formed in October 1952 by about 10 prisoners.[36] It was a social organization which afforded its members an opportunity to feel that they belonged to something which had no connection with communism, the Chinese, or any aspect of camp existence. Its only planned goal was to meet and hold a reunion after returning to the United States.[37] The Chinese, however, labeled the group subversive and within a few weeks of its inception broke it up. All the POWs of 1st Company were first assembled to hear a lecture by a Chinese on the evils of the BLACK DIAMOND. and after that the leader of the group was jailed.[38]

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The GOLDEN CROSS was not avowedly anti-Chinese, but suffered the same fate as the BLACK DIAMOND. Its members fashioned crosses out of pieces of metal and wore them in pierced ears. There were about 45 members of this organization, which lasted only a month.[39]

Another short-lived social group was the BLACK C.T.[40] The VIPERS was also a social group consisting of about 10 prisoners; they spent their free time smoking marijuana together.[41] An informal singing group was known as the FOUR ROSES.[42] The BLACK ROBE was an anti-communist group in 1st Company.[43]

In the 3d Company the leading anti-communist groups were the KKK, KILL THE COMMUNISTS, TATTOO CLUB, and PROGRESSIVE TEA PARTY. All had the same aims of deterring prisoners from co-operating with the Chinese and harassing the Chinese themselves.

Section IV - General

It will be noted that, in spite of the prevalance of the initials KKK throughout the camps, there was no POW group or organization among American prisoners which waged interracial warfare. Organizations established on racial lines did exist, but this was a result of the Communist policy of segregating Negro and Caucasian prisoners, rather than an expression of the prisoners' will. At Camp 5, many of the whites thought that the Chinese treated Negro POWs more leniently and gave them more and better food and clothing. This, however, engendered bitterness towards the Chinese and

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not towards the Negroes. One instance of overt friction did occur in the summer of 1952 at Camp 3 between the Spanish-speaking American prisoners and some other American whites. The CIRCLE was active in the affair, demanding that the Spanish-Americans be removed from the company. (Opinion in the CIRCLE was that, "The Spanish boys were 'running over' the others.") Armed with knives and sticks, both sides prepared to do battle; but the Chinese averted the clash by setting up mortars in the hills surrounding the company.[44] On the whole, relations were amicable between the races and minorities within the American POW body.

The overall lack of success of most POW organizations was not due to any lack of persistence on the part of the POWs, but rather to Chinese vigilance. The camp authorities were persistent in their efforts to discover covert groups, and in this sphere they were almost uniformly successful. Informers aided the Chinese by compromising the secret organizations; this simplified the Chinese task of surveillance. The lack of specific aims hampered some organizations, by causing their members to expend their energies in several directions.

If the POW covert organizations were not strikingly successful at positive action, their very existence kept the Chinese busy tracking them down, questioning prisoners as to their motives, and in general caused the camp authorities no little annoyance.

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NND 867210
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The anti-communist groups gave evidence of the fact that all American prisoners would not acquiesce passively to communist indoctrination, and that there were many who realized that their military obligations continued even while they held the status of a POW.

The solitary confinement and jail sentences meted out to leaders of the various groups (even those not actively opposed to the Chinese, e.g. BLACK DIAMOND in Camp 5) is evidence of the fact that the Chinese, perhaps overestimating the power and influence of these groups, regarded them as a threat to their control of the prisoners.

These overt POW groups which required a minimum of co-operation with the enemy in order to exist - singing groups, recreation committee, and the like - served to create a non-communist social fabric within the camps. They afforded the prisoners some slight outlet for their energies without forcing upon them too compromising a position.

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CHAPTER 6

INTERROGATION

Section I - Introduction

This chapter will be devoted to a study of NKA (North Korean Army) and CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) interrogation techniques and procedures as they were applied to captured United States military personnel during the Korean conflict.

Prisoners of war have been considered valuable sources of information throughout the course of recorded history,[1] and this fact was not overlooked by either of the two belligerents opposing the United Nations forces. Both the NKA and the CCF emphasize the importance of prisoner interrogation in their military planning. Captured enemy documents indicate the significance attached to the interrogations of prisoners of war,[2] and a study of both the NKA and CCF intelligence organizations reveals the existence of highly specialized sections charged with the interrogation of captured personnel.[3]

It should be noted here that, in spite of its importance as an intelligence factor, POW interrogation in Korea was not primarily concerned with the development of purely military information, but was directed to a far greater degree along personal and political lines.

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Hostilities in Korea began without any formal understanding between the belligerents in respect to the interrogation of prisoners of war. Article 17 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 states in part:

> Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.

There was no statement or provision embodied in the Convention which prohibited or limited questioning on the part of interrogators. Prisoners, in turn, were left free to answer questions if they wished but were granted the right to refuse to answer all questions except those enumerated in Article 17. The Convention further states:

> No physical violence or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

The POWs in North Korea were not in a position to use the Convention as a basis upon which to demand their "rights," however, since neither North Korea nor Communist China were signatories. In addition, the fact that the United States has never formally ratified the Convention was sometimes used by the Communists in dealing

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with the prisoners. The few POWs who attempted to invoke the provisions of the Convention during the course of an interrogation were told by the enemy that, because the United States had not ratified the Convention, it was permissable for prisoners to disclose any and all types of information.

On the other hand, the Communists made frequent statements concerning their willingness to abide by the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Convention, but, imbued with their ideological fanaticism, they were less than scrupulous in their application of these provisions. Although they stated officially that they were treating the POWs in "complete conformity with the laws of humanity," this conformity was not evidenced in the prisoner of war camps and interrogation centers.

Since by definition "the enemy" includes both the North Korean Army and the Chinese Communist Forces, and inasmuch as they entered the conflict at different times and under different circumstances, the discussion of their techniques and procedures which follows is necessarily divided into two main sections.

The first of these sections, Section II, is concerned, first, with North Korean interrogation of U.S. POWs during the early part of the conflict, second, with the organization and role of POW interrogation in the overall NK intelligence system and, finally, with the questioning of POWs at "interrogation centers."

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Section III of this chapter is much broader in scope, not only because it concerns the interrogation by the CCF of a far greater number of POWs, but also because the Chinese were far more active in the field of POW interrogation than were their NK counterparts.

Allowance must be made for some degree of overlapping between the two sections, since many of the U.S. POWs captured and interrogated by the NKA in the early stages of the war were later questioned at length by the CCF. A further distinction under these two broad sections is made necessary by the fact that the interrogation procedures at the time of capture were naturally different from those at higher headquarters and at the interrogation centers. Still another distinction can be noted in the procedures involving the questioning of Air Force personnel and of those people who were suspected of being "agents" or members of the CIC.

Added to these was another facet of prisoner of war interrogation which, following a pattern developed by the Soviet Union in World War II, involved extensive questioning along personal-political lines. Both the NKA and the CCF indicated greater interest in this field than in either tactical or strategic interrogation.

The conduct of prisoner of war interrogations in Korea seems to have been subject to numerous variables. Communist procedures in this field appear to have varied with the tactical situation,

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the progress of the PANMUNJOM peace talks, the apparent knowledgeability of the individual POW, and even the whim of the interrogator. Any attempt, therefore, to delineate specific "techniques" is reduced to a study and comparison of many individual "case histories." Since each of these histories is subject to the varying factors described above, the techniques indicated in each instance must be viewed accordingly.

Section XI - North Korean Interrogation Techniques and Procedures

1. NK Organization for POW Interrogation

A study of individual debriefing reports from returned U.N. POWs indicates that the North Korean interrogation system was rather confused and disorganized. However, although there was a wide gap between prescribed procedures and actual practice, a definite plan for the evacuation and interrogation of captured U.N. personnel did exist.

Prisoner of war interrogation was the responsibility of the Preliminary Investigation Section, which functioned as a part of the Military Security Bureau. This bureau, in turn, operated directly under the Social Security Ministry, which itself was but one level removed from the top echelon of the North Korean Government. It was an elite group composed largely of Koreans born or educated under Communist tutelage in the U.S.S.R. (It should be noted that this high-level organization was developed from the

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NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/14/98

Ministry of Internal Affairs, which had been established by the Soviets in 1945 and had 60,000 men directly under its command.) The similarity between the organization of the North Korean and Soviet intelligence systems can thus be more easily understood.

The lowest echelon concerned with formal POW interrogation consisted of nine-man teams located at regimental POW collecting points.[5] In many instances POWs were questioned as to name, rank, and serial number at the time of their capture, usually at company or battalion level. However, it was not until they had reached a regimental collecting point that any effort was normally made to elicit information of a military nature.

2. Role of POW Interrogation

a. Tactical

For the most part, attempts by the IO to obtain military information of a purely tactical nature were the exception rather than the rule. Of those POWs who were questioned at all immediately after capture, most were asked only to give their names, ranks, and serial numbers, and possibly to identify their units. Those prisoners who were interrogated at (what probably were) regimental POW collecting points were usually questioned very briefly (15-20 minutes) on unit identification, adjacent units and (possibly) the boundaries of the units. Few attempts were made to thoroughly develop or enlarge upon this information.

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NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

One manner in which POW interrogation fitted into the NK intelligence system is illustrated by the following quotation from a captured NK document:

> From the interrogation of a POW from the 1st Company, 3d Battalion, U.S. Division, we were able to confirm that the intelligence we have obtained from our reconnaissance in the rear of the enemy defense position was accurate. Also, we learned more about enemy movements.[6]

b. Strategic

A few selected POWs were questioned extensively in an attempt to gain strategic information, but these cases were few in number and did not appear to be integrated into an intelligence plan. Much of the information sought under this classification was of a highly technical nature; in most cases at a much higher level, technically, than the interrogator could comfortably handle.

c. Political

Of particular significance is the fact that most of the interrogations by the North Koreans were directed toward developing information along political lines. Apparently this was done with the aim of determining the prisoner's political stability, in order to measure the chances of converting him to communist beliefs.

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NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

3. NK Interrogation Plan

A captured North Korean staff manual outlines a definite plan for the interrogation of captured U.N. POWs by NKA personnel.[7] Initially, POWs were to be separated according to rank and according to the U.N. units to which they had been attached at the time of capture. Officers and enlisted men were to be handled separately. Interrogations at regimental level (POW collecting points) were designed to be simple, and were calculated to obtain only that data which pertained to the unit's immediate operations. It was here that the POW was to receive his first questioning by trained interrogators. Any questioning prior to this was carried out by front line troops as a part of the initial processing. Interrogation data obtained at regimental level was to be recorded on special forms, and, together with any captured documents, was to accompany the POW to division headquarters, where the chief of the division interrogation team was to inspect the forms and make a selection of likely sources of information among the POWs.

Those selected in this fashion were then to be questioned in accordance with the intelligence requirements of the various staff sections. The results of these interrogations were to be immediately submitted to corps headquarters without regard to whether the interrogees were to be detained or turned over to the NK police authorities.

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NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

4. Interrogation of a U.S. Officer

Although the regulations outlining this plan were specific, they were rarely observed in actual practice. The following case, in which the prescribed procedures were very closely followed, is therefore an exceptional one. The interrogee, a U.S. Army lieutenant from the 24th Infantry Division, was captured near POHANG by elements of the North Korean 12th Division on 12 September 1950. An account of his experiences follows:

a. Initial Processing

At the company CP, a NK soldier recorded the name, rank, and organization of all US personnel. After a wait of 30 minutes, the lieutenant was marched back to the battalion and was later taken to the regimental CP. At one of these, he was asked to fill out a form. Included on this paper was a question as to whether or not he required medical attention and a list giving him, as a POW, three choices of action: first, to return to the front and take up arms against UN forces; second, to be released so that he could work his way back to friendly lines; and third, to be interned at a POW camp in Seoul. The lieutenant states that he was not permitted to make a choice.

b. Regimental Interrogation

The lieutenant was subjected to his first interrogation at regimental headquarters approximately six hours after his capture. A NK major (who acted as) interpreter-interrogator did the questioning. He followed a printed form which contained about 250 questions and was divided into several sections. The first group of questions concerned the organization, strength, and

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

equipment of the interrogee's unit and followed a sequence which reminded the lieutenant of US FMs 101-5 and 101-10. The next three groups pertained to logistics, tactics and the use of combined arms, respectively. The following section contained questions of a personal nature. The last group was political in scope and contained such questions as: "How do US EM feel toward cabinet members?" The political affiliations of the interrogee were also taken up here. The entire interrogation lasted approximately three hours.

c. Division Interrogation

The second interrogation of this officer was conducted at division headquarters and lasted approximately one hour. Questioning was handled by a Soviet Army officer dressed in the uniform of a NKA captain. A NK major acted as interpreter. A clerk wrote down answers to the questions in Russian; questioning was done spontaneously without reference to an outline or guide. Queries were non-military in nature and generally covered political subjects. A discussion was conducted into the relative merits of democracy and communism, with the Soviet officer attempting to prove fallacies in the belief that democracy was preferable to communist concepts. Finding that (the lieutenant had been) assigned to the 19th Infantry Regiment, the interrogator went to a large cardboard file and brought out folders labeled with numerical designations corresponding to the three infantry regiments of the 24th Division. A search of the files revealed that the lieutenant was being carried as assigned to the 34th Regiment. This had been true, as the POW had only recently been assigned to the 19th. A dossier was then removed from the file and the officer was read a complete history of his life, including information which allegedly could only have been obtained from a personal history statement (Form 643) filed in the United States in 1946. At the conclusion of the interview, the POW was told that he would be reinterrogated at Army level.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

d. Corps Interrogation

A third interrogation, lasting 5 to 6 hours, was conducted by another NKA major at corps headquarters. Parts of this interview were recorded. The major, who stated that he was a former English professor at Seoul University, volunteered the information that he was corps director of propaganda and that his duties included the organizing of propaganda aired over Radio Seoul. He explained that UN prisoners were required to read prepared statements to the effect that they were receiving good treatment. According to the US officer, these recordings were generally accomplished at the point of a gun to preclude deviations from the script. The interrogation conducted at this level was apparently another effort to persuade the interrogee to re-examine his political ideology. Great pains were taken to explain the basic concepts of communist doctrine. The questioning was devoid of military significance until the corps artillery officer appeared and interjected a request for information concerning US artillery time fuses. He could not understand why certain fuses gave "three bursts" while others did not. The POW replied that it was obviously the result of faulty manufacturing, an answer which apparently satisfied the NK officer.

e. Army Interrogation

The fourth and final interrogation of this officer POW was undertaken at army level and lasted approximately 8 hours. Two interpreters were used during this session; one a SK woman, the other a man who claimed to be a civilian and who stated that he was undergoing confinement as a result of a criminal act. The lieutenant believes that (the latter) was an informer attempting to gain his confidence. The interrogators were two Soviet officers wearing the uniforms of an NKA Lt Col and Col, respectively. The Lt Col was present throughout the interview; the Col appeared intermittently. The Lt Col directed the conversation into such channels as politics in

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the United States, the contrasting ideals of communism and democracy, and the superiority of the former. He also attempted to draw the [illegible] into an argument over the comparative merits of the US and Soviet armies. American literature was introduced as an excuse to inquire into the receptiveness of the US public to "liberal" political treatises. Questions were asked aimed at determining military educational levels and (the) economic background of US army officers and [illegible]. Military equipment was compared. The lieutenant was asked if the US was geared for war production, particularly with regard to aircraft and armor. He was also queried concerning matters of immediate tactical value. Questions along these lines included the number of ships in the Seventh Fleet, the location of airfields basing fighter and (bomber) groups, and the number of aircraft based in Japan. Intermittently during the discussion, the Colonel interspersed questions to clear up points which he did not thoroughly understand. The Lt Col attempted to point out to the US officer what he termed errors in political thinking. It was obvious that the Soviet officers considered this session as an indoctrination course and that any significant information derived in the process was incidental and of secondary importance. No specific strategic information regarding US industry or production potential was sought.[8]

It should be stressed again that the procedure described was not generally followed. Captured U.S. personnel were usually questioned briefly by the NKA in regard to name, rank, serial number, and unit identification soon after being taken prisoner and were not interrogated again until after they had reached a permanent camp.

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5. Interrogation of a Non-Commissioned Officer

Another returned POW, a U.S. Army sergeant, was interrogated in a slightly different manner. The NKA had determined from the initial processing that the POW was a specialist in communications. Approximately twelve days after his capture (July 1950), he was interrogated by two NK officers in a schoolhouse in SEOUL. One of the interrogators spoke English and acted as interpreter for the other. Their preliminary questions concerned the POW's identification and the name of the communications officer of the POW's unit. The sergeant avoided answering the latter by stating that his communications officer had been killed a few days before the sergeant himself had been captured.

The main portion of the interrogation was centered about questions concerning U.S. Army codes. The sergeant was asked to decode a few U.S. Army messages. One message used a five-letter code group with which he was familiar, but he answered that he could not decode it without the aid of a cipher device. When specifically asked if he could do it with this device, he stated that, in order to decode the message, he would also need additional Signal Operating Instructions, as well as the code group, date and time group. When asked for the meaning of the numerals from zero to nine -- the long count on voice radio transmission - he answered that they didn't mean anything, as far as he knew. The interrogators were most insistent in their endeavors to make him decode the messages,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

but they did not threaten him or offer any inducements. Both officers were armed with pistols. There were no other guards present. The interpreter spoke good English and took notes in long hand. The interpreter told him, "You Americans are like race horses with blinders and can see only what is in front of you." The POW's answer was, "At least we know where we are going." At this point both officers got angry and told him to get out.

6. NKA Interrogation Program at the "Valley"

A captured NK document pertaining to the questioning of 452 U.S. POWs held in the "Valley," 10 miles SE of PYOKTONG, shows the results of a very extensive interrogation program conducted by the NK during the period between 3 November and 23 November 1950.[10] The questioning was conducted by the Political Section, 1st Corps, NKA (HAN CHAS HO, YUN UNG MUN, and MUN KI POK were credited with directing the interrogations) and was concerned primarily with the development of information of a sociological and political nature. According to the report, only a very limited amount of military information was developed.

The following titles of the sections in the report indicate the types of information sought: Morale and Opinion of U.S. Troops; Life of the Soldier in the U.S. Army (covering pay, food, travel, and reasons for volunteering for service); Morale; Difficulties Encountered in the Korean War; Opinions Concerning the Termination

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of the War; Opinions of the U.S. POW Concerning the NKA; POW Opinions Concerning China and the Chinese Forces Entering Korea; Opinions Concerning the U.S.S.R. The report also contained statistical analyses concerning the backgrounds of the POWs. The POWs were broken down into three categories: Officer, NCO, and Enlisted Men. The information here covered such subjects as civilian occupations (labor, clerical, farmers, merchants, free enterprise, private enterprise, landlords, and others). Other charts showed a breakdown of the POWs' educational level, social position, and length of service. Although the report implied that the information contained therein was the result of personal interrogation, none of the returnees who were in that particular camp at that time remember any formal interrogation.[11] It may be conjectured, therefore, that most of the information developed was obtained through personal history forms or autobiographical statements which most of the POWs had been required to complete once after capture, and again after reaching the "Valley."

The debriefing reports of returned POWs reveal that a NK major also conducted personal interviews with several POWs at the "Valley";[12] but here again the information sought was strictly political in nature. At the conclusion of the interrogation, the major jotted down on the interrogation sheet his observations concerning the character of the interrogee. He wrote, "This man is (is not) sincere." (Several POWs questioned by this major were later selected

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/95

to go to P'YONGYANG with the "Peace Fighters"). Information demanded by the major was listed on a personal history statement. It included name, rank, and serial number, length of service, reason for enlisting (if enlisted), name of mother and father, and their respective incomes. A standard part of the format, and a statement that was repeated many times over, was, "State your hopes and desires."

Regardless of the method used, the net result of the Political Section of the NKA was a well-prepared sociological study concerning 452 of the U.S. POWs who were under NK control in November 1950.

7. NKA Interrogation Center ("Pak's Palace")

In April 1951, the NK established a highly specialized interrogation center near the city of P'YONGYANG. The following description of "Pak's Palace" - as the center was called by the POWs - together with what appears to be a typical interrogation, is taken from the debriefing report of a returned POW:

> The first mention of an interrogation center to be run by the North Koreans was made in the early part of February 1951, by Major KIM DOK SONG, then in charge of the "Peace Fighters" group in "Traitors' Row." He came to a USAF major and told him that a friend of his, PAK, was just entering the interrogation field and that he wanted to interrogate a POW for practice. The POW was interrogated by PAK from the 7th to 10th of February at NOSANG, three and one-half miles due west of what was later "Pak's Palace." These interrogations could only have

DECLASSIFIED
NND 869210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

proven unsatisfactory to PAK since, at this time, he gave evidence of having only the barest knowledge of English. The U.S. major returned to "Traitors' Row." He saw PAK again on 17 Mar 51 at (YD 3 3?40), three miles west of the center. On 2 Apr 51, he was finally brought to the permanent "Pak's Palace."

"Pak's Palace" was located twelve KM northeast of PYONGYANG on the MSR to KANGGYE. It consisted merely of a brickyard and a group of Korean houses appropriated by the military. It was run completely by the North Koreans. A Col LEE was the Chief Administrator, but the officer in charge of interrogation, and the dominant personality, was PAK. The expression "Pak's Palace" was coined by the US POWs in derisive tribute to him. PAK and "Dirty Pictures" WONG were the only two who could be classified as intolerably brutal during interrogations. A former university professor, also named PAK, PYONG, and a second LEE completed the interrogation team.

Here he was subjected to eight or ten interrogations, two by PAK, one by Professor PAK, several by PYONG, and once before a seminar of North Korean aviation cadets. The latter asked many specific questions such as, "How many square feet are contained in a B-29?" An interrogation by LEE, who spoke fluent English, consisted of sixteen questions on all phases of military information. In addition there were such questions as, "Why did you come to Korea?" "Who started the Korean War?" "What is your attitude toward the war?" Some titles of books for indoctrination purposes were suggested and recommended. He remembers specifically a North Korean "White Paper" in connection with general elections in South Korea. He was also questioned on the order of battle, the people in the chain of command, the names of all units known to him, of all targets hit by his squadron, the formations and tactics used by his squadron, and supply systems. To these questions he gave complete answers, but accurate only as of 1948.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Sometime in April, the US major sent a protest to PAK alleging PAK's brutality during interrogations. PAK was reprimanded and, thenceforth, appeared eager for retaliation. The opportunity presented itself when the POW, having escaped with two others on 28 Apr 51, was recaptured on 11 May 51. On this occasion PAK tore off each of his fingernails with a set of pliers and then set his clothes on fire by continued jabbing with lighted cigarettes.

While at "Pak's Palace," he was also interrogated three times by a General WONG, who had talked to him at a CCF interrogation center. General WONG had a full colonel as his interpreter. He wanted to know answers to questions on organizations, personnel, intelligence, and supply (but of nothing higher than wing level) The conversation would last for an hour and then WONG would demand that the interrogee write out the answers. The major came to have a lot of respect for the general and later considered that they were on the best personal terms. They met again at Camp 2 and Camp 2½. The general would sometimes go out of his way to visit him and say hello.

A typical interrogation by PAK would follow this pattern: The guard would come to get the major and would conduct him into a room eight feet square which contained a table and one chair and a Signal Corps wire spool. The major could either sit on the chair or the spool. PAK would ask such questions as, "What routes are followed by the B-29?" The major would spend four or five minutes giving evasive answers. Some abusive language, threats, or an occasional well-placed kick would follow, and then there would be the order to write out the answers. PAK would leave, return in a while, and would be satisfied if the sheets were filled with writing. He didn't care what was on the paper. He never gave any indication of having read any of it. It seemed to the prisoner that he was interested only in obtaining mounds of written material to show what a good job he was doing.[3]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

Although several U.S. Army and Navy officers and a few Navy enlisted men were questioned at "Pak's Palace," the great majority of POWs held there were USAF personnel, mostly officers.

The information sought at "Pak's Palace" was primarily of a military nature and covered a wide variety of subjects, usually depending upon the knowledgeability (alleged or otherwise) of the interrogee. Even this line of questioning, however, was occasionally interspersed with political harangues in an endeavor to indoctrinate the POW while he was being interrogated.

Another returned POW states that "Pak's Palace" appeared to be a training school, or at least that it did have a training function subsidiary to that of interrogation. He based this observation on the fact that Korean interrogators would come in as civilians, and, after having practiced interrogation for some time, would appear in the uniforms of Korean majors. There were also a number of UK Air Force personnel, most of whom seemed to be second lieutenants just out of flying school, who would interrogate U.S. Air Force POWs, through interpreters, on various aspects of American aircraft. During the month of April and the first part of May, 1951, the interrogations at "Pak's Palace" appeared rather haphazard. They took the form of oral questions by the interrogator, which the POW answered either orally or in writing. In May, 1951, however, the questions began to emanate from some source outside the Center. They were presented in written form and had

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

obviously been prepared by someone who was familiar with USA matters.

The interrogations at "Pak's Palace," rather than being conducted on a straight question and answer basis, generally took the form of topical discussions. The approach was informal; one interrogator invariably began his interview with a smile and the comment "Now we visit." During the normal process of interrogation, a general subject such as "Bridges" would be assigned, and the POW would be told to write a paper discussing the topic. At the next session, after the interrogator had reviewed the generalized essay, a more specific topic would be assigned. The "Bailey Bridge," for example, followed "Bridges."[15]

In March, 1952, a group of three North Korean officers came to Camp 2, which was then controlled by the CCF.[16] Shortly after their arrival, a group of about thirty POWs were taken to a nearby cluster of buildings, given pencils and paper, and assigned topics upon which to write. They refused, en masse, and were forced to remain in the building for the rest of the day. When they were released, they complained to the Chinese about this treatment. The CCF stated that the POWs would have to write, but that force would not be used. The POWs then returned to the NKA interrogators and wrote on such diversified subjects as "How to bid a bridge hand," "How to play golf," "The scenery from San Francisco to PUSAN," etc. No punitive action was taken by either the NKA or

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the Chinese. (This less co-operative attitude on the part of the POWs was probably a natural outgrowth of the "lenient policy" of the Chinese. It also tends to show a lack of co-ordination between the various working levels of the NKPA and CCF interrogation sections).

3. Use of Physical Violence

For the most part, physical violence was not employed by the North Koreans during interrogations of U.S. POWs. Notable exceptions to this, however, took place at "Pak's Palace" and seemed to be governed by the whim of Major PAK. Even here, violence was in most cases limited to slaps across the face whenever individual interrogators lost their tempers. Beatings and other types of brutal treatment were usually administered only for offenses more serious than merely resisting interrogation. A few POWs were made to suffer through solitary confinement and reduced rations while at "Pak's Palace," but this treatment was only rarely attributable to a prisoner's refusal to talk.

No POW is known to have died as a direct result of physical violence incident to an interrogation. In fact, direct physical pressure or duress was rarely employed as an interrogation technique. (Exceptions to this are found in connection with Bacteriological Warfare "confessions," which represent, as noted in Chapter 8, a specialized program.) It is conspicuous, however, that despite the rarity of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

physical torture, not one returned claims that he furnished the information which he provided his captors to his name, rank and serial number. Many individuals, particularly USAF POWs, have stated that, in conformance with instructions from their units prior to capture, they made no attempt to limit their answers to those basic questions. Although most returnees maintain that they did not divulge secret military information to the enemy, the same POWs admit, having discussed family and political matters at great length with their captors.

9. Use of Threats

Most of the returned POWs reported that it was standard procedure for an interrogator to flourish a pistol and lay it ceremoniously on the table in front of him at the start of an interrogation. This was supposed to serve as a constant reminder to the POW that he would be shot if he did not co-operate. Also, nearly every IO interrogator threatened his interrogee with non-repatriation if he didn't talk.

Instances of threats of immediate death for refusal to talk were rare. Such threats occurred mainly in the cases of POWs who were being interrogated in regard to Bacteriological Warfare (see Chapter 8). They were not employed as a standard means of obtaining what might be called "routine" information. There were instances reported in which a POW was told that unless he talked by the following morning he would be shot. But whether or not this constitutes

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

an "immediate" threat of death is a question that must necessarily be left to individual interpretation.

10. Use of Drugs or Other Inducements

None of the returned POWs believed that drugs were used as an aid to interrogation; nor does it appear that either liquor or women were ever offered as inducements. More often than not, cigarettes were offered to an interrogee, but this apparently was done to relax him and to establish rapport, and could hardly be called a bribe.

Some POWs have accused others of giving information in order to secure preferential treatment such as better or more food. Such incidents have not been verified, however, since former POWs are normally hesitant about admitting such activities.

11. Use of Interpreters

Because of the language barrier, North Korean interpreters were used for many of the initial interrogations during the first few months of the war. Later, especially at "Pak's Palace," the interrogators themselves were able to speak English and no translation was necessary. Some of them had obviously been educated in the U.S., since they spoke English fluently and even understood the slang expressions used by the POWs. However, the standards of education and linguistic ability among the interpreters did not appear to be uniform. Some were highly proficient, while others were quite limited.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

12. Reference Material as Aids to Interrogation

Returnees report that the North Koreans appeared to have very little in the way of reference material with which to check the veracity of the information supplied by the POWs. (This is in contrast to reports that the CCF had many such aids; see Section III e, this chapter.)

Section IV. - Chinese Communist Interrogation

Captured documents, debriefings of returned POWs, and interrogations of captured CCF personnel all indicate that the CCF approached the POW interrogation problem with a more realistic program than the NKA.

The following system for POW interrogation was described by a captured CCF soldier who was a member of a regimental POW unit:

> The POW Section constituted one of the sections in the Political Branch of Regimental Headquarters. A POW Section or Department was established in the Political Branch of units above Regiment in the Chinese People's Liberation Army after the war in Korea began, but before the CCF intervention (exact date of establishment is unknown). Division headquarters had a POW Section, Army Headquarters a POW Department, and Army Group Headquarters a POW General Department. The organization of the Division POW Section, Army POW Department and Army Group POW General Department was similar to that of the Regimental POW Section, differing only in the number of directors and unit members. There were three Directors and five POW unit members in the Divisional POW Section.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By LRR NARS, Date 4/11/90

Personnel of (a typical Regimental) POW Section:

Chief of Section (Bn S-2 equivalent) one Director, (platoon leader equivalent) three POW unit members (two platoon leaders equivalent and one squad leader equivalent, usually referred to as Unit members) and one messenger (private).

Duties:

POW Section (Regimental Headquarters): registration and evacuation of POWs and preparation of POW reports for submission to Division POW Section.

Chief of Regiment POW Section: overall supervision and direction of the work of the Section. Responsible to the executive officer of the Regimental Branch.

Director: registration of POWs.

POW Unit members: preparation of POW reports and evacuation of POWs.[17]

1. The Role of CCF POW Interrogation

As evidenced by their interrogation of U.S. POWs, the intelligence systems of the CCF and the NKA placed about equal emphasis on POW interrogation. Neither manifested an urgent need for tactical or strategic information. The Chinese, however, seemed more efficient than the North Koreans at extracting desired information. It will be pointed out later in this section how, in obtaining certain technical information, they used methods not experienced by U.S. POWs at the hands of the NKA.

The CCF efforts to obtain personal or political information from their POWs were certainly more exhaustive than those of the NKA.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Even so, it cannot be proved that the Chinese attached more importance to this type of intelligence than did the North Koreans.

2. CCF Plans Concerning PW Interrogations

The following is quoted from a captured CCF book entitled Infantry Reconnaissance, published in March 1953, which clearly outlines the policy of the CCF in regard to POW interrogation:

THE INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

The interrogation of prisoners of war is one of the sources of obtaining important intelligence information.

All the prisoners of war should be sent to the rear immediately, without delay.

The infantry squad leader has authority to interrogate the prisoners of war only when his unit moves independently. The platoon leader must not detain prisoners of war for more than ten minutes.

The commanding officers must confiscate all documents, newspapers and letters from the captured prisoners of war, and also separate the enlisted men, the officers, and the non-commissioned officers.

Normally, prisoners of war are interrogated individually. During interrogation, it is necessary to maintain a calm attitude and to keep the conversation flowing freely. The attitude toward the prisoners of war must be kind; give them food and cigarettes. The attitude toward the wounded is especially important. Prohibit confiscation of their bedding, clothes, and shoes.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The majority of the officers most likely will give you false information. Even though they do, avoid rudeness toward them at the time of interrogation. Also, it is true, too, that some officers do not belong to the ruling class, and are sympathetic with the Red Army.

The interrogation of the prisoners of war should be carried out immediately after their capture, when they have had no time to think of false information. But, in case they give false information, it should be pointed out to them immediately.

Never write notes in front of a prisoner of war or make any markings on a map.

The reconnaissance unit should interrogate the prisoners of war on any question that directly concerned the reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance platoon leader and squad leader should always determine if any enemy are within his direction of movement, the exact location of the enemy, their strength, and their activities.

The following questions should be used in interrogating prisoners of war:

(1) Where is your squad located?
(2) What are your activities: defense, attack or withdrawal?
(3) Please point out with your hand where your platoon is located.
(4) Where is your company located?
(5) Where is your cavalry company located?
(6) Where is your battalion located?
(7) Where are your heavy machine guns located?
(8) Please indicate by fingers how many heavy machine guns you have.
(9) What regiment?
(10) What company?

The above questions should be used by the reconnaissance platoon and reconnaissance squad.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

(11) Where are your sentry outposts located?
(12) Where are your advance guards located?
(13) What is the distance in miles from here?
(14) Are there any wire entanglements?
(15) Are there any tanks?
(16) Are there any armored cars?
(17) Are there any infantry troops?
(18) Are there any artillerymen?
(19) Are there any cavalry troops?

The above questions will be asked if the situation warrants it. These questions should be written in the enemy's language, and carried by the interrogators at all times.

If the situation is such that the removal of prisoners of war to the rear is not practical, or when the prisoner of war is wounded, then a detailed interrogation will be conducted in order to obtain the most important information concerning their superior officers in the front areas.[18]

Another captured booklet, issued by the CCF in March 1951 and entitled How to Interrogate Prisoners of War, reveals the detailed thoroughness with which the CCF treated POW interrogation and the manner in which they attempted to exploit all types of prisoners.[19] It also indicates that they realized their limitations in the field and that they recognized the need for improving their methods and techniques. The document cited above is quoted in part below:

THE TASK OF POW INTERROGATIONS

We have interrogated more than 50 American POWs since we entered the Korean war. They are officers and EM from the rank of lieutenant colonel down, and from various branches of service, such as Air Force, infantry, engineer, tank, and artillery units. Twenty-two files of systematic material have been made pertaining to this matter.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The interrogation of American POWs is a new task. With our differences and our limited knowledge of their characteristics and thought, we have, so far, in the last four months, gained some experience; however, methods will be developed step-by-step according to circumstances. As for battlefield interrogation, this book only mentions it for reference.

1. The preliminary preparation.

A. Selection of subjects.

If there is only one prisoner, there is no necessity for selection. If there are a few or many POWs, those with the longest service, the most experience, or with a specialty, should be selected for interrogation. It is better if the prisoner to be interrogated has an open mind and progressive thought (generally there are very few among the officers). It is bad to select an ignorant, stupid, professional soldier. Therefore, our officers should hold a preliminary conversation with the prisoner to select the proper ones for questioning.

B. After POWs are registered and personal data obtained, draw up a plan based on the general intention and practical situation to group the POWs under the control and guidance of the officers-in-charge and the interpreters. This should be done in accordance with the ability of the members assigned to this duty.

C. Prepare a concrete plan for the interrogation of POWs (summarized procedure and methods, et cetera) and then summon groups to conduct research and discussion in order to let everyone know his duties and how they should be done. At the same time tasks should be distributed among the groups.

D. Properly isolate the POWs (according to whether their political attitude is good or bad, or whether they present the same problem). Special personnel should be assigned to take charge of the living conditions of the POWs, in order to harmonize with the interrogation.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

2. Procedures.

A. Comprehension of the prisoners' historical and political attitudes: Establish a foundation for the interrogation and training of the POWs by understanding the practical experiences they have undergone since they enlisted in the service, and their views and personal attitudes towards the Korean War.

B. Interpretation of our policy and conduct of training: Interpret our policy of treating the POWs well in order to overcome their hesitation, then explain to them in significance of such big problems as the nature of the war et cetera, in order to reform their thoughts and combat their pride. By this process we can also secure a knowledge of their political attitudes and their personalities, which is helpful in the selection of methods or attitudes with which to approach them.

C. Questioning: The choice of a written or oral form of interrogation is to be determined by the practical situation. For instance, for information on the organization, strength and tactics used by the US Army, et cetera, the POWs should be questioned orally; while other information such as brief histories of the officers, et cetera, should be written by the POWs themselves according to the subjects prescribed for them. (This, of course, depends upon the cultural standard of the POW.)

D. Interrogation: A well-prepared (method) of interrogation is necessary for the stubborn, cunning and reactionary POWs who try to deceive and ignore us; however, we must not forget to make use of their weak points (such as fear of death, homesickness, anti-war tendencies, et cetera). Whenever a contradiction in the words of the POW is found, his tricks should be carefully uncovered by questioning with a severe attitude. However, this is not to be considered as a general method.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

E. Meeting of the POW: To solve problems of contradiction and to supplement and verify the statements, we must be well-prepared beforehand, before a meeting of the POWs can be held (the preparation includes deciding upon the contradictory points to be discussed, the cultivation of active POWs, procurement of more materials, and rectifying the contradictions in the materials). During the meeting, order must be preserved (prevent the POWs from damaging the meeting place, et cetera). To save time only valuable POWs are to be summoned for the meeting.

F. Arrangements.

G. Checking, amending and supplementing: Among the above procedures, only the "Comprehension of historical and political attitudes," "Conduct of training" and the "Arrangements" are imperative; other items may either be adopted or discarded to suit the practical situation. Do not stick to the rules too rigidly.

3. Typical characteristics of American POWs and the attitude and methods to be adopted.

The basic characteristics of American POWs are fear of death, homesickness, and anti-war tendencies. They do not have a clear understanding of their aggressive war in Korea. They were profoundly indoctrinated with reactionary ways of thinking before being conscripted and deceived by being sent to Korea. They especially long for the American way of life. If we can make use of their fear of death, homesickness, and their unstable standpoint, and give them good living conditions, we will find that they are not stubborn, and after they understand our policy they will generally give us information.

The POWs we have met so far are generally of the following types:

(1) Active ones: These are chiefly young enlisted men of higher quality, they accept our way of thinking, are willing and have the courage to speak and speak actively. We should do our

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

best to encourage and train this type of POW and give them due consideration in order to make them work for us and supply us with information. We may ask them to write according to the subjects we present to them. In this way they are allowed to express themselves freely and more information can be obtained.

(2) Pretended active ones: They pretend to be very active in order to be treated with consideration or to procure certain personal benefits. However, basically speaking, they are useful in supplying information to us, although their motives in giving information are dishonest. We should train those who are "backward," and handle those who are willing to supply information with a severe attitude without revealing that we know their true intention. This attitude can prevent them from constantly demanding better treatment, and so forth.

(3) Reactionary, fearful and homesick ones with an unstable viewpoint, but who are willing to supply information: We should make use of their weak points, handle them with a severe attitude and make them respect us. However, as long as they give information, do not spend too much time training them politically.

(4) Cowardly and hesitant ones who give only insignificant or ambiguous information: They usually try to flatter and pretend to be friendly toward us after giving a little information. For this type of POW we should seize upon their contradictory points and their basic weak points of cowardliness and fear of death and treat them roughly to force them to obey. Formal joint interrogation was adopted with effective results.

(5) Stubborn ones who simply say "I don't know," and are never the less still fearful and homesick: We should handle them with severity from the very beginning. Treat them roughly and then put them away for a few days to let them think it over. Meanwhile active POWs should be used to observe their reactions. Later on

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

another man should be used to question them again. They should not be interrogated until they have changed their attitudes.

(6) Stupid ones: The thoughts of this type of POW are confused, and they know very little. From them we can obtain, at most, such information as the designation of troops, the general living condition of the troops, et cetera. We should not waste time on them, but we must be careful that we are not deceived.

4. Experience

A. With respect to guidance, an understanding of the abilities of the cadre must be secured first. Then specific tasks should be assigned according to their individual experience. The interpreters should cooperate with the military experts.

B. With respect to the methods of guidance, the "group-participation" method should be adopted, a democratic spirit should be highly developed and the activity of the group stimulated. Interpreters should not be considered machines; outlined procedures for POW interrogation should be presented, discussed and studied as soon as they are ready to enable the interpreters to realize the intention and be prepared for their jobs. This is very important in the performance of their duties.

C. Generally speaking, it is best to combine the process of translation with that of arrangement, because the interpreters know the practical situation best. Doing it this way, the information can be made more practical, and there is no danger of discontinuity. Therefore, the interpreters themselves should keep detailed notes of interrogation and check them at certain time of the day. These notes should be arranged for the leaders' reference and for use as a basis for the interrogation on the following day.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

D. We should try to master the personalities, characteristics and political attitudes of the POWs. Different methods and attitudes of questioning should be used for different POWs, e.g., consideration for active ones should be distinguished from that for the stubborn ones; experience has proved that this way is correct.

E. The policy of good treatment of POWs should be properly carried out, giving them a good impression. Those who were well treated or given medical care on the battlefields were often deeply moved and it became easy for us to reform their thoughts. The importance and correctness of the policy of good treatment for POWs was proven repeatedly by those facts.

F. The training of the POWs in their way of thinking has a specific effect. Although not everyone will accept the training readily, yet they must finally be more or less moved by it. It is often found that many POWs change their attitudes after the training. Therefore, the training of the POWs in their way of thinking must not be neglected.

G. The attitude towards the POWs generally should be severe, this is very natural. We should be severe, but kind, generous, not proud and imperious; only this sort of action will make the POWs more respectful of us.

5. How to interrogate POWs on the battlefield.

Good results can never be obtained by demanding a large amount of information from the POW immediately after he is captured on the battlefield. Instead, our policy of good treatment of POWs should first be explained to give them mental comfort and relieve their hesitation, then questions can be asked. Experience has proved that this is the most effective method; haste will only bring failure.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

> On account of language difficulties, the statements of the American POWs must be interpreted; however, we have too few interpreters, and, furthermore, they are all lacking in military knowledge. Their way of interpreting word by word not only fails to express the attitude of the POWs, but is also often misunderstood. Therefore, interpreters must be trained in the techniques of interrogation. Then, they should be allowed to question the POWs by themselves. Information should be studied and conclusions drawn with the assistance of the leaders after the preliminary interrogation. Then a second interrogation should be conducted. This method not only obviates the confusion incurred in interpreting word by word, but also prevents the interrogation officer from handling the interrogation perfunctorily to avoid the tedious interpretation.[19]

4. Initial Interrogation by the CCF

The intervention of the CCF in Korea in November 1950 produced no perceptible change in either the extent or the technique of interrogating POWs immediately after capture. In most instances, what has been termed by the returnees as "interrogation" was, at this stage, little more than a "processing" to obtain names, ranks, and serial numbers. A few additional questions relative to unit identifications were also asked.

A captured booklet printed in Chinese, with an accompanying translation entitled Interrogation of British and American POWs, was issued in February 1951. The purpose of this booklet was to make the initial interrogation a very simple one.[20] It contained a list of U.S. and British tactical units in Korea, a list of the various ranks, a list of various duty assignments with accompanying

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

data on troop positions and strength, and a list of weapons in each area. In order to conduct an interrogation with the aid of this booklet, the captor had only to require a POW to point to or draw a line under the correct or more nearly correct answer. In this fashion, a great amount of information could be quickly extracted from a POW without requiring him to utter a word, and without the existence of any linguistic rapport between the interrogator and the POW. The display of knowledge in the booklet may have been designed to impress U.N. POWs with the idea that the CCF was already well informed, and thus to lead the prisoners into thinking that it would be futile to withhold information. This proposed motive is necessarily conjectural, however, since the document itself states that its preparation was necessitated by the dearth of English-speaking CCF interrogators. The following quotation from a similar captured enemy document also cites the shortage of linguistic personnel as the primary reason for the use of questionnaires:

> Many prisoners of war have been captured by various units during combat. Due to lack of English-speaking personnel in the field, we were unable to interrogate the POWs in time to obtain information in regard to the enemy's front line. For this reason, we have frequently lost many opportunities to annihilate the enemy and to obtain success in battles. To alleviate this problem, we have prepared these forms for interrogation of POWs.[21]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRC NARS, Date 4/11/90

Although a number of questionnaires were discovered in Korea, almost 80 per cent of the U.N. POWs were captured prior to the publication and distribution of these interrogation aids. Their effectiveness, therefore, cannot accurately be assessed. The appearance of these questionnaires on the battlefront in the spring of 1951, however, indicates the importance which the CCF attached to the tactical interrogation of U.N. POWs. It also illustrates their apparent dissatisfaction with their own efforts in this regard during the first months of Chinese combat activity in Korea.

5. CCF Interrogation Center

The first organized "high-level" interrogation program by the Chinese was launched in an area located approximately 20 miles from the temporary camp of "Death Valley." Oddly enough, this camp never acquired any sobriquet other than "CCF Interrogation Center." Selected POWs, usually officers, were brought from "Death Valley" and interrogated at great length on various topics. What appears to be a typical interrogation - that of a major of the U.S. Corps of Engineers - is reported as follows:

> Two days after the prisoners' group had arrived at "Death Valley," the Chinese came around to the huts and called out approximately ten of the prisoners. These men were taken to an interrogation center operated by the CCF. The average number of prisoners at the center was ten to fifteen, with some rotation among the group as new men were brought in and old ones were taken out.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The interrogation which he received during this period, although intensive, was extremely irregular as to time and sequence. Questioning would sometimes last several days in succession and even into the nights, and then would be discontinued for a period of time. In some instances an interrogation was stopped in the middle of what would seem to be (from the standpoint of the enemy) a lucrative subject and would not be continued for several days.

During this internment, the prisoner was questioned by two Chinese interrogators, both of whom spoke excellent English. The first was known as "Dirty Pictures" WONG, and the POW did not recall ever having heard the name of the second man. Although both were sadistic in their methods, the latter was even more constantly abusive and threatening than WONG. The interrogations were conducted by one or the other of them, or sometimes by both of them together. There was no evidence of the employment of recording devices, and answers were taken down by the interrogator (or interrogators).

The sessions usually began on a "friendly" basis, with the interrogator seated behind a small table and the POW squatting on a stool in front of him. Questioning was normally preceded by a little lecture describing the "aggressive" nature of the U.N. "intervention" in North Korea. The interrogator would conclude by stating that he realized, however, that it was not the fault of the individual, but the result of actions by President TRUMAN and General MACARTHUR. A dissertation on the "lenient policy" of the Chinese would follow this introduction. Under this "policy," if the POW "sincerely and deeply" recognized his mistakes and "sincerely and deeply" confessed and co-operated, everything would be all right. This approach, which appeared in various guises throughout the entire interrogation effort, was seemingly used to convince the POW that this was his duty to the "peace loving" people of the world to co-operate by answering fully and truthfully. There was no attempt at material bribery

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/14/98

during the interrogations, although a cigarette might occasionally be given the interrogee. Liquor, food, or the enticement of female company were never offered in exchange for information.

As the interrogation progressed and the POW either refused to answer a question or professed ignorance, the "friendly" approach was dropped abruptly and replaced by violent harangues. The prisoner would be told that he was "stupid" and that he could not fool the CPV. Threats, sometimes veiled and sometimes direct, were used incessantly and included threats of death, of being taken to Manchuria, of not being repatriated, etc. The prisoner was told that he was a war criminal and could be treated as such. He was reminded that something could happen to his family in the U.S., and that since he was now severed from the Army, his dependents were receiving no money or allowances. Interspersed with the threats were promises that, if he would co-operate, he would be given immediate repatriation, or he would be repatriated early, or simply that he would be repatriated.

The first topic on which he was questioned concerned the type of planes which were being used by the U.N. in Korea. Although he stated that he was an engineer and that he was unacquainted with types of aircraft, the two interrogators insisted, hour after hour, that he had to know the answer. When he finally identified them as A-26s, the Chinese informed him in disgust that even the U.S. enlisted men knew the planes were B-26s.

The emphasis, however, during his internment at the interrogation center was placed on TO&E and the location of U.S. units in Korea, and in CONUS. He was questioned in minute detail on engineer unit TO&E and to some extent on the composition of other units in an infantry division. Information on the current, as well as the authorized, strength of units and their locations in Korea was sought, as was the identification and

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

location of units in the U.S. which might be brought into the Korean War as reinforcements. Some Order of Battle questions were asked, including the names and background of the senior officers in the 2d Infantry Division. Aware that this unit had been brought to Korea from the U.S., the interrogators wanted to know the number and type of ships employed for the logistical operation. Technical information based on branch of service (Engineer) was also demanded, including details on U.S. Army doctrine on fortifications, demolitions, bridges, etc.

In addition to the topics discussed above - which might conceivably have been known by the interrogee - other lines of questioning were introduced which were completely outside the prisoner's field of experience and knowledge. These included such wide-range questions as the total number of ships in the possession of the U.S., and the percentage which were in "moth balls." He was also asked to estimate the amount of steel produced by the U.S. Steel Corporation in a day's operation. Negative answers were not accepted on these topics and finally he hazarded a completely unfounded estimate. Then, after hours of insisting that the estimate be made, the interrogators pounced on the figure and demanded to know why he had selected that amount, how he knew that it was accurate, why he hadn't disclosed the information sooner, etc.

After approximately one week of interrogation, he was shown a copy of FM 5-34 (Engineer Field Data) and a copy of a C&GS School publication listing the TO&E of all U.S. Army units. From this point on, he felt that there was no point in refusing to answer questions wherein the answer could be determined by a study of these publications.

At the conclusion of one particular day's interrogation, he was asked if he was familiar with the M-209 converter. Although he knew nothing of the details of the operation of this instrument, he assured his questioner that he was familiar with the item and the following day was told to write out a complete description of the equipment. He thereupon prepared a detailed

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

account of an electronic device which converted high voltage to low voltage or vice versa. When this was submitted, the Chinese told him that it was not the converter in which they were interested. Whereupon, he set down and prepared a description of a device which converted AC to DC current. This piece of work resulted in a high degree of irritation on the part of the interrogator, who immediately took him to the office of the commanding officer of the interrogation center. As they entered the room the commanding officer took two pistols from the wall, ostentatiously loaded them and placed them on the table. A lengthy interrogation followed, with the commanding officer asking the questions through an interpreter. He finally convinced the Chinese that the only "converters" with which he was familiar were the ones he had described. No direct threat was made with the pistols and he was finally informed, with obvious disgust, that he was extremely stupid, since even the U.S. enlisted men were familiar with the K-209 converter.

Although POW and the second Chinese were the only men who worked directly on him, he often saw the interrogator assigned to the three USAF POWs who were his cellmates. This individual, according to the Air Force men, was much easier to deal with than the major's interrogators. He was never abusive and was more inclined to accept a negative answer or even a refusal. On a number of occasions, he came to their cells at night, ostensibly to ask some additional questions, and left a few cigarettes.

Throughout the interrogation at the center, the Chinese constantly worked one POW against another. The major and a U.S. captain, both Engineers, were "worked" in this fashion, with the interrogator claiming that the other individual had already supplied the information and that there was no point in withholding confirmation or additional details. 22

An Air Force major who was questioned there supplies the following information about the CCF Interrogation Center:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

This "center" was located in a valley somewhere in the PUKCHIN area and was approximately 15 miles northeast of "Death Valley." It was not permanent in nature, and the Chinese had merely moved in and taken over several civilian houses, which they used both to interrogate and to house the POWs. SUBJECT can remember no more than thirty-five POWs at any one time. He was there from 24 Dec 50 to 17 Jan 51 and is quite sure that a day or two after his departure everyone else was removed. The chief interrogator was a General WONG, who later appeared as the chief of interrogation for all of the POW camps, with headquarters in PYOKTONG. His chief interpreter was HSIANG, a lieutenant colonel who had been with the 20th Bomber Command in World War II. Additional interrogators were "Dirty Pictures" WONG, TSAI, and four others. In contrast with the North Korean interrogators, whom he was to meet later, SUBJECT observed that the Chinese seemed to be much better, more highly trained, more expert in their field, more polished, and less easily fooled. From 1 Jan 51 to 17 Jan 51, he was interrogated four or five times. The following represents some of the information desired: (1) Drawings of airdromes where the major had been stationed. (2) Airplane characteristics (this topic was once developed by having a group of POWs hold an open discussion in the presence of interrogators). (3) Military order of battle, including a complete coverage of the personalities of all known high ranking officers. It was painfully apparent that a show of ignorance or a flat refusal to answer was not acceptable. SUBJECT soon found out that the best means of evasion was to write reams and reams of information, no matter how erroneous, taking precaution not to lapse into obvious absurdities. On 18 Jan 51 SUBJECT was taken to a town seven miles to the southwest and subjected to two more days of interrogation; but to these he attached little significance.[23]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

6. CCF Interrogation at the Permanent Camps

a. Camp 5

Although the CCF Interrogation Center near "Death Valley" apparently ceased functioning after January 1951, it was not until April or May of that same year that any other large-scale interrogation program was instituted to supplant it. Most of the POWs had by this time been transferred from temporary holding camps to Camp 5 (PYOKTONG), and it was here that formal, organized interrogations were resumed.

The history of a U.S. M/Sgt. who was interrogated there is characteristic of what happened to most of the POWs selected for questioning:

> SUBJECT was first interrogated at Company 4, Camp 5, in April 1951, by an unknown Chinese interrogator who spoke fluent English and had a good knowledge of American slang. The interrogator did not follow a prepared questionnaire and had no set form to his questions. The interrogation started with personal questions on marital status, family, financial status, and education. To this, the sergeant gave correct answers. Questions on military information were mainly on airborne and ranger training to which SUBJECT was unable to give any answers. At this particular interrogation the prisoner was able to avoid answering questions of a military nature with an "I don't know" answer. The interrogator was friendly and his attitude did not change with the unsatisfactory answers. The interrogator gave Chinese cigarettes to him. Although he was not threatened, the interrogator told SUBJECT several times that he had a very poor attitude towards peace-loving people.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

SUBJECT's second interrogation took place two nights later. At this interrogation, he had to sit cross-legged with no shoes on. The interrogator was "Micky Mouse" and his interpreter was CHUNG (phonetic). The interrogator was not friendly and would scream or stomp his feet when the SUBJECT would not answer or if his answers were not satisfactory. No threats were made, although the sergeant noticed that the interrogator had a pistol in his hip pocket. The interrogator repeated several times that SUBJECT's attitude was deplorable, the blood of poor innocent people would be on his head, and that one day he would see his errors. This interrogation started with personal questions about family, marital status, financial status, and moved to WW II experiences to which SUBJECT gave truthful answers. When he failed to give answers, the interrogator would reword the questions and try four or five times to obtain an answer. Although the interrogation lasted for four hours, SUBJECT was not excused and had to defecate in his clothing.

Following the interrogation, SUBJECT had to write a detailed autobiography by filling out a printed form that listed fifty to sixty questions. He remembered some of the questions and gave the following:

a. Marital status, wife's name, name of any children.
b. Property, car, houses, furniture, also any property owned by wife.
c. Father, mother, aunts, uncles, also all wife's relatives and relations.
d. SUBJECT's friends, wife's friends, the friends of these friends.
e. Religion, the names of priests of this religion.
f. Organizations to which SUBJECT and wife belonged.
g. Jobs held prior to military service.
h. Education, subjects studied, names of teachers.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

i. History of WW II service and other military service.
j. Occupation and jobs held in military service.

SUBJECT's third interrogation took place several days later, when he was called out and told to report to Professor TUNG. Professor TUNG informed him that his autobiography was not written correctly and would have to be rewritten. TUNG went over the autobiography with him and filled out another autobiography in Chinese with the same answers that he had given in his first autobiography. He was not threatened. During the interrogation, Professor TUNG brought up questions on engineering, but to the best of SUBJECT's memory no military engineering was discussed.[24]

Camp 5 was the largest of all the permanent camps, as well as the headquarters for all POW camps in North Korea. For this reason, probably more POWs were interrogated there than at any other camp. Most of the interrogations followed the same general pattern as the one described above. In some cases the POWs were treated more harshly, while in others they were given more consideration. The interview report of one officer states that:

> The approach at PYOKTONG was less violent in nature, and the heated harangues and threats which had been standard at the Interrogation Center (CCF) were seldom employed. He was offered Korean wine during the course of one interview, which he refused, and tea on several other occasions.[25]

Prior to the interrogations at Camp 5, the requirements for filling out personal history forms had been somewhat irregular.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

At Camp 5, however, all were compelled to fill out these forms, and some POWs report that they were made to do so every three months. Each autobiography would then be checked against the preceding one, and when discrepancies as to dates or events were noted, the POW would find himself subjected to further, lengthy interrogations. (See app. VII for autobiography.)

b. Camp 2

In October 1951, all officer POWs at Camp 5 were moved a short distance east of PYOKTONG to Camp 2, where a different technique of interrogation was employed. Selected POWs were taken from the main camp to secluded areas where each POW lived in almost complete isolation with his interrogator. The following case history, concerning the questioning of a U.S. warrant officer in January 1952, is representative of this type of interrogation:

> .....In early January the interrogation started in earnest. The sessions lasted all day, with occasional limited breaks to cut wood, since it was very cold.
>
> The next thing wanted by CHEW was a complete list of all the U.S. infantry divisions and their locations. SUBJECT very carefully started from number one and listed them all the way up to 105. In some cases he gave a general location, some he stated had been deactivated, and those that he knew were already familiar to CHEW, he listed accurately. He managed to spend two whole days on this project.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHEW was also interested in XV I infantry divisions, so SUBJECT made up an imaginary list including some authentic divisions. SUBJECT used the excuse that he had been a prisoner so long that the answer to many questions escaped him momentarily, but this excuse would never suffice. The reply to this was always, "You must know and therefore you must tell us."

About this time SUBJECT was left alone for several days. During this time he observed that a U.S. Lt. Col. and Capt. had been brought into the area for questioning.

CHEW came back and wanted a complete list of all the posts, camps, and stations in the U.S. SUBJECT listed all the old Indian forts of which he had ever heard and all old coastal artillery forts, in addition to all the others that he could think of. This list took him all day to prepare and then CHEW wanted to know how many infantry divisions were stationed at each of the aforementioned posts. SUBJECT made up the list, greatly exaggerating the number at each post.

About this time the questioning turned to the subject of tactics. SUBJECT drew a contour map showing the 2d Division in a certain area, the frontline and division boundaries, and guns in a straight line position regardless of the contours. CHEW seemed to be happy with the map, although SUBJECT stated there was nothing accurate about it.

CHEW knew that SUBJECT had been at Fort Bliss because of a personal history form that had been filled out at PYOKTONG the year before. At this time he was asked questions relative to the unit training at Fort Bliss, as well as other activities, and general questions about the fort.

Next the questioning turned to types of anti-aircraft defense for certain positions and areas. For defense of any airstrip, SUBJECT showed a battalion where it would be the least useful. In the case of a large airfield, he

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

relocated the same battalion, never showing more than one battalion defense. This also appeared to satisfy CHEW. SUBJECT also gave false information on how the guns in a battery defending a bridge should be located. He pictured the guns as being directly on the bridge. When CHEW asked how traffic could get by, SUBJECT stated that on a small bridge the unit would build rafts and tie them to the bridge and place the guns on the rafts. He went into great detail showing the construction of the rafts (12' by 12'), how they should be fastened, etc. CHEW was very happy with this information and took it to his headquarters. When he returned, he asked for more information on the same; whether the guns would fall off, were they fastened to the raft, etc.

Occasionally the questioning would revert to front-line tactics, distances between units, and individual unit disposition. Any figures given in regard to this were usually accepted.

SUBJECT was then asked to list all the officers in his battalion, to give a biographical sketch of each, what the men thought of each officer, and what SUBJECT thought of them. SUBJECT glorified all of the officers, but was always hazy as to their backgrounds, remembering that many of the officers mentioned were also POWs.

Next came a list of all general officers known to him, and he listed all he knew, including those retired or dead. SUBJECT thinks he mentioned twelve in this list, including a general who was ninety-four years old. When questioned on this, SUBJECT stated that it was true and the statement was accepted.

Knowing that he had at one time been at Camp Bowie, Texas, he was next asked to draw a map of that place. SUBJECT took four days to draw the map, in which he misplaced the buildings, rearranged the rifle range, and located an ammunition dump where it obviously couldn't be.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHEW finally asked him to write an autobiography "like LINCONF" (LINCOLN). SUBJECT took him literally and wrote in very great detail, including the house where he was born, the trees, the sidewalk, the names of all his first playmates, such as John, Mary, Helen, Joseph, etc., and a "little Chinese boy named Ching." He then told of when he went to the first grade and repeated the list of playmates (which he always ended with a "little Chinese boy named Ching.") After about thirty pages of this, CHEW complained that he was writing in too much detail. SUBJECT then quickly wrote a couple of pages covering his next thirty years. Later he had to expand this part of the autobiography.

On 13 Feb 52 SUBJECT was returned to the main compound at Camp 2 after fifty-three days of interrogation.[26]

7. CCF Interrogation Techniques

a. Use of Questionnaires

One of the techniques favored by the Chinese in obtaining information from U.S. POWs was the use of voluminous questionnaires. One POW states there were 367 separate questions on one of the forms he was required to fill out (app. VI). Some of these questionnaires were very similar to the personal history forms used by the U.S. Department of Defense; but others contained many additional questions of a military nature.

Since they were required to fill out these forms every few months, some POWs naturally contradicted themselves in certain statements, especially in the matter of dates. Even slight discrepancies, however, resulted in the subjection of the prisoner

DECLASSIFIED
NND 869210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

to a more searching interrogation on the ground that he had lied.

It is probably safe to assume that the CCF obtained most of their personal and political information from the use of these questionnaires.

Another form used by the CCF was simpler and required only that the POW underline whichever answer he thought was correct or more nearly so. The effectiveness of this form is hard to determine, since the majority of U.S. POWs were captured before its adoption.

A very common technique that was used in the later stages of interrogation was the practice of "working" two POWs against each other. The interrogator would first indicate that some POW had revealed a certain amount of information and would then indicate that the present interrogee could say at least as much. This approach was apparently attempted in most of the planned interrogation sessions.

(For a list of questions asked by CCF interrogators, see pp. [illegible])

b. Use of Physical Violence

Extreme physical violence was seldom used by the Chinese to extract information, but many of the POWs reported such abuses as having to stand at attention for several hours, sometimes in the cold, and being slapped in the face by their interrogators. A few were thrown in "the hole," and others were at times deprived of food. The infliction of these discomforts was,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

as with the North Koreans, left to the discretion of the individual interrogator. In the case of USAF personnel interrogated for BW confessions, the treatment was different. (see Chapter 8).

Like the North Koreans, the Chinese Communists apparently seldom felt that resistance to their interrogations ever reached a point at which "third degree" methods were necessary. It is true that they used physical violence in their efforts to extract BW confessions (see Chapter 8). In those cases, however, the Chinese were attempting to force the POWs to admit to deeds of which the POWs themselves had no knowledge. How much physical violence would have been necessary had the POWs been knowledgeable on the subject is a matter for speculation.

Almost all cases of extreme physical violence on the part of the CCF can be attributed to causes other than resistance to interrogation. Attempted escapes, acts of instigation, or other violations of camp rules were commonly used as the official reasons for the imposition of physical abuse. As in the case under NK interrogation, no POW is known to have died as a direct result of resisting CCF interrogation.

c. Use of Threats

The threats used by CCF interrogators were similar to those employed by the NKA. The practice of placing a pistol on a desk in front of the interrogator and having armed guards in the background was used consistently. Threats of non-repatriation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

were also frequent. Questions such as "Have you heard from your family lately?" could hardly be considered threats against a prisoner's person, but the clear implication was that if a POW wished to receive mail, it would be best for him to supply the desired information. Several returnees mention having been told that they would be shot if they did not co-operate. They go on to explain, however, that they did not, at the time, actually feel in danger of direct or immediate harm.

d. Use of Drugs or Other Inducements

There is almost no evidence available to indicate that drugs were used in connection with interrogation. The following account therefore constitutes a definite exception:

> Starting in February 1953, the Chinese gave SUBJECT hot tea with some drug in it every time he came in for an interrogation. About one hour after the interrogation, SUBJECT's heart would start pounding and he would get dizzy. This condition lasted for a few hours, or a few days, and in one case it lasted for a week. After February 1953, SUBJECT's mind was often blank and he lost much weight. He felt weak but could only sleep when he was completely exhausted. SUBJECT was taken to the hospital in June 1953. He spent one night there, and was given a shot and some pills.[27]

Another POW admits that he smoked marijuana prior to interrogation and that he was "high"; but he feels that he did not disclose any information. Marijuana smoking was apparently commonplace among the enlisted POWs (see Chapter 11).

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Cigarettes were routinely offered to interrogees, but, as in the North Korean interrogations, this procedure could hardly be called bribery. There were also a few of the interrogators who, on rare occasions, preferred to use hot tea in their efforts to set the stage for one of the "friendly" type interviews. There are no first-hand reports of the offer of female companionship as an inducement for the free giving of information, although one or two returnees had "heard" of such incidents.

e. Use of Female Interrogators by the CCF

One of the very rare instances on which the Chinese used women as interrogators is reported as follows:

> Interrogation began two days after capture. The interrogators were uniformed Chinese women who spoke fluent English and understood American slang. These women were armed with .32 calibre semi-automatic pistols carried in leather holsters. The automatics were wrapped in cloth before being inserted in the holsters and would have proved difficult to use quickly in an emergency. A guard was always stationed at the door of the interrogation room, providing ample protection for these female interrogators. The only thing offered POWs by the female interrogators were cigarettes. POWs were interrogated individually, every day or so. The interrogations lasted an average of one half hour and were conducted only during the daytime. Questions on the following items were asked a particular POW: name of unit, number of men, chain of command, weapons of units, (even asked about the Thompson submachine gun) number and types of vehicles, length of time in service, length of time unit had been in Korea, why he had come to Korea and had not stayed at home. The POW was also asked to write his father's and mother's address.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

> The guards at this stage of internment were very rough to POWs. They could not speak English, but that didn't stop them from cursing the POWs in Chinese. The interrogators, on the other hand, treated the POWs in a friendly manner. The POWs were told by the interrogators that, upon completion of three months schooling, the POWs would be set free.[28]

f. Use of Interpreters

The extent to which the Chinese used interpreters in dealing with U.S. POWs is difficult to determine. There are some indications that, during the first few months after their intervention in Korea, English-speaking interpreters were used to process the prisoners and to obtain a limited amount of tactical intelligence. Captured documents, it should be noted, show that the Chinese were concerned about a shortage of skilled linguists for dealing with POWs.[29] This apparently did not handicap their higher-level interrogation program, however, since the personnel at the CCF Interrogation Center and those employed at the permanent camps were competent linguists themselves and did not require any interpreters.

g. Use of Refe ence Material

Chinese Communist interrogators appeared to have a wealth of reference material for use in facilitating their interrogations. In many instances, after a POW had labored over the preparation of an organizational chart or the sketch of an installation, his questioner would produce a U.S. Army field manual

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

or chart which contained the desired information. Several POWs have indicated that once they knew the enemy had such material they felt it useless to try to outwit him by withholding information or making false statements. (Specific material which returned POWs observed in the hands of the CCP is listed in app. IV.)

b. CCP Interrogation of U.S. Army Personnel in Manchuria

Some of the first POWs captured by the Chinese were taken to ANTUNG, immediately north of the YALU River. The following account is representative of the few interrogations conducted at ANTUNG, all of which took place at about the same time:

> In ANTUNG the POW was questioned, in the presence of two other U.S. POWs, by a panel of seven Chinese, who identified themselves as the "Citizens' Committee of ANTUNG." The questions asked by the panel included the following:
>
> 1. What would happen to the POWs if returned to U.N. control? Would they be shot?
>
> 2. What would the prisoners do if returned to U.N. control?
>
> 3. Why did the U.S. not trade with Communist China?
>
> 4. Why was the U.S. blocking Chinese (Communist) entry into the U.N.?
>
> 5. Why did the USAF kill civilians by indiscriminate bombing?
>
> 6. What the POWs thought was wrong with U.S. foreign policy in general?

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

7. Was NATO a threat to peace in the world?

8. What of control of the U.S. by Wall Street?

9. Since the U.S. was unable to exploit the Chinese people anymore, was this a cause for the U.S. attitude toward the Chinese Communist Government?

The panel members asked these questions in a matter-of-fact manner, and the prisoners were free to answer the questions as they pleased. No action was taken against them if an answer given was derogatory to the Chinese Communist Government.[30]

It should be noted that only 15 U.S. Army POWs were taken to ANTUNG, and that all of these were brought there immediately after the Chinese intervention. No serious interrogation program was conducted there, and it can be concluded that the initial few were assembled there either for propaganda purposes or simply to satisfy the curiosity of the Chinese.

i. CCF Interrogation of U.S. Air Force Personnel in ANTUNG

About fifteen U.S. Air Force POWs were also taken to ANTUNG, probably for the same reason as were the Army personnel. Late in 1950, three USAF POWs were taken there, to be followed in April by a group composed of eight members of a B-29 crew. Later in 1951, another three or four were sent to ANTUNG for a few days. None of the POWs stayed in ANTUNG for more than a few days, and, while several of them were questioned by the "Citizens' Committee," no one was subjected to a serious interrogation.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

j. CCF Interrogation of U.S. Air Force Personnel in MUKDEN, Manchuria

One of the most intensive and well-planned interrogation programs conducted by the CCF was carried out at MUKDEN, Manchuria, between January and September 1953.[31]

Eleven members of a B-29 crew that had been shot down over Korea in July 1952 were transported separately to MUKDEN and (supposedly unknown to each other) were placed in solitary confinement in what one POW called a jail. Elaborate precautions were taken to keep the POWs incommunicado, and each of the eleven was interrogated individually at great length.

Some of the POWs had previously, in Korea, "confessed" to participation in Bacteriological Warfare, but, without exception, they state that they repudiated these "confessions" at MUKDEN.

One source states that 80 POWs were scheduled to undergo interrogation at this interrogation center, but there are no facts available to substantiate this claim. It is evident that some sort of experimental interrogation was conducted with this very select group; although Bacteriological Warfare "confessions" were emphasized during most of the questioning periods, there was probably another motive behind the program, since, as mentioned before, several of the POWs had already "confessed" to Bacteriological Warfare participation.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Several POWs state that they were continually exhorted to confess their "crimes," but their captors would never specify the nature of the so-called "crimes."

Enemy interrogation techniques at MUKDEN primarily emphasized mental duress, as opposed to extremes of physical torture. Unlike the great majority of interrogations conducted in Korea, however, the enemy "conditioned" the prisoners extensively by subjecting them to long and often painful physical harassment. Some POWs were forced to wear leg-irons for considerable periods of time, and one returnee relates that enemy personnel constantly kicked the leg irons against his legs and ankles. Other prisoners report that they had to stand for hours under rain spouts during heavy rain storms. These and other similar experiences undergone by the POWs in MUKDEN indicate that the Chinese, while they did not resort to such methods of torture as the "thumb-screw" and the "rack," exhibited no hesitancy about inflicting less crippling forms of pain.

The POWs at MUKDEN were usually interrogated by three-man teams consisting of an interrogator, an interpreter, and a clerk who recorded the answers. During the course of an interrogation, the interrogators were often rotated, thus permitting the questioning to continue without interruption for extended periods. In one instance, in which the interrogation reportedly continued for forty hours, a POW was forced to stand at attention during the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

entire period, with only a few minutes off to visit the latrine.

The motivation behind the MUKDEN interrogations is obscure. Only one group of prisoners was taken to this center; the questioning indicated generally the same type of intelligence interest as that which was displayed in Korea; and, although the degree of physical discomfort was somewhat greater, there was no basic variation in the interrogation technique.

Section IV - Interrogation by Soviet Personnel

Although many repatriates observed Caucasians in North Korea and believed that they were Russian, less than one-tenth of one per cent of the prisoners report having been directly interrogated by Soviet personnel.

The few interrogations by alleged Soviet interrogators (in some instances the POWs could not be sure as to their nationality) were conducted primarily with USAF prisoners and were concerned, for the most part, with information pertaining to the Air Force. Nearly all of these interrogations were conducted in the early stages of the conflict (1950-1951) and no individual POW experienced more than one. An exception to this statement involved the interrogation of a USAF lieutenant, who was questioned at SINUIJU shortly after capture and was later taken to ANTUNG, Manchuria, where he was interrogated eight or ten times by Russians. Later, at "Pak's Palace" in P'YONGYANG, he observed that a Russian in civilian clothes seemed

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

to be directing the questioning of the NK interrogators. This case appears to be one of the few instances in which the Russians had any kind of a planned program for the direct interrogation of an individual prisoner.

Another POW relates that, at "Pak's Palace," an individual whom he believed to be a Russian general officer attempted to question him at length about USAF techniques and equipment.

From the above, it is perhaps safe to conclude that the primary role of the Russian interrogator in the Korean conflict was that of an observer and, occasionally, an advisor.

Section V - Interrogation of Counter-Intelligence Personnel

Both the North Koreans and the Chinese were especially interested in interrogating anyone who had been connected with intelligence - in particular, those who were associated with CIC. "Wrongdoers" were often accused of being CIC agents. One U.S. POW, who had parachuted behind the enemy lines and had been subsequently captured, was suspected by the NKA of being a CIC agent. He appears to have run the full gamut of beatings, starvation, solitary confinement and other forms of torture, mental and physical, while the enemy tried in vain to make him talk. Although most of the rough treatment suffered by this POW occurred while he was in the hands of North Koreans at "Pak's Palace," his original captors, the Chinese, also "roughed him up" considerably. Following his

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

release from "Pak's Palace," he was transferred to the CCF POW camp at PYOKTONG and interrogated again, this time in the presence of a man whom he believed to be a Russian.

At Camp 5, a CCF interrogator named TONG was especially interested in CIC or CID personnel and questioned at great length those whom he suspected of being connected with either of these organizations or with the FBI.

On one occasion, the Chinese issued a statement ordering investigators connected with CIC, CID or other agencies to turn themselves in, since capital punishment would be imposed upon them if they were later discovered.

Section VI - Comparison of Chinese and North Korean Interrogation Techniques, as Described by a Returned POW [33]

One prisoner, who was interrogated extensively by both the Chinese and the North Koreans, had an opportunity to compare the techniques and the efficiency of the two intelligence establishments. He believes that the Chinese were better prepared for interrogation and more skillful in their application than the North Koreans. The Chinese demanded answers to all of their questions and insisted that all topics be discussed in great detail. In describing the assignment of personnel in an Engineer battalion, the POW was forced by the Chinese to enumerate the functions of every man in the unit. On the other hand, while answering a

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

similar question for the North Koreans, he found that he could not remember what he had said previously to the Chinese concerning seventy-five of the enlisted men in the battalion, and he was permitted to note their duties as "general." The North Koreans were apparently satisfied with mere volume, whereas the Chinese usually demanded specific answers; in addition, the former often sought technical information which was apparently beyond their own comprehension. This attitude, plus the fact that they sometimes approached an interview with preconceived ideas as to what the answers should be, often led them to record information which was completely absurd. At "Pak's Palace," for example, a POW was directed to prepare a sketch of a section of a Bailey Bridge. When he indicated five holes at the end of one panel by which it could be bolted to the adjoining section, his interrogator insisted that this could not be correct. The POW asked the interrogator how many holes he thought there should be, and the interrogator suggested twenty. Twenty holes were therefore drawn, despite the interrogee's professional knowledge that this number of holes would so weaken the section that it would become structurally unsound.

The fact that the Chinese appeared to have a very extensive collection of U.S. FMs and TMs, while the North Koreans possessed only a few mimeographed copies of TO&Es, indicates that there was very little exchange of interrogation aids between the two nations. (For a list of questions asked by both the NKA and the CCF, see app. V.)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

Section VII - POW Recommendations For Resisting Enemy Interrogation

In reviewing the suggestions made by returned POWs on the subject of resisting enemy interrogation, several points should be noted. First, and most obvious, is the fact that the recommended methods of "resistance" are almost as numerous as the returnees who were queried on this subject. There is no indication that the POWs, either from individual experience or from group discussions in the camps, were able to reach agreement on any one method or approach to the problem. The only consistency to be found in the suggestions is that, almost without exception, the repatriates do not suggest that future POWs be confined to giving only their names, ranks, and serial numbers. Their recommendations, on the contrary, incorporate a wealth of variations on the theme of outwitting enemy interrogators, and include suggestions that the interrogee be evasive, "play dumb," lie, refuse to volunteer even trivial information, alter the subject under discussion, and complain of being too ill to talk.

The range and diversity of these recommendations illustrates that few if any of the POWs had any positive idea of what to do when faced by an enemy interrogator. The complaint that there was a need for a thorough briefing preceding entry into combat was a dominant and recurring theme among the comments of the returnees. Some feel that orientation on communism would have strengthened their resistance to interrogation. Others believe that they

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

should have been allowed to divulge information which had become public knowledge. A very few suggest that the problem could best be solved by the individual POW himself; that is, that he should "play it by ear" and adapt his method of resistance to the circumstances.

The following list of recommendations by returned POWs is indicative of the variety contained in the suggestions which have been made:

1. Once an answer is given it must never be changed; stick to the story.

2. The POW should pretend that he cannot understand the interpreter. This will cause the interrogator to lose face and shorten the interview.

3. Appear sincere and ponder the questions. Always give an answer, because to give no answer is an insult and will cause the interrogator to lose face.

4. Qualify all answers by saying, "I think such and such," which leaves a way out when you are trapped.

5. Go into detail and consume time over insignificant items.

6. Do not try to impress the enemy with knowledge; play dumb.

7. Do not reveal your background, experience or education.

8. Pass on interrogation experiences to other POWs.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

9. Never listen to the blandishments of the interrogators. A friendly approach by the interrogator is always for the purpose of making the prisoner talk.

10. Never volunteer information. Once the POW finds himself talking on any subject, however trivial, he sooner or later becomes trapped.

11. Never try to outwit the interrogator. It can't be done.

12. Never tell anything that cannot be remembered later.

13. Never hurry to give an answer. Think it over carefully.

14. Don't lie unless the lie can be corroborated. Remember there are other POWs who are being interrogated. If the other POWs say something that contradicts your statement, someone is in trouble.

15. Talk freely but divulge as little information as possible. If a POW remains silent, the interrogators believe he is concealing something.

It should be stressed that the above comments were not offered by the POWs as methods by which to adhere to the restrictions of name, rank and serial number, but that they merely represent suggestions as to how to limit the amount of information given the enemy. It is not within the scope of this report to argue or assess the validity, the merits or the possible dangers inherent in any of the above. They are presented merely because they represent the thinking of what is felt to be a representative group of ex-POWs.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

It is felt that, although they are often mutually contradictory and some may appear to be superficial, they are worthy of attention since they represent considerations based on experience rather than on theory

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By NARS, Date 4/11/95

CHAPTER 7

INDOCTRINATION

Section I - Introduction

The communist quest for control over men's minds was very much in evidence in the POW camps in North Korea. U.S. POWs in the hands of the communist forces were subjected to a wide variety of indoctrinational experiences. The original motivation behind the indoctrination program cannot be established with certainty, but the following three aims are proposed as possible explanations for this activity: (1) the development of propaganda (peace appeals, broadcasts, etc.); (2) control over the prisoners during their internment; and (3) the conversion of the POWs to communist doctrine.

It may be assumed that, from the standpoint of producing propaganda for dissemination throughout the world, the program was eminently successful. In addition, if the spawning of POW informers may be considered a product of the indoctrination effort, the enemy undeniably gained a powerful weapon for controlling the POWs during their internment. The success of the third possible goal, however, is more difficult to gauge. The prolonged confinement experienced by the majority of the POWs, coupled with the indoctrination program and the propaganda which pervaded the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

camps, might appear to have created a controlled situation favorable to the acceptance of communist teachings. The reports of returned POWs, however, indicate that the prisoners who appeared to have been affected were less ideologically drawn to communist theory than simply possessed with a desire to exist with as little personal discomfort as possible. Former POWs believe that opportunism was the basic motivation behind the actions of the "Progressives" and the members of the study groups. It should be noted, however, that the material benefits actually gained by these "opportunists," such as occasional parties, relief from work details, and a few extra cigarettes, were comparatively minor in nature. There are no indications that POWs who followed the communist line enjoyed an obviously superior standard of existence in the POW camps.

It is notable that some of the earlier "Pros" later became known to their fellow prisoners as anti-Communists and apparently fell out of favor with the Chinese. The source material available for this study does not provide the basis for evaluating the sincereity of these individuals at either stage. Care should be exercised, however, to avoid placing too great an emphasis on this as an indication that the Communists were unable to retain any of their "converts." Normal agent handling would indicate that a man, after having been recruited, would then be given the opportunity to regain the trust of his comrades and thus increase both his

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

future value and the scope of his undercover activity. However remote the bulk of evidence may seem to make this possibility, it should not be ignored.

It is not within the capabilities of this report to estimate the number of real converts to communism or the number of agents, both immediate and potential, if any, which the enemy gained among the U.S. POWs in Korea. In view of the intensity of the indoctrination program during the compulsory attendance period (spring 1951 through spring 1952), and the pervasive propaganda and indirect indoctrination which was present throughout, the possibility must be considered that, aside from any actual converts, there may exist certain residual effects in the minds of some ex-POWs, which may some day stimulate actions or effect situations in a manner favorable to the Communists.

Section II - The "Lenient Policy"

Before we attempt to examine in detail the communist indoctrination program in Korea, some attention should be given to the so-called Chinese "Lenient Policy." Although the phrase was rarely defined by Chinese authorities, its nebulous fruits were continually dangled before the eyes of U.N. POWs. A typical approach is demonstrated in the following prepared speech given by a CCF officer to newly captured U.N. personnel:

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"American and British POWs; you don't have to be afraid. We Chinese People's Volunteer forces guarantee you safety so long as you have laid down your arms. Our lenient policy promises: (1) No killing of POWs. (2) No mental humiliation. (3) No confiscation of personal property. Now obey orders strictly....and do as you are told."[1]

The words of the CCF officer reflected the official policy expressed in the following excerpt from a captured enemy document:

"How we treat U.S. POWs: don't kill or maltreat, don't take personal possessions, treat the wounded, Treat all POWs equally because 'U.S. capitalists are the real enemy and the majority of POWs were laborers who were forced to fight.' If POWs lay down their arms, they are not the enemy. POWs must obey orders or they will be punished."[2]

Thus, in theory at least, every U.N. POW was regarded as a "liberated brother," entirely blameless for the sins of his masters and eligible for the lenient treatment provided he displayed by word and deed his willingness to accept Red "salvation." (fig. 5)

Section III - Early Indoctrination Efforts

1. North Korean

North Korean indoctrination and propaganda efforts began soon after the capture of the first American personnel. During the months of July, August, and September 1950, U.S. POWs were under continuous mental pressure to participate in propaganda meetings and to take part in radio broadcasts in SEOUL and P'YONGYANG. The first propaganda broadcast, an appeal by a U.S. Army captain to stop U.S. interference in Korea, was made only five days after the capture of

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the first POW A typical meeting to "protest against American intervention in Korea" took place in August 1950 at P'YONGYANG. A number of officers and enlisted men read prepared statements in a closely guarded schoolhouse against a backdrop of communist propaganda banners proclaiming "Korea for the Koreans," and "Long live the Friendship Between the Peace Loving People of America and the People of Korea." (figs. 1 and 2)

2. "Peaceful Valley"

On 25 May 1951, near CHANCH'ON, Korea, tanks of the 7th Infantry Division came upon 18 marines and an army corporal who had been captured by the CCF in late November 1950. These men had been released after six months of captivity and were laden with bundles of communist propaganda material which their Chinese captors had urged them to distribute to U.N. troops when they returned to their own lines. The experiences of this group of U.N. personnel, subjected to the complete cycle of imprisonment, intensive indoctrination and return to freedom, provided the first concrete information about communist "brainwashing" techniques.

The 18 marines were captured with many others by the CCF in the CHOSIN Reservoir area during the period between 28 November and 10 December 1950, and soon thereafter marched to a location approximately eight miles north of KANGGYE which became known to the POWs as "Peaceful Valley."

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GUIDE TO PRISONERS OF WAR

You are fortunate to have become prisoners of the People's Forces. Our enemies are the American imperialists and warmongers—not the ordinary people of America or any other country. It is a crime that the warmakers of your country have made you take part in their aggressive war.

We are fighting for the independence and unification of Korea, fighting against American imperialism and for the peace of the Far East and of the world.

We guarantee that:

Your personal safety will be guarded.
You will not be abused or humiliated.
Your personal belongings will not be taken from you.

But you are required to:

[redacted] our orders, otherwise [redacted] will deal with according to our military law. Hand over all weapons and military documents in your possession. (But keep your identity card and do not lose it)

Hand over the following prohibited articles:

Lighters	Knives
Flashlights	Drugs
Mirrors	Matches

Explosives

Tell your fellow officers and men to stop their futile resistance and put down their arms as soon as possible.

Observe our air raid regulations.

We shall send you to areas of safety where you can rest and when the war is over, you will be sent home.

The Korean People's Army
The Chinese People's
Volunteer Forces

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If the cordial welcome they received upon capture had not been sufficient indication that they were considered a special group by the Chinese, the first speech of the camp commander at KANGGYE made it explicit. There, together with 290 other U.N. personnel, they were told that all POWs interned at KANGGYE would be given political schooling and that those who were the "most progressive" would be quickly released. The speaker informed them that they were considered as "newly liberated friends" and that the Chinese would not hold them responsible for the sins committed under orders from their "aggressive, war mongering leaders." They were to enjoy all the benefits of the Chinese "Lenient Policy," but were warned that if they disobeyed camp rules and regulations severe punishment would be meted out. (The testimony from the 18 marines indicated that, during their entire stay, the CCF never physically abused any prisoners, even when infractions were apparent.)

From approximately 20 December 1950 to 3 March 1951, these marines and the 300 U.N. POWs at KANGGYE were subjected to an intensive eight-week indoctrination course during which co-operation was secured in most cases through the lure of an early release. The daily routine was designed to allot the most productive hours of each day to lectures or studies on communist theory and practice. The program of two to three hours a day for lectures and one to three hours per day for study periods permitted the CCF to schedule a total of 144 lecture hours and 96 study hours during the eight

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week period. Through the medium of a well-stocked library and well-trained personnel who associated with the POWs on informal occasions, the virtues of communism were continually extolled and the political philosophy and customs of the West were incessantly denounced.

In March 1951, the CCF informed the POWs that the Communists were going to launch a gigantic spring offensive which would result in the capture of thousands of "newly liberated friends." The more "progressive" of the prisoners would be released to U.N. lines in order to induce other troops to surrender and, later, to carry the "truth" back to the people of the United States.

On 3 March 1951, all POWs were removed from KANGGYE and placed on south-bound trains. One group of 60 men (from which the 19 later to be released were chosen) were utilized as cadre for a new camp established near SANGHWAAM-NI to handle the influx of U.N. prisoners following the offensive of 22 April 1951. Many of the original POWs were designated as "workers," and white cloth badges, on which the Chinese world for worker was stenciled, were sewn on their uniforms (the POWs say this word sounded like "Gun-So-Yen"). These "workers" consisted of administrative aides who advised new arrivals on the camp routine and the regulations, and correspondents who wrote articles for the camp newspaper and encouraged other prisoners to do the same.

On 18 May 1951, the group which was to be released was supplied with Chinese safe conduct passes and communist propaganda pamphlets

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

and was taken by truck to the vicinity of CHORCH'ON. There, on 24 May, during a U.N. artillery barrage, the CCF guards fled and the marines "escaped" to the U.N. lines.

The extremely close parallel between the indoctrination technique employed at KANGGYE and that employed at most of the major POW camps established later suggests the possibility that the inmates of KANGGYE were participants in what may be termed a "pilot plant" operation, designed to test the efficacy and validity of communist indoctrination efforts on U.N. POWs.

3. Peace Committees

One early communist indoctrination effort in Korea included the formation, during the spring of 1951, of peace committees in most of the permanent camps and their subsequent subordination to a supra-camp Central Peace Committee, located at Camp 12 in P'YONGYANG.

The peace committees, inspired by the Chinese, were elected by free balloting among their fellow prisoners but actually held their positions at the sufferance of the camp authorities and on the basis of their own continued "progressivism." Some of the apparent objectives of the camp peace committees were:

(1) To prepare peace petitions, surrender leaflets and radio scripts for dissemination by the CCF and NK propagandists.

(2) To assist in the spread of communist propaganda prepared by the camp authorities.

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NND 867210
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(3) To aid and encourage other POWs to accept communism indoctrination.

(4) To detect any organized or incipient resistance to the indoctrination program among the non-"progressives" or reactionaries.

During May and June 1951, peace committees were elected in Camps 5, 7, and 12, and a similar election was held in Camp 2 in September. Simultaneously with these elections, a great peace crusade was launched by the North Koreans with enthusiastic CCF encouragement and firm support. "Progressive" ranks in both CCF and NK administered POW camps were searched for candidates for positions of leadership on a proposed Central Committee of U.S. - British "POWs for peace." Camp peace committees were asked to submit delegates, and in May 1951 the following representatives were chosen:

From Camp 5:	Capt Harold KASCHKO Lt Jeff ERWIN M/Sgt John P PORTER Cpl Leroy CARTER (fnu) SPENCER (U.K.) Haida OZTRUK (Turkey)
From Camp 7:	Capt Ambrose NUGENT Cpl Robert GHYERS
From Camp 12:	Rfn Ronnie COCKS (U.K.)

In mid-June the delegates to the Central Committee arrived at their headquarters at Camp 12 and, in an election rally held shortly after their arrival, Capt Ambrose NUGENT was elected president, Rfn Ronnie COCKS, vice-president and Cpl Leroy CARTER, secretary-general.

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A co-ordinated propaganda and indoctrination effort was inaugurated, which included morning and evening study of communist works, political rallies, peace petitions, radio broadcasts, etc., and the publication of the Peace Fighters' Chronicle, the purpose of which was to make known the accomplishments of the Central Committee. The "Chronicle" was distributed periodically to each of the POW camps.

By spring 1951, all POWs in Korea had been transferred to CCF authority, and this led to the eventual dissolution of the peace committees. On 10 December, the Camp 12 complement of POWs left by truck for Camp 5, and all members of the now defunct Central Committee followed within two weeks.

In January and February 1952, the Chinese at Camp 5 attempted to resurrect the Camp 5 peace committee, but they were met with opposition from the majority of the POWs. Finally, the erstwhile delegates, emboldened by the action of their fellow prisoners, refused to serve on the committee and the matter was dropped.

At Camp 7, no further attention was devoted to this propaganda vehicle after the election of the two delegates to the Central Peace Committee in June 1951. Camp 1 maintained its camp committee until May 1952. By then, the activities of the members had greatly slackened and the general lack of interest of the camp as a whole toward the committee's objectives became apparent to the Chinese. The organization was disbanded, but three or four months later it was supplanted by a second peace committee composed of entirely

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new members. However, the title itself soon attracted derision and it was accordingly changed to the Camp Club. The membership remained intact, but the duties gradually changed to housekeeping and recreational details, with the propaganda aspects reduced to a minimum.

Section IV - Indoctrination - Practice and Procedure

Camp 5, later dubbed "Pyoktong University" by the men themselves, was the center of indoctrinal efforts aimed at U.N. POWs and served as a model after which all the other programs were patterned. Thus, in the following discussion, although much emphasis will be placed on the activities at Camp 5, the reader may generalize and consider such practices and procedures typical of those in the other major POW compounds which had similar programs.

During the period between March and November 1951, compulsory indoctrination programs were inaugurated at Camps 1, 3, and 5.[3] (Camps 2 and 4, with the exception of Bacteriological Warfare exhibits, never experienced any organized indoctrination procedures.) Attempts were made almost from the start to facilitate the indoctrination program by separating all prisoners according to rank, nationality, or race. Thus the younger prisoners, who generally comprised the lower ranks, were separated from the older, more experienced men, who might have furnished the determination and wisdom necessary to refute most of the propaganda. After this segregation, the Communists were able to plan political lectures

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designed to pit one racial or national group against another and to play upon latent prejudices. They may also have hoped to prevent the formation of organized resistance to their teachings.

The preparatory "processing" included the completion of questionnaires on personal history. These questionnaires became, with time, more and more detailed and finally evolved into an extensive autobiographical inquiry, demanding, among other things, specific information concerning a POW's social, economic, and educational background. There is abundant evidence to show that the information gleaned from the repeated completion of these autobiographical histories, after being verified by items extracted from personal correspondence and confirmed by personal observation, was used by political instructors in dealing with individual "progressives" or "reactionaries."

In most instances the indoctrination program began with an orientation lecture delivered by the company commander. The CCF "Lenient Policy" was contrasted with the "horrors of KOJE-DO" (U.N. internment center for Korean and CCF POWs). The initial discomforts of the POWs were attributed to supply difficulties due to U.N. air bombardments, rather than to deviations from the announced "leniency." The POWs were assured that the originators of the lenient policy had been fully cognizant of the distinction between the "people" of the United States and their "ruling classes"; it was promised that all POWs would be included in the former category. The CCF informed

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

them that while they were in camp they were to consider themselves as students and the Chinese as instructors. References to the "U.S.-inspired attack by South Korea or the peaceful population of the North," and to the "profit-hungry imperialists of the West who were bent on unleashing a third world war," indicated the direction this "re-education" program would take.

With the initiation of indoctrination programs at each camp, notebooks and pencils were distributed among the POWs together with instructions that they were to take careful notes on each and every lecture. Notebooks were periodically collected, and all discrepancies and laxities were noted. In some companies DPs or disciplinary police (POWs whose reliability was unquestioned by the Chinese) would continually move among the POWs during lectures, awakening those who were dozing and prodding those who were not taking notes.

The lectures, usually delivered to an assembled group, and read from prepared mimeographed texts or published works, lasted virtually the entire morning and were followed immediately by a meeting of squad monitors (see description below), who then received detailed instructions for squad discussions to be held in the afternoon. Each monitor conducted his squad conference through a series of rhetorical questions, the answers to which were carefully noted and forwarded to company headquarters. POWs who expressed opinions contrary to those of the instructor were soon summoned to camp headquarters, where, through a succession of interrogations, self-criticisms

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

and veiled threats, they were shown the error of their ways." Group discipline was maintained by Chinese-selected squad leaders whose responsibility it was to account for the presence of every man and to insure his co-operation. Chinese platoon leaders lurked in the background and checked on each squad's progress.

By the spring of 1952, the Chinese were confronted with indications that the indoctrination program had reached the point of diminishing returns. Lack of interest and even opposition became increasingly more noticeable. Compulsory indoctrination gave way to voluntary study groups in which from 10 to 30 men would consent, under the tutelage of a political instructor, to pursue a program of independent reading and discussion.[5]

1. Instructors

While it is impossible to determine the exact position which the political instructors occupied in the Chinese chain of command, there is no doubt that, in both their backgrounds and official responsibilities, they represented a distinctive element among the Chinese military administrators. These men varied in age from 20 to 45, and their predominantly civilian backgrounds were continually in evidence despite the standard CCF uniforms in which they were clothed. As a group, they were easily identifiable because of their knowledge of English which was derived, many claimed, from years spent in the United States attending various colleges

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

and universities. Ranging from colloquial to a stilted textbook style, their speech was at all times adequate enough to interpret communist doctrine and to interrogate "obstructionist" POWs. Rank equivalents in the Chinese military structure were difficult to ascertain, due to the absence of any distinctive insignia, but it was evident to the prisoners that the instructors enjoyed a somewhat favored position with little or no routine command responsibilities. (for additional information see app. XXI)

2. Squad Monitors

Squad monitors generally were selected by the CCF (although some reports indicate squad elections for the position) to preside as chairmen over the group discussions which inevitably followed every formal lecture. The squad monitor, armed with a handwritten or typed list of questions which he had received from the instructor, would lead group discussions and note the opinions expressed by each man. After the discussions, each person in the group would be required to write out the answers to the questions or to sign his own paper. Then the monitor would collect the answer sheets and forward them to company headquarters. Here the papers were reviewed to ascertain whether everyone had parroted the party line expressed by the lecturers.

As early as February 1951, the Communists had instituted a two-day course at Camp 5 in the proper techniques of monitoring,

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

with an enrollment of approximately 40 men to a class. The first day and a half were devoted almost entirely to a reiteration of propaganda themes, followed by a review of the major topics. The last four hours were allotted to lessons on discussion technique, voice projection and proper presentation of reports. The fact that such classes were never instituted in any of the other major camps (although graduates of the Camp 5 monitor school, after several transfers, eventually wound up in each of the other permanent camps) re-emphasizes the prominent role assigned to Camp 5 as an indoctrination center.

3. Squad Leaders

Squad leaders, either appointed by the CCF or elected by their squads, played a subordinate role in the indoctrination program. They were responsible for the supervision of work details, allocation of rations, etc., but in the indoctrination effort they were held responsible only for the physical presence of the squad at lectures and discussions, and for the maintenance of discipline and good order.

Section V - Special Techniques

1. Study Company and Study Group

When the compulsory indoctrination program began to falter, the CCF established the 5th Company of Camp 5 as a special study company. The first classes were held in August 1951 with an enrollment

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of approximately 100 to 150 "Progressives"; the course was concluded in November 1951. Classes in advanced communist political theory and economic thought were held for two to three hours per day for the first six weeks. The remaining weeks were devoted primarily to study. A second class, composed of from 75 to 100 prisoners, mostly of the neutral or un-co-operative elements of the camp, started in January 1952; its dissolution in March coincided with the general cessation of forced indoctrination in Camp 5. The two experimental six-week sessions apparently met with no noticeable success. Their indoctrination lectures did not differ greatly, either in content or presentation, from those given previously, and they neither answered the demands of the extreme "Progressives" for more advanced training nor quelled the restlessness of the reactionaries.

In June 1952, six POWs voluntarily joined together to form a "study group" in the third company.[6] To this small but receptive audience, two periods of three hours each, equally divided between study and discussion, were allotted daily. The group grew from six charter members to a peak membership of 30 just prior to "Little Switch," and it contained most of the notable "Progressives" in Camp 5.[7]

2. Libraries

The camps were provided with libraries which were well-stocked with communist reading material (app. VII). Cominform

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

journals, Communist Party publications, and theoretical works by well-known marxist writers were available on a four-day loan basis for interested individuals and were continually at the disposal of those enrolled in the self-study programs. Non-marxist authors, such as TOLSTOI, HUGO, DICKENS, SINCLAIR, CALDWELL, and STEINBECK, whose writings on social conditions were apperently acceptable to the Communists, were also amply represented.

Company librarians, usually appointed by the CCF with little or no regard for educational background or political reliability, were responsible for keeping the libraries open and clean during regular hours (1800-2100) and for distributing the stock of approximately 150 books. In some cases, the librarians were also responsible for posting Communist-approved notices on the company bulletin boards and for acting as mail clerks. Subsequent to the spring of 1952, all company libraries in Camp 5 were consolidated and a single large camp library was established.

3. Newspapers

Probably the most effective means employed by the Communists to indoctrinate POWs were the many camp and company newspapers managed and staffed by the internees themselves. These propaganda sheets offered a steady diet of communist doctrine and slanted news about the progress of the Korean War. The most widely read of these camp newspapers, Toward Truth and Peace, was written,

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

edited and published by "Progressives" at Camp 5. All articles, whether or not solicited, were rewarded by payments of up to 10,000 yuan or its equivalent in chits redeemable at the Chinese PX for candy, cigarettes, soap, etc. Communist sources reflected official satisfaction with the program, claiming that as many as 191 articles were contributed during the year 1952; the returnees indicate that when the payments were discontinued, the flow of contributions quickly dwindled.[8]


The hand-printed company wall newspapers, published twice a week, enjoyed a smaller circle of readers and more localized interest. They bore such titles as Open Mind, Peace Dove, Torch, Times, Standard, Globe, Daily News, Weekly Courier, etc., and were all abundantly illustrated with cartoons and drawings.

Short-lived newspaper ventures such as New Life, published at KANGGYE, and the Peace Fighters' Chronicle, of the Central Peace Committee at Camp 12, were established for specific tasks and were abandoned after brief tenures (figs. 6 through 9).

4. Correspondence and Broadcasts

A by-product of the indoctrination program, but certainly no less significant, was the full use made for propaganda purposes, of personal correspondence and recordings by POWs. Camp authorities made it clear that letters and recordings to ease the anxieties of families and friends were privileges and "rewards" for co-operation;

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90



Newspaper "Toward Truth & Peace" written and illustrated by POW's under CCF supervision at Camp 5 and distributed to other camps. Photograph reproduced from page 50 of Communist propaganda magazine entitled "'United Nations' POW's in Korea" published in English by Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, Peking, China; 1953.

FIG. 6

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NEW IFE

(IV)

JAN. 17 1951

AGI WAKE UP

• by Jos. Hammond • (2nd Co.)



★ A Wised-up G.I. ★

By NORWOOD H. HARDER (2nd Co. 1st Sqd.)

My name is Norwood Harder. I've been in the army 7 months and I'm glad that I'm one of the liberated G.I., because I've learned how my government has tricked me and my friends and family.


Fellows, look at these figures (income tax): 1939–4% 1946–57%. Can you understand why they jump so fast? Why must we pay taxes like that for capitalists?

Capitalism is no good. We want a government like the Soviet Union and China, don't we, fellows?

At present, we must all learn and learn well. And as soon as we get home, we must clean out all the capitalists and make up our own people government. We must do our part for its realization, so that we won't be deceived again by men like Truman and MacArthur.

Portraits Of War Criminals





Correction:

In the article "Wised Up GI's W W II" published in the Jan 10 issue Para. 2 line 8 for'd grees' read'degrees' line 8 for'n' read'they' last Para. line 4 for'Taiwan' read'Tai

OUR VOICES

John W. Hawkins (2nd Co, 1st Sqd.):

"..... I have had my eyes opened to the fact that we, the common people of America have been used blindly in politics. But from now on, I make up my mind to study politics and work for the realization of a better government in America. Since I was liberated and began to learn of a people's government, I have come to believe deep in my heart that the best thing in the world for the people is to form a people's government. also that of all the people of the world are to insure world peace, the common people will have to band together and fight against warmongers and capitalists of the world."

Hikida (2nd Co., 5th Sqd.):

"The action of the Chinese People's Volunteers is more than justified. They are helping their brothers grab them and enslave them.

"At first, I was bitter towards C.P.V., because they said 'Chinese army is very strong', so it would be a long war for us and we couldn't go home for years. Now I've realized that if the American imperialists 'lock horns', they would think it an easy deal at and they would try to take China too. As the capitalists are so greedy, the war would last for years and we G.I.'s would be continuously sent as cannon fodder."

Smith (2nd Co., 1st Sqd.):

"..... It will not be long before the whole world will have people's governments. ....."

McRoberts (2nd Co., 5th Sqd.):

"The Chinese People's Volunteers prevent the American imperialists from grabbing Korea, grabbing the whole world. They are fighting for the prevention of W.W.III." -231-

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

We Are No Longer Deceived!

Threat of Communism?

by [illegible] (Co. Sgt.)

Before I left the states all I ever remember hearing and reading was "Stop the threat of Communism" or "Communism threatens the peace and democracy of the world," or many more which all seemed to say the same thing in different ways. At that time I must admit I actually agreed that perhaps the statements were true and that the world was actually in danger.

It seems I never quite stopped to think long enough to wonder if this thing called "Communism" was really as big a threat and destroyer of world peace as everything I heard and read seemed to imply.

As a matter of fact it somehow and without up to now and what on "What Communism is." I am quite sure I couldn't have told him anything at all about the word!

Today I feel as if I could answer any man to his face showing what the word means and I am just as sure I shouldn't explain it as a threat to world peace. As a movement it appears not as a threat to peace but instead a definite threat to imperialism and capitalism. It will spread world peace and mutual understanding of all peoples.

Now that we are learning two sides of this story I would wish to ask you a question or two myself. Is not Communism for the benefit of the common people of the world? If so, I ask you again, how could anything which benefits masses of the people be any sort of threat?

What A Shame!

by Gordon (1st Sgt., Band Co.)

You all remember how the papers were being run by the capitalistic-minded S[illegible] about the Communists in China and other countries who are hoping for "democratic" the world. But we now know that the Chinese are working towards world peace and that every suggestion they make to achieve world peace is blocked by the American imperialists and warmongers. Friends, what a shame that the peace loving people in America can not be told the actual facts about our government.

Did I Learn A Trade?

by Boyd (Pvt. Sqd., Inf. Co.)

My name is [illegible] once in happy [illegible] by, till I got an idea to join the U.S. Army and learn a trade and get in a little travel. After a year and a half, I hadn't learned anything except how to use a rifle and to kill. One day I found myself on a ship headed for Korea, a place I had hardly heard of, to fight the people I didn't even know. We were told by the chiefs, I thought we would be treated or looked as we had been told. But I was mistaken. I have been here two months now and the chiefs have taken very fine care of me. We get good chow and fine medical care. They even gave us a nice Xmas Party.


We Were "Paid Killers"

by Daniel Yoshe (Pvt., Inf. Co.)

Since I was liberated, I've been given time to just stop and analyze this Korean problem. Often I've asked myself, "Were we paid killers?" "Are these Korean people really our enemy?" "Why am I here?" Most persons have come to the conclusion that the American capitalists have made us nothing short of "paid killers." But we were ignorant of the fact and we followed the capitalists without asking ourselves "why?" I am sure none of us would kill a fellow American in cold blood. But we have killed these innocent people just because Hodge and Truman said, "they are our enemy." In reality they are a peace loving people and it is only the capitalists' lust for more power and wealth that caused bloodshed. And we were the cannon fodder for their willful desires.

But now we are enlightened of these facts. I believe none of us here will be fooled again.

Pictur Gallery of a Warmger



Is Labour Government Ready for The People?

by R. Ryder (Sgt., Inf. Co.)

Every one knows that for a long time before the war England was ruled by the Tory Government. After the war the Labour Party was elected the so-called "People's Government." But if they were for the people, why did they send us to help the United States and fight the people of Korea, people we had never seen before — we should have been fighting for them not against them. There are no Korean soldiers in England or the United States, so why are we here killing them, and destroying their homes and farms. It is simply to make money for the wall street bosses.

After the last war they said this is the last war, there will be no more wars. As a matter of fact, there will always be war while the capitalists are in power.

Hyderabad (Incident) Major Events

by Evans (Inf. Co.)

Aug. 8, 1950 — I was working in a hospital in the U.S. when my commanding officer came up to me and said that he had orders on file to go overseas and that I was to get ready immediately.

Aug. 24, 1950 — I was in Japan. There was much confusion in my mind about where and why I was going and what I was going to do.

Soon I found out I was going to a place called Korea to do "police action." When I arrived there I was much more about what the "police action"

[illegible] if I have attended the [illegible] for my flight through my [illegible] — I [illegible] to the many [illegible] my speech. I was very impressed at the treatment that was given to us. When I came to this camp I received medical treatment and a warm place to sleep plus warm clothing.

Dec. 28, 1950 — To my surprise, even though I was far from home, they gave us candy, presents and organized for Christmas.

Contributions Wanted

Since its establishment, New Life has published 5 issues. And we have received anonymous contributions from various squads, sections but in comparison with the number of our readers, contributors, constitute a small percentage. So we earnestly ask all of our readers to write for New Life. We also ask our contributors to pay attention to the following things:

1. Subject of the contributions should be in close connection with your present study.
2. Be short, concise and right to the point.
3. Don't forget to put down your name (full), your unit (number of squad as well as of company) and the date.
4. Confirm to rhetoric and exposition [illegible]

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NEW (V) LIFE

JANUARY 22 '51

TO OUR LIBERATED BROTHERS

— By Kilsung Kee —

Editor's Note: On the night of Jan. 15, We had an Entertaining Party. Next morning, New Life received the following text of a farewell speech by Major Kilsung Kee, Deputy Director of Cultural Affairs, who had broken with the Army Band of Kaesung Province Garrison here to perform that night.

Dear liberated brothers:

Last night, comrades of the Chinese People Volunteers and Korean People's Army together with our liberated brothers enjoyed a very significant party. I was particularly impressed by your speeches, because from these speeches I can see clearly what a progress you have made and how much you have learned since your liberation. I sincerely hope that you will concentrate your mind on studying politics and do your endeavor to learn more, so that you'll be mighty reinforcements in the fight for a lasting peace of the world.

Some of you have proposed to sign an appeal to the UN for securing true peace in Korea. This is a very political way of fighting against the warmongers. It not only represents the interests of the American people, British people, but also represents the interests of the Korean people, the peace-loving peoples all over the world. In fact, all the progressive peoples throughout the world will support this right and just appeal of you.

Finally, let's hail:

All the peoples of the world, unite!

Fight for a lasting peace of the world!

(Major Kee's name in Korean)

Fight For True Peace!

— Collective ideas from the U.S.-, Lab Cor —

Is the American "cease fire" proposal a bid for true peace? No! How can a world beat peace when 475 million Chinese voices go unheared in the United Nations!

The Chinese people are not to be fooled by the old cry of "cease fire," because they heard that before. They want true peace!— like all the freedom loving peoples of the world.

True peace is not merely a matter of cessation of fighting. Hostilities have ceased before, but was there true peace realized? No! We want the peaceful solution of the Korean problem; we want a lasting peace of the world all the more. There can be a lasting peace only when the regimes of capitalistic countries like America, Britain, France, etc. are transformed into people's governments.

Friends, let's all fight for the true peace! for a lasting peace of the world!

We Don't Want This Dark World

Marshall Plan

George Marshall—the benefactor of the war-reached nations of Europe. Such was the saviour-like picture of him painted by the American capitalists. As a matter of fact, the Marshall plan was nothing but a means of gaining a stronghold upon Western Europe. The plan started by giving loans to all these countries to rebuild after the devastation of World War II. But in return for this, they had to buy American products to flood their own shops and markets. As a result, millions of workers lost their jobs, as there was no use but for the products they made. How can a country rebuild when it cannot even sell its own products? So they had to borrow further loans from the American capitalists but in return this time they had to let America have bases in their own lands. So now America has a line of aggression, 2000 miles from its own shores, in Western Europe and a stronghold on the countries there. This is the true purpose of the Marshall Plan. It is an aid to the American plan of world domination.

A Worker's Wage

I once heard a worker say he wondered why the dollar went so fast. I think I can give him a few facts to show him.

(In this short article, I shall leave alone the exploitation by capitalists before the wage comes into the worker's pocket.)

First of all he must pay income tax. The government takes 17.5% of his wages to pay the cost of waging war and building war materials, the dirty thing that runs out of his dollars is Social Security. This was a crumb thrown to the common people when they were clamoring for Security in their old age. Under this law the worker pays one cent out of each dollar and the employer pays one cent for that far so the worker can have an income when he is too old to work.

The average life of an American worker is 61 years. He can retire under Social Security when he is 65, so he can look forward to never having to work again four years after he is dead.

The worker buys a pack of cigarettes. The cigarettes cost him twenty-one cents. This is better than one and a half times the actual cost. The actual cost should be eight cents but there is thirteen cents tax on a pack of cigarettes.

The worker buys a gallon of gas. Without tax the gas would cost him ten cents. With taxes he pay twenty four and a half cents. This is true of everything he buys with the exception of food which is, for the most part, non-taxed. Even his clothing [illegible]

We can see from this that more than two thirds of the worker's dollars go for taxes. Now we ask, "where do the taxes go?" The answer — into the pockets of the capitalists and imperialists. They are living a very luxurious life and using the taxes only for their own interests, waging war and building war materials as I have said.

• • •

Slums

No matter what American city you drive through, you'll see some tall and beautiful buildings. But drive another block or two you'll see some worst living conditions. Why does this have to be so? Your children are wandering about the street with nothing to do. Having no money to further his education, a boy leaves school at the age of 16. Owing to small amount of schooling he is kept down to the low class job without any chance of ever bettering his living conditions. Having no money for medical care, a mother is kept out of the hospital with a sick baby in her arms. The poor child could not get a chance to live even in the worst condition that the world could offer him.

Why couldn't the U.S. government use its money to better these conditions instead of giving millions to the K.M.T. reactionary clique and sending fire wire across the Pacific to invade an innocent country?

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which co-operation, of course, implied the more or less subtle inclusion of communist propaganda. Many POWs, anxious to communicate with their loved ones, seized upon the opportunities afforded them, and, thus, the CCF propaganda effort overflowed the POW compounds and reached many hundreds of unsuspecting families. (For a detailed discussion of POW correspondence, see Chapter 15; for a discussion of radio broadcasts, see Chapter 16)

5. Motion Pictures

At irregular intervals, both the entire prisoner population and the CCF personnel in the camps would be shown Soviet, Czechoslovakian, or Chinese films which extolled social and cultural achievements in the U.S.S.R. and in the "People's Democracies." The indoctrinal effect was largely lost due to the language barrier; but because these movies constituted a relief from the boredom of camp routine, the showings were usually well received by the POWs. (For a list of films, see app. VIII)

6. Self-Criticisms

The practice of "self-criticism," employed extensively in all nations under Soviet control, was also widely utilized in the POW camps in North Korea. In many instances, as an integral part of the regular indoctrination program, POWs were obliged to devote one hour per week to confessing their shortcomings to each other and to the CCF authorities. Personal deficiencies, such as

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failure to brush one's teeth, sometimes received as much attention as more serious transgressions. Detailed confessions were re-written as often as four or five times before they were declared satisfactory by the Chinese. In cases of grave infractions of CCF regulations, and especially when the violator had a record of intransigence towards the Communist authorities, the accused would be forced to read his abject apology before the entire camp.

These self-incriminations were carefully filed, for they were later utilized either in indoctrination lectures, as proof of decadence due to life in a capitalistic society, or as supporting evidence in judicial proceedings against POWs accused of crimes against the CCF authorities. But at times, the whole idea backfired. There are reports of windy, four-hour-long self-criticisms punctuated by sarcastic references and innumerable double meanings. The Chinese punished some for their facetious remarks, but other comments either passed unobserved or were intentionally overlooked to prevent too much loss of "face."

Section VI - Indoctrination Content

The indoctrinal themes propounded by the political instructors differed in no material respect from the slanted viewpoints of the entire Soviet bloc. Included among the topics most emphasized were the following:

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(1) The treacherous South Korean attack upon the peaceful population of the North was a direct result of RHEE-TRUMAN machinations at the behest of Wall Street imperialists intent upon unleashing a third world war. (The instructors quoted extensively from a work entitled "Documents of the Korean War," in which there were photostatic copies of alleged letters from RHEE requesting U.S. aid for his plans to attack North Korea and other "documentary evidence" to prove the commitment of U.S. troops to battle long before such action was sanctioned by the United Nations.)

(2) The Chinese Volunteer Forces came to the aid of North Korea only because they were well aware of the RHEE-MACARTHUR-TRUMAN desire to utilize North Korea as a base for the invasion of Manchuria. Wouldn't defense of Mexico by the U.S. be justified if Chinese forces had been ordered to attack Texas?

(3) The history of the U.S. has been one of the exploitation of colonial peoples and the waging of war for profit by the ruling clique. Included among the shameful pages of recent American history are the Civil War, the expropriation of the American Indian, aggression against Mexico, the war against Spain, the territorial aggrandizement of Cuba and the Philippines, the seizure of Hawaii, the unsavory series of events which preceded the building of the Panama Canal, Yankee imperialism in Latin America, U.S. refusal to grant independence to Puerto Rico, and the diplomatic, economic, and military expansion of the U.S. throughout the world.

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(4) American monopolists intend to dominate all of Korea as they had intended to dominate China through their support of the bandit CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. The placing of American warships in the Straits of Formosa and the presence of U.S. military personnel on the island are ample indications that the island is considered a base for future aggression against China.

(5) The economic and social role of the Negro in the United States is that of a second-class citizen. Accounts of segregation, discrimination in education and industry, race riots and outright lynching are to be found in every newspaper; often actively supported or at least countenanced by officials in high places. (The reception of Paul ROBESON on a recent trip to Moscow was compared with that which he received in Peekskill, N.Y., and the "progressive" national policy of the U.S.S.R. was carefully explained. Negro troops were always reminded that there had never been a Negro president; they were assured that the all-Negro 503d FA Battalion had been deliberately sacrificed in Korea.)

The prison riots at KOJE were utilized by the CCF in an effort to depict life in U.N. internment camps as one filled with horror, torture, beatings, etc. Against this they contrasted their own "Lenient Policy."

The American POWs were said to be innocent victims of a deliberate U.S. policy opposing any peaceful settlement of the Korean War. Communist Party publications depicted rising U.S. casualties,

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huge industrial profits, and mounting popular feeling against the war.

It was declared to be the fault of the U.S. Government that only an insignificant portion of the sick and wounded POWs (149) were actually returned in April in operation "Little Switch." According to the CCF, American authorities had accused the Chinese of utilizing the exchange for propaganda purposes and, consequently, had refused to accept more than a limited number of such prisoners.

Much time was devoted to a detailed analysis of Marxist-Leninist theory and its application in the Soviet Union. The "History of the CPSU" (short course) was studied and discussed chapter by chapter, and many hours were expended by the political instructors in an effort to explain to the POWs the concepts of dialectical materialism, surplus value, etc. (For a complete list of subjects and themes utilized in indoctrination lectures, see app. IX)

Section VII - General

Any attempt to arrive at a definitive evaluation of Chinese indoctrination efforts among U.N. personnel is, of course, impossible without insight into the motivation and projected goals of the program. It does not appear that the Chinese anticipated the subversion and subsequent transformation of every captured soldier into a stalwart communist tool to be utilized in the direct extension of the party's ambitions. It is more reasonable to view the

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communist indoctrination effort as one designed to serve at least a two fold purpose.

First, the program afforded an opportunity for the Communists to test the efficacy of their indoctrinal efforts upon Anglo-American personnel as they had previously done on German, Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese political and military internees. The language and cultural training received by the CCF political instructors and indoctrinal approaches, and the positive and invaluable experiences culled from a three-year association with U.N. personnel made this "pilot plant" truly an abundant source of information.

Secondly, it may be assumed that, among the POWs, some were found whose faith in the essential validity of the democratic process was shallow and irresolute. The indoctrination effort was devised to inculcate the seeds of uncertainty and confusion into the minds of this group. The success of this aspect of enemy indoctrination cannot be determined as of this date, but it may be expected to produce, among some ex-POWs, varying degrees of leftist or defeatist sentiment which may be revealed in future periods of crisis.

Information obtained from repatriated personnel reveals that American POWs fell conveniently into five general categories during their period of internment.

So-called reactionary elements were comprised of two distinct types of individuals: first, the loyal American, bitterly resentful

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of communist vilification of his country and his way of life and little impressed with the alleged "accomplishments" of the communist world; and second, those with a natural instinct for rebellion against any peremptory exercise of authority, who found such authority all the more unbearable when wielded by the enemy. The "progressive" ranks were divided into two major groupings: the younger, more impressionable men, who thought they could discover the answer to life's injustices and inequities in communist doctrine; and a larger number, including the collaborators, whose subservience was dictated far less by any ideological affinity for marxism than by a desire to be included within the provisions of the CCF "Lenient Policy."

A final category, by far the most numerous, comprised those who sought safety in anonymity and in this way found a measure of security.

The personal motivations which impelled the reactionaries to attempt escapes in the face of constant dangers rather than endure captivity in relative safety, or induced them to show defiance and court punishment, even to the point of death, rather than submit to Chinese demands, are difficult to define.

Corporal Leroy CARTER, who had first been a delegate to the Central Peace Committee and, later, secretary general of that organization, was interviewed after repatriation and asked many questions concerning his activities as a POW. His remarks, transcribed

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verbatim, form the substance of "Portrait of a Progressive" (app. X), and present a frank and candid self-appraisal. Since his attitude is fairly representative of a large proportion of those who were labeled as "Progressives" by fellow POWs, his rather eloquent apologia seems to warrant close study.

Although it is apparent that the combination of long isolation in the Korean POW camps and continuous exposure to communist ideology did succeed in winning a few converts, the majority of the returnees believe that opportunism was the predominant motivation behind the actions of those who became known as "Progressives."

REFERENCES

1. ATIS 6 March 1951 from pamphlet Political Section, Nan Hai dated 1 February 1951.

2. 500th MISG Bulletin Enemy Documents, #101, 22 December 1953.

3. Dates for compulsory indoctrination: Camp 1 - June 1951; Camp 3 - November 1951; Camp 5 - March 1951.

4. Confirmed by Milton H. Peters (Interrogated at ASC - 1535 ASCIR).

5. Confirmed by Cpl. H. Dunn ASCIR #5452.

6. Claude Batchelor, Robert Hickox, Richard Morrison, Paul Schnur, Harry Copeland, and Lowell Skinner.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

7. This group included:

Chairman	Batchelor, Claude
Secretary	Hickox, Robert
Research Committee	Adams, Howard
	Morrison, Richard
	Schnur, Paul
	Copeland, Harry
	Skinner, Lowell
	Smith, Bernie
Members	Dunn, Harold
	Disney, Donald
	Lex, Charles
	Pinkston, James
	Stotts, Glen
	Grenier, Richard
	Douglas, Rufus
	Brazee, Frederick
	Laurie, Robert
	Dickenson, Edward
	Ward, John
	Hinkle, William

8. United Nations P.O.W.'s in Korea published by Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, Peking, China, 1953.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 8

BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE "CONFESSIONS"

Section I - Introduction

> History has never known such monstrous crimes.... the cannibalism of savages and the horrors of the medieval inquisition pale before the cold-blooded calculated villainy of the American imperialist militarists....the American imperialists - bloody butchers...have resorted to the most foul and ignominious means of exterminating people....bacteriological warfare.

Thus, the Cominform Journal For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy ushered in the Bacteriological Warfare campaign against the U.N. Forces. By mid-March 1952, this charge emerged as a dominant theme of Red propaganda. Communist accusations, supported by a number of alleged "germ warfare confessions," eventually resulted in a discussion of the question in the United Nations. Vehement and categorical denials were enunciated by representatives of the United States and of the U.N. command in Korea. Repeated attempts on the part of the U.S. delegation to have an impartial investigation conducted by the Red Cross or by a five member investigatory commission were thwarted by Soviet vetoes and threats of non-co-operation.

Germ warfare allegations, echoed by every Red propaganda machine from Radio Moscow to the Daily Worker, increased during the spring and summer of 1952 and reached their climax in October 1952 with the

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transmission to the United Nations of a document entitled Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Facts Concerning Bacteriological Warfare in Korea and China. This paper placed great emphasis on the testimony of four captured USAF officers whose handwritten confessions were photostated and attached to the report (fig. 10) Purportedly, the I.S.C. investigation was carried on by "important and independent scientists" for the purpose of examining "the historical facts, material proofs, and testimonies of witnesses together with first hand reports of investigations carried out on the actual scen by unbiased people, both Chinese and foreign...(which) all testify to the crimes committed by the U.S. government in waging bacteriological warfare."

The Commission, as could be expected, came to the following conclusion:

> The peoples of Korea and China have indeed been the objective of bacteriological weapons. These have been employed by units of the U.S. armed forces, using a great variety of different methods for the purpose, some of which seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese army during the second world war.
>
> The Commission reached these conclusions, passing from one logical step to another. It did so reluctantly because its members had not been disposed to believe that such an inhuman technique could have been put into execution in the face of its universal condemnation by the peoples of the nations.
>
> It is now for all people to redouble their efforts to preserve the world from war and prevent the discoveries of science being used for the destruction of humanity.

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It was generally conceded by those who knew the facts that the organization itself was a creature of the Communist World Peace Council and that it was composed of well-known Communist collaborators.[1]

On 12 March 1953 representatives of the Soviet Union introduced into the U.N. two additional "confessions" obtained from Colonel SCHWABLE and Major BLEY of the U.S. Marine Corps, with hints that more were to follow.[2] On 1 December 1953, the depositions of nineteen captured USAF officers were published in the communist press, as a supplement to People's China, thus raising to 25 the number of American POWs whose purported confessions were publicly exploited.[3]

All twenty-five of the Americans involved were repatriated, and, through their debriefings, the full story of the "confessions" was revealed to the world.

Those who had "confessed" were condemned by the enemy as "war criminals," but all charges against them were formally dropped in September 1953, after this terse announcement from Radio Peking:

> The twenty-five U.S. airmen, who during the fighting in Korea and within the territory of Korea, took part in the large scale BW conducted by the U.S. forces, have a grave case against them and merit punishment according to law. However, they were executing orders of higher authorities but were not, in themselves, men of primary responsibility for the planning and launching of bacteriological warfare against us, and, after committing the crime, they honestly confessed to it. Therefore, the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has decided, in accordance with the policy of lenient treatment of prisoners of war followed

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Members of the International Scientific Commission Interrogating U.S. POW John Quinn (the first man on the right).

PRISONER OF WAR JOHN QUINN (U.S. AIR FORCE) ADMITTED THAT HE HAD DROPPED GERM-LADEN BOMBS IN KOREA

John Quinn, aged 28, a U.S. prisoner of war, of Pasadena, California, is a first lieutenant of the U.S. Air Force (Serial No. [illegible]), and a pilot of the Eighth Squadron, Third Group of the Third Bomber Wing of the U.S. Air Force. On January 29, 1952, his plane, a B-26, No. 699,* was shot down by the Chinese People's Volunteers and he was then captured near Sunan,† Korea. According to his written confession, he had acted on instructions of his superiors, and dropped four germ-laden bombs in the southern suburbs of Pyongyang at 2:00 a.m. on January 6, 1952. At 9:00 a.m. on January 11, 1952, he again dropped two germ-laden bombs at a place southwest of Sinanju. He further admitted that he had received special training in bacteriological and chemical warfare in the Ground School of the U.S. Air Force in Kimpo, Korea, in December, 1951.

* The assigned number of the bomber has 3 digits, 699 being the last 3 digits.

† K. L. Sunch'on was captured in the vicinity of Sunan, but this was not the same place where John Quinn was captured.

The Confession Written by John Quinn is Reproduced Below:

I am John Quinn, a 1/Lt in the United States Air Force. I am 28 years old. I joined the Air Force when I was 26 on February 19, of 1948 my home is in Pasadena, California. After I graduated from Aviation Cadets in February of 1949 I was assigned to the Air University. They sent me through a six weeks course on how to teach called the Academic Instructor Course after I finished they assigned me to the Academic Instructor Division as a staff member, my job was Training Aids officer, to teach people how to make good use of pictures, charts, movies and slides in their instruction. I was teaching there when I got my orders to the Far East Air Forces for further assignment to fly B-26's in Korea. I was told to report for it on either August 25 to Langley Air Force Base to learn to fly B-26's. I was there for 8 weeks. We were sent from there to

2

Camp Stoneman for processing at Camp Stoneman I was inoculated for Typhoid fever, Typhus, Cholera, and Smallpox. We left the United States by airplane and arrived in Japan on 27 November. We arrived at Haneda Air Terminal and taken to Brooks, Area B, to await being sent to Korea. We were there until the 29th of November and then sent by train to Ashiya Air Base in Southern Japan. It was an overnight trip by train and we arrived on the 30th. The same day we were sent by C-47 to Kimpo Air Base in Korea. I was assigned to the 8th Squadron, 3rd group of the 3rd Bomb wing. The 3rd group is composed of 3 squadrons, 8th, 90th and 13th and is the only group at Kimpo

5

On December 17, 1951 I reported to the 8th Squadron orderly room and saw my name on the bulletin board to attend a lecture the next day at 9 o'clock. The next day Barron, a navigator who was also on the list, and I went to the lecture. The lecture was given in the ground school building in a large room. I'd say the room would seat 30 people. There were 20 people in the room, all pilots and navigators in addition to Barron and myself were Ralph[illegible] Schwartz, Reynolds, [illegible] Bentley, all navigators, Everett, Capt. Boat, Capt. Schmidt the Lecturer, Capt. McAllister, all pilots. Barron and I had been drinking coffee and arrived a few minutes late, the others were already there. The Capt that was talking seemed very displeased that we were late and reported for me that the lecture that

6

we were to receive were considered very important and highly secret that we were to pay close attention to everything that was told us but not to discuss the lecture later. We among ourselves. He said the lecturer had come from Japan and was an expert in his field. Then he introduced the lecturer, a civilian, as Mr. Oldfield. Mr. Oldfield was a middle aged man, 40 years old, slender, 5 ft 10" and losing most of his hair.

Mr. Oldfield began his lecture by telling us that his lecture was on biological weapons. He said that it was a terrible thing to contemplate but in this day of the atom bomb modern scientists were making small rapid strides, that we must be prepared for any form of attack. He said that we must know what these attacks might take on the

7

future and that we must be ready to defend ourselves. We must also learn how to carry out biological warfare ourselves in case it proved necessary. He said that he had spent many years studying germ warfare and that he would give us as much information as he thought we needed.

Mr. Oldfield told us that there were many many ways of spreading germ warfare. Germs that then could be applied anywhere at anytime that the means were ready. He told us that germs by themselves could not be dropped because they would die in 60 seconds in direct sunlight. That germs could, however, be turned by many different types of insects and rodents, that insects and rodents have been bred for many of these generations under laboratory conditions

8

and selected for their ability to survive anywhere at anytime, even under the most adverse conditions. To name a few of the ways that they can be spread, he said, was by dust, just like a smoke screen is laid down. That they could be spread in this way by ships moving in close to shore when the wind was blowing onto shore. That they could also be spread in this way by low flying jet aircraft. He meant any type of jet aircraft. He said that they could be spread by bugs in bottles, flies, flies, lice and mosquitos. There were many, bugs could also be dropped in many other ways, in boxes that would break very fragile in the sun and allow the bugs to crawl out and also in bombs. He said since we were flying B-26's he would discuss

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by our People's Army, that they be extended clemency, and issued an order on September 1 exempting all of them from prosecution.

The following pages present, as straightforwardly as possible, the historical record and an analysis of the methods employed by the Communists in extorting these false confessions.

Section II - The Historical Record

On 7 January 1952 a U.S. Air Force lieutenant[4] was attacked by MIGs and forced to parachute into North Korea. Captured almost immediately by North Korean police, he was taken to SINUIJU, interrogated briefly and then transferred to "Pak's Palace," a North Korean interrogation center near P'YONGYANG. There, after constant threats of imminent execution, a near starvation diet and continuous interrogation on germ warfare, he eventually submitted to Communist demands and became the first U.S. airman interrogated and coerced into a BW confession. In March 1952, the lieutenant made a radio address in which he condemned the use of germ warfare, and, on 21 June 1952, after removal to Camp 2, and after moderate physical and psychological abuse, he wrote and signed a Bacteriological Warfare "confession." These early accusations against him were followed, in late February, by similar charges against two other USAF lieutenants, Kenneth L. ENOCH and John S. QUINN, who were destined to play a leading role in the BW hoax.

When CHOU EN LAI officially launched the BW charges in a PEKING broadcast on 25 February 1952, in which he accused the U.N. of

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"callously brutal germ warfare," the enemy had not as yet extracted any confessions from American airmen. The Chinese had, in fact, interrogated only one man to any extent, and had not yet received any indications that a confession could be obtained. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Jacob MALIK, reiterated CHOU's charges in mid-March, but, later the same month, studiously ignored a U.S. proposal for an International Red Cross investigation in Korea, declaring the Red Cross "incompetent" on grounds that it was neither international nor impartial. Instead, the Soviet delegate asked that the United Nations formally condemn the U.S. for "wide" use of germ weapons.

In Korea a concerted effort was now commenced to force confessions from ENOCH and QUINN, members of the same B-26 crew who had been forced to abandon their aircraft on 13 January 1952, due to mechanical difficulties. Although captured immediately by enemy forces, they were separated and transported independently to a North Korean detention camp approximately five miles from P'YONGYANG, where they met again on January 30th. The two officers were first apprised of the germ warfare allegations when a North Korean interrogator informed them that the U.S. had been engaged in BW operations for some time, and that, as a result of a recent germ attack, all personnel in the camp were to be innoculated. On the 6th of March and again on the 10th of March, they were given two shots supposedly designed to counteract cholera and the bubonic plague. On March 12th, both men were transported by truck to PYOKTONG and were forced to undergo

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NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

intensive interrogations concerning their alleged BW activities. They were not, it appears, subjected to physical duress substantially greater than the normal discomforts suffered by all POWs, but both finally acceded to CCF demands. On April 9th, Lt. ENOCH wrote a detailed BW "confession," and, four days later, Lt. QUINN submitted 38 closely written pages of self-incriminating material. On 4 May 1952, a North Korean broadcast announced to the world that two captured USAF fliers had "confessed" to having dropped "unexplosive germ bombs" on North Korea, on the 13th of January.

Two other USAF lieutenants, Floyd B. O'NEAL and Paul R. KNISS, captured on 4 March and 31 May 1952 respectively, were subjected to similar treatment and submitted confessions to the CCF on 18 June and 6 July 1952. Together with ENOCH and QUINN, they were thenceforth used extensively for enemy propaganda purposes, and their names soon became practically synonymous with BW "confessions." The initial success of the Communists in obtaining these "confessions" was not easily duplicated with other USAF personnel: as of 30 August 1952 - six months after the inauguration of the BW campaign - a total of only 15 had submitted signed confessions out of almost 50 officers and enlisted men who had been interrogated and pressured.

On 20 June 1952, the United States again proposed - this time in the Security Council of the United Nations - that the United Nations request the International Red Cross to investigate the charges that the U.S. had waged germ warfare in Korea and Red China. Jacob

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRC NARS, Date 4/11/90

MALIK, Council chairman for June, delayed action on the resolution by tying up debate on a Soviet proposal that all nations ratify the 1925 Geneva protocol on germ warfare. A counter U.S. resolution on 9 July 1952 to the effect that, because of obvious Communist reluctance to admit an impartial investigative commission into Korea, the Red BW charges against the U.N. command be branded as false, was defeated by the casting of Soviet Russia's fifty-second veto in the Security Council.

The CCF in Korea, however, unmindful of the incredulous reception which the Red charges had received in the United Nations, prepared to exploit to the fullest the "confessions" obtained from the four USAF officers previously mentioned. During the period between May and October 1952, each flier was extensively interviewed by Wilfred BURCHETT, Alan WINNINGTON, Monica FELTON, and other representatives of the Communist press, and all such interviews were recorded and photographed with still and motion picture cameras. The officers were requested to write articles on why they had confessed to BW; these were inserted in the inter-camp POW newspaper, Toward Truth and Peace, and payments were made to them amounting to 20,000 yuan or its equivalent in soap, combs, candy, etc.

Letters were addressed to Communist-sponsored "peace conferences" and world youth festivals; one was sent to Madame SUN YAT SEN, thanking her for her strenuous efforts on behalf of world peace. The reply to the latter missive complimented the four "confessors" for their

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

role in exposing germ warfare and urged them to continue "in the front line of the fight for peace." On 3 August 1952, all four airmen appeared before members of the Communist-inspired and Communist-dominated "International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of Germ Warfare in Korea," where they confirmed their guilt and asked for forgiveness. On the 20th of October, one of the officers affirmed and elaborated on his confession before 200 POWs in the Camp 5 auditorium, and another lieutenant followed suit one month later. On the 18th of December, three of the "confessors" were transported by truck to ROK Camp 7, where their speeches were repeated before 300-400 South Korean POWs.

Between February and May 1953, the CCF launched a second, more impressive BW indoctrination effort, and an elaborate display was set up in each of the five permanent camps. Corroborative "evidence" of germ warfare was presented by the Chinese in the form of huge poster exhibits (depicting the loading and dropping of germ bombs), a three-minute film showing a North Korean civilian presenting a fragment of an alleged germ bomb to Chinese officials, photostated "confessions," recorded interviews with "confessors" and the entire printed proceedings of the International Scientific Commission. Attendance at the display was mandatory, and the POWs were tested upon leaving the exhibit. The variety and number of such displays, presented as a steady diet to the POWs during the course of many months, did succeed in impressing the more credulous, and, upon

DECLASSIFIED
NND 869210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

repatriation, many asserted they had begun to wonder if the charges against their government might not be true.

It is impossible to encompass within this short narrative the complete, detailed story of the Communist effort to obtain BW "confessions." But perhaps, through the experiences of a B-29 crew commander, Captain Theodore R. HARRIS, and of certain other captured personnel - experiences which, though not necessarily shared by all, are at least representative of those undergone by a substantial number - the pattern of that story may be made clearer.

On the night of 3 July 1952, Captain HARRIS, his RB-29 severely damaged by MIG attacks over SINANJU, ordered his men to abandon the aircraft. The eleven survivors of the crew, almost without exception, were captured by elements of the CCF immediately upon landing. All, after brief tactical military interrogations, were transported separately to "Twin Peaks," a CCF interrogation center approximately 35 miles NE of P'YONGYANG where, after threats, intimidations and eventual transfer to China, eight of the crew eventually executed and signed germ warfare "confessions."

At "Twin Peaks," alone, and unaware of the fate of the rest of his crew, Captain HARRIS was subjected to intense and detailed interrogations on military matters and the alleged utilization of germ weapons by the USAF. Steadfast refusal to co-operate with his captors led to frequent and severe beatings - with equally negative results. On one such occasion, his enraged interrogator ordered him to dig

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRC NARS, Date 4/11/90

his own grave under the cocked rifles of CCF guards. When this task was accomplished, one last opportunity was offered him to confess his "sins" against the Chinese and North Korean people. After his determined refusal, the CCF troops were ordered into a rough firing line and a blindfold was offered the prisoner. Then came the command, "Fire!" Triggers were pulled, hammers clicked - but there was no report. A sardonic interrogator informed him that this incident was only a sample of what he could expect if he didn't "confess."

During the period between November and January 1953, the captain remained in a hut, shackled and shivering. Since the Chinese refused to permit him to warm himself, his hands became severely frostbitten. The skin stretched so tightly across his fingers that not a wrinkle appeared, even in the natural creases. Through all this, he was unceasingly subjected to the efforts of three interrogators bent on obtaining a BW confession.

On 24 January 1953, he was blindfolded, shoved into a truck and started on a journey to MUKDEN, China - a journey which, unknown to him, the other members of his crew were taking at approximately the same time. His MUKDEN imprisonment began with weeks of constant interrogations designed to extract from him an admission of participation in germ warfare. No effort was ever spared to demoralize, degrade and humiliate him. Finally, when a Chinese officer took great pains to wipe his dirty boots on HARRIS's shirt, the captain struck out at him in blind rage. The Chinese left but soon returned with

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

four guards carrying a box-like device which the prisoner was to learn to know all too well. The four sides and top of this wooden box had been hinged in such a manner that, in its opened and flattened position, it resembled a wooden cross. He was ordered to sit in the center of the cross, whereupon the sides were folded up and the top was snapped into place and bolted. With his knees drawn up tightly against his chest, with a small hole ½ inch in diameter his only source of air, and with food, drink, and the opportunity to relieve himself denied to him, he remained so confined for more than ten hours. Upon release, he was immediately shackled around the ankles, each wrist to its respective ankle, and thus left for three days.

On 1 April 1953, again in shackles, he was blindfolded and transported by jeep to a second prison in MUKDEN, where he was confined in a small cell, the floor of which was perpetually covered with ¼ inch of water; and there he was subjected to endless interrogation. "Non-co-operation" soon led once again to the "torture box" treatment - this time for approximately 14 hours, with guards constantly beating a rhythmic tattoo on the surfaces of the box with wooden sticks. When released, he was virtually paralyzed from the waist down and for about 10 days his head rang with the echo of the sticks striking the sides of the box.

On 15 May 1953, Captain HARRIS was told that he had been found guilty as a war criminal and that punishment would be forthcoming. After this pronouncement, he was returned to his former place of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

detention, placed in solitary confinement and held there until early September. On 2 September 1953, he was informed that, not withstanding the fact that he had been found guilty, he was to be returned to the U.N. command. He was quickly hustled into a waiting weapons carrier, where, for the first time in 14 months, he was to meet five members of his crew to whom he was forbidden to speak but whose eyes told of experiences equal to his own. The group was transferred to a train; the blinds were drawn; and the long trip back to KAESONG began.

On 5 September 1953, the captain and the other members of his crew were taken to a tent in KAESONG where they were confronted with numerous NK and Chinese officers and civilians who called themselves a "People's Political Committee." A document was read first in Chinese, then in Korean, and finally in English; it stated that the B-29 crew of which the captain was commander had been taken north to MUKDEN for the purpose of interrogations concerning such crimes as BW, and that the crew had voluntarily admitted their guilt. The captain interrupted the proceedings with "that's a damn lie" and demanded that his name be stricken from the list of those who had confessed. When the Chinese refused to comply with his demand, the captain announced that he was going to refuse repatriation and that he had not fought off past CCF interrogators only to succumb at KAESONG. Thirty guards, not without a struggle, finally pushed and dragged the captain into a waiting truck, where, handcuffed and still

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

protesting, he was forcibly brought to PANMUNJOM.[5]

Although exhibiting a lesser degree of moral fiber and personal integrity, the stories of two other USAF officers must also find a place in this narrative, if only to highlight the tremendous range of character variation facing CCF interrogators and the totally different responses they inspired.

One of the officers,[6] a downed B-26 shoran operator, was captured by a North Korean patrol on 8 June 1952. Removed to a secret CCF interrogation center southwest of YANGDOK, North Korea, he was subjected to intensive interrogation on BW. He was alternately well treated and threatened with punishment as a war criminal. On 13 August 1952, after an internment unusually devoid of physical coercion, he supplied his captors with a BW "confession." From that moment on, he became a reluctant but malleable tool of the Communists. Almost a quarter of the BW confessions, including those of eight members of one crew, were in some measure directly attributable to his personal interviews and influence with other POWs accused of BW. His confession was bought cheaply and his services were well rewarded. He states:

> During my period of internment, I received no physical injury at the hands of the Chinese... From the period I said "Okay" I would tell them about germ warfare, my whole physical well-being was well taken care of. One officer used to come around every day and ask me how the food was and if I were well housed and so forth.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The other officer[7] was forced to crash land his F-51 northeast of HAIJU, North Korea, on his 19th combat mission, and was captured by enemy forces on the morning of 25 November 1952.

After a brief tactical military interrogation, he was transported by truck to an unknown location where he was placed in a Korean hut under constant surveillance. On the day following his arrival, a detailed interrogation on atomic, dust, and germ bombs commenced a 10-day period during which the Lieutenant was under continual pressure to confess his participation in BW. Threats of non-repatriation and conviction as a war criminal were alternated with glowing descriptions of the CCF "Lenient Policy" and incontrovertible evidence (in the form of recordings and facsimile "confessions") of the host of other POWs who had already "confessed" to BW charges.

Although living conditions during this period were by no means opulent, they were adequate: "At first they gave me an overcoat for covering, then they exchanged the overcoat for a wool blanket and, later, within a week or two, they gave me a cotton padded quilt... (and)...during my entire period of captivity I was fed at least two meals a day."

Seven days after capture, despite the fact that the interrogator, according to the prisoner, never did threaten him with physical torture or death and never injured him in any manner whatsoever, the lieutenant furnished his captors with a germ warfare "confession."

While the interrogators were busily occupied in Korea, Communist

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BWS NARS, Date 4/11/90

propagandists on the world front were equally zealous. On 4 January 1953, CHOU EN LAI renewed charges of germ warfare by USAF personnel, and on 23 February 1953, as if in substantiation, a PEKING broadcast quoted two captured U.S. Marine Corps flyers, Colonel SCHWABLE and Major BLEY, as confirming the fact that germ weapons had been given "field tests" in Korea. The confessions of the two pilots came at an opportune time for the Communists, since 24 February 1953 was the date the General Assembly reconvened. Little time was lost in getting the two spurious "confessions" circulated among the delegations (March 12). The torturing of the two officers could well have been an integral part of Soviet preparations for the General Assembly session.

Major BLEY recounts his experiences thus:

> As I was in solitary confinement almost all my period as a POW, I can speak for myself only in regard to mistreatment. I was shot down and captured on 8 July 1952, but I did not receive any mistreatment until September. Then my captors began to try to make me confess to knowledge of and the part I played in germ warfare. Around 1 September 1952, an interrogator whom I had not seen before approached me and started a "softening up" procedure by discussing general topics of interest to any American, such as politics, economics, sports, and normal living conditions in the U.S. After two or three days he informed me that my interrogation period had almost been completed and that I would be with other POWs, write letters home and be left alone until after the war had ended, and then I'd be repatriated. He then asked me if I had any worries on my mind or would like to clear my conscience of any subject that I had not been asked about. When I replied "No," he reiterated I

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

would soon be on my way to a main POW camp but he had just one more question that I'd have to clear before leaving the interrogation center - germ warfare. Naturally, I denied any knowledge of the subject and told him such a type of warfare was not in use in Korea. For about one week the interrogator came to my cell daily, both A.M. and P.M., and questioned me on the subject. He advised me it would be useless for me to continue denying germ warfare and sooner or later I would have to make a confession.

After a week or ten days of continual questioning, and refusal on my part to "co-operate," the interrogator ordered my guard to make me sit at attention in my cell all day and then left me alone for several days to "think it over." When he returned and found I still would not admit to germ warfare, I was taken to an underground cave to sit and sleep. I was not permitted to leave my cell or the cave except to urinate, and then only in daylight hours.

Around the 10th of October, I was taken out of the cave and returned to a mud hut cell, where the interrogator renewed his attempts to make me confess to germ warfare. When I again refused, he ordered me to stand at attention for periods of six to seven hours. This continued for about two weeks, and when I still refused to "co-operate," I was taken to a cell some four feet wide, six feet in length, and with a ceiling about four feet high. This cell had been especially constructed for POWs who would not co-operate with the Chinese interrogators. For several hours each day I was required to stand in a hunched-down position in this low ceilinged cell, with the Chinese guard standing at the door with a rifle and bayonet in the small of my back.

Every few days the interrogators came around and asked me if I had any problems I would like to discuss with them. When I replied in the negative, they would tell me in great detail how nice it was in the main POW camps and how soon I would be there after I made my confession

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

on germ warfare.

On 15 November 1952, I was moved from the interrogation center in the central part of North Korea to PYOKTONG. There I was put in a cell infested with rats, fed less than I had been before (one cup of rice and one cup of either turnips or cabbage each meal, twice a day, and given only three cups of water each day.) When I was thrown in this cell, the Chinese POW officer told me I was to be given a lengthy thinking period. It was. For five weeks I saw no one except my guard, who was stationed continually at my door, and the "Chink" who served my food and water twice daily.

Sometime, in the latter part of December, the same interrogator approached me again with the same question and got the same answer. The next day they assigned a new interrogator who came in my cell, walked up to me and without warning struck me in the face with his closed fist, knocking me across the room. When I got up I started towards him but the guard shoved me back with the butt of his rifle, took some rope and tied my hands behind me and ordered me to kneel in the corner.

For about ten days the interrogator, assisted by the guard, worked me over daily, sometimes hitting me in the face when I was unable to defend myself. At the end of each "treatment" period, he would ask me if I was ready to "co-operate" with them.

Early in January 1953, I was moved again to the edge of PYOKTONG and placed in another mud hut, where I had no heat at all, either night or day.

With the light POW uniform I had on, I was unable to keep warm at any time, was required to stand at attention almost every day and was not permitted to lie down at night. Anyway, it was necessary for me to keep moving around in the cell or I would have frozen, as the temperature was then below zero degrees Fahrenheit.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

I believe this treatment lasted for six or seven days; I'm not sure. Half frozen and without sleep for many nights, I was worn both physically and mentally.

One night, around midnight, my interrogator escorted me to the POW camp commander's office where, through an interrogator, I was told they had concrete evidence that I participated in germ warfare, showed me the second time a part of another POW's confession on germ warfare (which I believed was a fake) and then gave me a written forty-eight-hour ultimatum. It was written in English, signed by some Chinese whom they told me was the general in charge of all Chinese North Korean POW camps. It stated, in effect, that I knew about germ warfare and that for the part I had played in it I would be considered a war criminal. I would be shipped to China, and given a trial by a civil court on the charge of participating in germ warfare against the Chinese Volunteers and People of the Democratic North Korean Republic.

However, it further stated that if I made a full confession I would be treated as a regular POW and be repatriated after the end of the war.

I was taken back to my cell, not fed at all for the forty-eight-hour period and again required to remain awake at night.

The interrogator came again at the end of the ultimatum period and I told him I would go along with the lie. He had all the information he wanted me to write out, and, within a few hours, I had it all rewritten and signed. I believe the date of my deposition was 25 January 1953. However, it was rewritten several times to get it exactly as they wanted it, sometimes by removing sentences and paragraphs and sometimes by adding some. They had great difficulty in deciding just what they wanted me to say and how I wrote it. I was in no condition to resist or even argue with them.[8]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

But Communist preparations were of little avail. On 8 April 1953, the General Assembly voted to support U.S. demands that an impartial committee be constituted to investigate Communist charges that the U.S. waged germ warfare in Korea.

Not discouraged, however, the Soviet delegation, in October, distributed to all U.N. delegations the final report of the International Scientific Commission, which echoed all previous allegations. In reply, U.S. delegate Henry Cabot LODGE showed the U.N. General Assembly films in which five U.S. airmen told how their Communist captors tortured them into confessing germ warfare in Korea. All five categorically repudiated their confessions. The Soviet delegate, Jacob MALIK, could only retort that the fliers had recanted their confessions under "star-chamber" proceedings ordered by U.S. Defense Secretary Charles E. WILSON.

One of the last American officers to confess was Colonel Walker MAHURIN. His story is representative of the accounts of those who succumbed only after many months of extreme pressure. It illustrates vividly the point that, although some victims of Communist pressure can resist for a long time, these same victims may eventually be forced into submission through the protracted employment of such techniques as were used by the Chinese and NK. (It is significant to note that, during the period from the beginning of the BW campaign to the end of the war, only three U.S. colonels - two Air Force and one Marine - became POWs in North Korea, and all three were made to

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

confess. But, in each case, the confession was extorted by means as severe as any used by the Communists. It can be safely concluded that the Communists were prepared to use any effort necessary in each of these three cases.)

Colonel MAHURIN was forced to abandon his F-84 on 13 May 1952, and was captured immediately by elements of the CCF. On the 15th of May he was moved to what apparently was a North Korean interrogation center and was interrogated briefly in regard to tactical military information. On 3 June 1952, he was transported by truck to a former coal mine area located approximately 20 miles northwest of P'YONGYANG. Here, nine Chinese interrogators, each of whom appeared to be a specialist in one particular area (i.e., aircraft tactics, radar, communications, unit commanders, TO&E, etc.), worked in shifts for 12 hours per day for 44 consecutive days to extract the information they desired from him. During this period, the prisoner co-operated to some extent with his captors in the hope that his name would be placed on the POW lists and that his family would be informed that he was still alive.

On 17 July 1952, he was transferred to PYOKTONG, North Korea, where a Comrade WONG informed him that military interrogations were at an end and that he was going to work on the colonel to obtain a BW confession. WONG informed him that he still was not listed as a POW and that the alternative was either co-operation or death. Col. MAHURIN declared later:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

I was kept without sleep, threatened and browbeaten. I was told they would resort to torture and that all pilots who did not confess were killed. They told me that they would interrogate me until I confessed.

In September, 1952, the intensity of the pressure to force a ~~IN~~ confession from him was increased. He was forced to sit at attention in his room a minimum of 15 hours a day for approximately 30 consecutive days; at one point, he was forced to sit at attention on the edge of a wooden platform for what he estimated was 38 hours. During one period a total of fifteen interrogators were utilized in an attempt to extract a confession from him.

In October, 1952, his frantic attempt to slash his wrists was thwarted by the unexpected arrival of the guard. Pressure, however, did not abate, and a series of day-long interviews with Alan WINNINGTON were arranged in the hope that the Communist correspondent would meet with more success. The colonel was told that countless other American aviators had already "confessed" and that they were now living in peace and enjoying the fruits of the Chinese "Lenient Policy." He was forced to listen to the recorded confessions of four U.S. airmen, each of whom named him (the colonel) as their group commander and the person directly responsible for the entire program. He still refused to confess.

At this point the interrogator warned him that he had been given his last opportunity. Colonel MAHURIN felt that death was imminent, and, in a last desperate effort to make his fate known to the world,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By _____ NARS, Date 4/11/90

he pulled his entire beard from his face with the hope that he might be recognized by someone on his way to the execution site.

But his fears were not realized and he was left to himself until April 1953, when a new interrogator appeared and informed him that, once again, they were going to try to get a confession. His treatment now changed abruptly; he was permitted to bathe and shave and was given books to read and more food. In a conciliatory tone, his interrogator promised him that, if he confessed, his statement would never be made public ("You keep quiet and we will keep quiet.") and that the time had long since passed for the disclosure of new confessions, since the whole affair had already received world-wide attention.

In May 1953, the colonel submitted to communist demands and confessed. After repatriation, he described some of the considerations which had prompted his decision in the following words:

> By this time, germ warfare had been known to the world for over one year...I felt that my country had over one year to combat these charges...I felt that, after one year, I had paid my debt to my country and now my duty was to my wife and family. I wanted to relieve their anxiety for me. I was willing to take a chance that if I wrote a germ warfare confession, I would contact my family and that I would be returned after hostilities. I believed that my worth to the United States would be greater from a military standpoint if I could come home and once again be able to fight instead of disappearing and never being allowed to return. I felt that, once returned, I could speak the truth and tell the people what to expect if the U.S. fell into Communist hands. Based on this analysis only, I told the interrogator in May 1953 that I would write a confession.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 887270
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

In early July, he was moved to the Camp 2 annex, where he executed and signed his first BW "confession." When his first effort was declared inadequate, he completed a second, and it was accepted on 10 August 1953. He was then told that the war was over and that, because he had co-operated, he would be permitted to go home - on two conditions: first, that he make a recording of his confession and, second, that he submit to one further military (as distinguished from political) interrogation. He accepted and complied with both provisions.

On 1 September 1953, the colonel was again requested to rewrite his confession along certain lines prescribed by the Chinese. This was done, and the confession was recorded during the early morning hours two days later. He was then taken to PANMUNJOM, where he encountered his first fellow American in more than a year.

The BW "confessions" campaign continued until the very eve of repatriation, and the majority of those who had already confessed found themselves faced with the necessity of having to expand and revise their earlier manuscripts. The purpose behind this demand by the Chinese may not have been apparent at the time, but it was made clear on 1 December 1953, when Depositions of Nineteen Captured U.S. Airmen on their Participation in Germ Warfare in Korea was published as a supplement of People's China. The Communists wanted to eliminate glaring discrepancies and to fit the various confessions into an integrated pattern in order to insure their credibility and

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

enhance their propaganda value.

By the time it was all over, the Communists had interrogated 91 USAF personnel on BW. Of these, 76 had been subjected to some form of duress; the others had been interrogated in a very routine and sometimes perfunctory fashion, and had been allowed to forestall any further questioning by emphatic and categorical denials. A total of 38 men submitted "confessions." This figure, however, should be examined closely. One man admitted only that he had attended lectures back in the U.S. on BW, but denied any actual participation in germ warfare while in Korea. Another, although he had written out a "confession," refused to sign it. A third, after a period of intensive interrogation, finally gave in and penned a very sketchy draft of a "confession." Later, he resisted all attempts to make him fill in the details. Five others, all from the same B-29 crew, signed "confessions" and later repudiated them, remaining adamant in this latter position, even though they were subjected to rigorous interrogation in MUKDEN over a period of seven to nine months. Out of the remaining 30 confessions, the Chinese saw fit to exploit only 23.

In addition to the Air Force personnel, the Communists interrogated two marine pilots and an army corporal. Their signed confessions were published and used for propaganda purposes.

Section III - Physio-Psychological Pressures

The art of extracting "confessions" or "self-criticisms" has,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

since the early purge trials, become part and parcel of the communist terror machine. The techniques of such extortion and the procedures employed for breaking even the strongest of human spirits have been well developed and improved to near perfection. In Korea, American personnel chosen for special attention as potential Bacteriological Warfare "confessors" were subjected to a relentless series of physical and psychological pressures. Apparently, the efficient tactics of the Russian MVD are well known to their Chinese and North Korean counterparts.

The campaign to obtain confessions of germ warfare from the POWs consisted, first, of a conditioning period designed to create mental confusion and a sense of utter futility, followed, if necessary, by coercion, to the point of complete physical collapse. Dr. Charles MAYO, in a Department of State Bulletin dated 6 November 1953, states:

> The tortures used in these cases, although they include many brutal physical injuries, are not like the medieval tortures of the rack and thumbscrew. They are subtler, more prolonged, and intended to be more terrible in their effect. They are calculated to disintegrate the mind of an intelligent victim, to distort his sense of values to a point where he will not simply cry out "I did it" but will become a seemingly willing accomplice to the complete destruction of his integrity and the production of an elaborate fiction.

At the very outset of the first interrogation, the accused would be told that, although he was a prisoner in the hands of the CCF, he was still a combatant, and that, until he had demonstrated

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRC NARS, Date 4/11/90

complete co-operation with his captors, the status of a normal POW would be denied to him. Evidence of this co-operation was to consist, of course, of a confession to having waged Bacteriological Warfare in Korea. After the denial which inevitably followed such a charge, the interrogator would launch a bitter tirade against the "butchers of women and children" and "dogs of Wall Street," climaxed by an official accusation of germ warfare read from an impressive document said to be signed by MAO TSE TUNG. In a business-like manner it would be declared that, because the prisoner had so bloodied his hands, he was to be considered a "war criminal" and thus would not be protected by the provisions of the Geneva Convention. The death sentence would be pronounced and the POW dismissed to await the hour of his execution.

The second interrogation would often assume a completely different tone. A smiling, conciliatory interrogator, solicitous for the welfare of the prisoners, would offer cigarettes and perhaps candy, talk of home and family, and express wishes for the POWs quickest possible repatriation after the cessation of hostilities. The "Lenient Policy" would be described in great detail and declared available to all who "unburdened their souls" and "repented their sins against humanity." One such forgiving Communist interrogator stated, "Don't think of me as an interrogator; think of me as a doctor who is here to help cleanse your conscience - to wash your mind of these terrible actions you have committed here in Korea..."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

For some, after days of doubt and despair, this sudden and unexpected opportunity to escape from what appeared to be certain death was sufficient motivation for a false germ warfare "confession." But others resolutely crowded out of their minds all thoughts of home, family, and of life itself, and steeled themselves to await whatever fate would befall them.

The next step taken to compel the reluctant "war criminals" to confirm the Bacteriological Warfare allegations was to place the potential "confessor" in complete isolation. Once alone, deprived of the comfort and security of fellow Americans, with no news of family or the war, and without the most elementary means of diversion, mental attitudes progressed rapidly from nervous anticipation to passive acceptance, and in many cases led to a state of complete mental apathy. While the POW was forced to lie on a cold, damp, dirt floor, without bedding or clothing other than his flying suit, the minutes would seem like hours and each day an eternity. Throughout the ordeal, the incessant interrogations continued with their all too familiar appeals: "Confess and earn the forgiveness of humanity; confess and rid your conscience of this most vile and foul deed; confess and avail yourself of the beneficent 'Lenient Policy' - communication with family and friends, fresh fruits and vegetables, attention to medical needs, a change of clothes, an opportunity to shave and keep yourself clean, the comfort of living with other American personnel and, above all, the realization of your eventual

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By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

repatriation on some not too distant day."

After months of this, a number of men, finding themselves unable to resist further, succumbed. Colonel SCHWABL at a public hearing in February 1954 testifies:

> Every effort was made to degrade and humiliate me and to reduce me to the level of an animal wallowing around in dirt and filth, living practically the life of a beast in a cage. My inherent pride as a Marine officer was submerged and with it my moral and spiritual outlook was contaminated.
>
> Like the slow dripping of water working on the nerves, the Chinese kept repeating that the only course of action open to me was to confess, confess and CONFESS. They did that until I would go to sleep at night saying should I confess, confess - knowing that my confession will be a lie."

The picture is indeed an ugly one. Dr. Charles MAYO, in the Department of State Bulletin cited previously, describes it thus:

> ....human being reduced to a status lower than that of animals; filthy, full of lice; festered wounds full of maggots; their sickness regulated to a point just short of death; unshaven, without haircuts or baths for as much as a year; men in rags, exposed to the elements; fed with carefully measured minimum quantities and lowest quality of food and unsanitary water, served often in rusty cans; isolated, faced with squads of trained interrogators, bullied incessantly, deprived of sleep and browbeaten into mental anguish.

While all prisoners were subjected to the same pattern of intimidation, deprivation of basic physical needs, isolation and mental torture, the techniques varied, depending upon the degree of resistance manifested by individual prisoners. For at least ten POWs, all members of the same crew, internment in Korea was climaxed by many months in a series of interrogation centers in SINUIJU, Korea

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NND 867270
By BWG NARS, Date 4/11/90

and MUKDEN, Manchuria, where Communist brutality was exhibited in its most callous form. The following examples of the inhuman methods used by the Chinese to extract germ warfare confessions from prisoners of war are representative but by no means all-inclusive:

a. ------ was hung by his hands and feet from the rafters of a house for a period of 13 hours; forced to stand at attention 22 hours and then beaten when he fell exhausted to the ground; placed under a roof drain all night during a driving rain storm; and interrogated for three hours with a spotlight six inches from his face (refused to confess);[9]

b. ------ was denied food for a period of 10 days, permitted neither rest nor sleep for 12 consecutive days and placed under constant 24-hour interrogation for 12 consecutive days; also forbidden to stand or sit without explicit permission from the Chinese while interned in a three by three room for more than 95 days (confessed);[10]

c. ------ was interrogated for 10 days while in handcuffs in a Korean interrogation center; after refusal to yield, he was taken to MUKDEN, Manchuria, where his legs were shackled and pressure upon his shins was progressively increased (refused to confess);[11]

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8

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55-D-128: Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
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d. ---------- was kept in solitary confinement for over three months, threatened daily with death and roused almost nightly by guards who appeared ready to kill him; during one interrogation, he was forced to sit at attention on the edge of a wooden platform for what he estimated to be 38 consecutive hours (confessed);[12]

e. ---------- was interrogated eight hours a day for 60 days, and four hours per day for 54 days; he was thrown into a hole five feet long, four feet wide and four feet high, where he was left for a week without food or water (refused to confess);[13]

f. ---------- was forced to remove his shoes and clothes in sub-zero weather and run over corn stubble until the soles of his feet were battered and bleeding and he collapsed from pain and exhaustion (confessed only to having attended BW lectures);[14]

g. ---------- was stripped to the waist, his hands tied behind his back and required to stand at attention for 21 hours in near freezing weather, with the threat of death if he moved (refused to confess);[15]

h. ---------- was threatened with death, physically abused, worked at hard labor 15-18 hours per day and then incarcerated in a closet three by three by four for a ten-day period, the last two of these without food

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or water; this "conditioning" period was followed by forty hours of continuous interrogation (confessed);

i. ---------- tells of having been beaten about the head and neck for 15 hours and not fed for four days; on another occasion guards restrained him while an interrogator struck him in the area of his wound with a thumb; during a later interrogation, his fingers were squeezed with pliers and his nails torn out (refused to confess);[17]

j. ---------- while in MUKDEN, Manchuria, was placed in a wooden box, the sides and top of which had been hinged in such a manner that in its opened position it resembled a wooden cross; he was ordered to sit in the center of the cross, whereupon the sides were folded up and the top was snapped into place and bolted; this box was barely large enough to contain him when he sat with his knees drawn tightly up against his chest and his head bent forward until his forehead rested tightly against his knee; he was confined in this box for approximately 10 hours, during which time he was not fed, not permitted to relieve himself and depended upon a small ½ inch hole for fresh air; upon being removed from the box, he was shackled, each wrist to its respective ankle, and thus confined for three more days; on a subsequent occasion he again was subjected to the "box treatment," this time for approximately 14 hours (refused to confess);[18]

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k. ---------- was forced to endure three days of constant threats of imminent death, beatings with rifle and pistol butts, denial of food, water and rest, and particular abuse of his painfully injured hand (confessed)[19];

l. ---------- although seriously wounded and infested with maggots on his hands, face and ears, was denied even the most rudimentary medical relief until he had agreed to sign a BW confession (confessed)[20];

m. ---------- was continuously interrogated for 12 days and nights, with food, water, sleep and medical attention denied to him throughout this period; on other occasions he was repeatedly beaten into unconsciousness by rifle butt blows to the head and his wounds pierced by the insertion of rusty needles into the infected area (refused to confess)[21].

It is evident that to torture prisoners mentally and physically in order to gather information and propaganda material is considered by the Communists to be a valid extension of warfare. Under this policy, the prisoner of war is given no peace until he serves the ends desired by his captors.

The technique of extorting false confessions from captured flying personnel in Korea involved a close study of projected "confessors" through personal observation and an analysis of their required

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autobiographies, followed by the proper application of physical and psychological pressures. The treatment, therefore, varied from individual to individual, but seldom to such an extent that most experiences were not universally shared in some degree by substantially all returned BW interrogees.

As may be seen from what has been presented herein, the pressures exerted by the enemy were psychological in nature, but in cases where interrogees proved recalcitrant, the enemy had no qualms about resorting to physical violence.

Section IV - Practice and Procedure

Once a POW had agreed to write a "confession," the interrogator would give him no rest until the deed was accomplished. The difficulties in composing a completely fictitious account of BW activities were somewhat alleviated by continuous corrections of draft copies and in some cases by the issuance of an outline. (app. XI)

Generally, the interrogator who had been instrumental in obtaining the "confession" would correct only minor "misinterpretations." The requests for more significant revisions were credited to "higher authority." Spelling errors and grammatical flaws were minutely checked; word choice was scrutinized, as in the changing of "I hate germ warfare" to "I loathe germ warfare." Stress was laid on what appeared to the Communists to be factual necessities, e.g., the insistence in one man's "confession" that heaters and an oxygen

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supply to keep germs alive at higher altitudes be mentioned.

There is some evidence of an effort to eliminate conflicting testimony, at least in "confessions" written by men who had been attached to the same unit. This became more and more difficult as BW "confessions" increased in number,and, during the period from July to September, 1953, the majority of the "confessions" were revised, rewritten, and back-dated as a condition to repatriation. Perhaps under orders from higher authority, some "confessions" were discarded as "contradictory" and the remainder were distorted to fit some ordered outline. This "co-ordination exercise," as it was called by the POWs, was carried on until the very morning of repatriation, at which time a number of POWs were also induced to record their "confessions."

Section V - Motivation and Rationalization

It is apparent that the extreme mental and physical duress to which many captured American airmen were subjected was the primary cause of their eventual submission to Communist demands. Those who confessed, moved perhaps by a self-generated sense of guilt, and apprehensive of the reception they would encounter upon their return to the United States, have now been able to present rationalizations for their behavior. They have become confirmed in their belief that they did as much as might be expected of any man and that they deserve no more opprobrium than that which has been cast upon Cardinal

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MINDZENTY, Cardinal STEPINAC, Robert VOGLER or the others who eventually capitulated under relentless pressure from their Communist inquisitors.

Amid the mass of confused apologies and occasionally contradictory rationalizations, one subject is emphasized by almost every BW "confessor": the returnees felt that their intelligence briefings had been inadequate to guide them through the trials to which they were later subjected by the enemy. The universal complaint was that USAF personnel should have been better prepared for their ordeals. Some returnees charge that, even after September 1952, when the world-wide germ warfare campaign was in full swing, intelligence officers seriously underplayed, or neglected entirely, the series of BW "confessions" which had been emanating from North Korea since April 1952. One air force officer testified that his intelligence people informed him with a figurative shrug of the shoulders, "The days of name, rank, and serial number are over. We know nothing of the enemy we are fighting. We must play it by ear. Our only advice to you is that you be careful of what you say, take care of yourself, and use your own judgement in what military information you divulge to the enemy." Another pilot asserts, "Germ warfare was never mentioned to me in any briefings in Korea or in the United States, to my knowledge. Neither was I ever given any form of instruction or information as to what to give the enemy in the event of questions concerning germ warfare." A third declares that he was told that one was

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not restricted to merely divulging his name, rank, and serial number, and that it was more important "for us to come back alive than not to come back at all.....Before my capture I did not remember ever hearing the word "Bacteriological Warfare" in any form. I didn't even know that there was such a warfare until after my capture." Still others maintain that they willingly signed a confession because they had been instructed, if their lives were placed in jeopardy, to furnish the enemy any information which "did not endanger the security of the United States." The decision as to what comprised the security of the United States was apparently left for them to decide.

The above statements are representative of the type of explanation offered by those returnees who had "confessed." (Note: It is not within the purview of this study to examine the other side of the question, i.e., the allegations of the various briefing officers involved and the reasoning of those responsible for the aforementioned instructions.)

Section VI - Confessors and Non-Confessors

For future conflicts, it is obvious that we must organize a more effective code or norm of behavior for those POWs who will be subjected by the enemy to pressures designed to obtain from them either intelligence or grist for the enemy's psychological warfare mill. To say that "every man has his breaking point" presupposes

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defeat and, perhaps unwarrantedly, serves as an excuse for those who have been broken. This viewpoint, no matter how true technically, overlooks one important factor; it will not always be convenient, expedient, desirable, or worth the effort for the enemy to push every man to his breaking point. This might well serve as one corner stone for future "resistance training." By way of analyzing the implications of this statement, we will compare herein the experiences of those who confessed and those who successfully resisted.

Of the 78 U.S. POWs who were "pressured" by the Communists concerning participation in Bacteriological Warfare, it is interesting to note that 38, or almost one-half, in one form or another, submitted confessions to such participation. Thus we have two convenient groups that may be used for purposes of comparison and which may possibly serve as a basis for analysis in evaluating the efficacy of Communist efforts to obtain information or confessions through the extreme use of physical and mental duress.

From 7 January 1952, when the Communists first decided to extort BW confessions, to the signing of the Armistice, at least 131 USAF officers and airmen fell into enemy hands. This includes the number of those captured, held prisoner and eventually repatriated. It does not include those who are missing in action or who still may be captives. The information in this report is based on the testimony of the 131 returnees and concerns itself primarily with them. It is possible that an undetermined number of those who

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did not return may have been subjected to pressures that resulted in their deaths. There is, however, only one instance recorded where a POW (one of the 131) witnessed from a distance what he thought to be the execution of several airmen. These, he was told by the Chinese, were B-29 crew members, but he could not otherwise identify them. Further examination of this case shows that there was only one B-29 crew missing at that approximate time and that it was indeed interned in the general locale where the incident was reported. Furthermore, individual members of this crew were subjected to mock executions, but it is significant that each man was eventually repatriated.

It seems reasonable to conclude that these accounts all referred to the same incident and that the distance made it impossible for the observer to discover the bogus nature of the performance. In every instance where returnees mention that fellow POWs disappeared and were never again heard of, further checking discloses that they were eventually repatriated. If there were any USAF personnel captured after January 1952 who suffered death rather than confess to false BW charges, their capture and execution was apparently kept secret from the rest of the POWs and therefore cannot be substantiated by any evidence available at this writing.

Of the 131, 40 were never given any interrogation on BW. In a few of these cases a question or two may have been asked, but the matter was pursued no further after denial by the POWs of any

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knowledge on the subject. It is interesting to note that some of the 40 were, however, subjected to intensive interrogation on other subjects; at least 10 or 15 were interrogated for periods ranging over two or three months. These interrogations were accompanied by threats of death or non-repatriation and such mistreatment as solitary confinement and physical discomfort. In some cases all the factors were present which would ordinarily have been considered propitious for a BW interrogation: the right time of capture, the proper type of aircraft, internment at an interrogation center, appropriate rank and crew position. The situation becomes all the more puzzling when one discovers that some members of the same crew were subjected to intensive BW interrogations and made to confess, while their crewmates were either interrogated on purely military matters or left alone completely. Apparently, the decision whether or not to extort a confession often depended solely on the whim of the interrogation team.

Of the 91 who were interrogated for periods ranging from an hour up to several months, 13 have stated that they were subjected to no duress whatsoever and were allowed to deny the charges with impunity. Seventy-eight received some sort of pressure, ranging from threats of death or non-repatriation (the latter was repeated so often that in most cases it lost its effect) to mock execution before firing squads, denial of food and water, exposure to the elements, suspension by the arms from rafters and, in one case,

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

enclosure for hours in a wooden box. Thirty-eight submitted verbal or written confessions; however, eight of this group repudiated their confessions while still in the hands of the enemy and never again acquiesced to Communist demands that they revise or sign the confessions. It is noteworthy that they suffered substantially no greater punishment after their repudiation than before.

Of the 30 who confessed, wrote and rewrote, signed, and in some cases made broadcasts of their confessions, seven complied with the demands of their interrogators after less than 10 days of BW interrogation; two of these did so after only four days of duress. At the other extreme, one officer was questioned and pressured continuously for almost a year before he confessed. A study of the reports of the 40 men who were pressured and successfully resisted indicates that these men, as a group, underwent the same types of pressures, both physical and psychological, that the "confessors" did. At least three successfully withstood for over a year the full gamut of Communist pressure, including extreme physical torture, isolation, doubt as to their POW status and threat of immediate death.

With due regard to the danger inherent in any easy generalization, it can be stated that, for every "confessor" who gave up after a specified amount of duress, it is possible to find a corresponding "non-confessor" who withstood the same amount of pressure. This does not imply that all the non-confessors could or would have resisted indefinitely; but it does mean that they at least did so for the

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By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

period to which they were subjected to the varying pressures involved.

REFERENCES

1. The members of the ISC were: Dr. Andrea Andreen (Sweden), Prof. Jean Malterre (France), Dr. Joseph Needham (UK, Prof. Oliviero Olivo (Italy), Prof. S.B. Pessoa (Brazil) and Academician N.N. Zhukov-Vereshnekov (USSR).

2. Colonel Frank H. Schwable, 04429, USMC,
Major Roy H. Hley, 010450, USMC

3. The front page of the supplement listed the following as the authors of the depositions:
Colonel Andrew J. Evans, Jr. Colonel Walker M. Mahurin
Capt. John A. Osburn 1st Lt. George F. Brooks
1st Lt. John G. Ellis Jr., 1st. Lt. William L. Fornes
1st Lt. James E. Gunnoe Jr., 1st Lt. Bobby E. Hammett
1st Lt. Howard B. Hitchens Jr., 1st Lt. Robert S. Lurie
1st Lt. Robert E. Martin, 1st Lt. David E. Penny
1st Lt. Winston J. Simonsen, 1st Lt. Roger Warren
2d Lt. Vance R. Frick, 2d Lt. Charles M. Kerr
2d Lt. Warren W. Lull, 2d Lt. Charles E. Stahl
2d Lt. Richard G. Voss

4. 2d Lt. Charles E. Stahl, AO 1911688

5. This account of Captain Theodore R. Harris' experiences is taken substantially from his sworn testimony after repatriation.

6. Captain David E. Penny, AO 729654

7. 1st Lt. George F. Brooks, AO 1911275

8. Phase II and III Interrogation Report
Major Roy H. Hley, 010450, USMC

9. 1st Lt. James L. Stanley, AO 591426

10. Col. Andrew J. Evans, Jr., 4072 A

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NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

11. 1st Lt. Francis A. Strieby, AO 1912123

12. Colonel Walker M. Mahurin, 8658 A

13. 2d Lt. Edward G. Izbicky, AO 2223853

14. Capt. Aaron Shapiro, AO 1284590

15. Capt. John F. Dick, AO 775827

16. Capt. Thomas L. Eyers, AO 695638

17. 1st Lt. Daniel D. Peterson, AO 2221743

18. Capt. Theodore R. Harris, AO 782261

19. 1st Lt. Samuel E. Massenberg, AO 1911861

20. 2d Lt. Richard G. Voss, AO 2222690

21. 1st Lt. Charles M. Hill Jr., AO 1843018

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CHAPTER 9

ESCAPE AND EVASION

Section I - Introduction

The official casualty lists prepared by the Department of the Army for the Korean Operation[1] indicate that 670 U.S. soldiers who had been captured by the enemy managed to escape and return to U.N. control. Representing approximately 10 per cent of the total number of U.S. Army personnel captured, this figure would seem to indicate the presence of a fairly successful Escape and Evasion program in Korea.[2] An examination of the facts behind these escapes, however, reveals that a major qualification must be added to this conclusion. The men who escaped, without exception, had been prisoners for short periods of time and had not been evacuated to the permanent POW camps along the Yalu River. They escaped from their immediate captors, from aid stations, and from front line holding areas. Some of these instances were probably not "escapes" in the usual sense because they involved no restraint by the enemy; the terms "abandonment" or "release" would be as applicable as "escape." The outstanding fact in a review of Escape and Evasion in the Korean Operation is that no U.S. military personnel succeeded in escaping from an established temporary or permanent POW camp and in returning to areas under the control of U.N. forces.

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It is the object of this chapter to examine those factors involving topography, enemy security measures, physical conditions in the camps, and attitudes of the civilian populace which negated the escape efforts of U.S. POWs. Also included is an analysis of the attempts which failed and a summary of the escape recommendations made by repatriated POWs.

Section II - Topography and Escape [3]

1. General

With the exception of Camps 6, 7 and 12, which either were in existence for only a short time or were established for a special purpose, the permanent camps maintained by the enemy in Korea were scattered along a fifty-mile stretch of the YALU River (fig. 11). The westernmost camp (Camp 1) was less than 90 miles upriver from the point at which the YALU flows into the Yellow Sea. Two of the camp locations (Companies 1 and 2 of Camp 2) were less than a mile apart, while distances of 5 to 30 miles separated the others. It was apparently possible for the POWs to escape from this complex of camps by crossing the YALU River into Chinese-held Manchuria, either over the ice, during the winter months, or by means of small river craft. Although this route would appear to be generally uninviting since there were no areas of sanctuary in or beyond Manchuria, it did figure in the escape planning of at least two groups. Escape to the east coast was also considered

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
by some of the prisoners, but this route posed the most difficult problem from the standpoint of topography. Between the POW camps and the Sea of Japan lay from 125 to 175 miles of tortuous travel through the most mountainous portion of the Korean Peninsula. The high mountains of the YANGNIM Range and the KAIMA Plateau were broken by deep gorges and narrow valleys, making foot travel almost impossible except on the few roads and trails. Discarding these two possibilities, the escapees had three other general routes to consider: down the YALU River to the Yellow Sea, southward along the west coast of Korea, or southeast over the NORTHERN TAEBAEK Range, which forms a spiny mountainous backbone for this portion of the Korean peninsula. These three areas must be discussed individually, since containing different topographical features, they presented different problems for the escapee.

2. The YALU River Route

The POW camps were all located either on the YALU River or within six miles of its banks. The possibility existed, therefore, that if an escapee either drifted down the river in a commandeered fishing boat or followed the river's banks to the Yellow Sea, he would eventually be picked up by U.N. air or sea craft. Any attempt to escape down the river would have been complicated by two major physical obstacles. The first was the SUP'UNG Dam, the largest in the Orient, which would have required circumvention,

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and the second was the complex of channels and islands which divide the river south of UIJU. This latter feature would have greatly increased the difficulty of selecting and following the main channel, particularly at night. During the winter months (December through March), the YALU was frozen over.

3. The Western Coastal Route

The western coast of Korea is comprised generally of low mountain ranges which extend inland between 25 and 100 miles from the Yellow Sea and are separated by lowlands and river plains. The slopes of the mountains and foothills are covered with sparse trees, shrubs, and grass, and some of the gentler slopes are used for the cultivation of dry crops. Movement on foot is difficult in the mountainous portions but easy along the coastal lowlands and river plains, except during the growing season (June to October), when the rice fields are flooded.

4. The Central Mountain Route

Two of the mountain ranges of Korea, the P'YONGAN-PUKTO and the NORTHERN TAEBAEK, form a semi-continuous chain from the POW camps on the YALU to the 38th Parallel. The NORTHERN TAEBAEK Range measures approximately 50 miles from east to west, and the elevations of the mountains vary from 1,500 to 5,000 feet. The winding gorges and steep valleys which predominate the range constitute a handicap to movement on foot. Mixed forests of pine,

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fir, oak, and birch grow on the higher ridges, and scrub grass is found on the intermediate slopes. The scattered underbrush makes penetration difficult, although the forests themselves are only moderately dense.

Section III - Capture and the Temporary Camps

1. Capture and Movement to the Rear

Enemy treatment of POWs immediately after capture is pertinent to a study of Escape and Evasion not only because of the better possibility of escape at this time but because of search methods and procedures. A thorough and systematic search program prevents the prisoner from retaining items of equipment which might later prove to be of value in planning and executing a successful escape.

Enemy policy, as expressed in the following excerpt, followed normal intelligence procedures in requiring the immediate search of captured military personnel:

> When a prisoner is captured, he must be searched as soon as possible to prevent him from destroying any identification badges and papers he may be carrying.[4]

U.N. soldiers who fell into the hands of the enemy were first disarmed and then subjected to a preliminary search. A review of the experiences of returned POWs indicates that while the policies

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established in enemy text books and manuals may be standard, their application was not. Search methods employed by the CCF and the NKA neither followed an established procedure nor displayed any perceptible change of technique as the war progressed. Prisoners were searched with varying degrees of thoroughness and in various fashions. Both method and efficiency varied, not only from one set of prisoners to another, but also within a single group. There were instances in which prisoners were stripped down to their underwear, in order that their persons, their clothing, and their other belongings could be carefully scrutinized. This procedure can be considered the exception, since it was more common for an enemy soldier merely to pat the prisoner's body for hidden weapons and then order the prisoner to empty his pockets of their contents. In numerous instances, POWs were able to retain small personal belongings in their pockets while their captors inspected the items which had been tossed on the ground. During wintertime, searches were often limited to the pockets of outer garments, and many items carried in pants or shirt pockets remained undetected. In almost all of the instances reported throughout the Korean Operation, small items concealed in the crotch or hidden in the footwear or headgear of a prisoner escaped notice during these searches immediately following capture. The fact that several prisoners retained hand grenades or weapons in shoulder holsters under their parkas or overcoats for several hours or even for days

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

after capture demonstrates the cursory and often haphazard nature of the methods employed by the enemy. While it is true that most of the compasses, maps, and knives in the hands of the POWs in the permanent camps were surreptitiously manufactured for escape purposes, some of them were actually pieces of U.N. equipment which had been concealed by the POWs and overlooked by their captors during various searches.

After having been disarmed and searched, the prisoners were generally held in immediate-rear areas until a sizeable group of POWs had been collected for movement northward. Food and medical care during this period were either limited or entirely non-existent, and security measures were often cursory. (No returnee accounts show any indication that the enemy used specified units or sections, comparable to the U.S. Military Police, for guarding or moving prisoners.) Returnees generally agree that the chances of escape at this time ranged from good to excellent. While detailed information about POWs who successfully regained their freedom from the enemy immediate-rear areas is not available for this study, it may be assumed that the factors of proximity to, and knowledge of, U.N. lines, plus comparatively good POW physical condition and the lack of organized enclosures and guard units at this time, all tended to create a somewhat favorable atmosphere for escape. On the other hand, the potential escapee was faced with such obstacles as the heavy concentration of enemy troops in forward areas, the mental

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

shock of having been captured, and, during the winter of 1950-51 (when the majority of U.N. POWs were taken), the numbing and debilitating effect of the extreme cold.

Although evacuation procedures varied according to time and place, the following material contains a generalized summary of the methods which prevailed, particularly during the winter of 1950-51.

When sizeable groups of prisoners had been assembled, the movement to the rear areas began. The number of prisoners in each of these groups varied but often mounted to several hundred during the period between November and December of 1950. POWs moving rearward were marched at night, often at a rate which greatly taxed their physical capabilities. The columns of prisoners followed the MSRs, either in single file along the shoulders of the road, or two and three abreast when there was no vehicular traffic. Guards, in addition to preceding and following the column, flanked the POWs and sometimes intermingled with them. Breaks were infrequent, and, when they occurred, the guards formed a loose perimeter net to watch their captives. Personnel for this evacuation duty were apparently taken from line or reserve units, and, although the number varied, there was generally one guard for every 3 to 10 POWs. Shortly before dawn the prisoners were usually herded into Korean houses along the route of march and sentries were established at the doorways.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

As compared to the later, permanent camp phase, this period offered certain definite inducements and advantages to a potential escapee. It is true that, by this time, the physical condition of the POWs had begun to deteriorate due to the sub-standard food and (during the winter months) the extreme cold. This factor was considerably outweighed, however, by the comparative ease with which the POWs could make an initial break. Despite the efforts of the enemy, security during the night marches was never perfect. Many opportunities existed to slip away during rest periods or to hide in ditches or behind bushes whenever a bend in the road hid the POWs from their guards. Few escapees were apprehended leaving the columns; the problem, as always, was to travel undetected in enemy country. In rear areas, enemy logistical and police forces were present in strength, and civilians, particularly children, were almost everywhere. An additional difficulty facing an escaping POW was the fact that there was little that he could do to stockpile food or acquire equipment. Escapes, therefore, although sometimes successful, were generally hasty, spontaneous and entirely dependent upon the individual. A POW could not depend upon a group of fellow prisoners to augment his own resources. Many attempts, although successful from the standpoint of gaining immediate freedom, ended in recapture after a few days when the prisoner, weakened by hunger, was apprehended as he sought food. Other escapees simply blundered into enemy soldiers in the strange terrain. Escapes during

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

evacuation, it would appear, were "spur-of-the-moment" affairs, with the strength, endurance and knowledge of the individual POW pitted against the hazards of enemy interception and the more passive obstacles of distance and terrain.

2. The Temporary Camps and the Winter of 1950-1951

In late 1950 and early 1951, the North Koreans and the Chinese became the custodians of several thousand U.N. prisoners of war. Whether through indifference, lack of preparation or inadequate supply, months passed before any semblance of organized, logistically supported POW camps became available to hold the prisoners. This factor is of twofold importance from the standpoint of escapes. First of all, it introduced the temporary camps as points of departure for possible escapes, and, secondly, it resulted in the marked physical degeneration of thousands of U.N. POWs, a status which seriously decreased their escape potential for many months.

The term "temporary camp" as used in this connection deals with those major internment points established by the enemy during the early period of the Korean War. Prior to the establishment of the camps along the YALU River, the enemy held large numbers of POWs in areas which came to be known by such titles as "Death Valley," "Dining Camp," "Bean Camp," the "Valley," and "Peaceful Valley." These were not organized areas of internment,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

but were valleys or villages commandeered by the enemy and utilized as improvised POW camps. They were generally located in the valleys of the NORTHERN TAEBAEK Range. As was to be expected, these temporary camps lacked the formal equipment of prisons and operated without barbed wire, guard towers, or other elaborate security measures. The POWs were housed in Korean dwellings and were guarded by sentries stationed outside the buildings and by loose networks of guard posts around the interment areas. The use of head counts and roll calls, and the organization of the POWs into squads, introduced some semblance of order, but the scattered houses, sickness, and the continuing death rate all contributed to haphazard security and loose control. Surreptitious departure from the physical confines of these temporary camps was almost ridiculously simple. In addition, fellow prisoners could conceal a man's absence for hours and perhaps days by "covering up" during roll calls. Despite these favorable circumstances, however, there were no successful escapes from the temporary camps. An examination of the attempts which failed clearly indicates the factors which negated the advantages of loose enemy security measures. Food, always of paramount importance in Korean escapes, was so meager in these camps that it was almost impossible to stockpile any sizeable amount for escape purposes. Other equipment to aid in survival was extremely scarce, and there was no POW group participation in assisting escapees or in pooling whatever resources were on hand. In addition, the cold

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of the Korean winter and the ruggedness of the terrain would have taxed even a physically able fugitive.

Details of the physical condition of the POWs during the winter of 1950-1951 are covered in Chapter 14 of this study and will not be repeated at this point. They are of sufficient importance, however, to warrant mention of the fact that inadequate food, neglected wounds, disease, filth, and lack of heating, clothing and bedding apparently so sapped the physical endurance and morale of the POWs that they were unable to cope with the hardships necessarily accompanying an escape attempt. Those who tried were captured in two or three days by enemy troops or by Korean civilians. Perhaps the best illustration of the physical condition of the POWs is the fact that, of the 4,100 U.S. Army men captured in the four-month period between November 1950 and February 1951, better than 45 per cent died in the hands of the enemy.[4] It is felt that the lack of successful escapes from the temporary camps can largely be attributed to this physical inability, combined, of course, with the factors of cold weather, harsh terrain, and civilian hostility.

Section IV - The Permanent Camps

1. General

In the spring of 1951 the enemy established the first of the permanent camps in the Korean village of PYOKTONG. As the year progressed, other camps were opened and the temporary camps were

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

gradually closed. Eventually, all of the U.N. POWs (except ROK personnel) were held in eight of these internment points. There are many factors pertinent to an analysis of escape which were common to all of these camps; for example, the uniform absence of dogs and searchlights as instruments of security. It is considered advisable at this point, however, to introduce a brief resume of each camp and to describe specific factors such as physical location and camp security. (In conjunction with this discussion, attention is directed to the sketches of the camps in App. III)

a. Camp 1 (CH'ANG-NI) March 1951 - August 1953

Camp 1, the second of the major POW camps established by the Chinese, eventually contained approximately 1,400 lower-ranking enlisted men. Companies 1 through 4 consisted of U.S. personnel; Companies 5 through 7 were composed of British POWs. The camp was located in the village of CH'ANG-NI in the valley of the YONGJU River, and was approximately five miles from the point at which the river flows into an estuary of the YALU and less than 10 miles from the YALU River itself. U.S. prisoners were quartered in Korean houses in the west end of the town, while the British companies were located on the eastern outskirts.

Security at Camp 1 depended primarily upon the Chinese guards assigned to the installation. Although estimates as to the composition and strength of the guard unit vary widely, it would appear

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

that some 200 to 300 CCF troops were assigned to this duty. Guard posts were located at the corners in the interior of the company area, and the sentries were armed with rifles or sub-machine guns. There are indications that the security forces were augmented during the hours of darkness, but the extent of the increase cannot be determined. In addition to the guard posts on the immediate perimeter of the camp, returnees report the presence of machine gun emplacements in the surrounding hills and ravines, and other guard posts located at nearby vantage points which commanded a view of the terrain.

Guard personnel generally served four hours of duty on their posts and then were replaced informally and individually rather than through formal guard relief. A few fences were erected in the camp in the summer of 1952, but they did not form a continuous line and can be considered generally ineffective as an impediment to escapes.

b. Camp 2, Company 1 (PYONGJANG-NI) October 1951 - August 1953

During the period from October 1952 until repatriation, Company 1 of Camp 2 was composed of approximately 280 U.N. officers. Prior to that time it also contained the officers of what later became Company 2. The camp was located in a small valley approximately four miles from the YALU River. A cluster of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/92

Korean houses had been commandeered by the Chinese for the purpose, and a former schoolhouse served as quarters for the main body of the POWs. The compound was not enclosed until the spring of 1953, when a double fence was erected. A barbed wire fence approximately five feet high formed the inner portion of the barrier, and three feet beyond this stood a second fence made of interwoven saplings. In addition to the guard posts which surrounded the compound, there were roving guards who patrolled inside the area and between the two fences. The detachment of Chinese soldiers assigned to this camp consisted of approximately 200 men and appeared to have composed one company. From six to eight guard posts were located at intervals around the fence and at the gates, and from four to six additional sentries were stationed on the high ground behind the camp and in the general vicinity.

c. Camp 2, Company 2 (PYONGJANG-NI) October 1952 - August 1953

Company 2, with a POW population of approximately 150 officers, was located about one-half mile to the east of Company 1 and some 500 yards off the main road. The four buildings which composed the compound were enclosed by a single fence, constructed partly of barbed wire and partly of interwoven saplings. During the daylight hours, the 75 to 100 Chinese guards who lived nearby manned the four guard posts which surrounded the compound. At night, additional guards were placed outside to form a secondary security perimeter.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

d. Camp 2, Company 3 (CHUNGHA-DONG) August 1953 - June 1953

The 130 U.N. enlisted men confined at Company 3 were generally considered recalcitrant by the CCF, and it would appear that security measures were more rigid here than in other places of internment. The camp was located on the banks of the CH'UNGHAN GANG River which flows into the YALU at a point approximately eight miles to the north. Three separate barbed wire enclosures were used to contain the POWs, and the guard unit of from 50 to 100 troops manned approximately six permanent guard posts in and around the enclosures. The guard relief for each enclosure conducted a head count when it came on duty. There are some indications that, at night, the guard contingents on duty were doubled.

e. Camp 2, Company 4 (OSANG-DONG) May 1952 - August 1953

This company of 150 to 175 POWs was in existence for only a little over a year and consisted primarily of U.S. Air Force personnel captured late in the Korean War. Even by Korean standards, this camp was loosely organized. It consisted basically of a number of houses in the village of OSANG-DONG which had been entirely or partially taken over by the Chinese to house the POWs. Guard posts were scattered around the houses in which the prisoners were held. (The organization of the guard unit, as reported by one returnee, is shown in chart form in app. XV.)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

f. Camp 3 (six miles NNW of Camp 1) June 1951 - August 1953

Camp 3 was located on the banks of an estuary of the YALU River, approximately six miles from the river itself. The POW population consisted of some 850 enlisted men and was divided into two main sections, including from two to five companies (depending on the date). The northeast section was regularly divided into two companies, which were separated by the only barbed wire fence in the camp. The southwest section contained the remaining companies and possessed no physical barriers either dividing or enclosing the compounds. Security problems were simplified for the Chinese, however, since both sections were located on points of land which protruded into the river. In the southwest section, from six to nine guard posts operated during the day; extra posts and roving guards were added at night. Four five to seven guard posts, also augmented at night, provided security for the northeast section of camp. Immediately outside the camp, there were additional guards patrolling the enemy command post area, which the majority of the returnees refer to as a regimental headquarters. Estimates as to the number of guards employed at Camp 3 are consistently low. An analysis of the reports, however, appears to indicate that the physical separation of the two sections of camp caused most returnees to report only the number of guard personnel used in securing their particular area. The overall guard strength at Camp 3 is estimated, therefore, at approximately 250, fifty of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

whom were used to secure the regimental headquarters, with the remainder divided between the two sections.

g. Camp 4 (WIWON) August 1952 - August 1953

Located on the banks of the WIWON-GANG River, Camp 4 was composed of three companies, each containing approximately 200 U.N. non-commissioned officers. Companies 1 and 2, located in the town on the north side of the river, were surrounded by a six to eight foot barbed wire fence and were separated from each other by a wall of rock and mud. The total guard strength for Camp 4 has been estimated at from 200 to 250 men, and returnees indicate that there were four or five guard posts, including two guard towers, located adjacent to Companies 1 and 2. Additional guard personnel were employed during the hours of darkness. Company 3 occupied an area enclosed by barbed wire in a section of WIWON located on the south side of the river. Two guard towers and at least one sentry box were established near the compound. Here also, additional sentries patrolled during the night. The guard towers of Camp 4 were erected in the spring of 1953. Prior to that time, guard posts were utilized exclusively.

h. Camp 5 (PYOKTONG) January 1951 - August 1953

Camp 5 consisted of approximately 1,200 U.N. POWs and was located on the tip of the PYOKTONG peninsula. The main part of the town of PYOKTONG was at the base of the peninsula, and

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the fact that it was normally occupied by a large number of Chinese troops in addition to the Korean population added a measure of security to the camp. The first of the YALU River camps, Camp 5 underwent many reorganizations, but the security arrangements for the five companies remained fairly simple at all times. The camp area was separated from the town by a four to five foot barbed wire fence which bisected the peninsula. A guard unit of approximately 200 men provided sentries for 10 to 12 guard posts located some 50 yards apart around the river side of the peninsula. Estimates as to the number of troops in the village of PYOKTONG vary from 1,500 to 2,500, and, while these troops were not directly involved in the guarding of U.N. prisoners, they were available for security reinforcement and for search details.

2. Guard Personnel

For a brief period during the early months of the Korean War, U.N. prisoners were guarded by elements of the North Korean Army. However, when the Chinese assumed the main burden of the fighting and supply responsibility in late 1950, they also assumed control over the prisoners. The shift was gradual at first, and in some of the temporary camps, and even at PYOKTONG, the North Koreans supplied security personnel for a number of months under the "supervision" of the Chinese. In the spring of 1951, however, the CCF assumed full control of the thousands of U.N. POWs. Returned POWs do not (generally speaking) paint as grim a picture

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of the soldiers who guarded them as might be expected. The guard personnel were apparently members of regular units of the CCF. Their chain of command was distinct and their operations were separate from those of the interrogators and the indoctrination personnel who actually controlled the everyday lives of the POWs. Each camp had a guard unit commander who was responsible to the camp commander. Communist methods in regard to posting and changing of the guard in the internment areas generally followed normal military procedure. The sergeants of the guard posted the personnel, the corporals of the guard inspected the reliefs, and the privates manned the sentry boxes or walking posts. These ranks and titles are used for purposes of comparison, of course, since the Chinese who guarded the POWs, like their counterparts in front line units, wore no insignia indicating rank or grade. Their diverse activities and varied responsibilities in connection with their duties, however, revealed obvious rank stratification. When not on post, the Chinese guards lived á garrison-type military existence which included Saturday morning inspections, close order drill, weapons training, political lectures and labor details. The weapons carried by guard personnel consisted of Japanese World War II rifles in some instances, and Soviet sub-machine guns in others.

The consensus of opinion among the returned POWs is that their guards were neither particularly friendly nor particularly cruel. They were apparently well instructed in their duties and conscientious

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

in their performance of them. A few reports refer to instances where friendships were struck up between prisoners and guards, but these are rare exceptions. The guards' relations with the prisoners, while allowing for certain individual variations, appear to have been impersonal and reasonably correct. A few returnees believe that the guards might have been susceptible to bribery in the form of jewelry or American "greenbacks." It should be noted in this connection, however, that the very considerable black market trading which the prisoners carried on was done surreptitiously through the Korean civilians without using the Chinese guards as intermediaries.

3. Head Counts, Roll Calls, and Bed Checks

During their marches after capture and their transfers from one collecting point to another, the POWs were frequently counted by their captors, and the resulting tally became the basis for determining whether any men had escaped. After their arrival at the temporary camps, and in a few instances prior to this, the POWs were organized into squads and platoons, with U.S. personnel as squad leaders. Thus commenced the basis for the reporting system which became fairly standard in all of the camps. The day normally began with a roll call or head count conducted by the squad leaders at regular platoon or company formations. In most instances only a count was required; the figure was then reported

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

by the squad leader to the assistant platoon leader (a POW), who in turn reported it to the platoon leader (Chinese). An exception to this procedure was the method used at Company 3 of Camp 2, where the more reactionary POWs were held. At this internment camp, the political instructors held roll call for the first two weeks until the Chinese platoon leaders had learned to pronounce the American names. After this, the platoon leaders performed this function; it was never delegated to the prisoners. Each day ended for the prisoners, as it had begun, with a roll call or head count conducted in the same fashion as in the morning formation. It was possible to successfully cover for an absentee during these formations. An additional factor which was used to advantage by escapees was that, generally, roll call formations were not held on Sundays, at least during the later stages of internment. Saturday was therefore selected by several groups of escapees as a departure date because it gave them the possible advantage of an extra day of travel before their absence would be discovered. The nightly roll call did not bring a cessation to the close surveillance, however; returnees report that guards, platoon leaders, and political instructors checked the sleeping prisoners with flashlights anywhere from three times a night to every thirty minutes. In the smaller Korean houses this bed check was normally made through a window or door, but in the barrack-type quarters the checker entered the room and passed up and down the aisle.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Labor Details Outside the POW Camps

Although the POWs sometimes performed burial and ration-carrying details outside their compounds, the one occupation which was common to all internment points, and which offered the greatest opportunity for escape, was the wood-gathering detail. The POWs gathered wood for cooking and heating from the hills and valleys near their camps. Once or twice a week the Chinese would select a unit of POWs, usually of company strength, and march them out on this detail. At Camp 3, where wood was apparently plentiful in the immediately surrounding area, smaller details were sent out; these travelled only one or two miles to where the wood was obtained. Groups from the other camps, however, had to go five to six miles, and the detail became a task which occupied the better part of a day. Prior to leaving camp, members of labor details were counted; they were also recounted when they returned. In addition to a few interpreters who accompanied them, the 100-150 prisoners were guarded by CCF soldiers on an average basis of one guard for every 10 to 15 POWs. An advance detail of guards generally departed ahead of the group and dropped off personnel along the route of march and in the hills surrounding the area in which the work was to be accomplished. The prisoners would soon become aware of this fact, and they often played a game in which they would try to "spot" the hidden watchers and then yell greetings, to the discomfort of the guards. Upon reaching the labor area, the guards would form a loose circle and

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

direct the prisoners to gather firewood. They would attempt to maintain surveillance over the prisoners, but the thick foliage made complete observation impossible, and several escapes were made at such times. Two disadvantages existed, however, in connection with such attempts. Guards, unobserved but vigilant, were posted on nearby hills and posed a constant threat; in addition, there was comparatively little opportunity to bring out the food and equipment essential to survival.

5. Communication

a. General

The problem of communication, which might seem at first examination to have little connection with this chapter, is actually of extreme importance in a discussion of Escape and Evasion. In escape planning, it is not only necessary to stockpile goods and equipment, but it is essential to accumulate information about the enemy and the countryside and to co-ordinate escape actions. In addition, communication is of importance in assessing the possibility of making covert contacts with outside organizations or individuals.

b. Communication Within the Camp

In the larger camps, which were composed of several companies, the Chinese strictly enforced prohibitions against communication between members of various sections. In addition, POWs

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

confined in "the hole" or in solitary confinement were deprived of contact with their fellow prisoners. The methods used by the POWs to circumvent these regulations were many and varied. They ranged from simple notes, wrapped around rocks and thrown into another company area, to attempts at "secret" writing with a substance made from flour and water and subjected to heat by the recipient. In the camp at PYOKTONG, permission could be obtained on Sundays for prisoners to visit friends in other companies. These visits were rare, however, and although they were probably limited to POWs in the good graces of the Chinese, they did result in a certain amount of communication. Information could also sometimes be passed while men from various companies were washing their clothes on the river bank and the guards were not on the alert. The smuggling of information, cigarettes and tobacco in and out of places of special confinement was more difficult. A common practice involved sending notes to the kitchen where POW cooks would place them in the bottom of rice bowls destined for men in solitary confinement. When this method became too well known, it was sometimes possible to conceal notes among pieces of firewood delivered to the jail. Words of encouragement and information were often injected into songs which were sung loudly enough for the men receiving punishment to hear. Since men who were in solitary confinement in the same area often shared the same latrine, these latrines served as "mail boxes" for forbidden messages.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

c. Communication Between the Camps

Communication between the various POW camps was carried on primarily through groups of prisoners who, as members of athletic teams or entertainment groups, visited camps other than their own. The interview report of a U.S. Army master sergeant who was confined at Company 3, Camp 2, contains a description of an unsuccessful attempt at inter-camp communication:

> The sergeant, while leaving to go to Company 1 for an athletic meet, was caught with fifteen notes in his possession. They were to be delivered from Company 3 to Company 1. The Chinese forced him to strip, frisked him thoroughly and confiscated all the notes. He was asked who had sent the notes and to whom they were to be delivered. Most of them were of a personal nature, but the Chinese, nevertheless, were suspicious. The notes were not directly addressed to anyone and were not signed. The names of the addresses were concealed in a code; a note that began with "Only" was intended for Lt O'CONNER; a note that began with "Maybe" was intended for MAYO.
>
> All of the notes were coded in this way, with the first word providing the key to the identity of the intended recipient. The recipient could then tell, from the content, who had written it.[5]

In addition to this method, hospitals, such as the main one at PYOKTONG which treated personnel from various camps, served as "message centers" for both verbal and written communications.

d. Communication Outside the POW Camps

There are a few reported incidents in which Korean civilians, for a price (clothes, food, etc.), brought news of the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

outside world to the POWs. An example of this occurred in Camp 2, Company 3 and is described in a returnee interview report as follows:

> Although direct contact between military personnel in Camp 2, Company 3, was restricted, there was much contact with the Korean civilians. In the early part of 1953, contact was made with a ten-year old Korean boy. M/Sgt TOMASSEN was the contact man and met the boy twice a week. In exchange for tobacco and sundries, the boy would give him information on the tactical situation at the front by showing him a map. The map was made self-explanatory by the use of symbols. If contact was not made on a particular week, there was a hiding place where maps and other written news could be found. The information was obviously supplied by grownups and given to the boy to deliver.[5]

Generally speaking, however, communication with anyone outside the immediate area was impossible, except through the heavily censored POW mail. A discussion of attempts by POWs to transmit coded information in their mail home is included in Chapter 15 of this study and therefore will not be repeated at this point. It was inevitable that the thoughts of some of the POWs would turn to the possibility of establishing radio contact with the outside world in order to receive news and information. There are numerous vague references to radio receivers in the hands of the POWs, but they apparently all refer to one, or possibly two, incidents in which prisoners in Camp 2, Company 1, managed to receive broadcasts by using the radio portion of an enemy loud speaker system. One U.S.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Army captain, with a considerable amount of practical experience in radio work, constructed a home-made radio receiving set but obtained no satisfactory results.[7] The same POW was also involved in the surreptitious use of the radio in the loud speaker system. He relates, in his interview report, the method which he employed to transmit the information without exposing himself to the Chinese. The procedure is described as follows:

> About September 1952, at Camp 2, the captain heard one of a series of three broadcasts originating from Station AFRS in TOKYO. He distinctly remembered this particular broadcast because it gave some statistics on the number of aircraft downed by the U.S. Air Force in Korea.
>
> The POWs had discovered that it was important to adopt a system of disseminating news without jeopardizing the source of information. They therefore employed the technique of distributing news on a rumor basis, inferring that it had come from the British POW Compound. The reason for this was that the Chinese were more lenient with the British. It was unlikely that the Chinese would question the British as thoroughly about the presence of a radio as they would the Americans, had they suspected the presence of one at Camp 2. The medium used was a British doctor known as "SANDY." "SANDY" would come from the British compound where he supposedly had asked the radio technician about a purported broadcast. This "broadcast" would be the basis for the British supposedly circulating the news on a rumor basis. The British doctor "SANDY," would imply to the American POWs that the news rumors had been heard in the British compound. Actually the British compound would be hearing this news for the first time, not realizing that it was really straight from a news broadcast over AFRS heard at Company 1, Camp 2.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

In disseminating news to POWs in Camp 2, the procedure was reversed. When "SANDY" returned, he would tell one of the prisoners what he had "heard" in the British compound, and before long all the American POWs were discussing the news.

There were only three POWs who actually listened to these broadcasts. The news was dispensed in this indirect fashion to prevent detection by the Chinese, should any POW become involved in an interrogation. By not telling who had specifically heard this broadcast, no POW could be compromised should a confession as to the source of the information ever be extracted. The captain felt this protection was necessary and conceived the idea of telling no one about the broadcasts.[8]

6. Contact with Korean Civilians

Prisoners held in the prison camps of North Korea had little direct contact with the civilian population. For obvious reasons of security, their captors forbade intercourse of any type between the POWs and the Koreans and apparently enforced this regulation with consistency and vigor. The chance contacts which did occur generally fell into two categories: those resulting from encounters during work details outside the compound, and those resulting from the introduction of Korean workmen into the POW enclosures. Returnees from all of the camps report that a certain amount of surreptitious trading was conducted at all times between the prisoners and the Koreans. It is indicative of the reduced economic situation in North Korea that the civilians found it necessary to trade with prisoners of war in order to obtain such

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

items as clothing, soap, shoes, towels, etc. The prisoners in turn received food of various kinds and often sought garlic and spices to add variety to their prison fare. The amount of trading in tobacco seems to have fluctuated from time to time during the internment period. In some instances the prisoners traded their clothes for Korean tobacco, but at other times they offered the tobacco which had been issued them for food.

There are a few instances reported in which Korean civilians indicated that they would aid the prisoners in escape attempts. An operator of a flour mill in PYOKTONG is reported to have aided in the above escape attempt of an American officer; the operator of a river tugboat reportedly made arrangements to take a prisoner down the river to freedom. None of these contacts, however, resulted in any ultimate advantage to the fugitives involved. There are some indications that rivermen operating barges plying between Manchuria and PYOKTONG might have been willing to aid escapees in return for money or barterable goods. One returnee estimates that the asking price for this aid was from $300 to $500 or an undetermined number of watches.

The general attitude of the Korean civilians toward the prisoners seems to have been more apathetic than antagonistic. There were some instances of violence, which usually occurred when either an airman or an escapee was apprehended by the civilians. More often, the escapees reported that the Koreans displayed no particular

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

enmity and, in fact, often provided them with food. However, they almost invariably called the local security police. It was agreed by most of the returnees that their best chance for help from civilians came from the older people, particularly the women. The fact that escapees were almost always turned in to the authorities when they contacted North Korean civilians is probably more indicative of the fear of the latter for the Communists, and of their craving for the rewards which were offered, than of any particularly strong anti-American feeling.

7. Escape Committees and Escape Planning

To anyone possessing even a slight familiarity with the elaborate escape preparations and procedures employed in the German Stalags during World War II, the almost complete absence of similar systems in Korea is startling. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that organized escape committees were almost nonexistent. Certain covert groups of POWs, such as the CIRCLE and the [illegible] of Camp 3, claim to have aided in escape plans, but their concepts and efforts were so limited that, by comparison, they hardly merit serious consideration. In the officers' compounds, efforts were made to co-ordinate escape attempts, and the senior officer was informed of the date planned for each attempt. Only in Company 4 of Camp 2 did there exist an organization which might be considered a real escape committee. It was conceived during the winter of 1952-53

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

and eventually gained some semblance of organization. The committee was comprised of small groups of escape planners, unknown to each other, who were guided and given material assistance by two or three leaders. These leaders gathered information, supervised the reproduction of maps, arranged with kitchen personnel for food, and procured or supervised the making of escape equipment. No successful escapes were achieved through the aid of this group, and its true value cannot be determined, since the Armistice ended all need for it before its effectiveness had been thoroughly tested.

Returnee reports indicate that the primary reason for the lack of organized, operating escape committees, as well as for the failure of many of the planned escapes, was the presence of the POW informer. The establishment of an informer system among the prisoners can probably be considered one of the most successful, and certainly one of the most valuable, adjuncts of Communist domination over the U.N. POWs. A discussion of informers is found in Chapter 5. However, it must be noted here that, in discussions of escape prospects during the Korean War, returnees stress that it was almost impossible to hide their preparations from the Chinese and that informers among the POWs were the betrayers of this information. An example of the betrayal of prospective escapes by POW informers is contained in the following excerpt from the interrogation report of a POW who had been interned at Camp 3:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

In September 1951, two POWs attempted to escape but were recaptured just outside the camp. During the hours of darkness they managed to escape, evading the guard along the river. As soon as they reached the outside of the camp, they heard their names called by the Chinese guard, who was waiting for them. They were then told that one of their friends had told the Chinese of their attempted escape. The Chinese had been aware of their attempt all along.[9]

Numerous POWs were suspected of being informers, but proof was almost impossible to obtain. The prisoners, perhaps because of their general lack of group cohesion, were unable to isolate, control or eliminate informers. The maintenance of extreme secrecy constituted the only means available to the individual escapee through which to control this situation. If he made his preparations alone, he deprived himself of the advantage of aid and assistance from his friends. If he operated with a few trusted intimates, he created a "group" whose activity eventually became suspect.

8. Preparations for Escape

Whether he hoarded and collected by himself or with the aid of friends or an "escape committee," the escapee's first and foremost aim was the accumulation of food. Some food could be saved from daily rations and some could be borrowed from fellow POWs, but the kitchen personnel became the primary source for this essential escape commodity. Apparently almost all of the camps

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

had POW cooks who co-operated either on an individual basis or as part of a loosely organized group. A POW mess sergeant in the officers' company at PYONGJANG-NI gives the following example of this type of mess personnel-escapee co-ordination:

> At Company 1, Camp 2, the mess sergeant was told by a POW doctor to put extra food in a vegetable pit in the hospital mess. This area was to be known as the E and E food cache. The cook was not told who was planning the escape, but was told to have food there at all times, in case someone tried. The doctor would notify them where to pick it up. The food was never picked up, but the cache was nevertheless regularly replenished with fresh food.[10]

Food supplies accumulated by escapees at various times during the Korean War included rice, parched corn, soy beans, corn meal, fresh eggs, peanuts, candy, crackers, biscuits, apples, sugar, and salt. In some instances, the assistance provided by the kitchen personnel transcended the mere procurement of the food; the cooks also undertook to prepare it in forms which could be more easily carried, stored, and consumed during an escape. Steamed bread was converted into a cracker resembling melba toast, and candy was made from the sugar, with peanuts and deep-fried soy beans added. Additional soy beans were deep-fried for easy consumption.

Equipment for escape purposes was either stolen from the Chinese, obtained from fellow POWs, or manufactured within the camps. Knives were common in the internment areas. Small maps clipped

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

from Chinese publications were enlarged, with additional data inserted, often by Air Force personnel who had flown over these areas. Matches were hoarded and, in some cases, were waterproofed by dipping them in wax from melted candles. Compasses were made by hand and checked for accuracy against a few carefully guarded American compasses still in the hands of the prisoners. Canteens were stolen from the guards, and other water containers were made from pig bladders. Cooking pots were obtained, and canvas buckets were made from old field coats. Extra clothes, half soles for repairing shoes, ponchos and blankets were sometimes obtained. Ropes were stolen or made from rawhide, and mirrors were collected to be used in signalling U.S. aircraft. Medical supplies were accumulated by faking illness during a sick call and hoarding such items as sulfa tablets, vitamin pills, aspirins, and bandages.

During the days or weeks involved in the accumulation of escape material, the problem of hiding the food and equipment had to be solved. In their efforts to thwart escape attempts and to seize unauthorized diaries and other contraband, the Chinese conducted periodic searches of the prisoners' billets and persons. These investigations were always unannounced and were held anywhere from three to six months apart. During these "shakedowns," the prisoners usually would be marched to a nearby field or hill and either searched with their clothing on or forced to strip. When these examinations of their persons had been completed, they would

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

be taken to another area and held there while the ground on which they had originally been examined was raked to recover any articles which they might have buried in the dirt. While the POWs were away, another group of Chinese would thoroughly examine their billets. Although these searches were always a hazard, the returnees indicate that articles could be concealed with fair success by burying them in the dirt floors or hiding them in the heating flues, in the eaves, or behind the wallpaper. In addition to these places, which were available to all prisoners, other locations were used which were available only to special groups. A hole concealed under the woodpile in the POW kitchen served as an escape-kit cache for a number of months in Company 1, Camp 2.[11] The task of hiding articles was made more difficult by the necessity of concealing them not only from the Chinese but also from the POW informers - a problem which pervaded every aspect of any escape preparation program.

9. The Escapes that Failed

During the preliminary questioning of repatriated POWs, the most consistently positive information received pertained to escape attempts. A cursory examination of the answer sheets to[4] the Phase III questionnaires might give the impression that the POWs were constantly planning and executing breakouts from their places of internment. Such an impression, however, would be incorrect. Under the constant boredom and monotony of prison life,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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thoughts and talk of escape undoubtedly occupied the minds of the POWs for a considerable portion of their waking hours. They were almost devoid of news of the outside world. Freedom through any means was the ultimate goal of their existence. Past and future attempts were recited, discussed, critiqued, and retold until fact could hardly be distinguished from fiction.

It is the intention of this section to weed out the rumors and to evaluate the actual escape attempts which are known to have been made from the permanent camps. The primary difficulty in arriving at such an evaluation is that it requires a statistical survey on which to base conclusions. Unfortunately, although early debriefings of many returnees indicated their familiarity with escape attempts, the limited scope of the questionnaires prevented the full development of this information. The following observations and figures, therefore, are subject to this general qualification and may require some modification at a later date. It is believed, however, that the cases which are available for review represent most, although probably not all, of the actual escape attempts from both the permanent and the temporary camps.

Of the 3,745 U.S. military personnel repatriated in "Big Switch" and "Little Switch," only 94 can be definitely established, at this writing, as participants in bona fide escape attempts. The POWs usually worked in groups of two or three, with some prisoners making as many as two or three attempts over a period of time.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

However, the number of escapes which can be reasonably well documented amounts to a total of only 46. These escape attempts, which began in December 1950 with an attempt by two enlisted men to reach friendly lines from the "Valley" (a camp outside of PYOKTONG) and continued until July 1953, the month before the repatriation operation of "Big Switch," form a pattern which is consistent in several respects. Although there were a few attempts made during the winter, the majority, during each of the three years of internment, occurred between the months of May and September. Over 70 per cent of the escapees considered this period the most suitable from the standpoint of food availability, concealment from observation, and facility of movement. Although a few individuals escaped into the brush during wood details, the majority of them crept past their guards during the hours of darkness and hoped that their fellow prisoners would be able to provide them with a few more hours' start by "covering" for them at roll calls and bed checks. The average escaped POW in Korea successfully avoided recapture for less than 2½ days. Since the escapes were, without exception, abortive, it is difficult in many cases to determine what route the fugitives intended to take. In those cases where the route had been planned, however, almost half of the escapees had hoped to reach the west coast, steal a boat, and eventually attract the attention of U.N. air or sea craft. Two groups are known to have planned to enter Manchuria, reach an enemy airfield, steal a plane

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

and then return to friendly hands. The remainder of the escapees were almost equally divided between the choices of traveling either towards the east coast or else southward to the battlefront.

On six of these attempts, which represented some 13 per cent, the fugitives never even escaped from their camp areas. When they reached their rendezvous points, either in or immediately adjacent to the camps, they found that the guards were awaiting them. In three of these instances, their captors candidly told them that they had been betrayed by some fellow prisoners.

Of those prisoners who successfully escaped from their immediate place of confinement and at least began their trip to freedom, the majority sought the mountains for travel and avoided the roads and trails. They traveled by night and hid during the daytime, occasionally visiting a farmhouse to steal food. Knowingly or otherwise, the escapees were faced with an almost insoluble problem in their choice of routes to follow. Their only chance of avoiding the thousands of Korean farmers and refugees was to travel on remote mountain trails at night. However, movement by night in the mountains required physical endurance and stamina which the prisoners lacked. Eventually they were forced to descend to easier trails, to seek food from inhabited farmhouses or to travel by daylight. When this juncture was reached, capture became inevitable. The report which is quoted in part below offers a generally representative description of an escape and its consequences:

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

They left camp the night of 19 Aug 51. All lights were turned out around the camp at night, so it was easy to slip away. (Security has been increased since this time, so it isn't as easy to slip away as easily any more.) It took them from 9:30 PM to 1:30 AM to reach the reservoir which is about ¼ mile from camp. They stole a boat and put their equipment inside and pushed the boat down the river. It had been raining when they started out from camp, but now the rain stopped and the moon shone brightly. Evidently the guards along the banks didn't see them, or if they saw the boat with no occupants, they thought it was just adrift. It was their intention to get to the YALU River and travel south by boat. There were many boats available on all the rivers. It took them until about 3:30 AM to get to the other side of the reservoir, then they took to the road. They ran into a check point, where the guards yelled at them and they ran. They continued walking until 4:00 AM when two Koreans yelled at them and again they took flight. The Koreans were slow in getting down the road after them, so they had a chance to hide behind a big rock, and the Koreans ran past them. Then they climbed the mountain, crossed the road behind them and sat down to smoke a cigarette and discuss their situation. They decided to head south instead of continuing north to the YALU. They could hide out in the day, eating and sleeping, and do their walking at night.

At dawn they could see the Koreans searching for them. It began to rain and the rain continued all day. Their first mistake was in picking and eating raw sweet corn from the mountain slopes. They immediately became sick from diarrhea. They started down the road again that morning and managed to slip past two more check points. One of the escapees was sick all that night and found that he also had hepatitis (yellow jaundice). Their pack weighed 15 pounds and they took turns carrying it. The next day it was still raining when they located a hut just off the road which had dry wood inside.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

A little child saw them going into the hut, and after they had been there for about an hour, three security police walked in on them. They pretended to be friends. They took the escapees to one of their homes, cooked them some corn and rice, dried their clothes and let them sleep about 3½ hours. Not until they had awakened and started to leave did the security police reveal that the escapees were recaptured. One POW took out a razor and slashed one man's shoulder, while the other broke one of the guard's thumbs, whereupon the guards turned and ran from them. The escapees ran in the opposite direction. They got about two more miles away and were hiding in a corn patch when they heard the dogs and children (about 100 little children with knives and sickles). Behind them followed the security police. 12

The stories related by the escapees themselves reveal two factors which almost exclusively led to their downfall. The first was the lack of food; they could not possibly carry a sufficient amount with them to last the entire trip, and they found that they could not live off the land. The second factor was the large number of civilians living in North Korea. Indicative of the part that these people played in the recapture of U.N. prisoners is the fact that over 70 per cent of the escapees were either seized by civilians or were apprehended as a direct result of contact with them. Local North Korean security forces accounted for the capture of almost all of the remainder; there were only two instances where POW camp guards seized fugitives during searches of areas near the camps.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

10. Enemy Action After an Escape

Whenever they learned that prisoners had escaped, the Communists alerted other Chinese military units, North Korean security forces and the general populace in the surrounding area. Reports indicate that a fairly well organized system of communication existed, which made it possible for areas within 10 to 20 miles of a camp to be notified immediately. These security zones were often enlarged if the escapees were not caught the first day. The camp guards themselves would search only the camp area and the immediate vicinity. When the prisoners were finally apprehended, the camp would be notified and guards would then be dispatched to bring them back.

Apparently there was a standing reward offered to any civilian who aided in the capture of a prisoner. Several returnees report that this reward consisted of a 100-pound bag of rice. In view of the low living standards in North Korea during 1950-1953, this factor undoubtedly added greatly to the willingness of the Koreans to turn in an escapee, and, when combined with fear of reprisal from the Chinese, it largely explains the inability of U.N. prisoners to find civilians willing to assist them.

Punishment accorded recaptured fugitives was generally not too drastic. Inevitably they were forced to write, sign, and often read to their fellow prisoners a "confession" or "self-criticism," in which they admitted the errors of their "thinking" and promised

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

not to repeat their offenses. This was usually followed by a sentence of solitary confinement ranging anywhere from a week to six months. A detailed discussion of punishments prescribed for escapees, as well as for perpetrators of other "crimes," is contained in Chapter 10.

Section V - Escape Recommendations by Returned POWs

Recommendations made by repatriated U.S. prisoners from Korea on the topic of Escape follow a definite pattern and are in accord with what might be anticipated in light of the factors discussed above. In general, they agree that escapes should be attempted as soon after capture as possible. They discovered that once they were interned in the permanent camps, which were widely separated from each other in a country filled with unfriendly natives, their chances for successful escape were reduced to a minimum. Experiences undergone during enemy searches led the returnees to the conclusion that small but extremely important items could have been hidden in their clothing and on their bodies, and might well have been thus retained throughout captivity.

Many returnees state that the most important factor in connection with escapes from permanent camps is careful planning. Although extensive preparations increase the danger of observation by informers, lack of planning is fatal to success. Physical conditioning is highly important in the planning stage and must be

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

inaugurated weeks or months before the attempt is made. The returnees recommend that the prospective escapee engage in sports whenever possible, walk as much as he can, and generally increase his strength and endurance to their maximum. Participation in work details outside of camp not only improved the physical condition of the prisoners, but it gave them valuable opportunities to observe the terrain, population and security obstacles beyond their own compounds. The returnees feel that the execution of escapes should be limited to groups of not more than three or four men. The members of each group should be in comparable physical condition and should be prepared for any exigencies which might be encountered en route. These might include emergencies where immediate action would have to be taken by the others, should one escapee become ill or injured or be captured. To ignore consideration of such possibilities until a crisis occurred would probably lead to confusion and loss of time and would thereby greatly increase the chances of recapture.

The returnees consistently contend that the best possible disguise for a fugitive is that of a Korean civilian, preferably an old man. Here again, careful planning is necessary, since the gait and posture of the type of person to be imitated should be carefully studied and practiced. In Korea, a disguise is of value only at a distance, since any close observation of the non-Oriental facial characteristics of American POWs immediately renders their disguise ineffective. Returned prisoners recommend that force be

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

avoided in escape attempts if at all possible. Although the enemy ordinarily inflicted comparatively light punishment on captured escapees, they greatly increased this punishment if any guards had been harmed.

The period between May and September was considered by the returnees to have been the best time for an escape. Since the snow had melted by this time, the escapees did not leave tracks which would disclose their route, and, more important, they did not have to contend with cold in addition to the other discomforts. Summer was also the best time for living off the land, since gardens and food bins were available as sources of supply.

Two items of equipment are recurrently mentioned as being almost indispensable. The first is a map and the second is a compass. In Korea, the former was not as difficult to obtain as might be imagined. During search procedures, the Communists sometimes failed to discover and confiscate U.S. Army maps. In addition, enemy magazines and newspapers sometimes contained small maps of North Korea. These were often copied and made more accurate through the use of information obtained from other prisoners, particularly Air Force personnel. Almost all returned prisoners mention the value of a compass, although a few believe that, since most travel was done at night, thorough training in practical astronomy would serve as a substitute for this instrument. Identification cards and passes were almost universally discounted as valueless. A

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Caucasian could not pass himself off as a native under any conditions, and the unco-operative attitude of the Korean population made such things as blood chits and "promissory notes" of little value. Numerous items were used for barter, including watches, rings, U.S. currency, and clothing, but their value was again largely negated by the unwillingness of the Korean civilians to "do business" with escaped prisoners. Food, probably the most valuable asset to an escapee, should be of the concentrated type not susceptible to easy spoilage. Rations which met these criteria were unfortunately not readily available in the POW camps, but knowledge of how to process available ingredients into "escape rations" would have been helpful.

Movement after escape should be made only during the hours of darkness, and the fugitive should be careful to bypass villages, farms, roads, and roadblocks. Travel through the hills is considered safest, but care must be taken to avoid the crests since enemy lookouts often occupy these positions. In general, the returnees recommend that an escapee travel slowly and cautiously, since, by doing so, he will best be able to conserve his strength and to avoid mistakes.

In considering the many escape recommendations made by returned POWs, the one most strongly emphasized by all as being vital for success is that of realistic, prior planning. While this necessity may seem self-evident, ability to accomplish such planning

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

must, for the average individual, be based on thorough E&E training, tailored to the geography and circumstances to which the prospective fugitive is most likely to be exposed. Evaluation of the information which we have examined herein clearly shows that such training, and the inculcation of the spirit and will to use it, should be considered as essential as the "resistance" training which is discussed elsewhere in this report.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 10

JUDICIAL AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Section I - Introduction

This chapter is a study of judicial and disciplinary proceedings instituted by the CCF and the NK against U.S. POWs captured during the Korean Operation. The following discussion is concerned chiefly with incidents involving the CCF, although reference is made to a few known cases where trial proceedings were instituted by North Korean civilians.

The fact that there are few instances included wherein the North Korean Army used such procedures is not intended to indicate a more lenient policy on their part. The omission of any reference to NKA judicial proceedings is due primarily to the fact that their treatment is more properly considered under the heading of "war crimes" and is therefore not within the scope of this study. Also omitted from this discussion are any references to the application of duress used in producing confessions regarding Bacteriological Warfare participation. Although military and political advisors of the Soviet Union were attached to the CCF and the NKA, there is no indication that Soviet personnel ever directly participated in judicial or disciplinary actions against U.N. POWs. In addition to formal judicial and disciplinary measures applied by the CCF, there were

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

several cases where U.S. POWs were brought before "Kangaroo Courts" composed of other U.S. POWs. A discussion of these "Kangaroo Courts" is therefore included.

Section II - Judicial Procedures Under Korean Civilians

Trials of prisoners of war by North Korean civilians consisted mainly of instances in which prisoners of war were captured by civilians in isolated areas after having parachuted from aircraft. On these occasions, military authorities were often some distance from the scene of capture, and Korean civilians, either with or without the sanction of local police authorities, instituted some semblance of judicial procedure. The North Korean civilians never attempted to obtain confessions from the accused, and there is no evidence of political emphasis in their actions. POWs who experienced such trials have been unable to provide minute details of the procedure. Usually, they were treated as war criminals for destroying and burning the homes of the villagers. In most cases the POWs never learned the nature of the sentences imposed on them. But in many instances the captured prisoners of war were subjected to physical punishment by the aroused peasants and farmers. Eventually, the nearest military authorities would hear of these incidents and cause the prisoners to be surrendered and sent to established camps.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Section III - Judicial and Disciplinary Procedures Under the North Korean Army

Only a few cases have been reported in which U.N. prisoners of war experienced any judicial or disciplinary treatment under the NKA which resembled conventional Western procedures. The scarcity of cases should not be interpreted as indicative of leniency on the part of the North Koreans, however; since they not only punished POWs, but treated them in such a way that their actions are more appropriately classified as war atrocities. As noted earlier, such instances are excluded from this discussion.

Section IV - Judicial Procedures Under the CCF

1. Phases of Judicial Procedure

The CCF had no levels comparable to those provided in the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice for the implementation of judicial procedure, viz., summary, special, and general courts-martial. However, for purposes of this discussion, the word court-martial shall be used in all cases involving a panel of CCF officers. No distinction will be made, regardless of the number of members sitting on the panel.

Basically, the judicial procedure followed by the CCF consisted of three major phases: (1) pre-trial or investigative, (2) trial proper, and (3) end of trial or sentencing. It should be noted, however that these three phases were not always evident in every

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

court-martial hearing conducted by the CCF. In all cases, phases two and three were contingent upon the results obtained in phase one.

The Western mind might logically assume that the CCF, having once ascertained the innocence of the accused as a result of investigation, would be inclined to discontinue the proceedings. However, such was not normally the case. Whenever they desired to court-martial a prisoner of war, the CCF usually attempted to extort a confession from him regardless of the truth or falsity of the charges. Once a confession had been obtained, phases two and three normally followed. In many cases after a confession was obtained, phase two was omitted and the accused was sentenced directly (phase three).

There is no case on record in which an accused, after having been brought to trial, managed to establish his innocence. In view of this circumstance, phase one assumes great importance and provides the key to all judicial proceedings under the CCF.

Phase one began, without exception, when the prisoner of war was brought before the CCF company commander, the CCF company political officer, the CCF platoon leader, the CCF platoon political instructor, or CCF interpreters of various echelons. The techniques utilized by the investigators varied, but there are two which can be considered basic. The first one consisted of summoning the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

prisoner of war and applying pressure to make him confess to any type of wrongdoing, without a hint as to the offense charged; the second technique consisted of accusing the prisoner of a specific crime or violation.

In the latter case, the CCF then concentrated upon obtaining a confession to the allegations from the accused, whether the charges were true or false. The time involved and the methods used varied with the ability of the prisoner to withstand the barrage of threats, mental coercion, physical discomforts, implications through "confessions" of other POWs, promises of better treatment upon confession, and the ever-increasing number of false charges that seemed to multiply in direct proportion to the tenacity of his resistance. The POW was never informed of any rights in respect to self-incrimination; instead, he was urged to confess and plead guilty and to thereby benefit from the Chinese "Lenient Policy."

Phase one ended when the accused signed a confession and pleaded guilty to all the allegations. There is only one exception on record, where the accused, through extreme stubbornness, was able to have certain charges dropped or qualified before he signed a confession.[1]

Completion of this phase was then followed by phases two and three, or by phase three alone. In the latter case, sentencing directly followed the pre-trial "investigation." The accused was merely told that he had been court-martialed and found guilty, and

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

he was then informed of his sentence.

2. In the Courtroom

Whenever there was a "trial," the setting of the court-martial scene was arranged with elaborate care. The immediate area both within and without was heavily guarded by armed CCF troops and each defendant usually had an armed CCF guard standing directly behind him.

The members of the court were seated at tables. The number of members ranged from three to twelve; most of them were CCF, but some of the prisoners reported that, occasionally, there were North Korean officers on the panel. In addition to the members of the court, other personnel composed the prosecution and the defense. The former consisted of a prosecutor and assistant prosecutor; the latter of a defense and assistant defense counsel. The defense did not participate in any of the proceedings and contributed nothing to the trial other than its presence.

The number of prisoners of war handled in each trial varied from one to thirty-three men, although the charges against the defendants were often dissimilar. Sometimes the accused were made to sit cross-legged on the floor and at other times they had to remain standing, but at no time during the trial were they allowed to speak.

Some reports indicate that spectators, consisting of CCF, NK, and U.N. personnel who held various positions under the CCF (i.e.,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By KRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

squad leaders, study group leaders and monitors), were present at some of the trials.

3. Trial Procedure

A typical trial opened with speeches in Chinese by the senior member of the court, which were translated into both Korean and English by court interpreters. Then the prosecutor would read (in Chinese) the charges against the accused, which were also translated. These were followed by the confessions of the accused, also read by the prosecutor. In some cases, after the prosecution had finished, the court deliberated in the corner of the room (at other times, the sentencing took place immediately). Shortly thereafter, the court members would return to their seats, and the senior member would announce the decision (always guilty) and pass sentence.

At no time during the trial were witnesses called. The defense never charged that the confessions were false or had been obtained under duress. None of the fundamental rules of evidence common to Anglo-American jurisprudence or moral standards were observed. The only difference between direct sentencing after confession and going through the "trial" phase first was that, in the latter case, more CCF personnel participated and more of the trappings of court procedure were utilized. The legality of the procedures do not appear to have been in accord with the moral, international, or judicial concepts of non-communist states. Appropriately, one source reported

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

that a banner with an inscription in English reading "Court of Condemnation" hung on a wall behind the court members who had tried him.

4. Motives of the CCF in Instituting Courts-Martial

It is difficult to understand the motives of the CCF in holding courts-martial. The CCF sentenced many prisoners of war without any judicial proceedings and could just as easily have similarly sentenced those who were given trials, instead of resorting to a pretense of legality. The charges brought against POWs were usually not sufficient, unless grossly exaggerated, to warrant a trial according to U.S. standards. However, the fact that the CCF did make this show of legality deserves consideration.

The assumption that the CCF instituted these proceedings purely for their propaganda value does not suffice as a complete explanation. It may be, that by threatening to detain convicted prisoners, the CCF hoped to improve their bargaining position at the conference tables of PANMUNJOM.

Section V - Disciplinary Procedures

Under the non-judicial or disciplinary punishment sections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a commanding officer is empowered to deal with minor offenses that are prejudicial to good order and discipline without resorting to judicial procedures. Article 96 of the Geneva Convention likewise affords the commanding officer of a prisoner of war camp recourse to this method.

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The CCF used non-judicial punishment extensively. The type of punishment meted out under this procedure in many cases was extremely harsh, as opposed to very limited punishment allowed in comparable U.S. proceedings. Also, in many instances, prisoners of war were punished for offenses against which there were no specific prohibitions.

"Self-criticisms" were statements in which a POW would first admit to an offense, then criticize the motives which had led him to commit it, and would finally promise never to repeat it. The CCF utilized self-criticisms in two ways. The self-criticisms obtained prior to disciplinary punishment can be considered analogous to the "confessions" required in the preliminary stages of judicial procedures. Occasionally, however, the CCF would not punish a POW after he had written a self-criticism. In this event, the self-criticism would be filed for use at some later date. When a sufficient number of self-criticisms from one prisoner had been accumulated, the CCF would punish him. In many cases a POW was given no punishment other than being forced to read his self-criticism aloud during a formation.

In order to induce POWs to write self-criticisms, the Chinese often displayed a great disparity between the treatment of those who readily signed prepared statements and those who refused. If he signed, the prisoner was sometimes treated leniently; whereas

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if he refused, he was often confined and subjected to various pressures designed to make him write the required self-criticism.

There were some POWs who managed to make facetious statements in their self-criticisms. One of the favorite techniques practiced by POWs who had to read their statements before an audience consisted of promising never again to "get caught" committing a particular crime or act.

Several returnees have reported that they had to re-write self-criticisms several times before they were accepted as satisfactory. One returnee stated that the formats for self-criticisms were established by higher authorities. He stated, as an illustration of this, that on one occasion he was compelled to re-write a self-criticism which had been accepted the day before because a change in the format had subsequently been received from higher echelons.

Psychology was applied by the CCF to obtain self-criticisms. On occasion, the CCF would give a prisoner more sheets of paper than he needed, accompanied by an order to fill in all the pages. This would cause the accused to amplify and embellish in order to fulfill the requirements.

There were some POWs who stuck to their principles and refused to write self-criticisms. These recalcitrant individuals were among those classified as "die-hard reactionaries," and they were segregated by the CCF and eventually transferred to other companies, where, through their stubbornness, they could not contribute to

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

bolstering the resistance of other POWs.

Section VI - "Kangaroo Courts"

Webster's New International Dictionary contains the following definition: "Kangaroo Court - slang, U.S. - an irresponsible, unauthorized, or irregular tribunal, or one in which, although under some authorization, the principles of law and justice are disregarded or perverted, as a mock court held by vagabonds or by prisoners in jail..."

For the purpose of this discussion, "kangaroo courts" may be divided into two categories. In the first category are those composed of POWs who were sympathetic to the CCF cause and who were guided by CCF monitors. There is considerable difference of opinion whether the punishment meted out by these POWs was more or less severe than that normally prescribed by the CCF. It is likely that CCF monitors exerted their influence upon the POWs comprising the "court."

In the second category were the actions taken by those POWs who were anti-CCF and anti-"Progressive." These men formed various societies or organizations within the camps with the avowed purpose of counteracting the co-operation of the "Pros," and, either by threats of reprisal or by actual force, tried to eliminate or minimize the collaboration of the "Pros" with the CCF. Members of such organizations were often exposed to the CCF by informers and received

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either judicial or disciplinary punishment. Specific acts charged against some of these prisoners of war consisted of attempted murder (for pushing a "Pro" in the river), disrupting studies, starting "reigns of terror," overthrowing camp authority, and various subversive activities. One organization such as this existed in Camp 3 under the actual name of KANGAROO COURT. (For a description of this organization, see Chapter 5.)

Section VII - General

This study has attempted to present the facts obtained from records of repatriated prisoners of war and to correlate these facts into an understandable pattern of CCF judicial and non-judicial procedures.

It is not clear how the CCF determined whether the procedure to be used in punishing a prisoner of war for a particular offense would be judicial ("court" action) or non-judicial (direct discipline). It is apparent, however, that the CCF generally instituted harsher measures for offenses of a political nature. (For a list of punishable offenses, see apps. XVI and XVII.)

The CCF informed the prisoners of war that they were dupes of the "Wall Street warmongers," slaves of "bloodthirsty capitalists," etc., but that the CCF would treat them as liberated members of the proletarian class. Arising from this "consideration," an arbitrary obligation was then imputed to the prisoners of war.

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From this time forward, prisoners of war could be tried for non-performance of obligations (much like the citizens of the U.S.S.R.) viz., not studying and preparing themselves to be members of the proletarian class. Those prisoners who manifested objections were termed "reactionaries" and were tried either as enemies of the working people or for maintaining a hostile attitude towards the working people. This may account, in part, for the statements by many returned prisoners of war that they were tried for the commission of acts against which there were no specific prohibitions. The CCF considered that violations of this arbitrary (but to them very real) obligation entailed legal responsibility and merited punishment.

On 10 July 1951, preliminary truce negotiations were initiated at KAESONG. Throughout these negotiations, which continued for more than two years, the most controversial question was whether prisoners of war should be forcibly repatriated against their expressed wishes. The Geneva Conventions provided for the return of all prisoners of war unless they were undergoing or had been sentenced by judicial proceedings. If such was the case, the matter was to be negotiated with the detaining power, who could then release the prisoners if it so consented. When the Geneva Conventions were prepared in 1949, it is clear that the Western-oriented delegates were thinking of judicial proceedings consistent with our standards and definitions of crime, trial, and punishment. It is possible

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that, because of this mental preconception, it did not occur to these delegates that a situation might arise in which prisoners of war would not want to be repatriated.

Throughout the truce negotiations, the refusal of a great number of CCF and NKA POWs to return home posed a dilemma for the Communists which involved possible "loss of face." To combat this, it is entirely possible that the CCF and NKA instituted judicial proceedings against U.N. prisoners of war in their custody. With the subsequent increase of prisoners whom they were not obligated to release because of convictions by "judicial proceedings," the Communists perhaps intended to increase their bargaining power at the truce conferences. Although the number of "convicted" U.N. prisoners was in no way comparable to the number of Communist prisoners refusing repatriation, the CCF and the NKA may have planned by this procedure to coerce the U.N. delegates to succumb to their demands, knowing the emphasis placed by Westerners upon the worth of the individual. This analysis, of course, is necessarily conjectural.

Although the goals of the CCF and the NKA in the Korean conflict do not appear to coincide with the objectives of the Soviets after World War II, the similarity of the methods and procedures involved is unmistakable.

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CHAPTER 11

CAMP LIFE AND ROUTINE

Section I - Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with some insight into the actual conditions under which U.S. POWs lived during their internment. It discusses their general treatment at the hands of the Chinese and North Koreans, the physical conditions under which they lived, and the daily activities which consumed their time. The first portion of the chapter deals with the Non-permanent Camps. These fall into two general categories; the Temporary Camps - set up in the early stages of the conflict and later closed when the permanent camps had become established; and the Special Purpose camps - often temporary in nature, and smaller than the permanent camps, but distinct from the first type because they were established for the special purposes of either interrogation, or propaganda and indoctrination. Each of the camps in these categories is discussed individually. The second portion of this chapter deals primarily with life in the Permanent Camps, but, because of the general similarity of conditions in these camps, camp life is treated topically, i.e. housing, personal hygiene, work details, recreation, etc., with reference being made to individual camps only for purposes of illustration and contrast. Further insight into

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the daily routine of POWs in the permanent camps may be gained by reference to the appendix which presents a composite picture of the daily schedules in each camp. (app. XVIII)

In the first year of the war, the physical conditions under which the POWs lived were hardly adequate for survival. In all camps, with the exception of "Peaceful Valley," food, shelter, medical facilities, and many other "necessities" were available only in extremely limited quantities. Between July 1950 and May 1951, of the 6,115 U.S. Army personnel captured, 2,615 died (about 42 per cent).[1] In the early summer of 1951, however, a large decline in the death rate reflected the improvement in camp living conditions and the possible effect of warmer weather upon the POWs, who had undergone severe privation due to the inadequate clothing and shelter of the previous months. During the next two years, conditions gradually continued to improve; food supplies increased to at least a subsistence level, the facilities of existing camps were improved, and new camps were opened.

The mental condition of the prisoners was of course greatly influenced by their physical environment; but, apart from the typical dejection and confusion of individuals in captivity, the POWs in Korea were subjected to treatment aimed at unsettling their normal allegiances and traditional beliefs. In addition to the formal indoctrination efforts, almost every aspect of daily life reflected some element of propaganda or psychological pressure, and they were

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continually forced to defend themselves against Communist efforts to adversely influence their behavior toward their fellow prisoners and their country.

In general, it may be said of camp conditions everywhere that, when taken in combination, they effected a situation in which both mental and physical independence was reduced to a minimum, the former by keeping the POWs constantly involved in propaganda activities, and the latter by keeping them at the mere level of existence.

Section II - Camp Life and Routine in the Non-Permanent Camps

1. "Death Valley" and the "Valley"

The "Valley" and "Death Valley" were probably the worst of the temporary camps. The North Koreans, who were in control of both these camps, were charged with their maintenance and supply and therefore bore the responsibility for the poor living conditions; but the Chinese were also represented and, with the passage of time, exercised an increasingly greater amount of control over camp policies.

Life for the POWs during the limited existence of these camps (early winter, 1950-51) was apparently little more than a struggle for survival. No uniform plan for the treatment and control of POWs was evidenced, and no regular pattern of daily life emerged. One returnees states that a considerable amount of time was consumed in searching for firewood,[2] but it is likely that, aside from this and the inevitable burial details, little else was required in the

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way of work, and that what little energy was possessed by the POWs at this stage was devoted primarily to the unique problem of staying alive.

Though little work was required of the POWs, it is also true that little was offered them in the way of clothing, housing, food, medical supplies and the other items required to satisfy even the basic needs of prisoners. Housing was primitive and crowded; after officers and EM had been segregated, groups of 18 to 30 were packed into small rooms.[3] Rations were hardly adequate for survival (see Chapter 12), and during the first few weeks, because there were no utensils for eating, the POWs ate out of tin cans or their hats turned inside out. When bowls were later issued, the POWs improvised "chop sticks."[4]

There was little attention paid to either the morale or the psychological state of the prisoners at this time, (even from the standpoint of indoctrination), with the result that many POWs apparently sank into a state of mental apathy. At "Death Valley," a few indoctrination lectures were delivered by a British correspondent,[5] and a few prisoners were removed to the CCF Interrogation Center for questioning,[6] but there were no real indoctrination or interrogation programs. Similarly, at the "Valley," a few books reflecting the communist line were issued, and some prisoners were questioned, but these were apparently unusual occurrences.[7]

Excluding the possibility that the general neglect itself might

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internment and the infrequent punishments which were administered were notably mild in nature. Discipline was apparently maintained by threats of "public criticism," denial of food or assignment to a more arduous work detail. The actual punishments imposed on the POWs, however, consisted of forcing a prisoner to stand at attention in the presence of other POWs and publicly criticising his conduct or behavior.[8]

In its ho sing arrangements, "Peaceful Valley" was not unique. POWs were billeted in native-type Korean houses (discussed more thoroughly in Section III, 1), with the size of the house determining the number of men billeted therein, and the number in each of the squads (which varied in size from 8 to 14 men)being dependent upon the capacity of the rooms to which they were assigned. The rooms were heated by the "hot floor" method (see section III, 1), and, with the one blanket which had been issued to every two POWs, in addition to any U.S. clothing they had been able to retain, the prisoners slept huddled together - cold, but sufficiently warm to keep alive.

Whatever daily chores had to be done, such as chopping and hauling firewood, hauling water, and policing details, were allotted by roster and usually did not consume more than an hour. Although the work was not particularly heavy or difficult, some POWs who were extremely weakened had difficulty in performing it. The POWs

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

have been planned, no overall plan for the treatment of prisoners was ever evidenced, and the combination of this indifferent treatment, malnutrition, disease, cold weather, and general inadequacy of facilities led to a very high mortality rate in both camps.

2. "Peaceful Valley"

The conditions which existed at "Peaceful Valley" were in sharp contrast to those at the "Valley." The camp was under the complete control of the Chinese. Study and indoctrination were heavily emphasized in the daily routine, and the "lenient (treatment) policy" operated freely. In some respects, life at "Peaceful Valley" was very similar to that which later existed in permanent Camps 1 and 5, but the emphasis at "Peaceful Valley" was on a comradely student-teacher relationship between prisoners and captors, and there were fewer of the blunt methods of control used at the permanent camps. No attempt was made to completely isolate officers from enlisted men (although the officers were grouped together in one squad), and there are indications that control was never implemented by the use of force. Instead, the Chinese apparently adhered scrupulously to the policy of appealing to the "reason" of the POWs, and if any pressures were exerted, they were purely psychological. The CCF adopted an attitude of treating the POWs as "equals" and not as persons of an inferior status. There are no reports of prisoners being beaten or tortured by their captors during this

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apparently ate the same kind of food as the CCF, but the CCF probably enjoyed a greater quantity. At one time or another, nearly every POW suffered from diarrhea, a high percentage of which emanated from dysentery. In contrast to the conditions at the "Valley" and "Death Valley," however, not more than 15 or 20 POWs were believed to have died at this camp, and nearly all of these deaths were the result of frozen limbs (all of which had been received previously, during the time of capture, or enroute to the camp) or of wounds (all of which were received before or at the time of capture).

A typical daily schedule at "Peaceful Valley" would include:[9]

0700	Rise, morning walk or light calisthenics, wash
0800	Breakfast
0900	Lecture or study
1000	Lecture or study
1100	Lecture or study
1200	Dinner (sometimes the noon meal was omitted)
1300	Rest
1400	Lecture or study
1500	Lecture or study
1600	Camp housekeeping, police call, details
1700	Supper
1800	Free time
1900	Usually bedded down at dark or before

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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3. "Bean Camp" and "Mining Camp"

The last of the temporary camps to be organized were "Bean" and "Mining" Camps. Both of these camps were set up in January or February of 1951, and, like the "Valley" and "Death Valley," were apparently improvised to meet the needs of the moment. Approximately 1,900 U.S. POWs, captured between January and June 1951, passed through these camps which were closed in October 1951 when facilities for handling prisoners on a large scale were no longer needed near the front lines. Following the usual pattern, conditions were poor, and the mortality rate was high in both of these camps (an estimated 600 died),[10] at least until the summer of 1951.

"Mining Camp" consisted of two large buildings, one an ex-schoolhouse, into which were crowded about 800 POWs, mostly American, with a few United Kingdom and Turkish troops.[11] The only segregation introduced involved the separation of the officers from the EM. Although a few interrogations were held, there was apparently very limited activity, in this field, and the men were usually left alone.[12] By summer, however, an indoctrination program had been instituted, and the daily schedule ran roughly as follows:[13]

0600	Rise, roll call, wash
0700	Breakfast
0800	Details, lecture, study
1200	Dinner

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

1400 Details, study

1700 Supper

2100 Lights out

"Bean Camp" was located about ten miles away from "Mining Camp;" both camps were southeast of P'YONGYANG, near SUAN. It was an old army camp, probably Japanese, and contained some 50 buildings laid out in rows.[14] No schedules for "Bean Camp" are known, but it is likely that the usualy camp activities, including wood and burial details and some interrogations, were carried on there.

4. Camp 12

Despite its limited existence, Camp 12 is classified as a special purpose camp rather than a temporary camp. Under the direction of the North Koreans, it came into existence in February 1951, when a group of twenty men from Camp #5 were selected to go to P'YONGYANG for the purpose of making voice recordings for radio broadcasts. (see Chapter 16) For a few months, this group, gradually augmented by arrivals from other camps (Camp 12 never contained more than 80-100 POWs), was shifted from place to place, always in the vicinity of P'YONGYANG. The group finally became permanently located about 10 miles northeast of P'YONGYANG in July 1951, shortly after the arrival there of delegates to the Central Peace Committee.

The primary objective of the camp was to further the aims of the propaganda and indoctrination programs. One of the main

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

activities involved the preparation and presentation of material for radio broadcast recordings and other propaganda media, and apparently a considerable amount of time was devoted to indoctrination. Not much is known of the day-to-day activities except that the usual wood, water, police, and other housekeeping details took place, and that the general treatment of the POWs was apparently not exceptional. Although the North Koreans attempted to make the POWs believe otherwise, the living standards at the camp were probably slightly inferior to those which prevailed in the permanent camps by the summer of 1951.

5. CCF Interrogation Center

A rather short-lived camp (December 1950 - February 1951), the Center's special purpose, as its name indicates, was interrogation. Living conditions (including the quantity of food issued) were probably slightly superior to those which existed at "Death Valley," but they could hardly be described as satisfactory. Five men were reportedly required to sleep in one room under one blanket,[15] and, although one returnee states that warm water was available for washing,[16] another former internee reports that there was no water available for this purpose and that POWs were forbidden to go to a nearby creek to cleanse either themselves or their eating utensils.[17] The latter informant goes on to state that, as a result of the generally filthy living conditions and the lack of facilities

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

for washing, the POWs and their clothing soon became infested with lice,- a situation which was not satisfactorily alleviated on the one occasion during which they were allowed to wash their clothing in boiling water.

There are no schedules of the daily routine available, but it appears that the POWs who were sent to this camp engaged in few if any activities not directly connected with the process of interrogation. One returnee states that POWs were not permitted to leave their rooms except when they were taken out for interrogation or when they needed to use the latrine. The same source reports that the Chinese were so concerned about preventing POWs in one room from communicating with those in another that they even staggered the schedule for collecting food to prevent such contact. He also reports that guards (one during the day and two at night) were stationed outside the house in which he was confined, in order to enforce these controls.

6. "Pak's Palace"

"Pak's Palace" was an official interrogation center located near P'YONGYANG, administered completely by the North Koreans. The name "Pak's Palace" was coined by POWs in derisive tribute to Maj. Pak, the NK officer in charge of interrogation, who reportedly inflicted abnormal cruelties upon his POW victims. Prisoners were sent to "Pak's Palace" on a selective basis and usually did not

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

remain there for any extended period of time (usually one or two months at the most). The center had no fixed internal organization, and the number of prisoners interned there at any one time probably ranged from 30 to 50.

Since the mission of "Pak's Palace" was interrogation, this activity occupied most of the waking hours of the POWs who had been sent there. However, although there were no regular work schedules,[20] POWs who were not being interrogated were sometimes assigned to housekeeping details, and, according to one returnee, processed POWs were put to work digging air raid shelters for the center.[21] The same source reports that the daily routine went roughly as follows:

Dawn	Rise
0800	Breakfast
0900	Interrogation or details
1200	Dinner (sometimes only two meals a day)
1300	Interrogation or details
1600	Supper
1700	Some interrogations (no details after supper)
2100	Lights out

This schedule was not inflexible and was occasionally changed according to the progress of the interrogation.

POWs at "Pak's Palace" were quartered in one building; the number in each room varied from 7 to 13.[22] Newly arrived prisoners

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were isolated from old inmates, and the security and control at the installation was maintained by NK guards who lived outside the center in nearby Korean houses. The center itself was surrounded by a barbed wire fence a little over six and one-half feet high, which contained a guard tower and one entrance.[23]

Living conditions at "Pak's Palace" were described by one returnee as reasonably good,[24] but it is also probably true that individual treatment depended to some extent upon the progress of each individual's interrogation. Prisoners were fed two or three times a day,[25] and the food was reportedly adequate, at least in quantity.[26] Standards of personal hygiene were probably slightly higher than those which existed in the temporary camps, since returnees have stated that water could be heated for washing and that the POWs were permitted to go to the creek every morning to wash.[27] It was also reported that the prisoners were issued a small amount of Korean soap for this purpose. In contrast, however, is the situation reported by a former internee who states that, at one time, when there was a shortage of bowls and spoons, several POWs had to share the same utensils without the opportunity to do more than lick them off before they had to be passed on to a comrade.[28]

Section III - Camp Life and Routine in the Permanent Camps

Housing Conditions

POWs were usually quartered in what had once been Korean

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homes. These buildings varied somewhat in their size and in the number of rooms they contained, but they were usually rather small (one returnee reports that in Camp 1 the houses were between 24 and 30 feet long, 12 feet wide and 14 feet high)[29]. The houses were usually of frame construction with walls of mud and roofs of straw or slate. The inner ceilings, which were fairly low, were made of paper (often newspaper), an item that also served as wallpaper for the inside walls when it was available. The floors of these houses were of clay, beneath the floors were pits in which during extremely cold weather, fires were built. These fires were usually permitted for only a few hours in the morning and late afternoon and ordinarily constituted the only source of heat available to the POWs.

One returnee states that, when this "hot floor" method was used, the clay floors sometimes became so hot that some of the POWs stuck their stocking feet out into the snow to cool them off and froze their toes in the process. This caused their feet to sting more fiercely than ever; but even though they cautioned each other about it, some continued the dangerous practice[30]. Apparently, in windy weather, the houses were cold even when the floor was heated. However, on cold days the POWs did not find the rather crowded conditions objectionable, since with body heat they helped to keep each other warm, especially when they slept huddled together at night on the floor.

There were a few exceptions to the above conditions, including

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a schoolhouse with wooden floors at Camp 2, some concrete storehouses, and some log buildings constructed by POWs at Camp 2 in the latter half of 1952.[31] Some POWs were apparently able to construct home-made stoves of mud and red bricks for heat. These stoves, using wood and coal dust for fuel, required constant repair, and were usually torn down during the summer and rebuilt when winter returned.[32]

Most of the camps had no electricity during the early stages of the war, but, as time passed, power lines were installed, with the result that the POWs were provided with a small amount of electric light. There was usually never more than one dim bulb in each room, however, and this was generally inadequate for reading purposes. (The POWs did their reading in the libraries or recreation rooms where the lighting was better.)

There was apparently a dearth of fire-fighting equipment in most of the camps. One former POW states that the only items of equipment available for fighting fires in Camp 1 were chow buckets, and that in the event of fire, POWs would fill the buckets with water from the well and carry them to the fire.[33] Another states that there were no instructions or equipment for fighting fire in Camp 5, and that, on one occasion, the 2d Battalion headquarters building burned to the ground before a small, manually operated fire pump arrived from outside the camp.[34]

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2. Personal Hygiene

Sanitary facilities were never provided in abundance in the POW camps, nor were sanitation projects heavily stressed by either the Chinese or the POWs. However, the resultant insanitation ameliorated somewhat after the summer of 1951. The Chinese camp authorities intermittently attempted to cleanse POWs of lice and vermin[35] and to enforce certain sanitary regulations,[36] but such improvements as the construction of latrine facilities were accomplished largely through POW initiative. One notable exception occurred shortly prior to repatriation, when the CCF arranged for Korean carpenters to construct a fly-proof, rock-lined latrine for POWs at Camp 2. (One returnee surmises that this belated attention to sanitation resulted from fear of a camp inspection by the International Red Cross.)[37]

During the early days at several camps, slit trenches served as latrines. These were supplanted by what were described simply as "unenclosed latrines" improvised by the POWs. Unless Korean farmers appropriated the contents for use as fertilizer, the POWs cleaned and emptied their own latrines.

Inspections of quarters were held periodically by the Chinese, who often checked personal cleanliness in the process. At some camps inspections were held at regular intervals, sometimes weekly, but reports indicate that sanitary conditions always remained far below average U.S. standards.[38] At Camp 2, in late 1951, according

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

to one source, there were no camp rules on personal cleanliness because the POWs kept themselves cleaner than the Chinese.[39]

For washing facilities the prisoners were usually forced to use the nearest available spring or stream; there were, however, cases of better conditions, as at PYOKTONG, where, in June 1951, spigots were installed in the company area.[40]

Until 1953 toilet articles were conspicuously scarce at most camps, although there were occasional issues of soap, towels, toothbrushes and toothpowder. These articles were distributed quite freely during the summer of 1953 at some camps. Cloth ditty-bags containing complete toilet kits were issued at Camp 2 in the spring of 1953,[41] and during the last year at PYOKTONG it is even claimed that there was a surplus of soap and toothpaste.[42]

Many POWs grew beards during the early period since razors were generally unavailable until 1952. Some of the POWs manufactured their own razors from pieces of scrap metal. (At Camp 1 it was discovered that metal blades from boot heels served well for this purpose.)[43]

Barbers were unavailable to POWs during the first year of their confinement, possibly due to lack of equipment, since several later commenced operations in various camps with supplies issued by the Chinese. By November 1952 a POW barber was established at Camp 4,[44] and soap for shaving purposes was issued to him regularly. Haircuts were given quite frequently in other camps by both POW and

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Chinese barbers. Razors, mirrors and other barber equipment were issued to each company at Camp 5 in 1952.[45]

3. Work Details

Work details constituted a major part of the POW's daily activity. Included among these were wood-gathering, ration breakdown, construction labor and other less frequent occupations, such as burial parties (common, however, during the mass deaths in early 1951), water-carrying, K.P., and labor not related to camp maintenance but performed for the benefit of the Chinese and North Koreans, such as harvesting and road repair.

The most common detail was wood-gathering; each camp frequently dispatched parties to the surrounding countryside to gather firewood for use in stoves, open fires, and in the heating fires beneath the earthen floors. These fires consumed wood rapidly, and consequently details had to be dispatched often and in considerable strength. From the larger camps POWs were usually sent out in parties of 100 or in company strength, and seldom over five miles from camp. Usually the jobs involved only the transportation of loose brushwood or timber already cut. Most camps imposed a certain quota for each wood-gatherer, and some even offered incentives for fulfilling or bettering the quotas.[46] Several sources mention an instance of voluntary labor being rewarded when the Chinese desired some logs removed from the YALU for firewood.[47] Volunteers were solicited

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

with the promise of sake as an incentive. Those who responded were given about a half a pint of sake after completing the detail.

These and other work details were sometimes used as a punishment for prisoners sentenced by the Chinese for infractions of regulations. In such cases the hours were longer and the work was carried on continually. Company 3 of Camp 2 was a "hard labor" company for "uncooperative" or "recalcitrant" POWs who had been sent there for punishment after being sentenced by CCF courts. From this company, wood details of squad size (about fifteen men) regularly cut down trees for firewood and carried them about two miles to camp. Their quota was from 30 to 40 trees a day.

At Camp 1 each detail was assigned a wood quota of 2500 caddies for each three-week period. One caddy was estimated as containing eighteen pieces of wood; thus, in the usual company-sized detail (200 men), sent out two or three times a week, each man carried between 24 and 36 pieces of wood. This wood detail usually took about two and a half hours. In the summer of 1953, wood-gathering details were replaced by a four-man party which loaded a truck with logs from the YALU River twice a week.

All camps had work which could be included under the general title of Ration Breakdown. Camps located on the YALU Riverr such as 3 and 5, dispatched parties of POWs to unload supplies from barges and carry them up to the camps. Other details carried rations from supply dumps or camp warehouses to company messes. Although most

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of the rations unloaded from YALU River barges were transported to Company 3 of Camp 2 by oxcart, enough was left behind to insure that the hard labor group returning to camp would be well-laden.

Labor for construction was supplied by prisoners in many camps. This sort of work consisted of clearing ground, hauling logs and dirt, digging ditches and bunkers, repairing existing buildings and constructing new ones. These projects took place only occasionally. Camp 2 constituted an exception to this rule, for it was continually being reorganized, and had, as a consequence, much construction and repair continually in progress. Here the usual work schedule consisted of five to seven hours a day for six days a week.

Burial details occurred only occasionally, except during the mass deaths of early 1951. During this earlier period, burials were performed by squadmates of the deceased and were almost daily events.[48]

Ditch digging and general labor were occasionally assigned as a punishment at Camp 1. At Camp 2, Company 3 - the "hard labor" group - "make-work" projects, such as digging and filling up holes, were performed around camp when more essential work was not to be found.

As work could be assigned by way of punishment, it could also be withheld as a reward for co-operation. At Camp 5, when compulsory indoctrination was concluded and a voluntary study program introduced, members of Company 1 who participated in the program

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

were excused from details. It would appear that certain "Progressives" were also allowed greater freedom from labor than were their fellow POWs, but because of conflicting reports, the degree of favoritism exercised cannot be accurately determined.

For the majority of the POWs, whatever work they did was aimed at upkeep of the camps, and the spartan conditions of camp life did not create very serious labor problems in matters of supply or maintenance. The prisoners were not used as laborers for the CCF or NKs as a general rule. Furthermore, the preclusion of any over-emphasized work program was fairly assured by the requirements of the Chinese "lenient policy" - indoctrination, sports, and "normal" activities. (See Chapter 7, this report, for fuller explanation of "lenient policy.")

4. Recreation

Apart from indoctrination and work details, recreation claimed most of the POWs' active time. No sports equipment was issued by the Chinese in appreciable quantities until late 1952 or 1953; meanwhile the more sedentary games predominated in the early stages, since it was easier to improvise homemade cards, checkers, and chessmen than bats and baseballs.

The poor physical condition of the POWs during the early months of confinement also precluded any extensive efforts for an active sports program; even so, team sports were started with the construction

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of baseball and football fields and basketball courts long before any equipment was issued for these sports. By the summer of 1951 frequent inter-company basketball games were played at Camp 5 on a court in the Company 1 area. A series was commenced between the Chinese and the POWs of Company 1; however, as soon as the POWs recovered from their ill treatment of early 1951, they began to win from the Chinese so consistently that the games were called off. A softball field was also constructed at Camp 5 during 1951. Camp 4 had football and baseball fields and a basketball court in an area readily accessible from Companies 1 and 2, while Company 3, across the YALU River, possessed a basketball court of its own. At Camp 2, Company 1, the prisoners made a basketball court in July 1952; Company 4 set up a volleyball court in February 1953.

Basketballs and soccer balls were among the first items issued by the Chinese. The British at Camp 5 were issued a soccer ball as early as the fall of 1951 and were allowed to play on a suitable field in PYOKTONG until a field was cleared in camp in the spring of 1953.

For those POWs who preferred less active sports, the Chinese opened company clubrooms at most camps and gradually provided them with a fair selection of games such as chess, checkers, cards, etc. A camp library was established at Camp 1. At Camp 5 the cessation of compulsory indoctrination heralded the distribution of more equipment and the furnishing of clubrooms with improved recreational

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

facilities.

By the summer of 1953, the POWs at almost all the main camps could fully participate in all the major active U.S. sports, including badminton, at Camp 2, and boxing and ping pong at Camps 4 and 5, and in a variety of other games in the company recreation rooms, including pool and monopoly at Camp 5. During the day, prisoners from most camps could swim in the YALU, combining exercise with bathing.

Camp 2 was less favored in its recreational system than most of the others. The internees were allotted less time for recreation - about two periods a week - even after the indoctrination period ended. Despite this restriction, they played volleyball, softball, basketball, and soccer, swam in the YALU River and had access to cards and ping pong equipment. The personnel of Company 3 were isolated from outside contacts until they were permitted to send a basketball team to play Company 1 in May 1953. The 3d (sergeants) platoon of the same company was denied any recreation except on Thanksgiving and Christmas.

The Inter-Camp Olympics, held at PYOKTONG from 15 to 26 November 1952, became the high point of the POW camp sports program. Each of the main camps and ROK POW Camp 7 dispatched a team of athletes, and the entire affair was extolled by the Chinese and the "Progrssives" as epitomizing the "lenient policy" and Chinese good fellowship.[49]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRIG NARS, Date 4/11/90

> At all times the co-operation, generosity, enthusiasm and selfless energy displayed by our captors was perfect and left nothing to be desired. The lenient treatment policy has long ago passed its title of "lenient," it has instead become a "brotherly love" treatment for every one of us. (Inter-Camp Olympics 1952; POW Camps Administration, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, PYOKTONG 1952.)

The pamphlet quoted above, written by "Progressives," states that the number of athletes on the assembled teams totaled 500. Of these, it is known that Camp 2, with a total population of around 500, mostly officers, sent about forty men, while the contingents from other camps may have been larger. The POWs selected for the Camp 2 team were released from work details a week before departure and were given augmented rations. The same practice undoubtedly prevailed at other camps. At PYOKTONG the participants in the Olympics were issued sports uniforms and were even fed meat and given wine and beer. Hordes of CCF and POW photographers covered the event.

The Games opened with the symbolic lighting of the Olympic torch and a parade of the athletes with massed colors, marching to the musical strains of "World Democratic Youth," "The March of Friendship" and "Defending World Peace." The master of ceremonies addressed the athletes before the commencement of the games with the usual slogans concerning "friendly relations on an international basis."

The list of games included all types of track and field events -

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

football, basketball, softball, volleyball and soccer - as well as other contests in boxing, wrestling, gymnastics, tug of war, and a physical training exhibition. Camp 5 emerged the winner, followed by Camps 1 and 4, in that order. Token prizes were awarded to teams and individuals. (See special publications sponsored by CCF entitled Inter-Camp Olympics - Document Library, G2, DA.)

Despite the claims of "friendly relations," the POWs representing different camps were separated from one another in the bleachers, and the officers at Camp 2 were billeted at a distance from the enlisted men. Although most POWs suspected the Olympics would be a propaganda vehicle for the Chinese, all relished the opportunity to leave camp and contact other prisoners, and very few raised any objection to participation in the games.

Other entertainment at the camp level included moving pictures, stage shows, band music, dances, bingo, and musical broadcasts. Some of these affairs were uncolored by communist propaganda, but others were conducted on a basis at least as obvious as the Olympics. The latter category included movies, CCF and NK entertainment troupes, and some of the POW plays and stage shows.

Returnees from all camps allude to the occasional visits of Chinese acting troupes and the periodic presentation of films. The entertainment troupes offered song and dance routines and short plays, most of them containing an educational slant. Some of the topics acted out by visiting companies included "The Slaughter of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the ROK Army," "Loyal NKA Fighters," "Eisenhower Assists Syngman Rhee," "NKA Captures Americans," and "Americans Want Only to Love Korean Women and Are Afraid to Fight the NKA."

Movies were shown two or three times a year at each camp, and, like the touring actors, they presented a definite message, as indicated by some of the titles:

Emergence of China under Mao-Tse-Tung

Russian Victories at the Olympic Games

Waste of U.S. Supplies by Chiang Kai-Shek

Personalities (Howard FAST, Paul ROBESON, William Z. FOSTER, V.I. LENIN, J.V. STALIN)

Modern Cotton Mills and Good Working Conditions in the U.S.S.R.

Meeting on the Elbe (showing Russian troops battling the Germans while the Americans waste time)

and a short film showing a U.S. officer shooting a Korean woman. Despite the obvious propaganda content, the POWs enjoyed the movies as a relief from the dull round of daily activities, seldom absorbing the instruction or understanding the dialogue, which was in Russian, Chinese, or Korean and was repeated to them by an interpreter.

In addition to Communist-produced entertainment, the POWs themselves were encouraged by their captors to present amateur theatricals. Many prisoners became enthusiastic supporters of such programs at first, but when camp authorities and "Progressives" began to influence the character of the shows, their zeal waned. Among the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

plays presented were: Bacteriological Warfare, "Korean War, "Over a Hundred Generations, and, "Oppose the Separate Peace Treaty with Japan. The last-named drama, written by a POW at Camp 5, was performed at Camp 5 and at Camp 3.

Communist ideology did not intrude into musical activities to a great extent, but some songs considered conducive to propaganda treatment were slanted. The Chinese organised song-fests at many camps on May 1st, August 1st (Chinese Army Day) and October 1st (Chinese Revolution Day); at Camp 5 the camp authorities organized a regular singing program from March through October, 1951, with intercompany competition. The songs included Communist classics (translated into English):

The Internationale

Workers Unite for Battle

Motherland

topical and national Communist songs:

Cross the Yalu River

We are Youth

Stalin

Mao Tse-Tung

Kim Il Sung

and American songs altered by "Progressive" POWs:

Deck of Cards

Take Me Out of Korea (to the tune of Take Me Out to the Ball Game)

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The Farmer is the Man (to the tune of The Farmer in the Dell)

Other music sponsored by the Chinese, who sometimes distributed instruments to the POWs, included a hill-billy band which played music over the public address system at Camp 1, a music group at Camp 3, and a band at Camp 5, which also played over the PA system. These activities actually began in 1953, since instruments were not issued prior to this time. Camp 4 held the distinction of being visited by a CCF band which also entertained at the Inter-Camp Olympics.

5. Sex, Perversion, Narcotics and Liquor

The severe confinement of life in the compounds led to frustration of normal sex tendencies, depression and boredom among the POWs, and these reactions eventually gave rise to practices not uncommon to prison life, such as perversion and use of narcotics. However, the degree of credibility to be ascribed to certain POW reports must be tempered by the knowledge that much of the information furnished by the returnees was gleaned from sex discussions among the POWs, during which stories were possibly exaggerated.

Though it is difficult to estimate accurately, reports suggest that the frequency with which POWs experienced sexual relations with Korean women was very limited. Some sources indicate that local females could be approached successfully in exchange for such items of value as watches, food, or clothing, but the number of prisoners

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/95

attempting such meetings or the methods by which they avoided discovery cannot be determined. No reports state that any prostitutes were provided for the POWs. One source from Camp 5 claims that some prisoners swam across the backwaters of the YALU River to Korean houses on the other bank where women could be found;[50] others said that women frequented the hills where POWs were sent on work details.[51] Scattered reports suggest that "Progressives" had access to female interpreters, or that the Chinese occasionally arranged for girls to attempt to seduce prisoners and then scream "Rape!" at the crucial moment, signalling the Chinese to intervene and haul the offender off to jail.[52] POWs at Camp 4 were reported to have easily seen through this scheme.[53] At Camp 3 a house of prostitution supposedly operated near Company 1 for the benefit of the guards, but the POWs themselves had no access to it. Several sources claim that near Company 6 of Camp 5 there were some CCF or NKA female personnel, either air raid wardens or Headquarters "WACs," who were accessible to POWs for items of barter.[54] Another report says rendezvous were held by POWs from Company 1 with Korean prostitutes from a local brothel near a pig pen on the edge of the compound.[55] A "Progressive" who worked "downtown" was reported to have asked the Chinese for permission to marry a CCF female interrogator; this request was apparently denied, and he was returned to his company.[56]

In the absence of access to members of the other sex, some POWs felt obliged to achieve sexual gratification through various

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

acts of perversion, references to which appear in several reports.[57] At Camp 3 there were apparently three habitual homosexuals whose activities were thought to be continuations of sex habits acquired before capture. In addition to these, the pressure of circumstances, aided by "professional" encouragment, induced some 25 to 30 other POWs to become part-time sodomists.[58] Camp 5 allegedly contained three habitual homosexuals who were fairly well known and 23 who practiced occasionally. One returnee lists nine persons who indulged in homosexuality, including two who he said were "married" by the camp authorities.[59] Another source claimed that a British POW was sentenced to two months in jail for trying to "rape" a fellow prisoner,[60] and an officer-returnee states that the Chinese themselves told him that many acts of perversion had taken place among the POWs.[61]

In the realm of narcotics, the prisoners soon discovered hemp or marijuana growing wild, and they began surreptitiously to gather the leaves, dry them and then roll them into cigarettes. However, no figures are available for the number of POWs indulging in this vice. Marijuana traffic at Camp 5 apparently got under way in the spring of 1952. Marijuana was obtained also by trading with civilians; at Camp 2, Company 3, this became a steady source of procurement, and POWs there also traded soap and rice for marijuana with the company's NK barber. A source at Camp 3 claimed that 70 per cent of the POWs smoked the "loco weed,"[62] while another said that the Chinese issued tobacco which contained 10 per cent marijuana.[63]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Neither of these reports seems especially credible, but both suggest that there was considerable use of the weed.

At Camp 5 it was also mentioned that narcotics other than marijuana, i.e., morphine and opium, were sometimes used. POW medical corpsmen were reported to have saved and later bartered with the morphine from the medical kits in their possession at the time of capture.[64] One source, avoiding detail, states that a few POWs were given opium,[65] while another returnee describes French POWs from Company 4 making opium from poppies growing wild in the fields.[66]

Although these reports of sexual incidents and narcotics usage are not, for the most part, mutually substantiating, they are the only evidence available; they are also almost all in agreement on the prevailing Chinese attitude toward these practices. Chinese authorities consistently prohibited POWs from approaching Korean women, and whatever liaisons were effected occurred without their approval. They also formally discouraged activities relating to sexual perversion, although their repressive actions seem to have been largely perfunctory. On one occasion a Chinese instructor delivered a long lecture on the evils of "punking," eliciting much derision from the POWs when they at last comprehended his recondite terminology. The CCF attitude toward marijuana-smoking was similar; they formally opposed the practice, although no suppressive tactics were instigated. One POW was even told to go ahead and smoke, but not to recruit others into the habit.[67]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

In 1953 some ingenious POWs at Camp 3 effected another diversion from the monotony of camp daily life. Using available materials and either stolen or accumulated rations, such as flour, sugar, potatoes and potato peels, they constructed and commenced the successful operation of a still. The mash was allowed to ferment for 15 days prior to distillation; the makers termed their product "excellent."

Section IV - POW Reactions to Daily Life

POWs captured during 1950 and up to the summer of 1951 experienced extreme mental depression as well as physical suffering. The period was characterized by extreme apathy on the part of the internees. Isolation from familiar surroundings and routines and the feeling of helplessness engendered by their incarceration, coupled with such physical factors as malnutrition, exposure and neglect, produced despondency and dejection of spirits. One returnee states that many prisoners, concerned merely with day to day survival, sat all day watching what went on around them; the lack of activity seems to have made them edgy and accelerated their vigilance. However, although several reports indicate that POW mental attitudes declined to a point where many lost the will to live, it is impossible to ascertain how much this general depression affected the mortality rate, especially in view of the abundant physical causes.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Those who survived the rigors of early 1951 began to recover mentally and physically during the summer of that year, as camp conditions improved and malnutrition declined. At the same time, the Chinese became more active in their indoctrination efforts and introduced a propaganda campaign designed to induce their prisoners to accept communist political beliefs. Some tried to avoid the issue by withdrawing into sports, non-political activities or religious preoccupation, but even these, in order to be assured of non-interference, made outward submission to the Communist programs. Those taking refuge in anonymity had to attend lectures and study obediently in the days of compulsory indoctrination, sign peace petitions, and attend and discuss Bacteriological Warfare exhibits.

Others, for the sake of efficiency and POW welfare, or perhaps merely for something to do, co-operated with the CCF in the mechanics of running the camps. These had to display at least a politically neutral attitude in order to be allowed to work. Certain cooks and some committee members in this category volunteered for their jobs, hoping that the Chinese would let them do their work without introducing political ramifications. The cooks were usually unmolested, but committee members were often used by the Chinese for propaganda purposes. Once chosen, none of these men could easily resign their appointments without displaying an obvious reactionary attitude.

Minor functionaries, such as squad and platoon leaders, were usually appointed by the Chinese, although sometimes they were

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

elected by the POWs, In any case, these jobs were accorded no political significance by the CCF and involved little compromise by the nominees.

Still other POWs who joined in escape attempts or subversive groups antagonistic to indoctrination often refused outright to participate in Communist-inspired programs. Despite occasional surface appearances of co-operation, the attitude of these POWs amounted to complete rejection of all communist authority and indoctrinational overtures. Various ingenious devices to upset the Chinese were contrived by reactionary-minded POWs. A typical one occurred at Camp 2 in late 1951 or early 1952 during the intensive indoctrination program of the CCF, when a number of the POWs decided to inaugurate a "Crazy Week." Without warning or explanation, they suddenly seemed to go mad. Some walked around the compound escorting, kissing and fondling imaginary ladies; others "rode" around on imaginary bicycles and horses; one POW clipped his hair into an Indian warlock and performed a war dance around the camp, later appealing to the political instructor for protection on the grounds that he was an Indian and thus one of the minority groups which the Communist claimed to protect. The actions during "Crazy Week" thoroughly confused the CCF, and they temporarily abated their program.

On perhaps a less reactionary plane, the POWs at Camp 2, sometime after the spring of 1952, surreptitiously organized classes covering various subjects including electricity, practical mechanics,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

chemistry, physics, shorthand, mathematics, engineering and several languages. These courses continued until repatriation and were organized with the purpose of providing the POWs something to occupy their minds. It was felt by one source that many of the POWs derived considerable educational advantages from them. There were also classes in navigation, including celestial, conducted with a view toward escape and evasion. The Chinese were apparently unaware that these classes were held regularly, but occasionally there were attempts at suppression in the form of confiscation of students' notes. Classes were generally held in small groups of two to fourteen, since any larger than this were regarded as prone to discovery.

The Chinese employed an assortment of control techniques to eliminate all sources of authority from their own command and to regulate activity by the POWs in accordance with communist-ordained policy. To achieve this, they enforced segregation by rank, nationality, race and tongue, and firmly encouraged the POWs to disregard their former military status. This policy tended to undermine disciplinary ties among U.S. personnel and minimized the possibility of subversive organizations which could be guided through military chains of command. In addition, the Chinese acted promptly to discourage internal organizations formed by the POWs to promote escapes, reactionary activities, or even religion and good-fellowship. Members of these groups were exposed by informers in most cases and were often penalized by the Chinese for their participation.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Along with active measures to suppress individual and group resistance, the Chinese also tried to divert and distract the energies of the POWs by keeping them at work, study and recreation. In general, this succeeded fairly well, since no activities dangerous to Communist control ever developed to significant proportions. All escape efforts from the permanent camps failed, and no anti-Communist organizations managed to evade Chinese notice sufficiently to carry out effective action. However, the positive aspect of the CCF program - that of indoctrination - apparently did not succeed in a material way (at least according to surface indications). Most of the POWs, especially after the spring of 1951, proved unwilling to accept communist ideals or renounce their own, even to escape Chinese harassment.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 12

FOOD

Section I - Introduction

This chapter, dealing with food conditions in the POW camps of North Korea, is presented as a factual summary of such subjects as sanitation, distribution procedures, POW struggles to cook unfamiliar victuals, augmentation of diets from outside sources, and political leverages developed from the food shortage.

Sources of information on food conditions are widespread among the returnees, providing a reasonably sound basis for general documentation. Considerable material, however, has been taken from the report of one POW, who, having been an Army mess sergeant for many years, was familiar with food service techniques in general and was able to record far more detailed observations in this field than was the average returnee. The possible fallacy of relying overly on one informant is fully appreciated; however, there are important areas in the subject of food not covered by other reports but developed in plausible detail from this source.

Section II - Food Issued En Route From Point of Capture to Areas of Permanent Confinement

When they were first exposed to it, most American POWs found Chinese food unappetizing and perhaps even sometimes repugnant.[1]

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NND 869210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/98

But even though the Chinese rations continued to seem distasteful to many POWs, the food offered them was apparently as nutritious as anything the CCF ate in the forward areas and probably was all that the Chinese had to offer.[2] An instance reflecting POW sentiments toward Chinese cooking occurred at midnight on the day one particular group was captured. The men were furnished a meal of fishheads and rice in the form of a chowder, which the Chinese had procured from the North Koreans. The POWs were invited to consume as much as they desired and to eat with any available utensils, but although all were admittedly hungry, few men even tasted the food.[3]

Most POWs described the provisions they were issued during their northward march from their points of capture or collecting places to the permanent camps as thoroughly inadequate both in quantity and quality. One man relates that rations, issued to his group only twice a day, consisted of millet and corn, and that the latter, although occasionally boiled, was sometimes raw, cracked field corn.[4] Another source received nothing until three days after capture, when he was furnished half-cooked corn and melted snow-water. He was thereafter fed twice a day on a diet of mush, cracked corn, millet, soybeans and occasionally rice. On the march to "Death Valley," in December 1950, food mainly consisting of millet, whole corn, rice and hot water was prepared at certain points ahead of the main body of the POWs and issued when they arrived, on the basis of one bowl per man.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Although many of the POWs were impressed with the deficiency of their marching diets, several state that their rations were similar to those issued to the guards who accompanied them. One prisoner described the basic fare of both himself and his captors as consisting of millet, rice, boiled corn and sorghum. Another, who fared better, relates that his group and their guards on the march to SINUIJU, from 6 December 1950 to 15 December 1950, received rations which included rice, pork, beef, and potatoes. Other conflicting reports, however, maintain that, at times, POWs received less food than either their captors or their guards while on the march.

The dearth of eating utensils also hampered the American POWs at this stage of their captivity; many of the men had thrown away their mess gear previously. As a result, the POWs often ate with their fingers and used a helmet, piece of tin or a cap turned inside out for a receptacle.

During this rearward march phase, many POWs stole as much food as they could from the North Korean farmers along the route. The Chinese confiscated this food whenever they discovered it, but apparently did not punish POWs who were caught doing this.

The extreme degrees of hunger suffered by the POWs are well illustrated in several accounts of voracious devouring of quasi-edible morsels which would have been loathsome under normal conditions. For example, it is reported that, sometime in April 1951, a group of three or four men were given dried fish, which they ate

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

completely, bones and all, although they themselves describe the fish as "smelling horribly."[7] At P'YONGYANG, after having existed on a diet of millet, corn, and kaoliang, another group was twice issued dog meat; not only did they find it palatable, but they offered to eat as much of it as could be made available.[8] Indicative of the deficient quantity is the report that, in February 1951, a single bowl of bean paste was shared by an entire group of approximately 30 POWs.[9]

During their journey northward to areas of permanent confinement, some groups of POWs and their captors subsisted on food prepared by the civilian population. This was occasionally arranged through the political advisor or instructor in charge of the group, who would requisition food prepared by the Koreans and pay for it when the group departed. In one case it is reported that a body of prisoners were fed by civilians all the way from their assembly point to the temporary camp at "Death Valley." These meals were usually served at 0800 and 1700 hours and consisted mainly of cracked corn, millet and 3/4 of a canteen cup of pork broth.[10] Four of the meals consisted of half-cooked corn kernels; but otherwise Korean civilian meals were described as quite edible.

This was substantiated by the conclusions of POWs returning from the interrogation center at "Pak's Palace," whose groups halted at restaurants on the way to PYOKTONG. The NK officer in charge, who paid for the meals, ordered soup, rice, and millet, with "Kimche."

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

This food was far better than their usual fare and it was considered a treat, although the prisoners believed the NK major pocketed the difference in cost between the average meals and the millet meals he bought them.[11]

At PYOKTONG, in November 1950, a few POWs were fed by civilians for several days, with rice and dry fish added to the diet. Meals generally consisted of a bowl of cracked corn, millet or rice, made into a mushy soup, with fish served twice a day.

At "Death Valley," the food situation apparently remained as perilous to the POWs as it had been on their march northward. This installation was named by the sufferers themselves, one squad of whom once kept the body of a deceased POW in his barracks for three days so that rations could be drawn for him and shared among them.[12] Direction of the cooking was assumed at first by the Koreans, but in a short time the POWs were permitted to cook for themselves. "Death Valley" was declared by some to be the first place where the American POWs received less food than their guards. Each POW building there had an attached kitchen where the food was prepared. The daily diet of 400 to 600 grams was composed of corn, millet, sorghum, soybeans, and bean paste.[13, 14] Extra rice and pork was provided by the Koreans on New Year's Day, 1951, as a special supplement.

Section III - Organization of Cooking Staffs and Personnel

During the initial stages of POW confinement, the North Korean military services occasionally directed cooking, as at "Death Valley"

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

in November, 1950. Although the Communists retained the supply function, the task of the food preparation was soon given to the POWs. POW food handlers volunteered or were detailed by their captors from time to time, usually working under the supervision of a Communist-appointed POW mess sergeant.

According to one source, the Chinese exhibited a calculated preference for employing unskilled cooks in the kitchens.[15] In Camp 5, Company 4, from February 1951 to April 1953, this policy was vigorously enforced by the Communists, who refused to place people with cooking experience in kitchen work. Many diseases as well as dietary deficiency, could possibly have been averted by more experienced mess personnel. Incompetent cooks failed to wash the corn properly or remove the husks which may have caused much of the diarrhea then prevalent. They frequently overboiled the rations, destroying essential vitamins so sorely needed. Drinking water was also served unboiled.[16]

In several instances, an experienced U.S. mess sergeant volunteered to cook but was denied the position by the Chinese. Even after the POW cooks were supervised by Chinese mess officers, the same sanitary problems stemming from lack of experience prevailed. Later, beginning in July 1951, a few more experienced cooks were permitted to work in the kitchens of Camp 5, and cooking staffs listened to suggestions and improved the food by taking the advice of POWs with cooking experience.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Mess personnel were generally volunteers with the exception of the POW "head," equivalent to a U.S. mess sergeant, who was selected by the Chinese. Positions were retained for indefinite periods, usually until a man desired to be relieved from this duty. Occasionally a Chinese cook was appointed as "head," and POWs would select from their own ranks the men to assist him. Men often volunteered to work in the kitchens to relieve the monotony of life in the compounds.

The duties of the "heads" consisted of supervising the preparation of food, drawing rations from the Chinese QM officer, and assuring an equitable distribution to the squads.

K.P. rosters were organized more informally than under the normal Army procedure. K.P. selection was always handled at squad level. Often there were volunteers, but otherwise assignments were made on a rotational basis, two men from each squad being selected daily. The primary duties of the K.P. consisted of peeling potatoes, cleaning pots and pans, and assisting the bakers and cooks. They usually received no remuneration or increase in their diet for performing these tasks. The prisoners consumed their meals either in their respective quarters or outside, weather permitting; after mess, one man from each squad was usually detailed to wash the squad's dishes. This detail ordinarily lasted a week, the method of selection depending on the squad members; if they did not agree, the individual members of each squad washed their own dishes.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

Beginning in August 1952, the Chinese adopted a more receptive attitude toward proposals relative to the food situation, but unfortunately this occurred after many men had already died from disease or malnutrition. At Camp 2, Company 3, in March 1953, M/Sgt. Richard ARTESANI, an experienced mess sergeant, was questioned by his Chinese commander as to how the food could be improved. He replied that much could be done but that discussion seemed useless since his many prior suggestions had been ignored and he had never been allowed to cook. To his surprise, he was appointed mess sergeant on the spot, superseding the U.K. incumbent, and allowed to replace immediately several cooks whom he considered incompetent. The commander then introduced a new mess policy, embodying a "hands off" attitude by the Chinese, which allowed POW cooks far greater latitude in their kitchen duties. This innovation boosted morale, and, eventually, both the quality and the sanitary state of the food were improved immensely. Other returnees give high praise to this mess sergeant whose initiative instigated these reforms.

Section IV - Preparation of Food

There were several factors to consider in the POW kitchens; the food was inadequate; it was often disease-laden; the POW mess personnel were mostly inexperienced; there was no central authority among them; sanitary supplies and techniques were notably absent; the Chinese rations were strange to the POWs and their preparation

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

required experimentation, all of which produced arguments. It should occasion little surprise that food prepared under such circumstances infected most of those who consumed it for any length of time with various diseases.

Diarrhea, co on in most camps from the beginning, apparently affected the entire population of Camp 5 in mid-January, 1951. One returnee states that POW cooks in the "Valley," in November, 1950, failed to wash the corn and left some of the husks. These, being undigested, may have caused the diarrhea. It is certain they caused discomfort and bleeding in passage.

Men unscathed at the time of capture apparently endured the ravages of this diarrhea more successfully than the wounded or the sick. One source suggested that if the latter had been accorded any extra consideration by POW cooks at the expense of the healthy, many deaths could have been prevented. The cooks could perhaps have introduced a liquid diet, but in general all men were treated alike. M/Sgt. ARTESANI's chief suggestions included placing the sick on a liquid diet and introducing strict water purification; he felt that discipline might have been maintained by stationing men in the kitchen to safeguard the welfare of all and by more vigorous enforcement of water purification by the senior officers and NCOs. Orders to boil all water before use were issued at the "Valley" and at Camp 5 by two POW doctors, but shortly thereafter there was no one present to enforce these commands because the POWs were segregated by grade

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

by the Chinese, thus destroying the chain of command.

The issue of boiling out vitamins became the subject of much POW discussion. One point of view was purportedly represented by certain medical officers (POW doctors) who informed the cooks that it was imperative that they boil all vegetables to prevent diseases arising from the human feces used as garden fertilizer. On the other hand, M/Sgt. ARTESANI maintains that not only did the POW cooks consistently overboil the food, but the process of boiling it all en masse served to delete some of its preciously few vitamins. He felt that the correct procedure was to get the water boiling first and then to add the ingredients. At Camp 5, Company 4, it was the custom to chop up the fresh vegetables, adding rice or other grains, and to cook all the issued foods in a meatless soup. Sgt. ARTESANI tried to persuade the cooks to serve all the vegetables raw, to preserve the vitamins. In January 1952, the POWs still suffered from night blindness and the cooks heeded his suggestions, serving raw vegetables, obtaining what ARTESANI believes were beneficial results. They peeled off the outside layers and put them in the soup pots to be cooked and boiled, leaving the insides to be served raw.

The POWs often improvised their own cooking methods in order to attain the most efficient utilization of the food. The cooking oil furnished by the CCF for inclusion in the soup was often used to make corn patties, doughnuts, baked bread, french fried potatoes

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

and cole slaw. Some was saved so that it could be included in soup for the sick. This plan weakened the soup for the healthy men, but it provided them with a much-needed variety of solid foods.

At Camp 5, Company 4, juice was extracted from soybeans after they had been cooked and fed to those who needed a liquid diet; the bean pulp was then used in the regular soup.

Another improvement occurred at Camp 2, Company 3, when the cooks ground the salt down and issued it so that each POW could salt his food to his own taste. Previously the rock salt had been put directly in the soup.

At Camp 5, Company 4, the POWs were issued three-quarters of a canteen cup of sugar every ten days from November 1951 to August 1952. Frequently, they used this to make candy. After they had scorched the sugar, they would cook it, place it in balls, and allow it to harden. The finished product was similar to caramel.

During the early months, acting from desperation, the POWs obtained food in any way possible. A ROK POW, for example, climbed a tree and stole three magpie eggs from a nest. He and two U.S. POWs made an omelet from which they obtained only one spoonful apiece.

20

The Chinese practiced severe supply economy to prevent wasting of food. Rigid enforcement sometimes led to the extreme of distributing tainted, pre-cooked food with fresh rations. An outstanding example of this occurred at Camp 5, when in July 1952, rumors

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

persisted that a medical team would inspect the camp. The Chinese issued an order that sanitation regulations were to be enforced strictly and that no food could be thrown away. The prescribed punishment for offenders was deprivation of rations for two days. Since, under the order, even uneaten food could not be discarded, unconsumed servings had to be collected and reissued even though they had become tainted.

The recaptured escapees, reactionaries and other offenders who occupied the numerous jails were not always fed as well as the remainder of the POWs. For example, in Camp 5 reactionaries awaiting transportation to a new camp were fed on half-rations constituting half a bowl of rice and egg plant, with a little steamed bread twice a day. At Camp 2, Company 3, from 14 August 1952 to April 1953, an enterprising POW mess sergeant attempted to improve the rations of the men in prison. They were restricted to a rice diet, but regular food was smuggled in to them concealed under the rice, accompanied by an enclosed directive to burn or destroy any excess amount, rather than return it to the mess hall.

A spirit of co-operation developed among the POWs in many camps as the period of their captivity lengthened. The men readily consented to contribute various individually issued items to the cooks to be used for the benefit of all. In Easter of 1952, the men in Camp 2, Company 3 were issued two eggs each, which they agreed to entrust to the kitchen staff which cooked a small quantity of them

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

in omelet form for persons needing special diets. The majority of the eggs, however, were used to make cakes and pies. In the same camp, the POWs also contributed half their individual sugar rations for doughnuts and pies, and each man donated one of the two small bowls they were issued by the Chinese. In these bowls were placed the daily "specials," which included cakes, pies, doughnuts, custards (made from potatoes and eggs), ginger bread and slaws.

In several cases, attempts were made to formulate special diets for the sick. Through exchanges of notes in lunch baskets, a POW cook would be notified which men needed a liquid diet, of which ginger milk always formed an integral part. Ginger grew wild in Korea and was always issued in plentiful quantities. (Note: No information is available as to why it was not issued to the sick during the earlier "starvation days.") To produce milk, ginger bulbs were ground up and permitted to simmer in boiling water until all the flavor had been extracted into the water, at which time sugar was added.

Only in one instance does there appear any description of a separate mess for hospital patients. M/Sgt. ARTESANI was given such a responsibility for a period beginning about May 1953, and for this there was made available to him a small private kitchen. He was never permitted to enter the isolation ward of the hospital; the Chinese always carried the rations in to these patients. When extremely sick patients needed special dishes, ARTESANI made them

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

in his private kitchen, but the regular hospital diet continued to be prepared in the main camp mess hall. The diet for the sick was described as fairly nutritious. Other rations issued to this special mess included tomatoes, lettuce, beef, eggs, apples and green vegetables. ARTESANI was able to furnish soft diets to some men in the prison and to those in the billets who were not hospitalized but were nevertheless too sick to eat hard foods. He continually overestimated the ingredients needed, received more than he actually used for the sick, and donated his surplus to the main camp mess.

21

Section V - Distribution, Ration Breakdown and General Supply

Procedure

The distribution of food was handled in most camps by selected squad representatives who collected their squad's rations at the kitchen before each meal. On rare occasions, if any surplus remained, second helpings were given. The ration bearers from each small unit carried buckets for the soup and wooden boxes in which to carry the rice to their huts or squadrooms where it was apportioned by the squad leader. Complaints over the division of the food were very infrequent. Some items were often distributed individually. After November 1951, each POW at Camp 5 received approximately five spoonfuls of sugar twice a month.

22

Consolidated kitchens for platoons or companies were established by the Chinese as early as the spring of 1951, but no change occurred in the system of meting out food by squads. The system was different

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

during the early days of captivity, when individual portions for each man were sometimes parceled out in the kitchen. In fact, at Camp 5, the prisoners were not fed by squad until May 1952, at which time squad leaders took over from the cooks the function of individual distribution. In the first days of Camp 5 the cooking itself was handled by individual groups in their own huts.

Mess sergeants or officers placed in charge of the kitchens worked with Chinese QM specialists in administering ration breakdown at company level. Describing this process, a former POW mess officer at Camp 2, Company 1, relates that at 1700 hours each day he contacted the Chinese QM representative and drew the next day's issue of rice or flour. Food supplies were stored in a building which was also used by the CCF as a billet. Vegetables, seasoning and the rare luxury of canned meat were not entrusted to the POWs overnight, but were drawn on the morning of the day they were to be used.

In the opinion of many of the returnees, the Communist POW command was generally dependent on normal CCF supply services. The YALU River constituted a much-used medium for transportation of food and clothing. This transportation system necessitated the assignment of a certain number of barges to each camp; the responsibility for their operation was vested in the CCF camp personnel who also supervised the process of unloading by the POWs.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Section VI - Cooking and Eating Utensils

Lack of cooking and eating utensils caused great inconvenience to the POWs and wakened many hidden talents for improvisation. The experienced POW cooks used field expedients to arrange their messes as nearly as they could to comply with (regular) army standards, and they manufactured implements when none were available. Though some POWs concealed G.I. eating utensils when captured, most had none, and in the early stages of the conflict, few were provided by their captors.

Implements used by the POW cooks for baking were often improvised from available resources. Methods of field expediency produced almost all the equipment possessed by the POWs for concocting cakes, pies, doughnuts and other pastries. At Camp 2, Company 3, during the period from 14 August 1952 to April 1953, two ovens were constructed from fifty-gallon oil drums and a brick fireplace. The drums, with their bottoms extracted, were placed horizontally along this fireplace, and tin shelves were constructed inside them to hold baking pans. These latter were built from old vegetable cans, which were cut in half with a C-ration can opener and pounded down to the size of a pie or cake pan. Brushes for the oiling of pans were made of bristles from slaughtered hogs. However, despite this equipment, supplies were limited, and the source of this information states that doughnuts were baked and served only twice during the period mentioned. Occasional variations were noted. At Camp 4, after August 1952,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

each man was issued a six-inch steel dish for vegetables, an enamel-coated, three-inch dish for rice, and a Korean-style bronze spoon.[24]

Cooking utensils available at Camp 5, Company 4, during the period from January to March 1951, consisted of only two fifty-gallon pots, each with a wooden paddle to stir and portion out the soup. Necessity having prodded their ingenuity, the POW cooks and their assistants gradually devised an assortment of utensils from scrap iron, wood, and waste materials, to meet their needs.

To manufacture knives for cutting meat, pieces of iron were pounded down to a cutting edge and rubbed against stones until their edges were keen. Spatulas were constructed from cut-up oil cans, the tin being attached to a wooden handle. Soup ladles were carved from white pine, as were knives and forks. Meat cleavers were contrived by grinding down scrap iron shaped in cleaver form. Vegetable graters were made by punching holes in the tin from a number 2½ can and attaching it to a piece of board. Vegetable bins were constructed after the type used in army field messes.

Section VII - Sanitation

The dearth of proper facilities, attendant CCF indifference, and a combination of apathy, neglect and inexperience among the prisoners in the early stages of internment caused the POWs to be surrounded by unsanitary conditions in both the preparation and the consumption of food.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Impure drinking water constituted a major problem. Many returnees felt that the absence of a disciplined policy toward boiling and purifying drinking water contributed greatly to the outbreak of diarrhea. One source states that unpurified drinking water was consumed at Camp 4, Company 3, as late as two months prior to the "cease fire" date, 27 July 1953; the Chinese, up to this time, had issued only one small chlorine bottle to the company medical corpsman which could be replaced when it was returned empty.[25]

Diseases arising from filth became prevalert in warm weather. During July and August 1951, at Camp 5, Compary 4, POWs ate flies and mosquitoes with their food. At times they were allotted only forty-five minutes to eat, and their rations were infested with more insects than they could extract in this time. The Chinese introduced odd schemes of extermination - at one time requiring each prisoner to carry fifty dead flies to the kitchen before he received any food. However, it is said that flies were so plentiful that one could brush his hand along the mess hall wall once and catch almost 100. Due chiefly to the inexperience of POW cooks, unsanitary procedures sometimes were prevalent during the preparation of meat, according to M/Sgt. ARTESANI.[26] The meat used in the soup was unappetizing because the cooks failed to cleanse it of animal hair and other foreign matter which clung to it.

On the other hand, in this same camp, the prisoners did seize the initiative by removing a slaughter area which had been located

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

only a few feet from an outdoor soup kitchen. A new boarded area apart from the compound was constructed for the slaughtering; pots were erected to heat water used in scrubbing the carcasses, which were carefully cleansed of all hair and foreign matter. About the same time, the soup kitchen was rebuilt with a rain-proof roof, and cheesecloth was tacked around it to keep out the flies.

Occasional sanitation drives were instituted after the men attained better health and were willing to improve conditions. The latrines were moved away from the water supplies and the mess halls, and screens were erected to exclude the flies. In general, unsanitary procedures involved in the preparation and consumption of food were a constant threat to the lives and health of the POWs.

Section VIII - Procuring Food From Outside Sources

There are several accounts of POWs buying, bartering or stealing items with which to supplement their rations. Success in trading with the enemy population varied according to the vigilance of the guards, the availability of barterable objects, the demand for these items, the audacity of the civilians, and the degree of Chinese condonation. Though never officially countenanced, trade flourished at some camps, while in others POWs who exhibited enterprise in this field were severely punished.

The chief goal in these transactions was food, but the POWs were often handicapped by a scarcity of goods for which the North Koreans would trade. At times only rings, fountain pens and sweaters

DECLASSIFIED
NND 869210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

were acceptable; on other occasions, other items of clothing could be traded. Men who worked on barge-loading details attained considerable success. Though forbidden to fraternize with civilians, they did so when the guards were lax and exchanged toothpaste, combs, etc., for Korean food and tobacco.

In some camps this unauthorized trade was apparently not as clandestine as the POWs believed. Shortly before they were transferred, a group of prisoners at Camp 12 were ordered to help themselves from an ox-cart containing almost all the items of clothing they had previously bartered to civilians.

According to a few sources, POW cooks in several instances were guilty of selling food to the men. The POWs of different camps occasionally engaged in inter-camp trading for victuals and other valuables; one account relates that U.S. POWs made surreptitious purchases, in the spring of 1951, of millet from the Turks at Camp 5.

The pronounced shortage of food in all the camps produced typical black market activity. Men who were able to steal or obtain extra food by some other means sold it to those who had managed to conceal money during and after capture. During the period from January to June 1951, eggs cost 10 dollars apiece at Camp 5. Chinese "tailor-made" cigarettes were 20 dollars a carton, matches brought from five to ten dollars a box, and watches sold for anywhere from 50 to 500 dollars. Marijuana and sulfa drugs could be

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

obtained for even higher sums. The primary currency used in these transactions consisted of Military Payment Certificates.

Although stealing from civilians was forbidden, the POWs often obtained peppers, cucumbers and field corn from nearby Korean farms. In several of the camps, after the winter of 1951, the Chinese permitted the POWs to cultivate garden plots. At Camp 3, in the summer of 1951, the prisoners initiated this themselves by stealing seeds from the kitchen. Another group of POWs, at Camp 12, spent most of their daylight hours in the spring of 1951 tilling gardens at SAMSAN-DONG on the south side of the TAEDONG River; however, insects ate most of their plants and the group moved again in June, before the crops could be harvested. At Camp 5, in the summer of 1952, the inmates were allotted garden plots, and the POW cooks used the produce to augment regular rations.

Only twice are circumstances described in which the Chinese furnished official sources from which the POWs could procure extra food items. In July 1951, a small PX was opened at Camp 5 where the POWs were permitted to purchase candy, cigarettes, and small items of food with chits they received after turning in their American dollars to the Chinese. This PX remained in business for a week and then ceased operations as soon as its objective was accomplished - to drain off all the American money the POWs had been hoarding. The only other case where the Chinese offered supplementary rations occurred at PYOKTONG in the summer of 1951. The Chinese announced

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

that they could accept North Korean money, American greenbacks, or silver, in return for which they would purchase certain types of food and other items in Manchuria. They collected the currencies and the silver, and about a month later produced the requested items. A dollar purchased about forty-two eggs; other articles obtained included socks, thread, matches, candy, sugar, and tea.

Section IX - Food On Special Holiday Occasions

Holidays were regarded by the Chinese and North Koreans as important occasions. It is significant that both U.N. and Communist holidays were honored. The purpose behind these gestures remains uncertain, but some of the POWs felt that the Communists may have sought to impress their captives as part of a subtle indoctrination process. Others imply that to smooth POW indoctrination, the Communists purposely left unmolested many of the cultural, traditional, and non-political patterns of the POWs. This policy was perhaps expected to evoke gratitude from the prisoners. Some of the POWs feel that their captors, through these celebrations, were giving an object lesson in "peaceful co-existence."

There are many instances where extra rations were distributed on holidays. On Soviet Revolution Day in October 1952, and on Thanksgiving and Christmas of the same year, POWs at Camp 2, Company 3, received a special menu of boiled rice, plums, pork, chicken, eggs, and pastry. At Christmas they also received apples, a bottle of beer apiece, and a carton of cigarettes per squad.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

On holiday occasions at Camp 12, such as Korean Independence Day and Thanksgiving, the prisoners were furnished a few small scraps of meat, steamed dough, and, once, a loaf of coarse brown bread the size of a hamburger bun. Another source relates that special meals, which at times included an ounce of sake, hard candy, eggs, hams, chicken and pork, were served on the following holidays -- Christmas 1951, St. Patrick's Day, Easter, and July Fourth, 1952, and on Chinese and Korean holidays during September and November 1951.

At Camp 1, in 1952, special meals were distributed twice, once on Christmas and once on Chinese Army Day (called PLA Day); food on these occasions consisted of pork, canned fish, several vegetables, and even beer. Apparently nausea frequently ensued, since the food was too rich for the weakened digestive systems of the POWs.

At Camp 4, Company 3, sake was received on three or four different occasions, including New Year's Day and several Russian and Chinese holidays. The sake was issued to platoon leaders in tin buckets and was then distributed to the squad leaders, who divided it among the individual men.

The Chinese used eggs on several occasions for Easter Day festivities. In 1953 they staged an Easter egg hunt at Camp 2 on a hillside near the compound; one POW concealed three dozen eggs which were enthusiastically hunted by 300 of his fellow POWs.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

At Camp 5, meat and cigarettes were issued on Easter Day, 1951; it is perhaps not entirely coincidental that this occurred simultaneously with the commencement of the indoctrination period. Christmas at Camp 5, in 1951, provided the occasion for a "feast;" chicken, potatoes, gravy, greens, candy, tea and coffee were provided for the consumption of the prisoners. POWs at Camp 5 received similar meals on other Chinese or American holidays.

On Thanksgiving Day, 1951, at Camp 12, a small selected group of POWs were accorded a "feast" consisting of a small quantity of pork and other unusually varied food items. This occasion constituted a real treat for the men, since they were furnished chairs, tables, sheets for tablecloths and floral decorations.

The only other available account of unusual festivity came from a source whose celebration was unique. On the day he was to be shipped to KAESONG for repatriation, each squad in his company of POWs was issued a bottle of wine, beer, or whiskey to celebrate the cessation of hostilities.[28]

Extra holiday rations were apparently financed from monthly appropriations; after each holiday meal, rations for the next few weeks usually were reduced until the deficit was restored.[29]

Section X - Use Of Food For Indoctrination and Propaganda Purposes

On Easter Day, 1951, at Camp 5, meat and cigarettes were issued when the indoctrination program was introduced, and regular rations

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

were increased during this period.

Opinion differs as to the extent of the preferential treatment accorded "Progressives." Some who applied themselves to programs conducted in the camps were given parties and received such extra emoluments as tailor-made cigarettes and a ration bonus. However, several reports indicate that preferential treatment for "Progressives" often included only a very small increase in rations and an insignificant amount of cigarettes or other articles. One source states that rations in his compound were identical for both reactionaries and "Progressives."

It was frequently noted that both the variety and quantity of the food fluctuated according to the progress of the Peace Talks. The Chinese countered this observation by claiming either that the food supply depended on the availability of markets or that the irregularity was caused by American bombing of supply areas, roads and bridges. Despite this, POWs claim that they learned to judge the progress of the Peace Talks by the amount and quality of the food they received. If the negotiations progressed favorably to the Chinese, rations were good.

Occasionally, promises of extra food were used by the Chinese to elicit co-operation from the POWs in transmitting items of propaganda. In June, 1951, the Chinese prepared a "Peace Appeal" to the United Nations, which was signed by the majority of the prisoners at Camp 5.[30] The men reportedly annexed their signatures for two

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

reasons: one, to inform U.N. authorities that they were alive, and two, because of the promise of better food.

Section XI - General

A majority of the returnees felt that their diet was entirely inadequate, especially until the summer of 1951. Figures show that a substantial number of POWs died from malnutrition. The period from January to April, 1951, was referred to by occupants of Camp 5 as the "Death Period;" over 1200 men died during this
31
time. The hospital overflowed with men suffering from lack of food, and many died because in their hunger and misery, they lost the will to live.

It has been suggested that other factors contributed to this situation, such as the practice of trading food for cigarettes, but it is difficult to conceive of these as dominant causes of the food shortage.

When the Chinese first introduced a sports curriculum, they were apparently disappointed to find their charges too feeble from malnutrition to engage vigorously in any games. The prisoners were fed so poorly that they were in a constant state of exhaustion.

In comparison with CCF, NKA, and North Korean civilian rations, however, the POWs, by their own testimony, may not have fared too badly. Consideration should be accorded the fact that Chinese and North Korean troops were accustomed to subsisting on less food than U.N. personnel were.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

By comparison with their captors' rations, POW food improved by stages until it was rated by one source, at Camp 5, Company 4, as often better than the victuals issued to the Chinese soldiers and decidedly superior to those eaten by the North Korean civilians.[32]

Chinese field rations were usually adequate in quantity but often deficient in quality, as evidenced by the high incidence of beri-beri among the Chinese troops. The barley product contained in CCF rations in Korea compared favorably to its U.S. equivalent. However, millet grown in the U.S. is not usually consumed in an unadulterated state, as in the Chinese manner, but is processed to yield starches and miscellaneous dextrines and dextroses. Chow mein (not to be confused with the popular American restaurant version) was another dietary staple of the Chinese troops that has been rated as a product unacceptable to the American palate. It is composed of a fine, granular mixture of cereal grains, ground flour, beans, corn, milk, and salt, processed by baking, and consumed directly or mixed with hot or cold water to form a gruel.[33]

The Chinese were not unaware of the fact that malnutrition and starvation pervaded the POW camps and that the U.N. countries knew this. In November 1951, they arranged a lecture at Camp 5, explaining Col. HENLEY's report on deficient food in the prison camps. This document had been presented in Washington before the Senate, charging the Chinese with treating the POWs like cattle and systematically slaughtering them by denying them food, contrary to

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the rules of the Geneva Convention. At this lecture, the Chinese denied the report and explained that the food had been deficient because of the bombing of supply routes. However, meat and vegetables at Camp 5 became more abundant immediately following this incident; the calory content of soups was increased, and there was more variety and a greater amount of food.

Several returnees declared that the inadequacy of rations existed because the CCF did not make any effort to procure food for the POWs. It is a matter of record that food conditions improved almost universally after the summer of 1951. Rumors even persisted in the summer of 1951 that the North Koreans wanted to release the POWs because of the amount of food they consumed, but that they were overruled by the Chinese.

Any attempted analysis of dietary deficiencies must take into account the difference between the food standards of the POWs and their captors. Doubtless, Chinese supply officers could little conceive that their captives' ordinary rations would constitute a feast to the Chinese soldier, and that, conversely, Chinese combat provisions, rated at well over the subsistence standard by the Communist QM, would scarcely keep the American POWs from starvation.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 13

CLOTHING

Section I - Introduction

The purpose of this presentation of clothing conditions among the prison camps of North Korea is to provide a detailed picture of POW habiliments and other QM-type equipment which the internees used during their confinement. The scope of this summary encompasses the entire period of hostilities, from the early days of great shortages in 1950 and 1951 up to repatriation, by which time clothing issues had been augmented to a degree that contrasted considerably with their former scarcity.

It is felt that a fairly accurate record of documentation has been attained on this subject, since sources for the information have been numerous and, in many cases, mutually corroborative. Almost all returnees interviewed could supply relatively complete data on their own wearing apparel.

The basic components of the summary include a discussion of confiscations and permitted retentions by POWs of their U.N. clothing, comparisons between U.N. and Communist-issue uniforms recorded by the POWs themselves, and detailed descriptions of garments issued by the Communists. Interwoven and simultaneously considered with these topics is the ubiquitous question of just how much privation

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NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

POWs were forced to endure from clothing shortages, and how sufficient they considered the garments issued them. No idea is entertained of developing any conclusions other than factual on these subjects. Majority conclusions among the POWs as to certain facts or issues are presented as such; in cases where documentation of statements is not manifold, appropriate indication has been made.

Section II - Confiscation of U.N. Uniforms

The degree of confiscation to which POWs were subjected in regard to their clothing and other personal articles varied considerably from one individual case to the next. Most dispossessions occurred immediately after capture, at which time the captors, often guided by their own individual needs, decided just how much U.N. clothing and equipment their prisoners could retain.

The POWs were rarely stripped of all their garments, since their captors were usually unable to provide complete replacements in the front lines. Thus, even when their own uniforms were worn, torn and almost unwearable, the prisoners were often forced to use them indefinitely for periods running from weeks to months. Instances are few where the Chinese or North Koreans issued any clothing to the POWs until the latter had reached permanent or semi-permanent areas of detention miles behind the lines. By the time the captive U.N. personnel arrived at these locations, their garments were often in tatters.

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The Communists usually appropriated such items as watches, wallets, identification tags, ID cards, and money from their prisoners immediately upon capture.[1] The prisoners sometimes concealed these articles from the probing searches of their captors; at other times the investigations were more superficial, and valuables could be secreted without the use of great deception. The number of Military Payment Certificates circulating in the compounds attests the cunning of the POWs in this regard.

Some cases have been recorded where prisoners were permitted to retain their U.N. uniforms throughout their internment,[2] but usually, when the Chinese and North Koreans issued clothing to their captives, they confiscated all U.N. material which the prisoners possessed. One of the exceptions to this rule occurred at Camp 12, where, in June 1951 at least, the POWs refused to use the complete NKA uniform issued them, preferring to wear a mixed uniform, part U.S. and part Korean. This hybrid attire was intended to eliminate the onus or "sting" of wearing Korean clothes.[3]

Almost all the prisoners wore their U.N. clothing without benefit of Communist issues or additions at least as late as the spring of 1951. Later, when full issues of clothing by the Communists became common, any other item of clothing which had not been issued by the Chinese or North Koreans was confiscated. If prisoners attempted to conceal any unauthorized articles, they were punished.[4] The only frequent exception to this rule involved

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

combat boots, which the POWs were often permitted to retain.

Section III - Clothing Shortages and Comparisons with CCF Uniforms

The shortage of clothing in the POW camps was not as generally pronounced as the shortage of food, but it nevertheless constituted a major source of discomfort to many of the prisoners throughout their confinement. The initial distributions of Communist garments designed to replace tattered uniforms were delayed in most cases until the spring of 1951. By this time many prisoners had been confined for months, and their clothing had deteriorated to such an extent that they employed extreme expedients to garb themselves. Black marketing in clothing broke out at Camp 5 in the spring and summer of 1951.

The situation was remedied somewhat when worn-out U.N. apparel was permitted to be exchanged for Chinese and North Korean uniforms in most camps during or after the summer of 1951. Both winter and summer issues were eventually distributed, the lighter clothes being worn under winter garments in very cold weather. But a broad dimensional disparity between occidental and oriental physiques often prevented the POWs from attiring themselves in the uniforms provided by their captors, and sometimes resulted in the wearing of mixed uniforms.

The North Korean uniforms apparently were constructed of very light material, poor in quality and loosely sewn. The POWs eagerly

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NND 867210
By BRD NARS, Date 4/11/90

exchanged them for Chinese uniforms whenever possible, since the latter were warmer and of better quality.[6] At Camp 3 the prisoners were all issued Chinese clothing, blankets and tennis shoes in return for the Korean uniforms, and pronounced the new clothes to be a great improvement.[7]

POW garments were similar in style to the CCF uniforms, but the latter were constructed of better quality material. In addition, CCF troops were issued a special type of winter underwear which afforded them added protection from the cold, and they were furnished more durable footwear than the POWs.[8] CCF winter clothing for 1951 included quilted overcoats, jackets and trousers, leather and canvas fur-lined boots, summer uniforms to be worn under the quilted clothing, and a hair-lined cap.[9] For warm weather, the CCF ordinarily received as many as three summer uniforms.[10]

U.S. Army sweaters, field jackets and overcoats were declared extremely valuable in cold weather, since they provided considerably more warmth than their Chinese equivalents.[11]

Most of the clothes received by the POWs at Camp 1 in the middle of 1951 lasted barely a year, but the Chinese issued no new clothing until the end of 1952. Socks were the first articles to wear out, and new ones were improvised by the POWs from comforters, overcoat linings, or odd bits of clothing.[12] A piece of cotton cloth approximately a yard square was sometimes issued to the prisoners as foot wrapping.[13]

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

For repairing minor tears and rips in clothing, POWs could often procure needles and thread from company headquarters. Needles were also obtained, at Camp 5, from the Turks, who regularly stole them from the Chinese.[14]

In regard to clothing, few instances of CCF favoritism toward "Progressives" have been noted. In one case, a POW received a suit of cotton padded clothing as a reward for acting as interpreter for a North Korean major, but, in general, clothes did not constitute as ready an inducement as candy, food, or cigarettes.[15]

According to the consensus of POW opinion, the quality and quantity of clothing issued the prisoners by the CCF must be estimated as superior to that of the North Korean civilians, slightly better than the quality of raiment worn by the North Korean Army, and equal or slightly inferior to the type of uniforms used by the CCF.[16] This comparison does not necessarily indicate that the internees were well accoutered according to their own standards.

Section IV - Distributions of Uniforms and Accessories

En route from points of capture to areas of permanent confinement, the vast majority of POWs received no formal issue of garments from their captors and few incidental donations. Stray instances occurred where odd sets of clothing were contributed to replace tattered pieces of U.N. uniforms, but these constituted the exception rather than the rule. One POW states that he was furnished

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

a straw mat to sleep on and two old padded coats to use for covers, which he carried along with him through various places of internment until he reached his permanent camp.[17]

The first occasion upon which a regular issue was made to POWs occurred during February 1951 at Camp 12. The internees were provided with a set of long underwear, which included a long-sleeved undershirt and long drawers which tied at the ankles and were secured at the waist by a drawstring.[18]

Most regular distributions of Communist uniforms commenced during June or July of 1951 and were continued thereafter, at more or less regular intervals, varying according to the policy of the individual camps. The first complete set of North Korean uniforms was issued in June 1951 and included a khaki shirt, underwear, cap and high-cut tennis shoes. The latter came in sizes too small for the feet of many POWs. In October 1951, some winter-type, cotton-padded NKA uniforms consisting of a jacket, trousers and padded cap were provided, but these were denounced by the recipients for being constructed of light, poor quality material which was loosely sewn.[19]

The first big allotments of clothing distributed to the POWs during the summer of 1951 were comprised, for the most part, of regular Chinese summer uniforms. Though duplications of articles seldom were found in these issues, thus denying the POWs a change of clothing, they were quite complete and generally outfitted each

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NND 867210
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man from head to foot. The basic outlay generally contained blue cotton trousers, a blue cotton shirt, socks, tennis shoes, underwear, a towel and a cap.[20] Other items issued during June and July 1951 (in some camps) included worn blankets, bars of soap, additional sets of underwear, white cotton shirts, canteen cups and metal bowls.[21] The same blankets were, in most cases, kept right up until shortly before repatriation, when the Chinese ordered them thrown away and issued new ones.[22]

In many cases the POWs were permitted to retain their summer clothing during the winter months even after winter uniforms were distributed. Many used the summer clothes for underwear, although by this time they were well worn.[23]

During the succeeding summers, a larger amount of clothing and accessories was distributed to the prisoners. In the summer of 1952, at Camp 5, POWs received two complete sets of Chinese uniforms, double the previous year's issue, although only one pair of summer sneakers was furnished.[24] A source at Camp 2 asserts that, on returning their winter uniforms in the spring of 1952, his group was issued two sets of summer cotton blues, two pairs of unpadded tennis shoes and another set of underwear.[25] Razors and barber equipment were issued at Camp 5 in the spring of 1952, along with ten bars of soap and a tube of toothpaste per man. The latter was expected to last three months. One returnee claims that, by the time he departed from Camp 5 in August 1952, he had accumulated an entire

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

barracks bag full of clothes and accessories.[26]

In 1953 summer issues were even further augmented. Some men received three sets of each item, and at Camp 5 mosquito nets, wooden combs, fountain pens and notebooks were issued to each POW and a mirror was furnished each squad, according to one report. Another complete issue of summer clothing was distributed in April 1953 to supplement what the prisoners already possessed. During the last week prior to repatriation, the POWs were allowed to exchange their comforters and blankets for the first time.[27]

Basically, the winter uniforms issued to the POWs by the Communists strongly resembled their summer counterparts. The outer clothes contained cotton-filled lining,[28] and the entire wardrobe usually consisted of one winter-type padded suit, one overcoat, one towel, one pair of heavy tennis shoes, one comforter, one pair of padded gloves, one sleeping pad, cotton underwear and socks.[29] The comforter was made out of cotton in the form of a quilt. The tennis shoes were heavier and of a more durable type than the summer models and were usually cotton-lined.[30,31] The prisoners were also usually allowed to use their summer uniforms as underwear when it was extremely cold.[32]

In several cases winter uniforms apparently were not distributed until after the winter of 1951-52, during which POWs wore their U.S. Army clothes. These were confiscated in the summer of 1952.[33] But, according to the majority of sources, winter clothing and equipment

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

was received in most camps during the late fall of 1951. To acquire these garments and accessories, the POWs had to turn in all U.S. Army clothing and, in several instances, articles they had been issued by the Communists for wear during the summer.[34]

When spring arrived, the internees were required every year to rip their winter uniforms apart at the seams and wash and dry these clothes thoroughly before returning them to the Communists. This was done so that they could be sent back to China for repairs, repacking and reissue.[35] Overcoats represented the only pronounced exceptions to this routine.

By the summer of 1953, the Chinese apparently expected an armistice and proceeded to empty their warehouses. At Camp 5, tailor-made cigarettes and matches were issued, and toilet paper was placed in the latrines. Old comforters that had been distributed in 1951 were turned in for new ones. New OD mosquito nets and a poncho-type raincoat were issued to every man, and two food buckets, 2½ gallons in size, and two wash pans were issued to each squad leader.

On 19 August 1953, the day the POWs left Camp 5 for repatriation, the Chinese furnished them with unlimited quantities of tailor-made cigarettes. By this time the Red Cross had supplied each man with three cartons of American-made cigarettes, so the POWs distributed all the Chinese cigarettes they had accumulated to the Korean civilians.[36]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Most POWs were forced to wear their Communist-issue clothing and carry their new blankets to the places of repatriation.

All sick and wounded U.N. personnel were returned wearing almost identical clothing when repatriated. Their outer garments were blue in color and consisted of a quilted overcoat, light weight cotton pants, jacket and cap. They wore undershirts and shorts of a white cotton material. They had also been issued canned beef, beer, wine, soap, towels, toothbrushes, dental cream, candy, and cigarettes just prior to repatriation.

Section V - General

Shortages of clothing supplies for the POWs attained their most critical stage during the first year following the outbreak of the Korean war. After that, the availability of wearing apparel may be described as passing through evolutionary phases quite parallel to those noted in the food situation. However, the general tenor of opinion among the returnees leaves the impression that, during their confinement, the POWs suffered considerably less from insufficiency of clothing than they did from lack of food.

In the early days of the fighting, clothing issues appeared to be haphazard at best and for the most part non-existent. The general intention of the Chinese in the initial stages appears in the main to have been limited to the furnishing of CCF uniforms only to those POWs whose own clothing was in tatters or infested

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

with lice....and even this was done only when the Communists had extra garments available. Otherwise, the prisoners were marched northward in their original clothing and issued Chinese uniforms after arriving at permanent cantonments.

As the number of prisoners declined through malnutrition or disease, and as Communist supply lines consolidated, clothing issues began to assume a more regular pattern. After 1951, some uniformity was attained by most camps in their distributions of Communist uniforms to replace U.N. garb. Garments were furnished the POWs in most camps either two or three times each year, reaching an average yearly total of approximately three outer shirts, three pairs of shorts, three pairs of socks, one quilted uniform, and two summer uniforms.

There were few instances of political ramifications attached to clothing distributions, although some improvements seemed to coincide notably with the fortunes of the Peace Talks. In general, clothing issues seemed to depend primarily on availability, and few of the returnees have criticized their captors for actual negligence or intentional mismanagement in this regard.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 14

MEDICAL TREATMENT

Section I - Introduction

In the course of an analysis of medical treatment afforded U.S. prisoners of war during captivity in North Korea, it must be borne in mind that technological developments in oriental nations are generally far behind those in the western world. Some techniques of treatment are basically oriental in origin and stem from practices which have been used among Asiatics for many centuries. Though the western world may view such techniques as being only slightly above the level of witchcraft, they are nevertheless an integral part of the oriental culture and philosophy. A primitive setting such as found in Korea made even the best efforts of the enemy to provide medical care seem crude compared to the standards to which the westerner is accustomed. In attempting to evaluate the medical treatment afforded our POWs, thought must be given to the enemy's degree of sincerity in giving treatment as well as the caliber of treatment based on the means available.

The source material upon which the analysis was prepared includes the various Prisoner of War debriefing reports. Report of Conference with Repatriated POW Personnel, Medical Corps,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

U.S. Army, dated 1 December 1953, prepared under the supervision of the Office of the Surgeon General U.S. Army and Technical Intelligence Bulletin, issue #30, Headquarters United States Army Forces Far East. The latter sources have been of inestimable value inasmuch as the medical observations contained therein were made by medical personnel whose observations are deemed both objective and accurate.

Almost every POW in Communist captivity required medical treatment at some time during internment and a very large proportion did receive treatment to some degree. The purpose of this analysis has been to study the many hundreds of reports of those experiencing medical treatment, in order to derive the common factors and generalizations which tend to form a pattern. Any general pattern must then be correlated with the time element to trace the progress and changing conditions of medical treatment throughout the internment period. It is immediately apparent that medical care did not remain static during the period of internment but underwent a considerable transition throughout the Korean Operation and it is logical, therefore, to organize the material in this report chronologically. It has not been the purpose of this study to analyze the detailed technical aspects of medical care administered to POWs but rather to present a factual account from the layman's point of view.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Section II - Treatment During Evacuation

1. June-October 1950

Within a matter of days after the commitment of the 24th Infantry Division (4-5 July 1950) in support of the South Korean Army, United States military personnel had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The initial assembly point of 24th Division POWs captured by the North Koreans during the first several days was located at PYONGTAEK, South Korea. This group contained about 200 captives, many of whom were wounded, several seriously.

During movements between intermediate collecting points, the captives were afforded no medical treatment for their wounds, and some of them treated each other from their respective aid kits to the maximum extent possible. While in PYONGTAEK, however, the North Korean soldiers supplied a basin, bandages, and antiseptic with which captured U.S. medical personnel were able to dress the wounds of those in need of such attention.

After a few days at this location the group - minus the wounded - began the march north toward SEOUL, arriving there on 19 July 1950. The wounded arrived a few days later. Here the captives were permitted to bathe and shave, and shoes were issued in some instances. From this point the POWs were taken by train to P'YONGYANG where the group was joined by more prisoners, swelling the number to over 700. At the assembly point in

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NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

P'YONGYANG, a North Korean doctor and pharmacist was assigned to care for the prisoners. A make-shift hospital was established, and one U.S. medical officer and five or six enlisted aid men who were part of the POW group worked with the North Korean medical personnel in caring for the prisoners. Daily sick call was held. Medical supplies were limited to aspirin, sulphadiazine, unidentified powders for dysentery, and a few dressings. Dressings had to be washed and re-used.

During this period two of the more serious cases were evacuated to civilian hospitals in P'YONGYANG. One of these, a severe leg injury, was taken to a 500 to 600 bed hospital in P'YONGYANG which treated both North Korean military and civilian cases. It was staffed by North Korean and Russian personnel. Surgical instruments observed were of old German manufacture and the surgical techniques were poor. The other POW patient was taken to the "North Side Peoples Hospital" in P'YONGYANG, a 200 to 300 bed facility, where a blood transfusion was given by a POW donor. The North Korean surgeon in attendance stated he had received his medical training in Russia.

Early in September 1950, this POW group was moved by rail to MANPO. During the course of the journey, medical aid was furnished to about 10 of the most seriously wounded by U.S. medical personnel. Three POWs died during the trip.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Upon their arrival in the MANPO-JIN area, the captives were housed in barracks where conditions were extremely crowded and facilities for heating were inadequate. A hospital was established in the prisoners' area; its staff consisted of the same NK doctor and pharmacist who had been at the temporary hospital near PYONGYANG. Only the most seriously ill and wounded could be accomodated in the hospital. The inadequacy of the living conditions soon became apparent; the most common cases reporting for sick call suffered from diarrhea, scabies, and lice. During the period between 11 September and 9 October 1950, 19 deaths occurred. One case of appendicitis was taken to the "North Side Peoples' Hospital" in MANPO-JIN, a 50 to 75 bed facility under civilian control. The U.S. POW medical officer was permitted to assist in the appendectomy. Again it was noted that the equipment was antiquated and sanitary measures were inadequate. The surgical technique displayed by the North Korean attending surgeon was rated fair. He stated that he had received six months' training in Russia. The diet of this POW group fluctuated considerably during the period, but did contain sufficient quantity and balance to prevent malnutrition and pronounced vitamin deficiencies.

With the intervention of Chinese Communist Forces in mid-October, 1950 the lot of this particular group of prisoners began to deteriorate rapidly. Food and housing became progressively worse. Finally, on 31 October, the entire POW group, including

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

the sick and wounded, began the "Death March" to CHUNGGANG-JIN. The group - already reduced to about 650 - lost approximately 100 more prisoners during the march. Though orders were given that the sick and wounded be carried, the weakened condition of the prisoners made this practically impossible. Many were without shoes; the food was increasingly bad and was provided haphazardly, usually only once a day; many went a day or more without anything to eat. A few nights were spent in the open without any shelter. The weather had become bitterly cold. Many POWs had developed dysentery and when they stopped to defecate they were shot. No medical care was available during the march.

Upon arrival in the CHUNGGANG-JIN area the group remained under North Korean control. The prisoners were quartered in mud huts, and hospital facilities of a sort were established. Two North Korean doctors were assigned to give medical care and later the following summer the POW doctor with the group was permitted to treat minor surgical cases. Medical supplies were very limited and malnutrition was severe. Four to five deaths occurred daily for several months. Sick call was held every other day by U.S. medical personnel who in turn advised the NK doctor, with the latter deciding on the treatment. An attempt was made by the prisoners to improve the sanitary conditions. Latrines were dug, clothing was boiled to combat the lice problem, and the POWs handled the preparation of the food.

One other move by the group was made in March, 1951, to a

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

location some 12 miles to the south, where the POWs were housed in old Japanese barracks; but it was not until July, 1951, that the condition of the prisoners showed any marked improvement. At this time the diet began to improve and efforts undertaken by the POWs to improve the sanitation were beginning to produce some results. By 9 October 1951, when the group began the march to permanently established camps, less than 300 of the original group of over 700 remained.

The medical treatment of this particular group of POWs has been related in some detail because it was the only large group over which the North Koreans exercised exclusive jurisdiction for a considerable period of time during the conflict, and it offers the best opportunity to study medical treatment under the North Koreans. This group remained relatively intact once it was ultimately formed at P'YONGYANG in early September, 1950, and its members experienced a different pattern of medical treatment than did those POWs who were captured in October, November, and December after the CCF entered the conflict.

2. Period of CCF Entry, October - November 1950 until August 1951

During the month of November, 1950, when the Chinese Communist forces entered the conflict in force, U.N. fighting men were captured in increasing numbers. Comparatively large groups of prisoners were collected at various points behind the enemy lines and

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

marched to holding areas pending the establishment of more permanent type camps. One such group, captured near KUNU-RI, was moved to a valley about 65 miles southeast of PYOKTONG. Because of the deplorable living conditions, the area was soon named "Death Valley" by the prisoners. Although the captives were taken by Chinese troops, they were turned over to North Koreans on arrival at "Death Valley." Of the hundreds of prisoners interned at "Death Valley," almost to a man they report the complete absence of any medical care by the Chinese while they were enroute to this point. During the march to "Death Valley," the weather was severe and many of the POWs were so poorly clothed that they were suffering from extreme exposure. The food provided enroute was poor but became even worse after arrival. Sanitary conditions were practically non-existent. Many POWs were so weakened by dysentery that they lost voluntary control over elimination. There was no way to clean soiled clothing and those so afflicted were obliged to live in filth.

The number interned at "Death Valley" ultimately rose to about 2,000. Among the prisoner group collected at "Death Valley" were several U.S. medical officers, two of whom were subsequently able to assist with medical care. A makeshift hospital was established soon after arrival. The hospital could not nearly begin to accomodate all those who required hospital care; consequently only those in the most dire need of hospitalization were removed to the hospital. Since those who were placed in the hospital were already near death,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

it was quickly noted by other prisoners that they seldom returned. The hospital became known among the POWs as the "Death House," and many who were in need of hospitalization were reluctant to go to the hospital.

Initially, the only medication available was Tanalbin, a Japanese product used in dysentery cases. In January, 1951, a small amount of sulphadiazine, sulphaguanadine and aspirin tablets, as well as a limited supply of antiseptics and a few bandages became available. During the course of internment at "Death Valley" it is estimated that all of the prisoners suffered from dysentery at one time or another, as well as from severe loss of weight; and all suffered from the cold to some degree. Prisoners were dying at the rate of two to seven daily during late December, 1950, and January, 1951, with a high of 14 deaths on a single day. The POW doctors as well as one North Korean doctor made the rounds of the sick and wounded who were not hospitalized, but they could do little except offer encouragement.

Many prisoners died as a result apparently of the sheer loss of the will to live. For the lack of a more accurate diagnosis, POW doctors listed these deaths as due to "give-up-itis." The symptoms were readily recognized. Under a severe siege of dysentery the patient would often become despondent and refuse to get up and move around. After a period of time the victim lost interest in eating, would refuse to take anything except liquids, and had a

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

constant craving for cold water. Extreme emaciation followed and ultimately the individual would develop a fixated gaze which POWs commonly called the "500 mile stare," after which death usually followed within a few days. If POW doctors could reach these individuals early enough to prod them to eat and exercise they could usually be saved, but many escaped detection in the crowded camp.

During the latter part of January, the exodus to Camp 5 at PYOKTONG began. Some 250 to 300 sick and wounded were left behind at "Death Valley." On 13 March 1951, when ox carts were made available to transport the remaining group, only 109 were alive to make the trip. During the course of the journey to Camp 5, 11 more died. Of the approximately 100 sick and wounded surviving this ordeal, 75 died soon after their arrival at Camp 5.

The conditions described at "Death Valley" were generally the same at the "Valley" and other holding areas in the cases of those prisoners captured by the CCF in November and December 1951. The pattern followed during evacuation was generally consistent, in that there were only isolated cases of any medical treatment being provided to POWs immediately after capture and while enroute to and between the various collecting points. Sick and wounded prisoners who were unable to march with the group were left along the route of evacuation and brought along a few days later by ox cart or truck.

The POWs were delivered by the Chinese into the hands of the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

North Koreans at some point along the route of evacuation or at the holding areas. The holding areas were apparently established as temporary internment areas pending the designation or establishment of more permanent POW internment camps. Medical care available at these holding points was provided mostly by POW medics, with very limited assistance by enemy medical personnel. Medical supplies were extremely limited or non-existent. A few prisoners treated themselves from salvaged aid kits and other material which they were able to obtain covertly.

One notable exception to this pattern, however, is apparent. In early December, 1950, a group of about 300 soldiers and marines were captured around the CHOSIN Reservoir and along the U.S. evacuation route toward HUNGNAM. These prisoners were marched to KANGGYE, where they were interned in a valley that became known as "Peaceful Valley." Contrary to the situation at "Death Valley" and at other holding points, the Chinese retained sole control over this group and introduced the POWs to the "Lenient Policy" which was later to play such a dominant role in the administration of the permanent camps. The fact that only two deaths were reported during the period of internment at "Peaceful Valley" amply attests to the living conditions and medical care available.

The subsequent movements of POW groups from the various holding points to permanent camps were made under conditions similar to those described during evacuation from front line collecting points.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

in that medical care enroute was practically non-existent. The litter cases also were left behind on these marches and moved when some means of transporting them became available.

3. Period From August 1951 Until Repatriation

The pattern of medical treatment of POWs during evacuation did not change appreciably until the summer of 1951, after which continued improvement was noted throughout the entire period up to repatriation. For the most part, personnel captured during this latter period were apprehended singly or in very small groups at isolated points along the front. A certain consistency in medical treatment can be noted in that prisoners requiring medical attention at the time of capture were usually treated at bunker-type aid stations at or near the front lines by CCF or NK aidmen. Such attention was usually given within a few hours after capture. This treatment normally consisted of cleansing the wound, painting it with iodine or merthiolate, and applying a bandage to it.

POW wounded who were in need of immediate surgery were often carried on litters for miles by CCF or NK soldiers to enemy field hospitals located in caves 5 to 10 miles behind the front lines; they were treated on an equal basis with CCF and NK casualties.

Medical treatment reported by wounded flying personnel who were shot down and captured in rear areas followed a similar pattern; captured airmen in need of medical attention were frequently

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

treated at the nearest aid station or hospital before evacuation to a POW camp.

In these field medical installations the equipment and facilities were sometimes quite extensive, although they never approached the standards available in U.N. field medical installations. Numerous instances are cited of minor operations performed without the use of anesthesia, of the utilization of the crudest kind of surgical equipment, and of the observance of superficial sanitary measures.

Many former captives report hospitalization in enemy civilian and military hospitals in the rear areas. The facilities in many of these hospitals were sometimes rather complete, including examining rooms, operating rooms, x-ray facilities and pharmacies. On the other hand, some enemy field medical installations observed just before repatriation contained the crudest type of facilities, were infested with lice, and afforded only superficial medical care. In these latter hospitals POW wounded were treated simultaneously with enemy military and civilian casualties under identical conditions.

Section III - Facilities and Treatment Within Major POW Camps

1. General

The experiences of U.N. personnel captured by the enemy in late 1950 and early 1951 do not indicate that the Chinese or North Korean military forces were prepared to provide even basic medical care for the large number of U.N. captives taken during

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

this period. One returnee reports that a Chinese delegation which visited "Death Valley" in early 1951 was appalled by the general conditions which existed at this holding point.

The arrival at Camp 5 of the hundreds of emaciated prisoners from the holding areas offered hope for the improvement of conditions which did not immediately materialize. Many hundreds of POWs had already perished during evacuation and at the holding areas due to malnutrition, exposure, unsanitary conditions, and lack of medical care. Deaths continued unabated after arrival at PYOKTONG. Measures to improve conditions at Camp 5 were initiated by the Chinese. The services of captured U.N. medical officers were utilized by the enemy to supplement the few CCF and NK medical personnel who could be mustered.

There are indications that the Chinese were concerned about the high death rate among the POWs. The Chinese POW camp commander informed medical personnel that ample supplies of medicines and drugs would be made available and ordered deaths to cease within two weeks. A POW had to be almost dead before enemy medical personnel would consent to admit him to the hospital, yet paradoxically enough, U.N. doctors were severely reprimanded if deaths occurred in the compounds rather than in the camp hospital. The high death rate reached a peak in February and March of 1951 and remained high until the summer of 1951, at which time the increased supply of medicines and drugs began to show a marked influence on the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

effectiveness of the medical treatment.

After the summer of 1951, medical treatment as well as other aspects of POW life improved steadily right up to repatriation. Appendix XX portrays the survival rate during the course of internment in relation to the month in which capture was effected. Those prisoners captured in 1950-1951, when medical treatment was ineffective or non-existent, experienced a much lower survival rate than those captured after 1951, when medical care was much improved.

This trend cannot be attributed entirely to the difference in the length of internment. The brief downward trend of the survival rate in June, September, and October, 1952, is based on a small number of captives and does not take account of the possibility that, among the group captured, some may have been seriously wounded and beyond the help of medical attention. A very large percentage of prisoners taken by the enemy in 1952-1953 after the front became stablised were wounded personnel.

Survival statistics for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force as individual services were not available during preparation of this report, but it has been estimated that inclusion would make relatively little change in the overall picture presented, because of the proportionately small numbers involved.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

2. Prevalent Ailments Among POWs During Internment

The majority of prisoner ailments contracted during internment can be traced to the quality and quantity of the diet and the poor living conditions. The inadequacy of the diet resulted in greatly lowered resistance of the bodies of the POWs to any and all diseases which emanated from the squalid living conditions encountered prior to and immediately after internment in the permanent camps. Among the more prevalent maladies were dysentery, diarrhea, worms, bronchitis, malaria, tuberculosis, pneumonia, pellegra, beri-beri, night blindness, amnesia, and anascara.

Many ailments manifested among the POW group were difficult to diagnose, according to U.N. doctor repatriates. One of the most common of these was characterized by severe pain in the leg bones and joints. This condition defied all treatment, but would usually disappear within a few weeks whether or not treatment was administered. Diseases caused by exposure and dietary deficiencies occurred frequently in the winter of 1950-1951, but with the improvement in sanitation and food, the recurrence and fatality of these diseases diminished greatly after 1951. A few ailments brought on by vitamin deficiencies, however, continued to plague the POWs right up to repatriation.

Manifestations of mental disorders were noted among a few prisoners in the camps, but there is a lack of positive evidence that any type of therapy was undertaken by the enemy to treat

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

these cases. The Chinese usually administered an injection to quiet the mental patient or simply placed him in solitary confinement.

3. Medications and Techniques

The medicines and drugs administered by enemy medical personnel for various ailments were dictated largely by availability. POWs reporting for treatment were often unsure of the medicine administered to them, since the Chinese rarely volunteered information as to the medicaments they employed.

A type of charcoal pill (not otherwise identified) was the usual treatment for dysentery, as well as for worms and diarrhea. Several varieties of vitamin pills were used to treat night blindness. The sulpha-type drugs and penicillin were available in some quantity from the beginning of the interment period; however, they were administered only in the most serious of cases until 1952, when the use of these drugs became more liberal. Opium in pill form is reported to have been used in a number of cases to relieve pain or to quiet epileptics and mental cases. Iodine and merthiolate were available from the beginning and were liberally used, often for a wide range of ailments. Bandages had to be washed and re-used throughout most of the period of interment. Plaster of paris casts were commonly applied to immobilize fractures, particularly after 1951.

Of particular interest is the absence of prosthetics for those having undergone amputations of the extremeties. This lack of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

prosthetic appliances was noted among enemy amputees as well. The amputee in most cases had to improvise, and frequently other prisoners manufactured artificial limbs from the materials available about the camps.

There is no evidence that the Chinese sponsored a physical therapy program among POWs who required rehabilitation. Those in need of such treatment were largely on their own unless other POWs came to their assistance. Various field expedients were occasionally fashioned by the POWs to provide aids for the therapy. One POW who was afflicted with a 30 degree flexion deformity of the knee was given exercise with an improvised sand box which was nailed to the shoe. With this crude aid, the POW was able to reduce his deformity to 12 degrees.[1]

Prior to the summer of 1951, a great many operations were reported to have been performed without the use of anesthetics. After that summer, however, such instances were fewer, and the use of both local and general anesthesias was frequently noted.

4. Vaccinations and Innoculations

The Chinese undertook to immunize all POWs at various times during their internment. There are conflicting reports concerning the diseases for which vaccinations and innoculations were given. Few prisoners were immunized in 1951, but immunizations during 1952 and 1953 were quite general. Most immunizations were repeated about every six months.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

Immunization registers were issued to each POW showing the date, type of vaccine or serum, amount given, date administered, and the signature stamp of the person giving the shot (fig. 12) These registers were not issued until the summer of 1953 but were back dated to reflect shots given in 1952. The registers were not always accurate and in many cases, the indicated immunizations were never given.

It was the practice in 1951 and 1952 to use a common syringe and needle, wiping the needle with an alcohol pledget between shots. In 1953 needles were sterilized by boiling and were changed after each shot, but the use of the common syringe continued.

The first innoculations in 1952 followed closely after the initiation of the Chinese propaganda campaign of Bacteriological Warfare. In 1951, a typhus epidemic occurred in the CCF and NK armies, and a similar epidemic occurred in early 1952, along with outbreaks of plague among both the enemy military and civilian population. Although the POW camps did not suffer severely from these outbreaks, the Chinese made it plain that the shots were given to protect the POWs from diseases that were being spread by American planes. The Chinese undertook to innoculate the civilian population as well and emphasized these measures, to lend credence to the BW allegations. (See Chapter 8 for discussion of BW allegations.)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

5. Medical Supply

In spite of allegations by some repatriates that the enemy possessed ample supplies of medicines at all times and deliberately withheld them for political and ideological reasons, the evidence available does not support such a contention. Instances are cited of ample quantities of medicines being collected at particular locations; however, available information indicates this to be largely due to supply peculiarities rather than conclusive evidence of ample resources. It is noted, however, that during and immediately following March, 1951, the International Committee of the Red Cross delivered to HONG KONG substantial quantities of medicines for the relief of "the wounded and sick of the armed forces in the field, prisoners of war, and civilian victims of the war" in North Korea. As of December, 1951, these medical supplies had not been accepted and distributed by the Chinese. (See app. XIX for full text of memorandum from the International Red Cross to the Chinese Red Cross.)

There appeared to be no separate system of medical supply in the enemy military organization. Medical as well as other types of supplies were closely controlled by the commanding officers. Until the summer of 1951, medical supplies were critically short within the POW camp system.

The experience of POWs held at "Peaceful Valley" clearly indicates that a particular commander could, as the occasion dictated,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

姓名
NAME CRUZ NEGRON

年齡
AGE 24 性別 SEX MALE

國籍
NATION ALITY PUERTO RICAN

軍階
RANK PVT

軍號
SERIAL NO. US 50 112 067

疫苗種類 TYPE OF YACCINE	量 AMOUNT	日期 DATE	簽名
Plague Typhoid Vaccinia	1 cc	12/3	
Cholera Typhoid [illegible]	0.5 cc	3/4	
Diphtheria Typhoid [illegible]	1 cc	3/4	
Typhoid Cholera	0.5 c c 0.5 c c	3/4 4/5	
Cholera	1 cc	4/7	
Plague	1 c c	4/7	

發證日年月日
ISSUED ON _____ 1951

中國人民志願軍
CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS

第 3 俘虜營
CAMP NO. 3

預防接種注射證
IMMUNIZATION REGISTER

第_____號
No._____

POW Shot Record brought out by PFC Victor CRUZ-NEGRON, US 50 112 067

POW SHOT RECORD

FIG. 12

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

CONFIDENTIAL

make available sufficient medicines to facilitate the ideological transformation of a group of prisoners; however, this was done at the expense of other POWs who were equally in need of medicines and attests to the relative emphasis the Chinese placed on indoctrination over that of medical treatment.

Medical equipment employed by the enemy included a few captured U.S. surgical kits and a wide variety of miscellaneous surgical items of foreign manufacture, most of which were old and in poor condition. The use of expedients is frequently reported. Operations performed with straight-edge razors and scalpels fashioned from scissors were not uncommon in 1950-1951. Operating tables were crudely constructed of wood and contained no means of elevating or changing the patient's position to facilitate an operation. Equipment necessary to support operations was likewise limited. Ordinary thread was commonly used to close incisions, although catgut was occasionally used for this purpose. No special facilities for operating room lighting were noted. A single ordinary light of about 100-watt intensity was normally suspended above the operating table. Equipment necessary for complete sanitary measures was likewise limited. Sheets were occasionally suspended against the mud walls of operating rooms. Surgical gowns and masks, if worn at all, were changed infrequently. Although the supplies of medicines and equipment improved throughout the internment period, no favorable comparison can be made to western standards.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

6. Medical Personnel

Captured U.N. doctors were permitted to assist with medical care until the summer of 1951. As soon as the Chinese had sufficient medical personnel of their own available, they would no longer permit U.N. personnel to assist. Medical assistance which they were able to render subsequent to this period was for the most part done covertly. Within the established camps the medical personnel consisted mostly of Chinese male and female doctors, a few Korean doctors, both male and female Chinese and North Korean nurses, and Chinese and North Korean aid men.

The background and training of enemy medical personnel is difficult to determine and harder still to evaluate. Some enemy doctors reported training at the University of Peking, some alluded to training periods in Russia, and a few told of training in European countries and in the United States. The extent and proficiency of their training cannot be adjudged with accuracy, but those POW medical officers who were able to observe the techniques applied in the treatment of patients considered few of them qualified according to our concepts.

Nursing personnel appeared to have very little formal training. The nature of their duties and the limited degree of responsibility which their duties entailed indicate little training in the technical aspects of nursing. The normal duties of nursing personnel consisted of bringing food to the patients, emptying

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

bed pans, changing dressing on occasions, etc. Some of them performed laundry services for POW patients, but whether this was a normal duty or an individual arrangement has not been determined. Aid men performed the more menial tasks of keeping the buildings heated and carrying on general sanitation duties.

Some of the medical personnel attempted to further the indoctrination of the POWs during hospitalization; however, organized efforts along these lines are not evident. The majority of enemy personnel did not demonstrate ardent communist beliefs. However, the enemy made frequent use of medical treatment to further the objectives of indoctrination and interrogation. The "progressive" element among the POWs received prompt medical attention when others did not, and threats to withhold treatment from those POWs resisting interrogation and indoctrination were common. One USAF officer captured in January 1953, suffered frozen hands during evacuation and was denied medical treatment for several weeks until he had made a BW confession.[2]

7. Unorthodox Treatments

Prisoners of war were subjected to some rather unorthodox medical treatment. Some of these techniques are oriental in character and origin and, though used among the Asiatics for centuries, are little known among lay personnel in the western world.

One such treatment is known as acupuncture. One POW patient reporting with a foot ailment submitted to this treatment, which

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

consisted of inserting a number of 3-inch needles into the skin between the toes, behind the ankle bone, in the instep, and in the arch. The needles were left in place for from three to five minutes, and the treatment was repeated five times a week for four weeks. The POW reported improvement in his condition. Other repatriates report that such treatments had the pronounced effect of keeping prisoners from going on sick call.

The most common of these unorthodox treatments were the chicken liver transplants. According to the CCF doctors, this was a Russian discovery for the treatment of any debilitating disease. The treatment was voluntary in most cases. Prior to the treatment, the patient was given an extensive "build-up" on the merits of the treatment. A small incision was made in the patient's side, usually about four inches below the armpit, into which was inserted one or more pieces of chicken liver which had been soaked in a solution of penicillin. The incision was then closed and the patient was placed on a special diet which was far superior to the normal camp diet. The presence of the chicken liver was supposed to stimulate body metabolism, causing body tissues to overwork in warding off disease. Most patients demonstrated an improved condition. However, POW doctors who observed patients that had submitted to this treatment considered the good results to be due to the vastly superior diet and the psychological effect of the extensive build-up rather than to any direct therapeutic value in the treatment.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

8. Dental Treatment

The deplorable conditions existing for medical treatment in the early days of internment were no less true in regard to the facilities available for dental treatment. Dental hygiene was largely ignored throughout the internment period, and many PCWs pulled their own teeth. At Camp 5, in 1951, and later at Camp 2, one of the U.N. medical officers performed extractions, making use of a dental kit at Camp 5. Later a dental kit was shared by Camp 2 and 5.

It was not until early 1953 that any real attention was given by the Chinese to dental treatment. At this time a CCF dentist made the rounds of the camps, doing fillings and performing a few extractions. If filling were needed, the cavity was prepared by chipping at the carilous tooth with crude instruments. The technique was poor, and most of the fillings fell out within a few weeks. Extractions were almost always accomplished without the use of anesthesia.

Just prior to repatriation, another visit was made to the various camps by a CCF dentist, and the teeth of most of the prisoners were checked. In this instance anesthesia techniques were employed. The generally poor techniques used made most prisoners content to perform their own dental treatment.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

9. Sick Call and Hospitalization

As the major camps were established, medical facilities were organized concurrently or within a short time thereafter. The medical facilities available within each camp, often make-shift at first, kept pace with the general improvement in camp living conditions. Each camp contained what might be loosely termed a "hospital." The facilities fell far short of western concepts of a hospital, but basic care for patients was possible. A few surgical instruments were available, and minor surgery was performed. There are no reports of amputations of the extremities in these hospitals.

In some camps an aid station was present as a facility separate from the hospital. This was particularly true in those camps which had companies widely separated from the central camp administration. In those cases, limited dispensary facilities for one or more companies existed and usually included a CCF doctor and an aid man or full duty.

Sick call was held daily in some camps while in others it was held on alternate days. If a prisoner was too sick to report for sick call, the CCF doctor might even see him in his quarters. Those reporting for sick call could at best expect to receive only aspirins, vitamin pills and a bit of CCF medical advice. If hospitalization were considered necessary, the POW would bring his bedding and report to the hospital. In early 1951, a prisoner had to be almost dead to be admitted to the hospital.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Once admitted to the hospital, a POW patient could expect to sleep on the floor (except as noted below). If heat were provided, it would be of the under-floor flue type or from a charcoal burner within the room. In 1952 and 1953, two of the hospitals are reported to have constructed crude beds of planks resting upon two supports, which raised the patient off the floor. No mattresses or bedding other than that which the patient brought with him were issued.

Food was brought by CCF or NK female nurses usually in pails, and the patient ate out of a cup. Even as early as the spring of 1951 the food served in the hospitals was superior to that distributed in the camps proper, since it contained more variety and often consisted of special diets for particular illnesses. Many repatriated POWs were of the opinion that the improved diet was often a more important factor to their recovery than were the medications and treatment they received.

Frequently there was a delay of several days after he was admitted to the hospital before the patient was examined or treatment begun; this was particularly true in early 1951. By late 1951 and thereafter, examination by a doctor and subsequent treatment were very prompt.

The medical facilities at Camp 5 during the first six months of 1951 carried the bulk of the medical load. Since this was the first permanent camp, the majority of the prisoners from the initial

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

holding points were taken there. These prisoners were in very poor physical condition, suffering from exposure, dysentery, and malnutrition brought about by the conditions at the holding points.

The overcrowded living conditions at Camp 5 afforded no prospect for immediate improvement, inasmuch as the medical facilities, personnel, and equipment, inadequate even by minimum standards, were grossly overtaxed. Although at first the captured U.N. medical officers were utilized by the CCF and NK to assist in the care of the sick and wounded, the critical shortage of all medicines made their combined efforts seem insignificant. Pneumonia, dysentery, and malnutrition continued to stalk the POW compound. Most of the severe battle casualties had already died, and other deaths were averaging as many as twenty a day in February and March of 1951.

The establishment of Camp 1 between March and April of 1951 and Camp 2 in August-September, 1951, removed some of the pressure from Camp 5. Although medical facilities were soon established in these camps, they were initially inadequate, and the death rate was high during much of 1951.

By August, 1951, the conditions at Camp 5 were somewhat improved. The diet was better, basic sanitation was receiving some attention, and medical supplies were becoming available in sufficient amounts. The death rate had begun to drop after March, 1951, and by late October, 1951, had almost reached the zero point. With the formation of additional camps, overcrowding was reduced.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

In the summer of 1951 clothing was issued, and releases were made twice yearly thereafter. These factors contributed materially to the reduction of illness and availability of more medical facilities to the POWs.

An important factor in the hospital treatment of prisoners interned in the major camps was the general hospital at PYOKTONG. Established in March 1951, this facility handled the overflow of seriously ill from Camp 5. Initially, filth was prevalent and [redacted] received at the hospital that little could be done with the meager equipment and medicines available. After the summer of 1951, conditions improved steadily and as the other camps were organized, this hospital handled the more serious cases from the five camp hospitals. The hospital contained a pharmacy, an operating room, several wards, a kitchen and other supporting facilities. Its capacity was generally estimated to be about 75 to 300 patients. The same general pattern of administration, as previously described, was apparent in this hospital. A relatively competent staff was ultimately assigned, and sanitary measures were enforced. By November, 1952, a fluoroscope and a laboratory had been added, and in June, 1953, an x-ray machine was installed. Major operations were performed. Patients receiving treatment here in late 1952 and 1953 almost unanimously agreed that the treatment was good.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By [redacted] NARS, Date 4/11/80

Section IV - Medical Aspects of the Failure of Discipline

U.S. medical officer repatriates have expressed definite opinions that the death rate among U.S. POWs during internment was excessively high and did not favorably compare with the relatively low death rate experienced by both the British and Turkish groups. Although complete and detailed statistics are not available for comparison throughout the internment period, it is reported that the Turkish group did not lose a single man from the group of [redacted] range from 400 to 800 out of a total 1500 to 1800 prisoners in the same camp.

Available statistics for army personnel indicate more than 44 per cent died during internment (fig. 4 and app. XX). The possible factors bearing on this difference in death rate are subject to considerable conjecture, and many of these factors are beyond the scope of this section. However, the expressed opinion by medical officer repatriates is that a major contributing factor to this high death rate was the loss of discipline within the U.S. POW groups.

The relationship between discipline and survival in combat, long an accepted axiom, is no less true in captivity. Surviving captivity was largely a matter of maintaining one's health under extremely adverse conditions. The large number of prisoners who were wounded or became ill at the holding points where medical care

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

was almost non-existent could rely only on self-treatment or the care which fellow POWs could give. The almost complete disregard which individual POWs demonstrated for the welfare of those who became ill or were wounded resulted in the deaths of many who might otherwise have been saved, according to medical officer repatriates. The general apathy which prevailed among prisoners for the welfare of other individuals often took the form of outright refusal of U.S. POWs to carry the litters of the wounded during evacuation, as well as refusals to bring water and provide other care for those who were wounded or too ill to attend to their own needs.

This type of conduct fostered a state of mind that made men feel that if they should be taken ill they would be left alone and forsaken by their fellow POWs. In contrast to this, a strong group cohesion was noted among the British and Turkish groups, which was held together by a firm chain of command that was never broken by the enemy. When one of their group became ill or required medical care, he was quickly taken in and cared for by the group until his complete health had been restored.

U.S. medical officer repatriates point out that the training given our combat personnel in the fields of personal hygiene, first aid, and field sanitation is adequate but that the greatest fallacy in our training is teaching the military man that "he is the best cared-for soldier in the world." They further believe that the possibility of capture by the enemy is not given due emphasis in

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 9/11/90

our training, as evidenced by the reaction noted among our POWs immediately after internment in North Korea, when they suddenly realized that the comforts and medical care to which they were accustomed were not present. U.S. captives were not psychologically or emotionally prepared for the conditions under which they were forced to exist..

Section V - General

It is apparent that Communist medical treatment underwent a considerable transition during the course of internment of United Nations POWs in North Korea. Captives taken immediately following U.S. entry into the conflict experienced for a short period basically adequate medical care within the limited capabilities of the North Koreans to provide it. The period marking the almost complete destruction of the NKA and the CCF entry into the conflict also marked a turning point in the medical care destined for those already in a captured status, as well as for the large numbers of U.N. personnel captured immediately thereafter. The poor living conditions and almost non-existent medical care at most of the holding areas established the conditions for a high death rate within the permanent POW camps which were established in early 1951. Medical care within the camps, meager at first, and although it improved slowly, it was not until mid-summer of 1951 that the death rate could be stemmed. After the summer of 1951, continuous improvement in medical care was noted not only within the established

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

camps but during the evacuation of U.N. personnel from points of capture to the enemy rear.

Although the evidence is meager and inconclusive, it is doubtful that personnel of the CCF or NKA were afforded medical care which was greatly superior to that given POW personnel, except in the very early stages of internment. Prisoners captured just prior to repatriation, who were treated in various enemy medical facilities from the front lines to the rear, considered the treatment adequate under the circumstances but do not describe it in glowing terms.

United Nations personnel captured after 1951 were frequently treated in North Korean and CCF military hospitals on an equal basis with enemy personnel. Some CCF personnel were treated in the POW camp medical facilities throughout the internment period. There is little reason to doubt, however, that the North Korean civilian population fared poorly throughout the war. Civilians were observed to be suffering from generally the same type of maladies which were rife in the POW camps. North Korean hospitals for the treatment of civilians were known to be in existence, but the extent to which they were able to fill an obvious need cannot be accurately determined. Aid stations were present in some villages for the primary purpose of administering innoculations after the BW allegations were initiated in early 1952. Repatriated POWs are almost unanimous in the belief that the North Korean civilian

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

occupied a rather low priority in the Chinese scheme of things. The lot of the prisoner after 1951 was considered better than that of the North Korean civilian by most POWs.

Section VI - Recommendations by Medical Officer Repatriates

Medical officer repatriates believe future training should emphasize certain aspects of POW survival which are closely related to the medical field. The following points are among those suggested in which combat personnel should have a thorough understanding.

1. Medical care available to POWs under the Communists cannot compare favorably with that to which the westerner is accustomed.

2. The prisoner of war must learn to use simple but ingenious methods, in medical care, making maximum use of local materials and field expedients.

3. Modern medicine is not essential to survive illness. People became ill and regained health long before the advent of present day medical techniques.

4. The importance of discipline to individual and group survival under POW conditions cannot be over emphasized.

In the event of hostilities with the communist world in the near future, it must be assumed that captured personnel would encounter a standard of medical care similar to that experienced by POWs in North Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

If we could familiarize our personnel with the type and caliber of medical treatment which the Communists can be expected to provide POWs, and add to this knowledge the importance of self-administered care, the individual's responsibility to the group, and basic preventive measures to maintain health under POW conditions, their chances of survival under the Communists in any future conflict would be considerably enhanced.

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1. Report of Conference with Repatriated POW Personnel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, dated 1 December 1953, pg. 8.

2. AIIR, Massenberg, S.E., AF 589673 - 19 August 1953.

3. Report of Conference with Repatriated POW Personnel, Medical Corps, U.S. Army, dated 1 December 1953, pg. 13.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 15

CORRESPONDENCE

Section I - Introduction

This chapter concerns itself with an investigation of the various aspects of both incoming and outgoing mail, including the types, frequency, and restrictions on each. The effectiveness of communist censorship and the attempts of the POWs to avoid it are also discussed. The close relation between the Communist attitude toward the correspondence problem and the propaganda and indoctrination programs is emphasized throughout. There are periodic references made to the Geneva Convention of 1949. These references are presented for the purpose of illustrating the contrast between the standards agreed upon by a large number of nations, and the practices actually employed by the Communists of Korea - not for the purpose of suggesting either moral or legal indictments. It is noted throughout, however, that the Communists, realizing the importance of both incoming and outgoing correspondence, attempted by a variety of methods to use the mails for their own advantage, and it can be said in general that the Chinese Communists and the North Korean Forces did not comply with either the letter or the spirit of the Geneva Conventions.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Section II - Outgoing POW Correspondence

1. Frequency

a. The First Letter

The amount of time which elapsed before POWs were allowed to write their families ranged from days or weeks in some cases to periods involving many months in others, but no attempt will be made here to account for these divergencies by dissecting individual cases.

In the early stages of the war, the North Koreans displayed no apparent concern for the desires of the prisoners to communicate with their families and friends at home, and the majority of those who were captured during this period had no opportunity to correspond with the outside world until several months after capture, at the earliest. There were very few letters sent out during 1950, and these were not dispatched under uniform conditions. There are a few reports indicating that POWs were given an opportunity to write while interned at "Death Valley" in December 1950, but this is the earliest time reported, and the facts do not indicate that it represented consistent policy. Further, there is no indication that materials necessary for writing were uniformly issued at this time, and it should be noted that many of the POWs were apparently too sick or exhausted at this juncture to avail themselves of the opportunity.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

It has not been ascertained whether the Communist attitude toward correspondence during this early period was part of a general policy - as was apparently the case later on -- or whether it was simply corollary to the fact that, regardless of intentions, the North Koreans were probably unprepared to cope with the security and logistical problems engendered by their sudden role as the detaining power of a large number of prisoners of war. It can be said, however, that it was not until 1951, when the Chinese began to effectively assume control of the POWs, that any action was taken which might reasonably be interpreted as indicating the existence of a positive attitude toward the correspondence problem. This does not mean that all POWs were given an opportunity to write at this time; nor does it imply the existence of a positive, stabilized policy on the subject. However, during the early part of 1951, the Communists apparently recognized the problem and, subject to various restrictions, permitted the POWs an opportunity to write for the first time. It should be noted that it was at this same time - early 1951 - that the formal indoctrination program was begun in earnest by the CCF and, as will later become clear, writing privileges were closely linked with the indoctrination and propaganda programs.

In general, POWs were not permitted to write letters until sometime after they had reached one of the permanent camps (how long after depended upon the policy in effect at the particular

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

time). While there are reports of POWs being allowed to write while interned in one or another of the transit camps (collecting points), the weight of evidence indicates that this was exceptional. There was little, if any, concerted effort by either the North Koreans or, later, the Chinese Communists to conform to the standards of the Geneva Convention, which reads in part:

> Immediately upon capture and not more than one week after arrival at a camp, even if it is a transit camp, likewise in the case of transfer to hospital or to another camp, every prisoner of war shall be enabled to write direct to his family on the one hand, and to the Central Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, on the other hand, a card similar, if possible, to the model annexed to the present convention, informing his relatives of his capture, address and state of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible and may not be delayed in any manner.[1]

The amount of time which elapsed before POWs were permitted to write varied from case to case and was dependent upon such things as the time and place of capture; the distance from, and the route taken to the ultimate destination; and the policy which prevailed in the camp at the time of arrival. Those who were sent directly to one of the permanent camps had an advantage over those who were shifted from place to place or delayed en route. Likewise, those who were captured during 1952-53 had a better chance of being able to write home sooner than did those who were captured early in the conflict. Even in the latter stages, however, the policy

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

fluctuated to some extent and the CCF attitude in regard to correspondence appears to have been influenced at all times by the then current military and political situation.

b. Frequency in General

Coincident with the beginning of the formal indoctrination program in the early part of 1951, the CCF began to establish the policy of allowing POWs to write letters once or twice a month. The policy was anything but consistent, however, and shortly after it was first offered (January-March), the privilege of writing was withdrawn. One of the Chinese interrogators told a POW that there were too many prisoners dying and that the Chinese did not think it advisable to have a family receive a letter when the writer had subsequently died. He commented that it would be necessary to "fatten them up" before reinstating the privileges.[2] According to the same report, most of the letters which had been written during this period and had then been held up by the Chinese were finally dispatched. This, in the opinion of the returnee, was probably done because the Chinese considered it wise to send out some POW letters at the time the peace negotiations began, and, since these were already available, they were used.

By July or August 1951, the privilege of writing had been generally reinstated wherever it had been previously withdrawn. The frequency was, as before, dependent upon the number of times

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

writing paper and equipment were issued. This happened on an average of once or twice a month when two or, occasionally, three sheets of paper were passed out, one of which had to be utilized as an envelope. Later in the year, plain envelopes were issued and the number of sheets of paper was accordingly reduced by one. During this period, POWs were limited to one letter per shipment, and when a POW failed to avail himself of the opportunity to write when the paper was issued, he was not allowed to make it up by sending out two letters the following time.

In the early part of 1952, the Chinese began to issue single sheet, airmail type stationery instead of the customary plain paper and envelope. This air mail paper had a "peace dove" printed in the upper right-hand corner. At that time the Chinese apparently became somewhat more lenient in regard to the number of letters which could be sent out, as there are reports that POWs were able to use the stationery of friends who were not going to write (the friend would mail the letter instead of his own). One unverified report tells of a POW who stole paper from company headquarters without being detected and was therefore able to write "as many letters as he wanted."[3] On the average, however, the number of letters which could be written became rather generally established in all of the camps at three per month and remained so until repatriation.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

c. Exceptions to the Normal Limitations on Frequency

(1) Holidays

On Easter, Thanksgiving, Christmas, Russian Revolution Day, and other special occasions, POWs were encouraged to write as many letters as they desired, and one POW reports having written five or six on Christmas of 1951.[4] How strongly they were encouraged to write on these occasions is not clear, but one returnee notes that Christmas 1951 was the only time during his internment that he was "forced" to write.[5] Normal restrictions on content were maintained, and perhaps one of the main reasons for relaxing the restrictions on quantity was the hope by the CCF that, since the food and other conditions were improved to a certain extent on these holidays (see Chapter 12), the POWs would be less reluctant to include praise for the CCF (without which the letters would never be dispatched).

(2) Letters Written by "Progressives"

There are strong indications that, throughout the war, the "Progressives" were permitted to write more letters than were the other POWs. This may be explained by the fact that these POWs, standing in favor with the CCF, probably had easier access to writing materials than most, and also by the fact that they comprised the group most willing to write thorough-going propaganda letters.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

(3) Propaganda Letters

Returnees report that even as early as 1950, when it was not customary to extend writing privileges to the POWs, those who were willing to write letters which were compatible with the Communist propaganda aims were given special permission to do so. Later, when the privilege of writing was extended to the POWs in general, almost all letters had to contain some element of propaganda in order to pass the censor. To this degree, virtually all letters received in the United States from POWs might be considered as propaganda letters. The genuine propaganda letter, however, was one containing material which went beyond the normal minimum requirements of praise or mention of good treatment; and there was apparently no limitation placed upon the number of these which could be written. The Communist policies, in fact, encouraged the writing of propaganda letters to senators, congressmen, and other prominent persons, or to organizations affecting public opinion, such as the U.N., or "peace" organizations. Writing materials were available at all times for any POW who would write letters of this type.

d. Letters Which Reached the United States

Only a fraction of the POWs' letters actually ever reached their destination in the United States. Even with these there were delays of from two to eight months or more. One POW reports that about one third of those written by him were never

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

received; another sets the ratio at three-quarters; while a third states that, out of 150, only 22 got through. The rest of the reports present similar variations and make it difficult to establish any valid average. It is possible, however, to perceive some of the factors which affected the prospect of a letter arriving at its destination. These include the following:

(1) Content

This is dealt with more thoroughly in the sections dealing with censorship and restrictions. It may be noted here, however, that the likelihood of a letter getting through increased proportionately with the amount of material which it contained favorable to the Communists. Almost all of the letters reaching the United States did, in fact, contain propaganda in some degree.

(2) The Addressee

Letters to important persons or to large organizations affecting public opinion were given priority over letters to family or friends. How great a percentage of these were actually delivered cannot be determined, but it is probably safe to assume that it was greater than average, since the Communists had a positive interest in their arrival.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

(3) Methods of Transmission

Prior to December 1951, most letters were sent through PEKING or HONG KONG (the latter being the home of the International (Postal) Exchange Office - British). Many were found to have traveled rather circuitous routes before arriving at their destination, however, and some were found to bear postmarks of European countries. It is apparent that, at this stage, the methods of transmission were not uniform and that some of the letters may have been held up or lost as a result of the system. An example of how the variety of routes probably contributed to the lack of effective transmission is reported to have occurred in March of 1951, when the "Democratic Womens Organization" visited Korea. This group promised the POWs that they would personally transport their letters to England and mail them from there. The letters had to contain propaganda peace messages such as: "Fight for Peace" and "Get the troops out of Korea." The POW who reported this incident notes that the letter he entrusted to this group never arrived at his home.[8] Another returnee reports a similar incident in May 1951, when the POWs were told that a woman would carry mail in a diplomatic bag through Canada to the U.S.[9]

In late December, 1951, or early January, 1952, the Chinese agreed to exchange mail at PANMUNJOM, and, between that time and early 1953, over 30,000 letters are reported to have been delivered to the United States. The POWs, however, were never sure that the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

letters they wrote were even sent from the camps, and their uncertainty was increased by such incidents as the one reporting the discovery by prisoners on a work detail of several hundred discarded POW letters.[10] A more detailed discussion of the postal services provided for POWs during the Korean conflict is presented in Section IV of this chapter.

2. Types of Outgoing Correspondence

a. Christmas Cards

Reference is made in various reports to POWs being allowed to send out Christmas cards. These were undoubtedly home-made cards containing Christmas messages rather than actual printed cards. There is no mention of printed cards, uniform or otherwise, being made available to POWs during the holiday season.

b. Post Cards

The reports do not mention the use of post cards by POWs, nor do they indicate that such cards were ever made available to them.

c. Letters

Letters are the only means of written communication reported to have been used. In the early part of the war, they were written on plain white paper (approximately 8" by 10") and were contained in envelopes made by the prisoner from the same

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

kind of paper. Later, prepared, single sheet (Air Mail type) stationery was made available. This type was usually inscribed with propaganda in one form or another.

d. Telegrams

Except for so-called "peace" pleas and other propaganda petitions (which were, in actuality, dispatched by the CCF rather than by the POWs), there is no record of prisoners ever having been allowed to use the telegraph as a means of communication. There is no indication that the Communists ever made any attempt to comply with that portion of the Geneva Convention which reads:

> Prisoners of war who have been without news for a long period or who are unable to receive news from their next of kin or give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those who are at a great distance from their homes, shall be permitted to send telegrams, the fees being charged against the prisoners of war's account with the Detaining Power or paid in the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by this measure in cases of urgency.[11]

e. Radio Broadcasts and Their Relation to Correspondence

Inasmuch as the subject of radio broadcasts is covered in another portion of this report (Chapter 16) in some detail, it would not be profitable to debote any substantial amount of space to the subject here. It should be noted, however, that the subject of POW radio broadcasts is closely related to the subject of correspondence. Not only are many similar Communist attitudes (and

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

their accompanying actions) on indoctrination and propaganda to be found emerging in regard to both, but also, correspondence, in a sense, was used as the foundation upon which the pattern of the radio broadcasts was built. One of the devices used to induce POWs to make broadcasts was to represent the recordings as a substitute for letters and neglect mention of the fact that they would be used for public propaganda.[12] In addition, most broadcasts were in "letter" form and, often, they were based largely upon letters which prisoners had previously written and which the Chinese or North Koreans had selected as suitable for their purposes.

3. Restrictions

a. Material Available for Writing

The length of a letter was necessarily dependent upon the amount of writing material available. As mentioned previously, it was the custom in the early stages of the war to issue two (sometimes three) sheets of paper to the POW a few days before the mail was to be sent out. Later the practice changed, and one sheet of air mail type stationery was issued on these occasions.

The reports indicate no limitation on the length of a letter except that of space, and therefore the amount written each time depended chiefly upon the size of the handwriting of the individual Apparently some POWs went to extremes in their attempts to include as much as possible in the limited space available.[13] One report tells

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of a POW being called to the office of the political instructor and told to write in larger script because the censor was having trouble reading his handwriting. He was told that, if paper was his concern, he was not to worry, since he would be supplied with enough to satisfy his needs. This was an exceptional case, however, since there is nothing in the other reports to indicate that the Chinese were ordinarily so magnanimous. Probably, a more characteristic reaction by the censor to an illegible letter would have been to destroy it.

During the early phases of the war, most letter writing apparently was accomplished with the use of a pencil. There are occasional references in the reports to pen and ink being supplied as early as 1951, but it is not clear whether this was the usual practice or merely an erratic occurrence. There is, however, mention of pen and ink being available in the library.[14] Probably, the availability of utensils depended to a large extent upon the exigencies of the situation in the particular camp, at the particular time. Illustrative of how the sensitivity of the CCF authorities to the political climate and current events was reflected in their policy toward the POWs is the situation reported to have occurred in the summer of 1953, when the CCF distributed pens but refused to supply ink after Syngman 李承晚 freed the 27,000 non-Communist UNC POWs.[15]

b. Limitations on Destination

While one report indicates that, until the latter half of

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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1951, POWs were not allowed to correspond with anyone outside their immediate families, failure on the part of most returnees to mention this makes the existence of such a general policy doubtful. However, there is little doubt but that ultimately POWs were allowed to write to whomever they pleased within the limits of the number of letters permitted.

c. Propaganda Envelopes and Return Addresses

When air mail type stationery decorated with a "peace dove" (fig. 13) and, later, slogans such as "Unite for Peace" were issued, the POWs were presented with the choice of using it or not writing at all. They apparently chose the latter course at Camp 5 in the fall of 1952 when the prescribed return address included the phrase, "Against American Aggression." At first, some tried to cross out the objectionable phrase, but such letters were returned to them by the CCF as being unsatisfactory. Soon, the word spread that the POWs were to stop writing rather than use this stationery, and the CCF, faced with virtual unanimity on the subject by the prisoners, retreated from their position and issued new stationery the following month. It was still necessary to include a rather propagandized return address, but at least the disputed phrase "Against American Aggression" had been omitted. The new address was:

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90



"Peace Dove" envelopes issued to POW's in Korea for use in corresponding with their families. Photograph reproduced from page 20 of Communist propaganda magazine entitled "'United Nations' POW's in Korea" published in English by Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, Peking, China; 1953.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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POW Camp
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
c/o Chinese People's Committee for World Peace
Peking, China

It is not clear from the reports whether the required return addresses were invariably printed, or whether the POWs were sometimes offered a choice between various slanted addresses which they, themselves, would write.

d. Restrictions on Content

Apparently, the attitude of the Communists was that letter writing was not a right due any POW, but rather it was a privilege granted out of generosity. It is not surprising, then, to find it was permitted only when the restrictions and controls designed to further political objectives were complied with.

The restrictions on letter content may be considered in two categories: negative and positive. The negative restrictions - the kind with which censors have traditionally dealt - pertain to those things which POWs were forbidden to include in their letters. The positive restrictions prescribed what must be said. The application varied somewhat according to the time and place, but the underlying policies remained constant. While some letters abiding by merely the negative restrictions may have passed the CCF censor, the POWs believed that, generally, the inclusion of material pleasing to the Communists was also a prerequisite to the receipt of mail by the addressees.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

(1) Negative Restrictions

No military information, even the statement of circumstance of capture, could be sent out. Mention of camp location was also forbidden. There are instances of camp numbers being included in the return address, but this was not general and particularly not true after the camp system had become better organized.

Reference to names or addresses of other prisoners was not ordinarily allowed.[18] Some letters containing mention of other POWs did get through, but these were exceptional. One report states that permission to write about fellow POWs in the spring of 1952 was amended by summer so as to require one POW, when writing about another, to give his name, rank, and serial number; anything said about him had to be in a favorable light, e.g., discussing the good treatment he was receiving and how well he looked.[19] This report further states that beatings, atrocities, and deaths could not be mentioned, and that this policy prevailed until repatriation. In contrast, the majority of reports indicate that most of the POWs believed that mention of other prisoners was forbidden; this is borne out by the reported attempts made to smuggle out the names of POWs through the use of codes or other deceptions (see Section II-4, Codes).

Restrictions against the inclusion of adverse remarks about camp life, treatment, and the NK or CCF were general. Mention of inadequate food, medical facilities, or quarters was specifically

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

forbidden. In the early stages (February 1951), some POWs attempted to circumvent these restrictions and show true conditions by including requests for certain items in their letters home. They hoped that the need for these items would make the inadequate conditions apparent. One returnee listed the following:[20]

Item	Hoping to Indicate
Sulfaguanidine	Dysentery
Halazone tablets	Contaminated Water
Needles and thread	Poor clothing
Quinine	Malaria
DDT	Vermin

Whether any of these letters were actually forwarded by the CCF is doubtful. The use of this ruse must have been soon denied the POWs, however, as other reports indicate that POWs were not allowed to request anything except photographs throughout most of the war.

(2) Positive Restrictions

No effort was made to directly supervise the writing of letters - POWs reportedly could write them in the squad room, library, or wherever they wanted to, as long as it was done within the two or three days normally allowed after receiving stationery. The prisoners were constantly made aware, however, that unless their letters included material pleasing to the authorities,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

there would be little chance of their being forwarded. On some occasions they were told specifically that, unless they wrote on certain topics, their letters would not be sent out. Usually the approach was a "suggestion" that they include phrases and comments favorable to the Communists. But, even when this was not declared mandatory, the implication was unmistakable.

The "suggestion" took many forms, ranging from simple praise of their treatment and their Communist captors to the discussion of political and military issues in terms favorable to the Communists. Initially, specific phrases were suggested for inclusion, but this policy was apparently abandoned in favor of one which encouraged the POWs to discuss the required topics in their own words. Some topics which the POWs were told to include from time to time (or which it was "suggested" that they include) can be found in the following reports:

One states that, in early 1951, it was necessary to insert the phrase, "hope for peace in Korea."[21] Later that year the following had to be included:

1. Peace requests (applying what had been taught in the indoctrination program.)
2. Mention of good food, medical care, and gain in weight.
3. Descriptions of recreation activities, particularly swimming in the Yalu River.

Another report states that the POWs were told to say that they were healthy and happy, and to ask their families to join the peace

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

movements and to fight for peace.[22]

A third POW mentions that, in addition, a request to "get the 13th Air Force out of Korea" had to be included in order to pass the censor.[23] He further states that, later in 1951, the CCF outlined new points to be stressed in their letters home, among which were the following:

1. "Peace Committee doing a wonderful job."
2. "Wonderful" medical care.
3. Athletic programs.
4. Regular mail service.
5. Good clothing.
6. Warm buildings.
7. Good food.
8. "General welfare of the POW was good."

One important fact is that most of the POWs were apparently uncertain as to just how much propaganda it was necessary to insert in a letter to increase the chances of its being forwarded - a circumstance which may have led many of them to include more than was actually necessary, in the hope that they would thereby be insuring the delivery of their letters. The POWs believed that Chinese policy in this regard vacillated from time to time.

Some POWs completely refused to co-operate with demands that they include pro-Communist propaganda even though they knew that

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

without at least some degree of co-operation their letters would not get through. On the other hand, many were apparently able to justify, at least in their own minds, the inclusion of comment favorable to their captors; first, on the grounds of necessity, and second, by reasoning that these portions of their letters would be discounted by their relatives and friends at home.[24]

Some POWs used these positive restrictions as a subterfuge in their attempts to report the true facts to those back home. This type of device is discussed more thoroughly in the section on codes, which follows.

4. Codes

a. The Feasibility of Using Codes

Most POWs questioned on the subject are of the opinion that the successful use of a prearranged code would have been feasible. The primary difficulty of using codes was not the presence of strict censorship (although the importance of the censorship should not be underestimated), but the existence of an effective informer system. It was necessary to limit not only the number of those who knew the code but the very existence of the code itself. One returnee voices a well-founded objection against the habit of publishing in American newspapers the stories of clever devices successfully used by POWs in smuggling information to those back home. He calls this kind of disclosure "stupid" and feels certain

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

that it resulted in both the imposition of tighter restrictions on correspondence and punitive action against the POW concerned.[25]

b. Types of Codes

Codes used or attempted by the POWs may be divided generally into two categories. The first, which might be called a formal code, embodied the concealment of words or phrases. The informal code, on the other hand, disguised the meanings of words which were used innocuously amid apparent verbiage.

(1). Formal Codes

There are few reports of instances where formal codes were used by the POWs. Whether this resulted from lack of knowledge or a fear of reprisals cannot be determined. It would appear, however, that in order for anything resembling a formal code to pass the censor, it had to contain a certain degree of imagination. Simple methods were apparently not satisfactory. One POW placed dots on certain words in letters to his family. The words, when separated from the rest of the letter and arranged in sequence, would form a message. Upon repatriation, however, he found that none of these letters were ever received by his family.

Another POW reports that there were numerous attempts to send out letters containing coded messages; he claims that he knows of seven or eight which were received in the United States. Most of them, he reports contained requests for supplies needed for escaping,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

asking that they be air-dropped into North Korea. There are no indications, however, that these requests brought forth concrete action.[26] The same returnee reports that he personally sent out a number of coded messages in letters to his wife. He wrote them in a style that would cause her to question their contents, with the hope that she would submit them to the FBI for decoding. This she did, and he reports that the FBI was successful. The messages usually concerned the number of prisoners along the YALU, the number of known dead, and also carried requests for medical supplies.

One prisoner believes that it would have been relatively easy to work a code into a letter that was slightly "mushy." He believes that the CCF did not like love letters and would probably not have read them too closely.

(2). Informal Codes

In some instances the POWs did not use an actual code but attempted to pass on information by drawing parallels to past events or facts with which both the POW and his family were familiar, so that a message contrary to what the words themselves indicated would be conveyed. One sample of this reads:

> "Dear Folks: I am fine....(several paragraphs later)....and don't worry, for I now weight 132 pounds and have gained weight."

This was intended to notify his family, who knew that he had weighed 180 pounds prior to capture, that the Chinese had forced

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

him to state falsehoods, and to provide them with an insight into actual conditions. He claims that this type of deception was usually successful.[27]

Some POWs are of the opinion that information could often be rather openly conveyed, providing the writer was fairly careful. One returnee states that, in this manner, he was able to make clear the facts concerning a man who was missing in action.[28] Another former POW reports that, after the list of POWs held by the Chinese had been released in the U.S., word began to trickle back to the prisoners from their families that certain names had not been included. Several attempts (whether or not they were successful is not stated) were made to smuggle out the names of these individuals by inserting them in seemingly innocuous greetings or comments.[29]

The mail thus constituted a potential means of transmitting information to the U.S. authorities. One POW, after returning home and finding that the Department of the Army had requested relatives of POWs to forward letters containing any possible intelligence information to Washington for photostating, declared that, had he been aware of this fact while a POW, he would have tried to enclose much more information in his letters.[30]

Section III - Incoming POW Correspondence

2. Frequency

a. Time Lapse Before Delivery

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Mail was delivered to the prisoners at highly irregular intervals. This was particularly true in the early period, but, even during the months just prior to repatriation, there was little apparent regularity. One POW states that, out of a total of 125 letters he received during his captivity, 54 were delivered at one time and 26 more arrived the following month. This is an extreme case but, to a lesser degree, it was experienced by all of the prisoners. In view of this general inconstancy, it is difficult to determine an average time lapse in transmission of mail to the POW camps. It would appear, however, that most letters took from two to six months to reach the prisoners.

b. Exceptions to the Normal Irregularity

Scattered reports indicate that some POWs received mail with greater regularity and in greater numbers than the majority. Some POWs explain this in terms of individual favoritism, maintaining that those who co-operated with the Communists were given preferential treatment. A POW who held the position of mail clerk for a time, and who, incidentally, was generally classified as a reactionary, does not agree with this notion. He states that those who co-operated with the Chinese did not always receive more mail, although he also notes that they were definitely given more opportunities to write. Another returnee, on the other hand, mentions the names of two men who, unlike most of the prisoners, received mail regularly, and he states that he feels that this situation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

was used as a propaganda weapon by the Communists in their effort to soften up the other POWs for the indoctrination program. He says that POWs who did not receive as much mail were told that the people at home were not writing.[32]

c. Speed-Up Before Repatriation

Although mail was not ordinarily received until at least a few months after it had been sent from the United States, there is some indication that there was a general speed-up in delivery just prior to "Little Switch," and that the situation from then on improved. Some letters received at that time were only ten to twenty days en route.[33]

d. Effect of Complaints About Delivery

Ordinarily, POWs were given little redress after their complaints about the delays in the arrival of mail. The Chinese invariably placed the blame on the U.N. command. The Chinese claimed repeatedly that they delivered all mail that was turned over to them. The reports of the returnees, however, do not support these claims.

e. Withholding Mail as a Penalty or as a Means of Coercion

It is possible that mail was sometimes withheld from POWs as a penalty or as a means of coercion. One POW (who incidently states that he received only two letters during his entire internment)

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NND 867210
By ERG NARS, Date 4/11/90

reports that, while he was being punished by the CCF and was in solitary confinement, the authorities would bring him letters, have him sign a receipt, and then tear them up before he had read them.[34] Another POW reports that, during a period when he was not receiving letters, he inquired of the CCF and was told that he would not receive any mail until he wrote "favorable" letters home.[35]

Certainly, the absolute control exercised by the Communists over the mail of the prisoners provided them with an effective weapon. Their use of it as such is in flagrant contrast to the standards established by the Geneva Convention which reads, in part:

> Prisoners of War shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards....If limitations must be placed on the correspondence addressed to prisoners of war, they may be ordered only by the power on which the prisoners depend, possibly at the request of the detaining power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed by the most rapid methods at the disposal of the Detaining Power; they may not be delayed or retained for disciplinary reasons.[36]

2. Types of Incoming Mail

a. Letters and Cards

Letters were the instruments used most often by those who wished to communicate with the prisoners. There are numerous reports, however, of instances in which post cards were received. The ease with which post cards could be censored may have caused the more rapid transit and more frequent delivery of these missives.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

One POW, whose total incoming correspondence was considerably above the average, reports that he received 280 cards, as contrasted to 50 letters.

b. Packages

With the exception of isolated instances, such as the receipt at Camp 1 of some music sheets, there are no reports of packages having been received by POWs. In the latter stages of their internment, some small items enclosed in letters were passed by the censor, but these could not be classified as packages.

3. Restriction of Incoming Mail

It was obvious that the letters received by the POWs had been censored, because they already were open when delivered and enclosed articles such as pictures were sometimes returned to the wrong envelopes. Ordinarily, however, there was no evidence on the face of the letters (except, occasionally, a stamp reading "O.K. Camp __") to indicate that they had been censored. While some prisoners report having received letters which were cut up or had pages removed, this was apparently the exception rather than the rule. In all likelihood, a letter was withheld entirely when a portion of it failed to gain the approval of the censor.

There is no specific evidence available as to exactly what constituted censorable material in incoming letters. It is safe to assume, however, from their very absence in most of the letters

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

received, that any remarks unfavorable to the Communists or adversely affecting their propaganda or indoctrination programs were prohibited. Although some reports indicate that the Communists were not as particular about incoming mail, the restrictions applied were not dissimilar to those mentioned in the previous section regarding outgoing correspondence.

a. Enclosures

Although packages, books, newspapers and magazines were never received by POWs, items enclosed in regular letters reached the prisoners from time to time. By late 1952 or early 1953, the prisoners sometimes received the following items in their letters:

Loose cigarettes	Powder for making soup
"Bull Durham" tobacco	Powdered and concentrated fruit aide
Sticks of chewing gum	Needles
Razor blades	Playing cards
Vitamin pills	Handkerchiefs
Medicine	Portions of magazines
Coffee	Clippings from newspapers (comics, sports)
Sugar	Portions of comic books
Photographs	

One report (unverified) mentions that some POWs received U.S. currency through the mail and that the Chinese exchanged this currency at the rate of 20,000 yuan to the dollar.[37] It should be noted in this regard that many requests by POWs for money had been received in the United States. The POWs had requested sums ranging from a few dollars for "drug store items" to hundreds of dollars. Obviously, many of these requests had been communist-inspired and had been

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

instituted in conjunctio with the propaganda program (the letter writers stated that the larger sums were to be spent for luxury vacations in China). The army advised the families of prisoners not to comply with these requests, not only because there was doubt as to their genuineness and the purpose for which the money would be spent, but also because the army considered it a violation of the Foreign Assets Control Law, which prohibits sending money to North Korea and Red China.[38]

Photographs were frequently enclosed and, incidentally, might have had some effect upon the Chinese propaganda campaign. The censors saw pictures of new houses, automobiles, and television sets belonging to the prisoners or their families. Some returnees report that, after seeing such pictures, individual Chinese showed less confidence in their statements regarding the "exploitation" of the American people.

b. Registration and Distribution

Enemy personnel treated each letter distributed to the prisoners as a registered document and required a signature upon delivery. Initially, the mail in each camp was handled by the political instructors or squad monitors. Beginning sometime in 1952, however, mail clerks (POW) distributed incoming correspondence for each platoon.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

c. Repeated Censorship

The identity or position of the individuals charged with censoring incoming POW mail cannot be determined. There were rumors from time to time that "Progressives" had been seen censoring letters,[39] but there is no clear indication that this was the case. Although several returnees state their belief that mail was censored several times in the Chinese chain of command, their reports present no consistent pattern on this subject. Information available, while conflicting as to details, appears to indicate that enemy procedure did not conform, in spirit at least, with that part of the Geneva Convention which reads as follows:

> The censoring of correspondence addressed to prisoners of war or dispatched by them shall be done as quickly as possible. Mail shall be censored only by the dispatching State and receiving State, and only once by each.[40]

Section IV - The Mechanics of Exchange[41]

Since correspondence represents one field in which a working agreement was inaugurated between the U.N. and the Communists during the Korean Operation, a brief description is reported herein of the mechanics for the exchange of mail.

1. Phase I - June 1950 - December 1951

During this initial period, no formalized service under the Geneva Convention was effected either by the United Nations

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

Command or by the International Red Cross on behalf of U.N. POWs held by the Communists. As a consequence only fragmentary service was afforded the POWs under Communist control. As a result of the appearance of a few pieces of POW mail in the U.S. and England bearing the address "Chinese People's Party for World Peace, Peking, China," a procedure was announced by the U.S. Post Office Department (PMG Order 46676 Postal Bulletin 19447, 1951) whereby mail to prisoners was to be sent via San Francisco and Hong Kong to Communist China for delivery. In general, the CCF authorized only extremely limited mail service to U.N. POWs during this period; mail service consistent with the standards of the Geneva Convention was non-existent.

2. Phase II - December 1951 - July 1953

On 19 December 1951, the Communist negotiators at the Armistice Conference at PANMUNJOM furnished a list of some 3,000 POWs to the U.N. representatives and further stated that they desired to permit POWs held by them to send mail to their families. The details were worked out and the exchange commenced during that month. The agreement only covered letters, and a subsequent request by CINCUNC that parcels be exchanged at the rate of one per month per POW was turned down by the Communists as not feasible.

APO 100 was established in YOKOHAMA, Japan, as the FEC focal point for the processing and reshipment of mail originating in U.N.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

countries, as well as for that received from the Communists at PANMUNJOM. The mail to North Korea was separated by prison camp number and was dispatched in separate bags to the U.N. Postal Officer at the Armistice Conference Headquarters where it was turned over to the Communist postal officer.

Mail for the POWs in North Korea was taken to PANMUNJOM daily - even during breaks and recesses in the Armistice negotiations. While the U.N. presented mail for exchange daily, the Communists generally presented mail from the U.N. POWs on a very infrequent basis, with lapses of two to three weeks being not unusual; it was accepted whenever offered. After the initial exchange, the number of letters from each POW averaged somewhat less than one per month.

Section V - The Relation of Correspondence to the Propaganda and Indoctrination Program

Apparently the Communists extracted biographical data from correspondence for the purpose of verifying information previously secured through interrogation and indoctrination procedures (autobiographies, etc). This, it may be assumed, provided one basis for the eventual categorizing of the prisoners into "Progressive" and "reactionary" groups and thus increased the effectiveness of the indoctrination program.

The practice of not allowing POWs to receive books, magazines or newspapers through the mail was also clearly related to the

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

indoctrination program and was designed to allow the prisoners to read only that which was compatable with the communist point of view.

Further, the vagueness of restrictions and requirements for outgoing mail made the POWs uncertain of the amount of praise and propaganda which had to be included in their letters and probably caused many to include more than was necessary. This situation caused the seeds of communist propaganda to be spread to a greater degree among the families and friends of POWs within the United States.

One particular incident was reported which illustrates the Communists' preoccupation with the attainment of their propaganda goals. Some POW mail was returned to the prisoners in a partially burned condition. The Communists claimed that the mail had been bombed by the U.N. forces and attempted to get the prisoners to write home mentioning this incident and enclosing the charred fragments.[42]

The CCF screened outgoing letters for possible use in radio broadcasts, and it is reported that they made photostatic copies of letters which they considered suitable for distribution to U.N. frontline troops. A specific illustration of the latter is said to have occurred in Camp 5 in 1952. At that time a soldier, recently captured, brought with him a photostatic copy of a letter written earlier by another POW. This letter mentioned that the writer missed his daughter and wished that he could see her. When the Chinese had distributed the photostats of the letter, they had included a picture

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

of an unknown seven-year old girl. When he saw these pictures, the POW author of the letter protested to the Chinese that his mail was being exploited illegally. The Chinese apparently brought the protest to the attention of their general headquarters, because the POW subsequently was told that the CCF could use any letter at any time and in any way they felt appropriate. They also added that the matter was of no concern of the authors.[43]

It has also been reported that the CCF used the names of POWs for propaganda messages which the individuals concerned had neither written nor approved. As an example, one returnee cites the case of a fellow POW whose name had appeared under a letter in the Shanghai News and also in a propaganda book, POWs Calling. This prisoner claimed never to have signed such a letter or to have had any knowledge of it before its publication.[44]

In general, the conclusion is inescapable that the Communists regarded the POW mail as one more instrument to be utilized to their advantage in the furtherance of both their foreign propaganda and the POW indoctrination campaigns.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAPTER 16

RADIO BROADCASTS

Section I -- Introduction

At frequent intervals during the three years of the Korean Operation, the voices of captured U.S. military personnel were heard in broadcasts emanating from Radio PEKING and from Radio P'YONGYANG. These broadcasts, in conjunction with letters from the POWs, provided the U.S. with knowledge that some, at least, of the captured soldiers, airmen and marines were still alive. The planned pattern of enemy exploitation of POWs, however, rather than any humanitarian motive, accounted for this break in the silence which surrounded the POW camps and their inmates.

The heavy propaganda content of the messages broadcast to the world was recognized by U.S. authorities, and in early 1953 the Office of Public Information, DA, issued a press release stating:

> Chinese and North Korean Communists are using captured American soldiers and their relatives and friends in the United States as propaganda tools....
>
> American soldiers have appeared before microphones of Communist radio stations.... (and)....have taken part in propaganda broadcasts....the voices on the air have been identified as those of American soldiers, and their remarks are strictly in accordance with propaganda themes. Tape recordings.... are being played over and over again on Communist radio stations.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

This chapter is concerned with a discussion of the part played by POWs in making recordings (tape or wire) for the radio broadcasts and the circumstances under which these recordings were made. Discussion of a relatively small but extremely active propaganda group known as the "Peace Fighters" is also included.

Section II - Circumstances of Recording

The earliest instance in which captured U.S. soldiers are reported to have made recordings for radio broadcasts occurred in July 1950 in SEOUL. The recordings were heavily political in nature and were accomplished under the supervision of the NKA. An officer POW who recorded at that time has stated that, as part of the pressure which was brought to bear on him, he was told that his continued refusal to broadcast would result not only in his own death but also in the death of the 71 men for whom he was responsible. The officer claims that he agreed to make the recording only after having been assured that his men, in addition to being spared, would be fed and treated humanely.

In the period between August 1950 and September 1951, there were some recordings made at P'YONGYANG[1], but, by the latter half of 1951, most broadcasts were being made under the direction of the CCF at PYOKTONG.[2] In addition, some recordings were made in the other permanent camps with portable equipment.[3]

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

The early broadcasts were prepared under the supervision of the North Koreans, but in 1951, as the Chinese assumed more and more control over the POW camps (with the exception of the Camp 12 "Peace Fighters," over whom the NK retained authority throughout their existence), the methods used to obtain recordings apparently became less forceful than those employed by the NKA. There are very few instances reported where POWs were threatened or urged under "pressure" to make recordings for broadcast, and it appears that prisoners who refused to co-operate with the Communists in this regard were not made to suffer for it.[4] Indeed, there are no cases reported (excluding those involving Bacteriological Warfare "confessions") in which either the Chinese or the North Koreans actually carried out such threats or punished POWs for consistently refusing to make broadcast recordings.

Instead of threats or physical persuasion, the Communists were more subtle and used what might be called an "incentive" approach. They portrayed radio broadcasts as a privilege by means of which the POWs could inform their families that they had been captured and were in "good" health. One POW mentions that, at the time they were "offered the opportunity" to record, the Chinese claimed that they were making every effort to contact the U.N. command and furnish a list of POWs, and that prisoners could help to accomplish this purpose by making recordings to their families. They also represented recordings as either a substitute for letters

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

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home or a more efficient method of conveying what had already been written.

Except in the case of the "Peace Fighters," there was apparently little or no special preparation undergone by those who were about to make recordings. One returnee states that in Camp 1 there were no lectures or courses given to POWs before recording. He declares that prisoners wrote their scripts under Chinese "supervision," and that short scripts were usually prepared within an hour, although two or three days often elapsed before the recordings were actually made.[5] Advice was usually given as to what should be included in the broadcasts (praise for CCP, propaganda topics, etc.). Although there were exceptions,[6] most POWs apparently wrote their own scripts, subject to review by the authorities; they knew, however, that even when the messages were not censored before recording, they would certainly be reviewed before being broadcast.

Section III - Type and Content of Recordings

1. General

Recordings made by POWs for broadcast may be divided into two general categories. The first had, as its sole purpose, the dissemination of Communist propaganda. The second, although it inevitably contained a heavy propaganda slant, was built around a personal message to the prisoner's family or friends. These categories were not absolute and, in addition, there are reports by

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

the returnees that some propaganda-free recordings were made from time to time. There is no indication, however, that these latter were ever actually broadcast by the enemy.

2. Straight Propaganda Recordings

These took various forms, including "political forums" and "peace appeals," and are discussed more thoroughly in the section dealing with the "Peace Fighters," below. It should be noted, however, that the opportunity to make politically slanted recordings was apparently not limited to any one group. One returnee reports that voluntary recordings of this type could be made at any time and could be of any length, and he mentions having composed a political recording while at Camp 5 in January 1953, in which he directed his words to the "mothers and fathers of the world" and echoed the Communist line on the voluntary repatriation issue.[7] The recording stressed the "needless waste of American boys in Korea" and the "peace-loving intentions of the Chinese." The text was written by the speaker but before being presented was partially rewritten by another POW. Reports of returnees lend substantial support to the view that, in spite of reported pressures, POWs probably could have refused to make this type of broadcast without suffering any harmful consequences.[8] (This, of course, does not apply to broadcasts of Bacteriological Warfare "confessions" discussed in Chapter 8.)

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

3. Mixed Message Recordings

The majority of the recordings made by the POWs fall into the "mixed" category. Capitalizing on the anxiety of the prisoners to reassure their families and friends, the Communists offered the opportunity to make recordings for radio broadcasts. Topics which were suggested to the POWs for incorporation in the scripts, however, included:[9]

a. Plea for removal of the 7th Fleet from Formosan waters.

b. Plea for removal of U.S. Air Force from Formosa.

c. Statements that the U.S. had committed atrocities in Korea.

d. Mention of good food and good treatment.

e. Peace Appeals.

f. Criticisms of U.N. leaders (including President TRUMAN).

The degree of propaganda which had to be included was not always known by the prisoners. They apparently felt that, at the minimum, they must include the comment that they were in good health and were being well treated. They probably also reasoned that the greater the propaganda content, the greater the possibility that the recording would actually be broadcast.

The opportunity to make recordings was apparently not presented in accordance with any consistent time schedules. Often,

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

when the Chinese censor found a letter which would serve as a sound instrument for propaganda, the POW author would be asked to make a recording. Volunteers for broadcasts containing more than a minimum of propaganda, especially if the message was directed to an influential person, usually found their offer accepted.[10] The opportunity for the POWs to send greetings to their families was often presented at or just before Christmas.[11] In the earlier stages, when there was considerable question in the minds of most POWs as to whether their status as prisoners was known, there was apparently a great deal of competition for the privilege of recording.[12] Later, however, when the propaganda aspects of the situation had become more evident, enthusiasm apparently waned.

Although most of the recordings (both propaganda and otherwise) were made voluntarily, the reasons for making them varied. Most POWs probably recorded either because, governed by the underlying desire to communicate with their families and friends, they were thoughtless or unaware of the possible propaganda ramifications of their actions, or because they were opportunists who hoped that better treatment would be forthcoming as a result of even limited co-operation. Others apparently co-operated out of fear of unknown (and probably unreal) consequences. One returnee states that POWs were not resentful toward those who had made broadcasts early in the war, since they realized that many had been duped into making them by promises that the recordings would be sent home.[13]

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The POWs remembered, too, that there had been a certain amount of competition for the privilege of making these recordings, and that many of them had been unaware of the implications of the propaganda purposes at the time. Resentment in regard to these earlier broadcasts, therefore, was directed more toward the enemy than toward the men who had broadcast; this was especially true when the voices of men who had subsequently died were heard over the public address systems. A different attitude prevailed, however, toward those who participated in later broadcasts and made derogatory remarks about the U.S.

14

Section IV - The "Peace Fighters"

In early February 1951, a group of 20 men were transported from Camp 5 to P'YONGYANG; this group formed the nucleus of Camp 12. During the ensuing months they were joined by POWs from other camps, but the total number was probably never greater than 80 to 100. The camp was under the immediate control of the NKA at all times.

15

Camp 12, which became known as the "Peace Fighters' Camp," was also recognised as the home of the Central Peace Committee. It was established for the special purpose of furthering the goals of the propaganda and indoctrination program. One of its primary activities involved the preparation and presentation of propaganda radio broadcasts, most of the actual recordings for which were made

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16
at P'YONGYANG. (See also Chapter 7, Indoctrination, for its companion activities.)

Prior to their removal from Camp 5, the men who were to form the nucleus of Camp 12 had been asked if they would be willing to go to P'YONGYANG to make radio broadcasts to the people back home, and had consented to do so. Some of them later claimed that they were under the impression that it was to be merely an "innocent" broadcast for the purpose of informing their families that they
17
were alive and being held as POWs. On the other hand, there are indications that most of them were aware of the propaganda aspects of the trip and had volunteered or willingly submitted to the suggestion in spite of this. One returnee states that they were all aware that the purpose of the trip was to make propaganda broadcasts for the Communists and to engage in the various other activities naturally flowing from a "Peace Fighter" movement. He claims that they had been approached with somewhat the following appeal: "Are you for Peace? Yes? Well then, will you fight for peace? Good! You are henceforth Peace Fighters and will have the
18
opportunity to display the courage of your convictions."

Regardless of their opinions at the outset, however, it was not long before the nature of the group and the purposes for which it was intended became patently obvious. They were reportedly marched through the streets of P'YONGYANG, and several members of the group were introduced to "SEOUL CITY SUE," the American wife

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of a Korean, who made propaganda broadcasts for the Communists over Radio SEOUL.[19] The POWs were reportedly given considerable indoctrination in the form of lectures and reading material, as well as promises and assurances that they were receiving, or would receive, improved rations and preferred treatment.[20]

If the POWs were not aware of the ramifications of their position as "Peace Fighters" by this time, they were certainly made cognizant of their status when the time came for them to make their first broadcasts. It became apparent at that time that the broadcasts were to be primarily of a political nature.[21] The scripts had to be written to conform to the wishes of the North Koreans and, in order to be accepted, had to include propaganda topics such as "World Peace" or criticisms of the U.N. or the U.S. and its leaders. Apparently many of the scripts had to be reworked several times and even then only a few were found acceptable.[22]

Nearly all the POWs at Camp 12 either made or added their names to voice recordings which were to be used for propaganda purposes.[23] Recordings were reportedly made discussing, among other things, prison life, atrocities committed by South Koreans, bombing of non-military targets and appeals for peace.[24]

In the spring of 1951, "radio panels" were formed, which engaged in so-called "round table discussions."[25] There were reportedly three panels, each with a moderator; the format consisted of questions such as: "What is your name? What do you think of this

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senseless bombing and killing?" Each panel made one recording and, in doing so, adhered strictly to scripts which had been prepared by the POWs and edited and approved by the NKA. The following samples of titles for the "discussions" reflect their content:

> "Petition to the United Nations,"
>
> "Petition to the Five Great Powers," and
>
> "Petition by U.N. Officers and Prisoners to Surrender."[26]

One returnee adds that the statements made in the recordings included derogatory remarks about General Douglas MacArthur, a peace appeal, and a surrender appeal.[27] Apparently there were about 15 to 20 POWs present when the recordings were made, and they indicated their names by way of endorsement in all of the recordings except the surrender appeal. The surrender appeal was a little less easy, however, and it has been reported that at least half of them refused to co-operate and identify themselves with it. No disciplinary action, or even threats of such action, resulted from this refusal.

In December 1951, the "Peace Fighters" Camp was dissolved, and its personnel returned to the camps along the YALU River.

Section V - Radio Broadcasts and Correspondence

There is a definite parallel between the exploitation of the POWs through their correspondence and through radio broadcasts. In both instances, the prisoners realized that, to some degree at

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least, material favorable to the Communists had to be included to assure transmission." (See chapter 14 for a discussion of Correspondence.) The problem for most of the POWs was to satisfy the enemy while simultaneously sacrificing as little as possible of their own beliefs and standards.

An additional association between the two subjects if found in the fact that letters were used as both the basis of and the format for many radio broadcasts. If the Chinese, while censoring out-

28

29

Since I have received no mail from you to
me in December 1950, have given me this oppor-

I am in good health and am being treated
well. I
very Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year. I

Although there were no restrictions on the content of messages sent on this particular occasion, the greeting nevertheless contained

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

a comment favorable to the Chinese - the remark that the POW was in good health and being treated well. That inclusion illustrates the feeling of the POWs that, regardless of the lack of explicit Communist instruction, there would be little chance of their recordings actually being broadcast without the insertion of some sort of "favorable comment."

Section VI - Propaganda Effects of Radio Broadcasting

The purpose of POW radio broadcasts, from the Communist point of view, can probably be summed up in two words: propaganda and indoctrination.

By playing upon the desires and weaknesses of the individuals under their control, the Communists managed to effect a situation where men who had not long before been actively opposing them on the field of combat were made to appear, at least superficially, to be praising them or accepting their political ideas. Even in those cases where compliance with Communist prerequisites was comparatively slight, this very phenomenon was used in connection with the propaganda and indoctrination programs to exemplify the tolerant and altruistic attitude manifested by the Communists toward the prisoners from "aggressive" nations.

The texts of POW recordings were often appropriated for use in propaganda books and articles, where their meanings were distorted and perverted to coincide with propaganda aims. The recordings

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

themselves were not only heard over the public address systems in the POW camps, but also were transmitted by radio over large areas. Many of them were picked up by U.S. monitors and eventually forwarded to families within the United States.

The degree of effectiveness of these methods in promoting or supporting the Communist cause is a question which is not within the purview of this report. Regardless of any direct effect, the experience gained by Oriental Communists in dealing with Western prisoners undoubtedly was of value to them, both in the knowledge they gained as to techniques, and as an insight into the weaknesses or gullibility of U.S. military personnel.

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1. ASCIR #0046, NUGENT, Ambrose, Maj., O 387162 Army
2. ASCIR #0063, THOMAS, John L., Cpl., RA 13350012 Army
3. ASCIR #0036, WILLIAMS, James, Capt., O 886899 Army
4. ASCIR #0065, HARRISON, Joe T., Capt., O 1333970 Army
5. ASCIR #0055, PAGE, Frank, Sgt., RA 13163929 Army
6. IBID
7. ASCIR #0039, DUNN, Harold, M., Cpl., RA 18301314 Army
8. ASCIR #0067, MACGHEE, David, Maj., AO 790271 USAF
9. ASCIR #0056, ARTESANI, Richard, M/Sgt., RA 11037873 Army

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10. ASCIR #0039, DUNN, Harold M., Cpl., RA 18301314 Army

11. ASCIR #0063, THOMAS, John L., Cpl., RA 13350012 Army

12. ASCIR #0052, MENDELL, Raymond, Sgt., RA 13261623 Army

13. ASCIR #0056, ARTESANI, Richard, M/Sgt., RA 11037873 Army

14. IBID

15. ASCIR #0067, MACGHEE, David, Maj., AO 790271 USAF

16. IBID

17. Phase II Interrogation Report
MUISE, Eric E.J., Cpl., RA 11252313 Army

18. ASCIR #0067, MACGHEE, David, Maj., AO 790271 USAF

19. Phase II Interrogation Report
MUISE, Eric E.J., Cpl., RA 11252313 Army

20. IBID

21. Phase II Interrogation Report
FLEMING, Harry, Lt. Col., O 1308131 Army

22. IBID

23. Phase II Interrogation Report
WARD, John G., Cpl., RA 14323840 Army

24. Phase II Interrogation Report
WILSON, Louis, 1st Lt., O 61384 Army

25. ASCIR #0059, COXE, Dwight E., WOJG, W 2142515 Army

26. Phase II Interrogation Report
WILSON, Louis, 1st Lt., O 61384 Army

27. ASCIR #0059, COXE, Dwight E., WOJG, W 2142515 Army

28. ASCIR #0054, BLACK, Joe, M/Sgt., RA 6304204 Army

29. ASCIR #0036, WILLIAMS, James, Capt., O 886895 Army

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30. Shall Brothers Be published by "Chinese Committee for World Peace and Against American Aggression," Peking 1952.

31. ASCIR #0036, WILLIAMS, James, Capt., O 886895 Army

32. Shall Brothers Be published by "Chinese Committee for World Peace and Against American Aggression," Peking 1952.

33. Press release issued by Office of Public Information, DA, in early 1953.

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8589th A.A.U.
Fort George G Meade, Maryland

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Temporary Duty at Fort Meade

This is to welcome you to Fort Meade and explain why you have been sent here for a short period of temporary duty.

As a returned ex-Prisoner of War you have already answered many questions during your debriefing or "interrogation." The object of the debriefing was, of course, to obtain information of value to our armed forces, our Country, and the families of your comrades still missing.

You and your fellow ex-POWs are in a sense like members of a scouting party who have returned from a long stay behind enemy lines, with much information about the enemy. A careful study of all the information received to date has led us to believe that you in particular may have answers which may help fill the gaps in our knowledge of the enemy and what he did.

We of course are not certain that you have these answers, but, like a gold prospector or oil well driller, we can only dig where it looks most promising. Your experiences, previous answers, and co-operative attitude make you appear most promising, and it is hoped that you may be able to recall additional important details or new facts, now that you have had time to relax and reflect on your experiences.

We should like to stress that the men who will work with you, some of whom were once POWs themselves, are not interested in obtaining information with which to prosecute or judge any of your fellow ex-POWs. They seek information only to help us to know our enemies and their methods better. If for any reason you desire not to answer any of their questions, you are under no compulsion to do so for you are an American citizen home again, thank God.

We hope that your short visit with us at Fort Meade will be an interesting and enjoyable one and we shall do our best to make it so.

/s/ Verner C. Aurell
/t/ VERNER C. AURELL
Lt Col SigC
Commanding

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90


ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS, CAMPS 1 THROUGH 5

(See Following Pages)

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CAMP 1
March 1951 - August 1952




STRENGTH: Approx 1800 (1150 US; 650 UK)

NOTE: ① Until the middle of October 1951 when they were transferred to Camp 2, there were a few officers in the Company 3 area but they were not actually members of the company.

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Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp Organization Camp 1	
Info Date Aug '52	Fig 14

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STRENGTH: Approx 1400 (900 US; 500 UK)


NOTE: ① US Cau Pvts and Cpls.
② UK Pvts and Cpls.

GEN: In August 1952, when Camp 1 was reorganized all sergeants were transferred to Camp 4

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Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 1	
Info Date Aug '53	Fig 15

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STRENGTH: *Oct 51 - Oct 52: Approx 224 US Officers and 59 other UN Officers (according to list handed over by the Chinese on 18 Dec 51 and corroborated by returnee reports.*
Oct 52 - Aug 53: Approx 130 UN Officers and 25-30 EM.

NOTE: From Oct 52, this camp was divided into company 1 and 2. Company 1 remained at this location and company 2 was moved to another site.


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Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 2 Company 1	
Info Date Aug 153	Fig 16

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By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

CAMP 2 COMPANY 2

October 1952 - August 1953




STRENGTH: Approx 150 US-UN Officers

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Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 2 Company 2	
Info Date Aug '53	Fig 17

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CAMP 2 COMPANY 3
August 1952 - June 1953



- *STRENGTH: Approx 230*


NOTE: Company 3 was composed mainly of POW who, from the Chinese standpoint, were either refractory or reactionary.

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Ft Geo G Meade Md

Camp 2
Company 3

Info Date	Fig 18
June '53	

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STRENGTH: Approx 145


NOTE: ① Direct control over the interrogation team was exercised by the Chief of Interrogation at Camp 2, Company 1.

② Worked at Platoon Level when needed.

GEN: The platoon organization is verified by a number of returned POWs; additional information from one source (ASCIR 0067) dated 28 Jan 54.

Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 2 Company 4	
Info Date Aug '53	Fig 19

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STRENGTH: Varied; see figures above on each company and explanation in Note 2 & 3 below.

NOTE: ① Composition: US EM (Cau)
US EM (Negro)
British EM

② Co 5 formed in October 1951

Composition:		
	US EM (Cau)	135
	US EM (Neg)	75
	US Officers	13
	US Sgts	40
	TOTAL	*263*

③ Composition:


	US EM (Cau)	150
	US EM (Neg)	20
	British EM	40
	TOTAL	*210*

GEN: All POW held at Camp 3 during this period had first been at Camp 5. They were transferred to Camp 3 in October 1951.

In November 1951 all officers were transferred to Camp 2.

Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md
Camp 3
Info Date Feb '52 Fig 20

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STRENGTH: Approx 750

NOTE: ① Formed in February by splitting up Co 1.
② Formed in July: composed of POW from Companies 1, 2, 5, and 9 whom the Chinese considered "Reactionary."


GEN: July 1952: British POW transferred to Camp 1.
July 1952: UN Negro POW below Sergeant transferred to Camp 5.
July 1952: Most Sergeants transferred to Camp 4.

Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 3	
Info Date Aug '52	Fig 21

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CAMP 3

August 1952 - August 1953




STRENGTH: *Approx 850 US Privates and Corporals.*

NOTE: ① August 1952: Company 2 was merged with Company 2.

② August 1952: Co 3 formed by splitting Companies 1 and 2. In May 1953, Co 3 was deactivated and its members assigned to Companies 1 and 2. Shortly after an unsegregated Company of USAF and Army EM, captured in the beginning of 1953, was formed mid-way between Camps 3 and 5. This new Company although well beyond the physical confines of Camp 3, received the title of Company 3, Camp 3.

Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 3	
Info Date Aug '53	Fig 22

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


STRENGTH: *Approx 600 (530 US, 32-40 UK, 25-27 Turks, 2-4 French.*

NOTE: ① Composed of UN NCOs.

Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 4	
Info Date Aug '53	Fig 23

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STRENGTH: Estimates of the original POW population vary from 3,000 to 5,000. Many deaths occurred during this period.


Army Security Center
Ft Geo G Meade Md

Camp 5

Info Date
Mar 51

Fig 24

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By ERG NARS, Date 4/11/90




STRENGTH: Approx 1500

NOTE: ① Until December 1951.

Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 5	
Info Date Aug '52	Fig 25

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STRENGTH : Approx 1250

NOTE: ① August 1952 Sergeants moved to Camp 4.
② January 1951 - October 1951 US Officers
October 1951 - December 1951 Study Group
December 1951 - August 1953 British Bn
③ Established March 1953.

Army Security Center Ft Geo G Meade Md	
Camp 5	
Info Date Aug 53	Fig 26

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Appendix III


AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS AND SKETCHES

CAMPS 1 THROUGH 5

SKETCH OF CAMP 12


(See Following Pages)

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
ARMY SECURITY CENTER FT GEO G MEADE MD	
PW CAMP 1 CH'ANG-NI, NORTH KOREA (XE 878 797)	
INFO DATE AUG '53	FIG. 28

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


ARMY SECURITY CENTER FT GEO G MEADE MD	
PW CAMP 2, CO 1 P'YONGJANG-NI, NORTH KOREA (YF 138 017)	
INFO DATE AUG '53	FIG. 30

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
LEGEND

1 PIG PEN
2 LATRINE
3 LIBRARY & POW BARBERSHOP
4 POW KITCHEN
5 POW QUARTERS
  A BATHHOUSE
  B QUARTERS
6 VEGETABLE PIT
7 CCF OFFICERS' QUARTERS
8 CCF POLITICAL INSTRUCTORS' QUARTERS
9 GUARD QUARTERS
10 SHED
11 KOREAN HOUSES
12 KOREAN SCHOOLHOUSE
• WELL
● GUARD POST
NG NIGHT GUARD POST ONLY



ARMY SECURITY CENTER FT GEO G MEADE MD	
PW CAMP 2, CO 2 P'YONGJANG-NI, NORTH KOREA (YF 129 022)	
INFO DATE AUG '53	FIG. 31


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LEGEND


1 STOREHOUSE & STABLE
2 CAMP HQ
3 BATHHOUSE
4 PO-RO MARKER
5 POW QTRS
6 POW QTRS & KITCHEN
7 POW QTRS
8 DISPENSARY
9 LATRINE
10 KOREAN SCHOOL & TEACHERS' QTRS
11 GUARD QTRS & KOREAN CIVILIANS
12 POW JAIL
13 POW NCO QTRS
14 GUARD QTRS & KITCHEN
15 GUARD OFFICERS' QTRS
16 GUARD COMMANDER'S QTRS
17 KOREAN CIVILIANS
◎ GUARD POSTS
X—X BARBED WIRE



100 0 100 200 YDS
TERRAIN TO SCALE (APPROX)
STRUCTURES ENLARGED


ARMY SECURITY CENTER FT GEO G MEADE MD	
PW CAMP 2, CO 3 CHUNGHA-DONG, NORTH KOREA (YF 277 036)	
INFO. DATE JUN '53	FIG. 33

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ARMY SECURITY CENTER FT GEO G MEADE MD	
PW CAMP 2, CO 4 OSANG-DONG (YF 203 075)	
INFO DATE AUG '53	FIG. 35


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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90




CAMP 3
SOUTHERN SECTOR
FIG. 36 -562-

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ARMY SECURITY CENTER
FT GEO G MEADE MD

P W CAMP 3
CHANGSONG, NORTH KOREA
(XE 851 869)

INFO DATE	FIG. 38
AUG '53	


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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90




CAMP 4

FIG. 39 -568-


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


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ARMY SECURITY CENTER FT GEO G MEADE MD	
PW CAMP 5 PYOKTONG, NORTH KOREA (YE 062 995)	
INFO DATE AUG '53	FIG. 42

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ENEMY REFERENCE MATERIAL ON U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Enemy interrogators had at their disposal a varied assortment of data which they used for checking the information supplied by the POWs. Included were the reference materials listed below:

1. Army and USAF manuals and training manuals.
2. Air and Army Order of Battle charts.
3. TO&Es of Army units and USAF groups and squadrons.
4. Organization of MATS.
5. Location of SAC bases in Okinawa, Japan, and USA.
6. Roster of all South Korean airfields.
7. Location of Troop Carrier units.
8. Location of U.S. Navy bases in Japan.
9. Accurate sketch of Kadena Airfield, Okinawa.
10. Change of commanding officers in the 5th Air Force.
11. Complete squadron rosters and personnel data of the 18th Fighter-Bomber Group.
12. Information on USAF units leaving the United States for overseas assignments.
13. Officer pay schedules.
14. Chart on General Staff work.
15. Code names and signs used by USAF.
16. USAF radio frequencies, including VHF.
17. Radio facilities chart for the month of April 1952. (Obtained from a crashed B-26 aircraft.)

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18. Manual on USAF radio ranges.

19. Material on APQ-13 and APN-3 radar equipment.

20. SAC bombardier manual (dated 1951).

21. USAF Tech Orders.

22. USAF Pilot's Handbook on F-86 aircraft.

23. Operating Manual for F-80 and F-51 aircraft.

24. Tech manual on F-84 Aircraft.

25. Pictures of F-86 and F-94 aircraft, including performance data.

26. TO&E of medical company.

27. Organization of U.S. hospitals.

28. Medical Department catalog (1949).

29. Training manual for medical personnel.

30. Medical training bulletins.

31. Information on U.S. Army training centers and forts.

32. A copy of FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data.

33. A copy of C&GS School publication listing the TO&Es of all U.S. Army units.

Most POWs reported that the enemy had poor knowledge of U.S. logistics.

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Appendix V

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SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ASKED BY ENEMY (NK & CCF) INTERROGATORS

1. General Military Questions

   a. Army and Air Force Order of Battle.

   b. Army paratroop training.

   c. Casualty reports.

   d. Replacement system.

   e. Recruiting system.

   f. Basic training syllabus.

   g. Organization of Joint Operations Command - JOC.

   h. Organization of Air National Guard.

   i. USAF personnel in Alaska and Okinawa. Names of military personnel that served with GHQ in Tokyo.

   j. U.S. aviation cadet program.

   k. SAC plans for the future.

   l. SAC survival schools.

   m. FEAF Bomber Command Strike Report.

   n. Types of USAF battle formations.

   o. Tactics of U.S. Army and USAF and occurring changes.

   p. Bombing tactics and types of targets.

   q. USAF aircraft marking system.

   r. Rescue facilities.

   s. Close support operations.

   t. Paratroop dropping tactics.

   u. Night flying.

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v. Time element in making the aircraft airborne from the moment of alert warning.

w. Air defense of all known USAF bases.

x. Accuracy of night bombing.

y. Means of detecting enemy camouflage from the air.

z. TO&E of the 1st Air Force.

aa. Instrument flying

bb. Celestial navigation

cc. The theory of aerial sextants.

dd. Frequency of air missions.

ee. Night interdiction missions.

ff. Flying routes to and back from the targets (Korea).

gg. Routes of air reconnaissance.

hh. Ground control system.

ii. Assembly areas of USAF bombers.

jj. ECM air refueling.

kk. Aircraft losses.

ll. Aviation medicine.

mm. Locations of hospitals.

nn. Aircraft maintenance.

oo. Ammunition dumps.

pp. Army patrol tactics.

qq. Transportation system.

rr. Organization of services and supply.

ss. Location of mines and outposts in Korea.

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tt. Ammunition supply carried by Army patrol.

uu. Construction of U.N. bunkers.

vv. Army Command and General Staff School.

ww. Japanese Security Forces, strength and intentions.

2. Technical Questions

a. Army communications system.

b. Codes and ciphers, code names, call signs, coding and decoding procedures, operation of coding and decoding device M-209.

c. Aircraft communications procedures.

d. Questions concerning Shoran, Loran, and IFF.

e. Emergency air signals or rescue signals.

f. Slang words used in air communications.

g. Radar stations and aircraft radar.

h. Location of early warning radar stations in Japan.

i. Radar network in United States, radar controlled AAA, and radio frequencies used.

j. Characteristics of USAF aircraft: F-80, F-84, F-82, F-86 series, F-94, F-51, B-36, B-47, B-29, B-26.

k. Hydraulic system of bomb bay doors on B-26.

l. Aircraft booster system.

m. Army liaison aircraft.

n. U.S. Army tanks, tank engines, and radio facilities.

o. Anti-aircraft artillery guns and ground electronics.

p. New U.S. Army weapons.

q. Research and development programs of Army weapons.

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r. Atomic weapons. Atomic decontamination training.

s. Chemical, bacteriological and radiological warfare training.

3. Installations

a. U.S. Army forts and camps in U.S.A., Japan, Alaska, Okinawa, and Guam.

b. USAF airbases and airfields in U.S.A, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Guam and Alaska.

c. Location of Army training centers in U.S.A.

d. Location of USAF flying schools.

e. Location of U.S. Navy bases and ports and Naval depots.

f. Location of heavy industry in U.S.A.

4. Political

a. Political party affiliations.

b. Opinions on socialist and communist forms of government.

c. Opinions on capitalistic and communist forms of economy.

d. Opinions on U.S. political and military leaders.

e. Racial discrimination in the United States.

f. What was the motto of the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars; number of posts and membership requirements.

5. U.S. Counterintelligence

The Chinese political instructors and interrogators demonstrated much interest in U.S. counterintelligence and its activities. Reactionaries were often accused of belonging to CIC or CID; the primary purpose seemed to be to discover those POWs who were connected with

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U.S. intelligence agencies. Specific questions asked by the enemy concerning such agencies were as follows:

a. Methods used by CIC in interrogating prisoners.

b. Functions and distribution of agents.

c. Whether each division had its own CIC unit.

d. Whether linguistic ability was a prerequisite for becoming a CIC agent.

e. What schools were attended.

f. What courses were given.

g. How many men in a CIC Company.

h. Do CIC personnel go to the front lines.

i. Do members of CIC give lectures to front line troops.

j. Did CIC personnel warn the troops to watch for prostitutes sent out by the Chinese to gather information.

k. Names of CIC agents.

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Appendix VI

An Outline of a Typical Autobiography as Required of the POWs by the Communists

I Brief Description of Yourself:

A. Name, serial number, rank, age, outfit and duty
B. Nationality, race and origin, native town, present address.
C. Education
D. Specialties
E. Hobbies

II Family (both yourself and parents) Financial Conditions:

A. Members of the family (name, age, occupation, political affiliation and religious belief).
B. Stock and property.
C. The principal sources of family income, monthly income, expenditures and savings.
D. Financial tie between you and your parents.
E. Attachment with your parents while you were in the armed forces.
F. Parents' address.

III Social Relationships:

A. Names and present addresses of your closest relatives and friends (colleagues, superiors, teachers, schoolmates, etc.).
B. Their occupations, religious beliefs and political affiliations.
C. Give degree of relationship between you and the.

IV History in Detail:

A. Life prior to joining the armed forces.
1. Birthday and birthplace.
2. School life. The schools you attended, when and where? What were your favorite subjects?
3. Professional life (both during and after schooldays), your jobs and pay.
4. Political activities, party affiliations both during and after schooldays.

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B. Military Career:

1. When, where and how did you enter the armed forces?
2. Assignments (time, places, units, rank, duties and principal functions).
3. Your intimate colleagues (officers or men) in the past various assignments.
4. What kind of military training have you received (when, where and in which unit?) The main courses and subjects studied?
5. How many times have you entered the armed forces?
6. Have you ever been discharged? If so, list your civilian jobs and pay. (time and place)
7. Did you fight in World War II? If so, when, where and what duties?
8. Were you wounded or captured during World War II? If captured, when, where and how did you get out? How many campaigns have you participated in? When and where?

V Social activities and political affiliations:

A. What party, social bodies and religious groups have you joined?

B. When did you work for them? What were your functions and activities and in the organizations?

C. The training and education you received from the organizations you have joined.

D. What is the nature and purposes of the organizations you have joined?

E. When were the organizations founded and who are the leaders?

F. How have you kept contact with the organizations (prior to and after capture)?

G. What are the activities of the parties, organizations and religion (to which you belong) in the armed forces? Are these activities legal or not?

H. What is your impression and opinion towards various political parties and social bodies in your country?

VI Prior to and since capture:

A. Your sentiments and feelings at being sent to Korea, after getting into combat and since capture?

B. Impression of the Chinese People's Volunteers.

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C. Time and place of capture.

_____
(Signature)

Company: _____

Squad: _____

Platoon: _____

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Reading Material Available in One or More of the Camp Libraries

Allen, James	Atomic Imperialism
Austin, Jane	Pride and Prejudice
	Mansfield Park
	Sense and Sensibility
	Persuasion
	Emma
Brown, Lloyd	Hero of Our Time
	Iron City
Burchett, W.	Golden Prague
	Cold War in Germany
Caldwell, E.	China's Feet Unbound
Cathala	Tobacco Road
Cervantes	They Are Betraying the Peace
Cornforth, Maurice	Don Quixote
Dickens, C.	In Defense of Philosophy
	Pickwick Papers
	Tale of Two Cities
	David Copperfield
Dreiser, T.	An American Tragedy
	An Autobiography
	The Financier
Dumas, A.	The Three Musketeers
	Man in the Iron Mask
Ehrenburg, I.	Economics in Peace and War
Fast, H.	The Last Frontier
	Citizen Tom Paine
	Freedom Road
Foster, W. L.	History of the American Labor Movement
	Twilight of World Capitalism
Gorky, Maxim	My Childhood
	My Apprenticeship
	My University
	Mother
Hugo, Victor	Les Miserables
Johnson, H.	Soviet Power
	Soviet Russia Since the War
Kahn, A.	High Treason, The Great Conspiracy
Lenin	Collected Works
Leontiev	Political Economy

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Lewis, Sinclair	Mainstreet
Malenkov, G.	Report to the 19th Party Congress
Marion, G.	My Visit to Russia
	Bases and Empire
	The Communist Trial
Marx	Collected Works
Montagu, I.	The Plot Against the Peace
O'Henry	Short Stories
Ostrowsky, I.	How the Steel was Tempered
Perle, Victor	American Imperialism
Plevier	Stalingrad
Prett, D.	The State Department's Cold War
Pushkin	Prince Mirsky
	Queen of Spades
Remarque	Flotsam
Sinclair, Upton	America's Outpost
Soong, C.	Struggle for New China
Stalin, J.	Collected Works
Stevenson, R.	Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde
Steinbeck	Of Mice and Men
	Grapes of Wrath
Sundarlol	China Today
	China Friend or Foe
Tolstoy	War and Peace
	Selected Stories
Twain, Mark	Tom Sawyer
Verigora	Man With a Clear Conscience
Wallace, Lew	Ben Hur

PERIODICALS

Bulgarian News	New Life
China Monthly	New Times
China Reconstructs	New China
China Review	Political Affairs
Communist News	People's China
Cominform Journal	People's World
Crossroads	Poland
Czech Life	Shanghai News
Daily News Release	The Soviet Man
L'Humanite	VOKS
London and NW Daily Worker	World Students News
Masses and Mainstream	Delhi News
National Guardian	Ogonyok

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Propaganda Films Shown
to POWs in
One or More of the Camps

The following films were reported to have been shown in one or more of the POW camps:

Chinese Nurse
Don Basin Coal Mines
Farming & Industry - USSR & China
Germ Warfare
Hero of the Golden Star
Harnessing the Han River
Meeting on the Elbe
New China
New Russia
May Days - 1951-52
Unforgettable 1919
School Teacher
Soviet Navy
Soviet Circus
Sports & Parades in USSR
The Fall of Berlin
The White-Haired Girl
The Civil War in China
Peace Conference of the Asian & Pacific Regions at Peiping
Peace Conference in Warsaw
The Huai River Project
Village Doctor

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Appendix XX

Themes Of Indoctrination Lectures Given
In the POW Camps

The Twilight of World Capitalism
Exploitation of the American Negro
How Big Business Runs the United States
How Communism Could Benefit the United States
Military and Political Expansion of the United States
Peaceful Co-existence
The United Nations - A Tool of the U.S. Imperialists
The United States and the Japanese Peace Treaty
The North Atlantic Treaty
How China Won Her Freedom
The Island of Formosa
Land Reform In China
China's Five Year Plan
The Lenient Policy of the CCF
Germ Warfare
The Life Story of Kim Il Sung
Rise to Leadership of the Korean People
Mistreatment of POWs on Koje Island
South Korea - The Aggressor
The High Cost of Living in the United States
United Nations Casualties in West Korea
Theory of Surplus Value
The Civil War in China
Negotiations at Kaesong
The 7th Fleet at Taiwan
The U.S.S.R. - Land of Socialism

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APPENDIX X

"PORTRAIT OF A PROGRESSIVE"

This is the personal story of a returned POW who readily admits to being one of the better known "Progressives" in the POW camps of North Korea. SUBJECT, a negro with 10 years educational background, was a corporal in Headquarters Battery, 503 F.A. Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division when he was captured on 30 November 1950 near KUNURI.

In the course of the interview, it became quite apparent that the SUBJECT was less interested in giving an objective evaluation of events than in presenting an explanation for his own conduct during 32 months of internment. The interviewer felt that such a desire should not be discouraged. The following "unburdening" as the SUBJECT characterized it - gives a clear insight into the thinking and personal motivation of one who readily submitted to Communist indoctrination.

SUBJECT's story follows and is told, wherever possible, in his own words;

SUBJECT was taken prisoner during the night of 30 November, 1950, when elements of the opposing forces overran the positions of the 503 F.A. just south of KUNURI. Still dazed from the succession of riflebutt blows to the head by an obviously frightened North Korean infantryman, he and his comrades were first herded to a small POW collecting point, superficially searched, and from there pushed

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and prodded along their way to their first semi-permanent POW camp - an abandoned mining camp later to gain the well-deserved reference, "Death Valley."

It was Christmas in Korea, but in the cold and uncertain days that followed, memories of other more fraternal Yuletide seasons quickly faded before the grim realities of POW life. The physically fit appropriated the food of those too sick to eat, and the strong elbowed away from the warmth of the small fire those too weak to resist. SUBJECT, frightened and confused, retreated when the others shoved, but already had planned the course of action deemed necessary for his own survival.

[illegible] never rated my self as being too intelligent, but I never figured myself dumb. So I figured, 'what are some of the things I am going to have to do now that I have been reduced to the status of a prisoner of war, instead of a soldier?'

An effort to make friends (which for SUBJECT, an admitted introvert, appeared a difficult task) by sharing food and his remaining few cigarettes only resulted in his being "pushed around" and providing an outlet for pent-up emotions and frayed nerves. The constant bickering and already all too evident petty intrigues within the POW group convinced him that:

> ...if any of which came up where anything was going to be taken out on anybody, if anything was going to have to be organized, if there was going to be anything accomplished, there was going to have to be somebody there who could do a little thinking.

That somebody, it appears reasonable to assume, was going to be

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SUBJECT, but, as yet, no pressure had been applied by his North Korean captors, and he preferred to retain the relative safety of anonymity.

On January 25, 1951, SUBJECT, and those of his comrades who were able to walk, began the long trek to POW Camp 5, PYOKTONG, North Korea later to earn the sobriquet - "The University."

Upon arrival at PYOKTONG, he was called to company headquarters and questioned in reference to the NAACP (a membership card which had been confiscated from him during his initial [illegible] the practice of long interrogations on "disinterested" [illegible] and almost [illegible] repeated calls [illegible] learned to [illegible] presumably [illegible] of his ability [illegible] reason, he felt, he was elected to the little [illegible] These older children, [illegible] some [illegible]

[illegible] pretty rotten [illegible] live. The Chinese then [illegible] live [illegible] li[illegible] the [illegible]

After only a week or two in office, [illegible] men that SUBJECT was getting more than his allotted share of the food,

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forced him - with Chinese approval - to resign. A brief period as squad leader and then a long, successful term as squad monitor placed him in the political limelight from which he never again was to escape. The security of obscurity - a cardinal tenet of POW behaviour - was lost to him forever.

As monitor, it was his task to lead group discussions on certain prescribed topics and to forward the political opinions of his squad to com[illegible] Those who were [illegible] street enough to venture [illegible] with the Chinese [illegible] were [illegible] of [illegible] with the [illegible] [illegible] were [illegible] and I was one of the first [illegible] First Company to know that the Chinese [illegible] First Company who started [illegible] going to be hard if the Chinese can't [illegible] was too high [illegible] the Chinese [illegible] The [illegible] and myself. Pretty soon I [illegible] to headquarters and given praise for having [illegible]

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His squad was the model squad and he was the model monitor. Medical care and food increased proportionately.

> After I realized that....if they started getting reports, things might improve for them in the company, hell, I started giving them (i.e., favorable political opinions) to the Chinese just as fast as I could give it to them. Well, in a sense, things actually began to improve. A little more food, a little better food..... so then I figured well, hell, I'm doing good for the squad, I'm really going great guns for the guys, I've saved a lot of guys I said, "OK, maybe when you get out of here, you can have the self satisfaction of having a clear conscience and all that!"

But SUBJECT now was having difficulties of his own. Pangs of guilt, and fear that his co-operation with the Chinese would be looked upon unfavorably by the authorities back home, led to a firm determination to extricate himself from this untenable position. But it was too late, for he had already all but burned the bridge between himself and his fellow POWs. His almost nightly visits to the quarters of political instructors - exaggerated and embroidered by GI rumor - stamped him indelibly as a "Progressive."

> So, then they kind of started moving away from me as far as the company is concerned, see. But as far as headquarters was concerned, they loved me to death, yes. See, because a lot of the men figured, "This guy, you'd better watch out because he's the Chinese favorite," see. So they started moving away from me in the company.

His request to resign was flatly refused.

> They said that the men liked me and that if I quit my job as monitor it would influence the men to stop studying and other monitors to quit, and that I would be on the side of the warmongers

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> and against the people. They told me that we were sent to fight and were not responsible for the war, but if we insisted on standing on the side of the warmongers, then we would be treated like warmongers. They said that my squad was against the warmongers and with the people. Then they asked me where I stood. I told them that I was on the side of the peace-loving people. So I continued my duties as a monitor.

Discretion, in ths case too, appeared to him the better part of valor, and the veiled threats of the Chinese were sufficient to keep him in line.

> Hell, everybody in the company knows what kind of a spot I'm on now....If I just completely back down I'm going to wind up way out somewhere and all of a sudden I'm going to die. Nobody will see me dying and they'll just say, "he died."

Fear of the Chinese and ostracism by his own comrades made his position far from a comfortable one.

> I wanted to benefit the guys in the first place. But when I got put in the middle, the guys wouldn't accept me back. I didn't want to go with the Chinese so I had to stay in the middle. There was no place else to go.

In May of 1951, the Chinese launched a great peace crusade which jibed with the then current international peace maneuver of the rest of the Soviet Bloc. Prisoners from the major camps' "progressive" ranks were eyed for positions of leadership on the proposed Central Committee of U.S. - British POWs for Peace. An "election" confirmed the appointment of SUBJECT. Once again, he declares, the POWs, by his election, made it impossible for him - apparently the true and clear-cut representative of the men - to extricate himself from the

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web he himself had spun.

> Now these guys are my own countrymen. Surely nobody in the United States is going to blame me after having been put on the spot by the guys in the camp. Thats my own, my own countrymen that I tried to help so much - admitting that I did a lot of it for myself. But actually I thought I was doing them a favor....I could have been a strong reactionary and maybe we all would have died. Who knows. But that is the way I figured it. So, I shot in the dark and I missed.

In mid-June of 1951, SUBJECT and the other "electees" were transported by truck to Camp 12 - a small compound NE of PYONGYANG which was to serve as headquarters for the Central Committee. There, together with officers and enlisted representatives of other camps, a co-ordinated propaganda effort was inaugurated which included political rallies, broadcasts and recordings, and the publication of the "Peace Fighter's Chronicle" - an inter-camp newspaper, the purpose of which was to make known the "accomplishments" of the Central Committee.

Although SUBJECT was relegated to a relatively inferior position in the Central Committee, the production of grist for the Chinese and North Korean propaganda mill was not a new experience. A series of articles, letters and recordings demanding that an end be put to this "senseless war," that "the Seventh Fleet be withdrawn from Formosa and the people of China be given a seat in the U.N. and that American troops are "nothing but merchandise on a counter being offered for sale" had already met with the hearty approval of his co munist captors. Participation in the Central Committee was rationalized by

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the presence and active participation of company and field grade American officers - SUBJECT was, after all, only a corporal.

In December of 1951, SUBJECT was returned to Camp 5 but his reception by the men was far from cordial. His reputation as a "Progressive" - engendered by his long absence - had reached uncomfortable proportions.

> When we came back from P'YONGYANG, I'm number one "Peace Fighter"....So, partner, I'm getting a lot of eyes....I'm feeling pretty bad I feel like a heel, because they don't understand very well. So I feel just like a dog. I figure, well hell, I've done something I shouldn't have done, because otherwise why should the men feel so____ ____ at me.

But his depression was only momentary. Insistence by the Chinese that he must continue his "progressive" activities dispelled any thought of rebellion.

> But when they start asking me to write articles, rather start telling me to write articles, by now my shot in the dark had missed by so much until I don't know what the heck to do. I'm damn near confused....I figure, at first I figured I was smart and then I found I wasn't so God-damned smart. I got myself into a situation and I didn't know how the hell to get myself out of it.

SUBJECT pondered over his predicament but, nevertheless, submitted to Chinese demands, believing that:

> there is enough good evidence to outweigh the bad....There's nobody that would not consider the duress - the mental strain. That a guy would go off his rocker, especially after he tried to do one thing and all of a sudden he found himself in a position where he can't go back without endangering himself and a lot of

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other people too.

From this time until SUBJECT was repatriated, he found himself shunned by his comrades and forced into a reluctant alliance with his captors. In a series of letters to the U.N. Kaesong delegation and to President EISENHOWER, he crudely, but faithfully, echoed the propaganda stance of the Soviet bloc and sank deeper into the quagmire of collaboration. His advice to a fellow POW who was being pressed for confession to a minor theft vividly portrays his conviction, at the time, that any display of independence was futile.

> I said, 'Well look, Old Partner. Hell, if you want to buck everybody in this camp, you have to understand this one thing. Damn near every man in this camp has confessed to one thing or another and he's got it down on paper. Now you can be a hero if you want. I'm not going to tell you how to be a hero. There's different ways to be a hero. But just to confess to stealing some fudge or something like that....Hell, If you try to buck - they are going to get that confession and they're going to take you where they want you to go and nobody is going to be able to say anything about it. Because this is not a place where justice is justice. Confession or no confession, you already are in jail. You're in jail now.

SUBJECT's obligations as a "Peace Fighter" lessened considerably during his last year of internment as the indoctrination effort itself appeared to slacken in anticipation of a truce settlement. Apart from his duties as chairman of the food and sanitation committees, he lapsed into a state of passive resignation. He was not strongly urged to remain behind, and the joy and eager anticipation of returning to his wife and daughter was marred only

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occasionally by thoughts of the reception he would receive.

> I might have slipped somewhere along the line because the way I played the game, I don't know if I played my cards exactly right or not. In fact the way I stand now, I don't even know how many enemies I made of the guys that came back....I don't know who's my friend and who's my enemy....Not so much for me but what about my family. I've got a daughter. What if I were ever called a traitor. Now those kind of things bother me. So I figured still I believe the good will outweigh the bad so I trusted. But while I still trusted the good against the bad, I don't know which will weigh more in the cases of many guys who don't actually know what the situation was. I don't know, see.

SUBJECT is obviously concerned about his alienation of those who "don't understand." But his concern, he maintains, does not detract from the essential validity of his policy during internment. His thoughts now, after months of reflection, are the same thoughts he held as a prisoner of war. He feels that circumstances dictated no other course of action.

> I believe, I frankly believe, that in a Communist POW camp somebody has to turn "pro." Everybody cannot be reactionary because if they do I believe they'll kill the whole dog-gone bunch. If I had to work it my way, if I had to do it all over again, if I just had to do it, I'd do it the same way I did it before. Maybe some things I wouldn't make mistakes in because they was the first time. I wouldn't make those mistakes again. But I'd do it the same way sure. I'd do it the same way I did it before. If I had to advise some guys going into combat, I'd say to at least one of those men that he had to make like a "pro." He didn't have to be, but he'd have to make like one and as a result of that he'd lighten the pressure on the rest of the men. Because if he didn't they

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are going to keep applying pressure one by one on one of the men until he cracked or they killed him. ....if they aren't interested in life, one man out of the group has got to be spokesman for the rest of the group. He's got to be able to lie, he's got to be able to deceive, he's got to be able to hold his temper, he's got to be able to stand up and take a lot of s__t too. He's not only got to take it from the Chinese but take it from his own guys. That's the thing he's got to be able to take. He's got to be able to do it. That's the advice I give.

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Appendix XI

An Outline of Material Discussed In Reference To Bacteriological Warfare "Confessions" - As Recalled By 2/Lt Warren W. Lull, AO 2223287

1. TRAINING FOR BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

   I. Lectures
      a. Where they were held
      b. What pilots attended
      c. Who gave the lecture

   II. Training Missions
      a. Who led these missions
      b. Type of ordnance
      c. Other pilots on the missions

2. ORDNANCE

   I. Types
      a. Code names and numbers
      b. Nicknames

   II. Storage, handling, etc.

   III. Precautions

3. MISSIONS

   I. Describe first mission in detail from briefing to debriefing

   II. Describe other pilots, dates, and times of takeoff; targets, weather, etc.

4. FEELINGS IN GROUP

   I. What did other pilots think of BW?
   II. What were your personal feelings after realization that United States was employing Germ Warfare in Korea?

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THE FOLLOWING TWO CHARTS INDICATE THE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL PRESSURE APPLIED TO POWS WHILE UNDERGOING INTERROGATION CONCERNING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE


The first chart shows the various pressures - physical, psychological, and physio-psychological - suffered by those USAF POWs who confessed either to participation in Bacteriological Warfare, or to a knowledge of such participation by other U.S. personnel. The testimony upon which the data recorded is based, is that of the "confessors" themselves, and no attempt has been made to evaluate the evidence. The pressures shown were not always used in direct and immediate connection with the effort by the Communists to extort confessions; sometimes they were simply a part of the general treatment afforded the POWs during periods of interrogation or during the "softening-up" period.

The second chart concerns those USAF POWs who were interrogated on or accused of Bacteriological Warfare, but who never confessed to any knowledge or participation. It included, in addition to those who were pressured, a list of 13 prisoners who, though interrogated for periods ranging from one day to three months, state that they were subjected to no duress of any kind.

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PRESSURES EXERTED ON USAF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE "NON-CONFESSORS"




CASE NO.	RANK	DATE OF CAPTURE	DURATION OF BW INTERROGATION PHASE (DAYS)
22	1ST LT	18 FEB 52	1
25	S/SGT	19 FEB 52	1
18	1ST LT	4 FEB 52	5
118	A/2C	1 FEB 53	6
20	1ST LT	17 FEB 52	7
42	CAPT	17 MAY 52	11
52	S/SGT	31 MAY 52	11
127	CAPT	10 JUN 53	32
130	1ST LT	19 JUN 53	36
36	1ST LT	20 APR 52	38
35	1ST LT	20 APR 52	39
46	S/SGT	24 MAY 52	80
49	MAJ	31 MAY 52	89
	THE INTERROGEES LISTED ABOVE, BY THEIR OWN TESTIMONY, SUFFERED NO DURESS		
92	A/1C	8 NOV 52	3
48	CAPT	1 JUN 52	3
100	A/2C	30 DEC 52	3
10	S/SGT	23 JAN 52	4
41	1ST LT	17 APR 52	4
45	1ST LT	24 MAY 52	4
21	CAPT	17 FEB 52	4
131	MAJ	20 JUL 53	4
108	1ST LT	10 JAN 53	7
74	A/1C	24 JUL 52	10
38	1ST LT	30 APR 52	13
33	1ST LT	8 APR 52	16
37	1ST LT	21 APR 52	19
34	1ST LT	8 APR 52	20
57	CAPT	11 JUN 52	20
125	1ST LT	15 MAY 53	31
17	1ST LT	1 FEB 52	32
82	1ST LT	15 SEP 52	32
23	1ST LT	19 FEB 52	34
101	1ST LT	30 DEC 52	44
90	1ST LT	8 NOV 52	37
30	S/SGT	19 FEB 52	51
91	1ST LT	8 NOV 52	56
122	1ST LT	19 FEB 53	58
85	1ST LT	6 OCT 52	59
56	A/1C	7 JUN 52	60
15	1ST LT	26 JAN 52	61
2	1ST LT	11 JAN 52	63
78	CAPT	7 AUG 52	85
66	1ST LT	4 JUL 52	102
121	1ST LT	8 FEB 53	107
115	2ND LT	17 JAN 53	116
27	CAPT	10 FEB 52	119
5	CAPT	14 JAN 52	134
29	1ST LT	19 FEB 52	147
28	CAPT	21 FEB 52	161
68	A/1C	5 JUL 52	170
6	1ST LT	16 JAN 52	213
61	CAPT	3 JUL 52	239
26	CAPT	19 FEB 52	399

FIG. 44

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PRESSURES EXERTED ON USAF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE "CONFESSORS"

CASE NO.	RANK	DATE OF CAPTURE	CONTINUOUS INTERROGATION BEGINS	CONTINUOUS BW INTERROGATION BEGINS	DAYS ELAPSED	DATE FIRST CONFESSED
77	1ST LT	7 AUG 52	9 AUG 52	27 AUG 52	1	27 AUG 52
96	2ND LT	27 DEC 52	1 JAN 53	1 JAN 53	3	4 JAN 53
107	1ST LT	11 JAN 53	19 JAN 53	13 FEB 53	4	17 FEB 53
75	1ST LT	28 JAN 52	15 AUG 52	30 AUG 52	5	4 SEP 52
120	CAPT	4 FEB 53	1 MAR 53	1 MAR 53	5	6 MAR 53
3	1ST LT	13 JAN 52	13 JAN 52	28 MAR 52	8	5 APR 52
94	1ST LT	25 NOV 52	28 NOV 52	28 NOV 52	8	6 DEC 52
43	1ST LT	21 MAY 52	21 MAY 52	19 JUN 52	9	28 JUN 52
87	1ST LT	29 OCT 52	18 DEC 52	18 DEC 52	10	28 DEC 52
7	CAPT	23 JAN 52	13 APR 52	13 JUN 52	16	29 JUN 52
114	1ST LT	15 JAN 53	15 JAN 53	20 MAR 53	16	5 APR 53
19	1ST LT	6 FEB 52	26 FEB 52	14 JUL 52	19	2 AUG 52
4	1ST LT	13 JAN 52	24 MAR 52	24 MAR 52	20	13 APR 52
1	1ST LT	7 JAN 52	7 JAN 52	1 JUN 52	20	21 JUN 52
72	2ND LT	14 JUL 52	16 JUL 52	16 JUL 52	20	5 AUG 52
47	1ST LT	31 MAY 52	9 JUN 52	15 JUN 52	21	6 JUL 52
69	A/1C	5 JUL 52	14 JUL 52	15 AUG 52	21	5 SEP 52
76	1ST LT	6 AUG 52	15 SEP 52	15 SEP 52	21	6 OCT 52
73	1ST LT	20 JUL 52	9 OCT 52	9 OCT 52	21	30 OCT 52
55	1ST LT	7 JUN 52	9 JUN 52	17 JUN 52	25	12 JUL 52
65	S/SGT	4 JUL 52	9 JUL 52	31 AUG 52	27	27 SEP 52
32	1ST LT	4 MAR 52	2 APR 52	19 MAY 52	30	18 JUN 52
24	CAPT	19 FEB 52	16 MAR 52	2 APR 52	33	5 MAY 52
83	MAJ	19 SEP 52	20 SEP 52	18 NOV 52	36	24 DEC 52
53	CAPT	8 JUN 52	8 JUN 52	5 JUL 52	43	17 AUG 52
63	T/SGT	4 JUL 52	15 AUG 52	15 AUG 52	47	1 OCT 52
62	CAPT	4 JUL 52	6 JUL 52	10 JUL 52	48	27 AUG 52
123	1ST LT	1 MAR 53	9 MAR 53	9 MAR 53	56	4 MAY 53
71	S/SGT	25 JUL 52	10 AUG 52	15 AUG 52	10	25 AUG 52
64	S/SGT	4 JUL 52	7 AUG 52	7 AUG 52	68	14 OCT 52
70	S/SGT	10 JUL 52	15 JUL 52	15 AUG 52	73	27 OCT 52
58	1ST LT	21 JUN 52	6 JUL 52	6 JUL 52	76	20 SEP 52
93	1ST LT	17 NOV 52	25 NOV 52	9 MAR 53	87	4 JUN 53
31	MAJ	28 FEB 52	28 FEB 52	8 APR 52	97	14 JUL 52
124	COL	26 MAR 53	12 MAY 53	12 MAY 53	97	17 AUG 53
67	1ST LT	5 JUL 52	13 JUL 52	1 AUG 52	110	19 NOV 52
54	1ST LT	8 JUN 52	8 JUN 52	15 JUL 52	229	1 MAR 53
39	COL	13 MAY 52	2 JUN 52	15 JUL 52	284	25 APR 53



NOTE: DESCRIPTION OF SOURCE MATERIAL USED IN THE PREPARATION OF PRESSURE CHARTS (FIG 8 FIG)
APPEARS ON PAGE

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PRESSURE CHARTS BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE "CONFESSORS" AND "NON-CONFESSORS"	
INFO DATE AUG '53	FIG. 45

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Appendix XIII

INTERROGATION CHARTS
(Four Sheets)

On this chart are shown all of the interrogations undergone by the 131 USAF POWs captured after 7 January 1952 - the earliest date of capture of any of those who were submitted to pressure in connection with Bacteriological Warfare confessions. The information is taken directly from the extensive debriefings of the POWs involved. Even after careful scrutiny, it was not always possible to record with certainty the day on which a particular period of interrogation began or ended, nor could one determine on every occasion the exact nature of the interrogation. Whenever an educated guess was necessary, the tendency was to ascribe longer periods of interrogation to the "confessors" and shorter ones to the "non-confessors."

The date of confession indicated is, in the majority of cases, the day on which the POW announced to the interrogator that he was willing to supply a "confession." The interval between that event and the submission of the final document sometimes covered several months.

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
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46

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ENEMY INTERROGATION OF USAF PERSONNEL—JANUARY 1952-SEPTEMBER 1953

CASE NO.	RANK	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND DUTY	DATE OF CAPTURE
1	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	7 JAN 52
2	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	11 "
3	1ST LT	B-26 NAVIGATOR	13 "
4	1ST LT	B-26 PILOT	13 "
5	CAPT	F-84 PILOT	14 "
6	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	16 "
7	CAPT	B-29 NAVIGATOR	23 "
8	1ST LT	B-29 BOMBARDIER	23 "
9	S/SGT	B-29 ENGINEER	23 "
10	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	23 "
11	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	23 "
12	A/2C	B-29 GUNNER	24 "
13	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	25 "
14	CAPT	B-29 RADAR OBSERVER	27 "
15	1ST LT	F-80 PILOT	26 "
16	1ST LT	F-51 PILOT	31 "
17	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	1 FEB 52
18	1ST LT	F-51 PILOT	4 "
19	1ST LT	F-80 PILOT	6 "
20	1ST LT	F-51 PILOT	17 "
21	CAPT	F-51 PILOT	17 "
22	1ST LT	F-51 PILOT	18 "
23	1ST LT	C-46 PILOT	19 "
24	CAPT	C-46 NAVIGATOR	19 "
25	S/SGT	C-46 ENGINEER	19 "
26	CAPT	C-46 PILOT	22 "
27	CAPT	C-46 PILOT	22 "
28	CAPT	B-26 PILOT	22 "
29	1ST LT	B-26 RADAR OPERATOR	22 "
30	S/SGT	B-26 ENGINEER	22 "
31	MAJ	F-51 PILOT	29 "
32	1ST LT	F-51 PILOT	4 MAR 52
33	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	6 APR 52



LEGEND:

- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH NO MENTION OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE WAS MADE
- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH BOTH MILITARY INFORMATION AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFESSIONS WERE SOUGHT
- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CHARGES WERE THE EXCLUSIVE SUBJECT
- PERIODS OF SPORADIC INTERROGATIONS (ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY INFORMATION)
- ARROWHEAD INDICATES THE DATE ON WHICH THE INTERROGEE FIRST CONFESSED, EITHER ORALLY OR IN WRITING
- INDICATES A CONFESSOR

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ENEMY INTERROGATION OF USAF PERSONNEL — JANUARY 1952-SEPTEMBER 1953

CASE NO.	RANK	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND DUTY	DATE OF CAPTURE
34	1ST LT	F-80 PILOT	6 APR 52
35	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	20 "
36	1ST LT	F-80 PILOT	20 "
37	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	21 "
38	1ST LT	F-80 PILOT	30 "
39	COL	F-86 PILOT	13 MAY 52
40	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	16 "
41	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	17 "
42	CAPT	F-84 PILOT	17 "
43	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	21 "
44	1ST LT	B-26 SHORAN OPERATOR	24 "
45	1ST LT	B-26 BOMBARDIER NAVIGATOR	24 "
46	A/2C	B-26 GUNNER ENGINEER	24 "
47	1ST LT	F-51 PILOT	31 "
48	CAPT	T-6 PILOT	1 JUN 52
49	MAJ	B-26 PILOT	3 "
50	CAPT	B-26 NAVIGATOR	3 "
51	CAPT	B-26 RADAR OPERATOR	3 "
52	A/2C	B-26 GUNNER ENGINEER	4 "
53	CAPT	B-26 SHORAN OPERATOR	8 "
54	1ST LT	B-26 PILOT	8 "
55	1ST LT	B-26 BOMBARDIER NAVIGATOR	8 "
56	A/1C	B-26 ENGINEER GUNNER	8 "
57	CAPT	B-29 RADAR OBSERVER	11 "
58	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	21 "
59	CAPT	F-51 PILOT	26 "
60	S/SGT	H-5 AIR MEDICAL TECHNICIAN	28 "
61	CAPT	B-29 PILOT	4 JUL 52
62	CAPT	B-29 RADAR OPERATOR	4 "
63	T/SGT	B-29 FLIGHT ENGINEER	4 "
64	S/SGT	B-29 AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHER	4 "
65	S/SGT	B-29 GUNNER	4 "
66	1ST LT	B-29 CO-PILOT	5 "

1952: JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

1953: JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP

FIG 47

LEGEND:

- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH NO MENTION OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE WAS MADE
- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH BOTH MILITARY INFORMATION AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFESSIONS WERE SOUGHT
- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CHARGES WERE THE EXCLUSIVE SUBJECT
- PERIODS OF SPORADIC INTERROGATIONS (ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY INFORMATION)
- ARROWHEAD INDICATES THE DATE ON WHICH THE INTERROGEE FIRST CONFESSED, EITHER ORALLY OR IN WRITING
- INDICATES A CONFESSOR


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FIG. 48

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ENEMY INTERROGATION OF USAF PERSONNEL — JANUARY 1952-SEPTEMBER 1953

CASE NO.	RANK	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND DUTY	DATE OF CAPTURE
67	1ST LT	B-29 NAVIGATOR	5 JUL 52
68	A/1C	B-29 OBSERVER	5 "
69	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	5 "
70	S/SGT	B-29 RADIO OPERATOR	10 "
71	S/SGT	B-29 GUNNER	25 "
72	2ND LT	F-84 PILOT	14 "
73	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	20 "
74	A/2C	B-26 GUNNER	25 "
75	1ST LT	B-26 NAVIGATOR	28 "
76	1ST LT	F-80 PILOT	6 AUG 52
77	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	7 "
78	CAPT	F-84 PILOT	7 "
79	A/1C	B-26 GUNNER	10 "
80	CAPT	B-26 NAVIGATOR	10 "
81	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	14 SEP 52
82	2ND LT	F-84 PILOT	15 "
83	MAJ	F-84 PILOT	19 "
84	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	24 "
85	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	6 OCT 52
86	MAJ	F-86 PILOT	18 "
87	1ST LT	B-26 NAVIGATOR	29 "
88	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	6 NOV 52
89	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	6 "
90	1ST LT	B-29 ECM OPERATOR	8 "
91	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	8 "
92	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	9 "
93	1ST LT	B-26 PILOT	17 "
94	1ST LT	F-51 PILOT	25 "
95	1ST LT	T-6 PILOT	29 "
96	2ND LT	F-51 PILOT	27 "
97	1ST LT	B-29 BOMBARDIER	30 "
98	1ST LT	B-29 PILOT	30 "
99	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	30 "



LEGEND:

- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH NO MENTION OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE WAS MADE
- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH BOTH MILITARY INFORMATION AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFESSIONS WERE SOUGHT
- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CHARGES WERE THE EXCLUSIVE SUBJECT
- PERIODS OF SPORADIC INTERROGATIONS (ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY INFORMATION)
- ARROWHEAD INDICATES THE DATE ON WHICH THE INTERROGEE FIRST CONFESSED, EITHER ORALLY OR IN WRITING
- INDICATES A CONFESSOR

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ENEMY INTERROGATION OF USAF PERSONNEL — JANUARY 1952-SEPTEMBER 1953

ARMY SECURITY CENTER, FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

CASE NO.	RANK	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND DUTY	DATE OF CAPTURE
100	A/2C	B-29 ECM OPERATOR	30 DEC 52
101	1ST LT	B-29 RADAR OBSERVER	30 "
102	1ST LT	B-29 OBSERVER	10 JAN 53
103	S/SGT	B-29 GUNNER	10 "
104	S/SGT	B-29 ECM OPERATOR	10 "
105	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	10 "
106	CAPT	B-29 NAVIGATOR	11 "
107	1ST LT	B-29 PILOT	11 "
108	1ST LT	B-29 BOMBARDIER	11 "
109	1ST LT	B-29 RADAR OPERATOR	11 "
110	M/SGT	B-29 ENGINEER	11 "
111	A/1C	B-29 GUNNER	11 "
112	A/2C	B-29 GUNNER	11 "
113	A/1C	B-29 RADIO OPERATOR	13 "
114	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	15 "
115	2NDLT	F-80 PILOT	17 "
116	A/2C	B-29 ECM OPERATOR	29 "
117	S/SGT	B-29 ENGINEER	30 "
118	A/2C	B-29 GUNNER	1 FEB 53
119	A/2C	B-29 GUNNER	4 "
120	CAPT	B-29 NAVIGATOR	4 "
121	2NDLT	F-84 PILOT	6 "
122	2ND LT	F-86 PILOT	19 "
123	1ST LT	F-84 PILOT	1 MAR 53
124	COL	F-84 PILOT	26 "
125	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	18 MAY 53
126	1ST LT	T-6 PILOT	21 "
127	CAPT	F-86 PILOT	10 JUN 53
128	2ND LT	F-86 PILOT	15 "
129	LT COL	F-86 PILOT	16 "
130	1ST LT	F-86 PILOT	19 "
131	MAJ	F-86 PLOT	20 JUL 53

1952 — JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

1953 — JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP

LEGEND:

- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH NO MENTION OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE WAS MADE
- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH BOTH MILITARY INFORMATION AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CONFESSIONS WERE SOUGHT
- PERIODS OF INTERROGATION DURING WHICH BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE CHARGES WERE THE EXCLUSIVE SUBJECT
- PERIODS OF SPORADIC INTERROGATIONS (ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY INFORMATION)
- ARROWHEAD INDICATES THE DATE ON WHICH THE INTERROGEE FIRST CONFESSED, EITHER ORALLY OR IN WRITING
- INDICATES A CONFESSOR

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BREAKDOWN BY GRADE OF USAF PERSONNEL INTERROGATED ON BW

GRADE/RANK	Total CAPTURED*	Total INTERROGATED	Total PRESSURED**	CONFESSED***
Colonel	2	2	2	2
Lt Colonel	1	0	0	0
Major	5	4	3	2
Captain	22	16	14	5
1st Lieutenant	59	49	43	21
2nd Lieutenant	6	3	3	2
Total	95	74	65	32
Master Sergeant	2	0	0	0
Tech Sergeant	1	1	1	1
Staff Sergeant	10	9	6	4
Airman 1st Class	14	5	5	1
Airman 2nd Class	9	2	1	0
Total	36	17	13	6
Totals:				
Officers:	95	74	65	32
Airmen	36	17	13	6
	131	91	78	38***

* Starting 7 January 1952, the earliest date of capture of any of the USAF POWs interrogated on Bacteriological Warfare.


** Cases in which enemy applied some pressure, no matter how slight, in an effort to obtain confession.

*** Of these, 1 never signed
5 later repudiated their confessions while still POWs
1 signed only a rudimentary draft and refused to revise it
1 admitted only attending lectures, but denied actual participation in BW.
Therefore, there were only 30 confessions that could be exploited by the Chinese. Of these, 23 were printed in the Communist press.

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Appendix XV



STRENGTH: 142

NOTE: ① Based on information received from one source (ASCIR-007 dtd 22 Jun 54)

② The guard company was under the direct control of the guard commander at Camp 3 proper.

Army Security Center Ft. Geo G. Meade, Md	
CCF Guard Company Camp 2, Co 4	
Info Date Aug '53	Fig 50

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PUNISHABLE OFFENSES IN THE POW CAMPS

This consolidation of offenses considered punishable by the CCF and NKA in Korea is based on the interview reports of six repatriated POWs and a copy of an enemy publication, Punishment for the Violator of Discipline (app. XVII), smuggled out by a seventh returnee. It reflects the general attitude of the enemy in Camps 1, 2, and 5.

I. Violations of Camp Rules and Regulations

1. Failure to observe camp rules and regulations
2. Failure to comply with daily schedule established for camp
   a. Not attending lectures
   b. Missing roll calls and formations
   c. Not participating during morning exercise
   d. Unauthorized absences
   e. Not dressing properly
   f. Wasting food
3. Failure to comply with rules established for the cleanliness and neatness inside quarters and in the outside area
   a. Urinating and defecating in places other than the latrine
4. Failure to comply with air raid instructions
   a. Not extinguishing lights during an air raid alert
   b. Exposing lights or other objects during air raids
5. Failure to maintain a proper attitude

II. Offenses Against CCF Personnel

1. Adopting a hostile or improper attitude towards CCF personnel
2. Insulting or disgracing CCF personnel
3. Striking CCF personnel
4. Disobeying commands and orders of CCF personnel
5. Swearing at CCF personnel
6. Being stubborn when questioned and resisting CCF personnel
7. Refusing to go on details

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III. Offenses Against Other POW

1. General

a. Threatening another POW
b. Striking another POW
c. Fighting another POW
d. Stealing from another POW

2. Against "Progressives"

a. Intimidating "progressive" POW
b. Striking "progressive" POW
c. Being sarcastic with "progressive" POW
d. Disturbing industrious and studious POW in their studies

IV. Committing Murder

V. Committing Rape

VI. Destruction of Property

1. Destroying, breaking, and damaging of the following:

a. Houses
b. Other property
c. Instruments
d. Water pipes
e. Rooms
f. Latrines
g. Tables and chairs
h. Windows and doors
i. Mirrors, wash basins

2. Destroying, damaging, or burning of the following:

a. Clothes
b. Shoes
c. Caps
d. Bedding
e. Blankets

3. Using books or magazines as toilet paper or cigarette paper

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VII. Theft

1. Stealing personal belongings of CCF or Koreans
2. Stealing produce from Korean farmers
3. Stealing firewood
4. Stealing food and cooking stolen food

VIII. Trading With or Contacting Koreans

IX. Escape

1. Planning, organizing, instigating, and/or attempting escape
2. Crossing fences at random
3. Types of escape:

   a. Simple escape - no intent to do bodily harm, no bodily harm or injury inflicted on CCF guards
   b. Aggravated escape - using weapons, overpowering CCF guards, injuring or killing CCF guards, injuring or killing another POW during escape

X. Leaving Company Area Without Permission

XI. Spreading Rumors, Sabotage, and Subversive Activities

1. Spreading rumors
2. Acting as a saboteur, sabotaging CCF efforts and policies
3. Contacting enemy personnel
4. Acting as a secret agent

XII. General Catchall Article

For any offense not covered in the above sections (I - XI), the punishment will be given according to the nature of the offense and the attitude of the individual in acknowledging it.

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PRISONER OF WAR CAMP RULES

The following is a verbatim copy of a list of rules in effect at Camp 5. This list was smuggled out of North Korea by returned POW Cpl Walter R WILLIAMS, RA54065023.

I Kinds of punishment set for the violation of discipline and system:

1. Hard labour (at least for 3 days)
2. Lock-Up (at least for 7 days)
3. Imprisonment and hard labour for reforming himself (at least for 3 months)
4. Life imprisonment
5. Capital punishment (submit for approval of higher authority)

II Students, committing the following misbehaviour, will be considered as violators of discipline:

1. Reactionary elements (Imperialist elements) who adopt a hostile attftude toward the C.P.V.
2. Disobey orders and resist the leadership of the CPV, swear at the Chinese personnel, refuse to go for detail work and continue to be stubborn after being questioned.
3. Damage any houses, public property and instruments. (This includes the damage of materials, water pipes, rooms, latrines, tables, chairs, doors, windows and mats).
4. Intentionally spread rumors, intimidate or try to be sarcastic on the progressive students, and purposely disturb other's study.
5. Organize and take command of an escape, and cross the wire fence at random. (The other deserters will be treated the same.)
6. Throw away or burn up one's clothes, shoes, caps, bedding, or blankets. (Such as those who defecate in the pants and get lice on them, or adopt any other method to destroy them).
7. Waste the food.
8. Expose any object during the air raid by keeping on burning and not turning off the light.
9. Rob the Korean people's personal belongings.

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III Students, committing the following misbehaviour, will be considered as violators of system:

1. Do not arrange things in the order as required. (Both inside and outside of the building.)
2. Do not dress properly.
3. Urinate or defecate at any place other than the latrine.
4. Steal public or private belongings as well as from the civilian's farm.
5. Leave the company without asking for leave.
6. Do not observe the designated system. (Like daily life schedule, lecture, report, discussion meetings, and asking for leave.)
7. Fight each other for no reason.
8. Attend the morning exercise, roll call or lecture late, or absent without any reason.
9. Take the food without getting permission.
10. Cook any food or steal fire wood for heating the floor.
11. Damage any book or magazine for no reason, or use them as toilet or cigarette paper.

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DAILY SCHEDULE FOR CAMPS 1 THROUGH 5

CAMP 1

Early '51

0500	Rise, wash
0530	Wood detail
0900	Breakfast
0930	Free, burial de
1600	Supper
1830	Roll Call
1900	Free
2100	Lights out

Winter 51-52

0700	(Dawn) Rise, roll call, PT, wash
0800	Breakfast
0900	Study, details or free time
1200	Rest
1400	Study, details or free time
1600	Supper
1730	Roll call
1800	Lecture, study or free time

Summer '51

0500	Rise
0530	Wood detail
0900	Breakfast
1000	Lectures, study
1300	Squad discussion
1400	Free time
1600	Supper
1700	Wood detail
2100	Lights out

Summer '52

0600	Rise, roll call, PT
0630	Lecture
0730	Breakfast
0830	Study, details or sports
1200	Dinner
1400	Lecture, study or details
1700	Supper
1800	Roll call, lecture, music on PA system or free time.

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2130 Lights out

Winter 52-53

0700 (Dawn) Rise

0830 Breakfast

0930 Details or free time

1200 Rest

1400 Details or free time

1500 Supper

1900 Roll call

2100 Lights out

2200 Lights out

Summer 53

0600 Rise, PT

0800 Breakfast

0830 Details or recreation

1200 Dinner

1300 Rest

1400 Details or Recreation

1700 Supper

1900 Roll call

2100 Lights out

CAMP 2 COMPANY 1

To November 52

15 Min before dawn: Rise, wash

Dawn Roll call

0700 Reading, discussion

0900 Breakfast

1000 Classes

1300 Free time

1400 Classes

1630 Free time

1700 Supper

After November 52

15 Min before dawn: Rise, wash

Dawn Roll Call

0700 Free time

0800 Breakfast

1000 Details

1300 Free time

1400 Details

1630 Free time

1700 Supper

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1800	Classes until dark	1800	Roll call
2100	Lights out	2100	Lights out

CAMP 2 COMPANY 3

Winter		Summer	
0530	Rise, roll call	0500	Rise PT
0700	Breakfast	0700	Breakfast
0800	Wood or ration detail	0800	Details
1230	Free (details might last till 1400)	1200	Dinner
1630	Supper	1300	Rest
1730	Roll call	1430	Details
2030	Lights out	1630	Supper
		1800	Roll call
		2100	Lights out

CAMP 3

Winter		Summer	
0600	Rise	0530	Rise
0640	PT	0600	Roll call
0800	Breakfast	0645	PT
0830	Lectures (before Sep 52) or details	0900	Breakfast
1030	Free (unless on detail)	1000	Lectures (till Sep 52) or free time

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1400	Discussion (before Sep 52) or details	1200	Dinner
1600	Supper	1300	Details
1700	Free time or sports	1600	Supper
2100	Lights out	1900	Roll call
		2100	Lights out

CAMP 4

Winter		[illegible] (vol indgc)	
0600	Rise	[illegible]	[illegible]
0615	PT	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
0900	Current events lecture	[illegible]	[illegible]
1000	Details	[illegible]	[illegible]
1630	Supper	[illegible]	[illegible]
1800	Roll call	[illegible]	[illegible]
2100	Lights out	[illegible]	[illegible]
		1600	Supper
		1830	Roll call
		2100	Lights out

CAMP 5

Winter '51		Summer '51	
0730	Rise	0500	Rise, roll call
0830	Breakfast	0530	PT, clean-up
0930	Details	0630	Breakfast

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1100 Free time (unless details lasted longer)

1600 Supper, roll call

1800 Lights out

[redacted]

Winter '52

Dawn Rise

0715 PT, wash

0800 Breakfast

0900 Lecture

1130 Squad discussion

1230 Free time, some details

1600 Supper

1800 Roll call

2100 Lights out

Winter '53

Dawn Rise, clean-up

0800 Breakfast

0900 Free time or details

0800 Lectures, some details

1200 Free time (light snack)

1300 Rest

1400 Discussion of lectures and some details

1700 Supper

1830 Roll call

2100 Lights out

Summer '52

0530 Rise, clean-up

0800 Breakfast

0830 Free time or details

1200 Dinner

1230 Swim

1300 Rest

1400 Details or athletics

1700 Supper

1900 Roll call

2100 Lights out

Summer '53

(Same as summer '52)

SECRET DENTAL

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1600	Supper
1800	Roll call
2100	Lights out

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INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES

The following letter has been extracted from Volume I (26 June 1950-31 December 1951) of The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Korean Conflict Collection of Documents.

No 282

le CICR
a la Croix-Rouge chinoise

Geneva December 10,1951

AIDE-MEMOIRE 1

for the attention of Her Excellency Madam Li-Teh-Chuan
President of the Chinese Red Cross

The International Committee of the Red Cross recalls, that since the month of March 1951, it has brought from Switzerland to Hong Kong a substantial supply of medicines which were intended for the relief, in the territory of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, of the three following categories of war victims: the wounded and sick of armed forces in the field, prisoners of war, and civilian victims of the war.

The International Committee regrets that the Chinese Red Cross did not until now see its way to accept delivery of these supplies with a view of their being forwarded and distributed.

The International Committee most deeply regrets that these supplies which could have been of very great assistance to victims of the conflict and still could help saving many human lives, are left unutilised, as ways and means for their forwarding and distribution have not, so far, been devised.

The International Committee earnestly hopes that the Chinese Red Cross, mindful of its obligations as neighbouring Red Cross Society called upon to act on behalf of the International Committee, will endeavour to give every assistance in this respect.

1 Remis le 10 December 1951, a Geneve, a Mme Li-Teh-Chuan.

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U.S. ARMY POWS SURVIVING INTERNMENT

The following list indicates the percentage of U.S. Army POWs who survived captivity during the Korean Operation. Personnel who escaped from the enemy have been excluded from this compilation. Statistics for the list were taken from (1) Battle Casualties of the Army (CT, 39), dated 30 June 1954, OACofS, G-1, DA and (2) Alphabetical Listing of Personnel Returned to Military Control from a Missing in Action or Captured Status During the Korean Operation, The Adjutant General's Office, Statistical and Accounting Branch, 16 March 1953.

Month	Number Captured and Interned	Died During Internment	Percent Repatriated
1950			
July	805	532	34.0%
August	21	21	0.0%
September	11	11	0.0%
October	9	5	44.5%
November	1911	888	53.6%
December	1002	509	49.3%
1951			
January	190	65	65.8%
February	660	421	36.3%
March	17	2	88.3%
April	431	66	87.1%
May	408	95	77.9%
June	11	0	100.0%
July	9	2	77.8%
August	45	4	91.2%
September	53	1	98.2%
October	24	6	75.0%
November	59	2	96.7%
December	7	0	100.0%

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Month	Number Captured and Interned	Died During Interpment	Percent Repatriated
1952			
January	7	0	100.0%
February	5	0	100.0%
March	13	0	100.0%
April	2	0	100.0%
May	6	0	100.0%
June	16	1	93.8%
July	15	0	100.0%
August	3	0	100.0%
September	30	1	96.7%
October	13	2	84.7%
November	8	0	100.0%
December	5	0	100.0%
1953			
January	2	0	100.0%
February	11	0	100.0%
March	13	0	100.0%
April	6	0	100.0%
May	7	0	100.0%
June	21	0	100.0%
July	105	0	100.0%
Total:	5961	2638	55.7%

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COMMUNIST PERSONALITIES

In any attempt to clarify the status and identify the positions of the Communist personalities encountered by U.S. prisoners in North Korean POW camps, certain difficulties become immediately apparent. Because most Orientals look alike to the westerner, the POW's found it difficult to remember distinguishing features. The language barrier was another factor which separated the Communists and their prisoners. Hardly a single U.S. prisoner understood Chinese. Some did possess a limited knowledge of Korean and Japanese as a result of previous service in these countries, but in no case was fluency in the enemy's language sufficient to allow free conversational exchange. Linguistic obstacles affected even the relatively simple task of remembering and writing down names. The transliteration into English of Chinese and Korean sounds often led to confusion.

The uniforms worn by the Chinese were of little aid in positive identification. Except for those at the very top of the command structure, the uniforms were devoid of distinctive markings. Because the prisoners could not recognize rank merely by looking at Chinese uniforms, they imputed to many the ranks which they felt appropriate to the duties being performed. The prisoners became further confused when some instructors professed to be civilian volunteers with no military status.

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A final factor explaining the lack of precise information regarding enemy personnel was the POWs' primary interest in themselves and their own welfare, and their understandable desire to avoid contact with enemy officials as much as possible. The Chinese continuously badgered the POWs, accusing them of misbehavior and oversight - a situation which caused them to try to avoid their captors and to neither observe or be observed.

The Chinese with whom American POWs came into contact fell into four general categories: (1) administrative personnel - including the camp commanders, company commanders, platoon leaders, and quartermaster contingents; (2) the various camp guard detachments; (3) interrogation personnel on a camp and supra-camp level; and (4) the instructors who administered the indoctrination program.

Relations between individuals within the four chains of command were apparently governed by punctilious adherence to "channels." The command structure was severely vertical with few, if any, horizontal connecting links. Administrative personnel, political officers, guard detachments, and interrogators lived and worked apart from each other. The barriers erected between these four groups were firm; individual loyalty and obedience apparently existed within the group only. The obedience exhibited by members of one group towards higher ranking personnel in another was notable by its absence. Guards would often stop prisoners who were accompanied by instructors anddemand that the prisoners show their passes. If a

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prisoner had no pass allowing him to be where he was, he was sent back to his prescribed area despite any protestations on the part of the instructor. Where camp regulations and security were concerned, the guards could overrule any instructor regardless of his rank. The interrogators, who regarded themselves as the bulwarks of the Chinese organizational machinery, were thus limited in authority to their own departmental confines. They could not remove any prisoner from one of the permanent camps for interrogation purposes without first obtaining the permission of the administrative staff. However, they did have their own special interrogation centers where prisoners were completely under their control.

Of the four classes, the instructors had the most direct and constant contact with U.S. prisoners. Although administrative and guard personnel were, of course, everywhere to be seen, only a few spoke English, and intercourse between them and U.S. POWs was severely restricted. Interrogators were able to converse with the prisoners, but, except when they were carrying out lengthy interrogations, their contact with the POWs was also limited. Therefore, the instructors provide the best source material from which to discover the type of man the Communists employed in an effort to influence the opinions of U.S. POWs.

The instructors' functions, both on company and platoon level, were not limited to the delivery of indoctrinal lectures. After a very short time in camp, the POW became aware that his company

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instructor could be a very useful individual. He held the authority to excuse an internee from work details, to facilitate his going on sick call, and, in general, to make the prisoner's lot either pleasant or difficult. In order, perhaps, to make the Americans more amenable to the indoctrination program, the Chinese enlarged upon the basic role of the instructor so that he might appear to the POWs as the source of the more pleasant facets of POW life. The instructor, therefore, carried out many of the functions usually associated with such diverse U.S. military branches as TI&E, the Inspector General, the Chaplain, and Special Services.

The two chief prerequisites for the position of political instructor were apparently, on one hand, political reliability and conversance with marxist philosophy and, on the other hand, proficiency in English. Of these two requirements, the former appeared to be the more important, since there were company instructors who spoke a poorer brand of English than the platoon instructors who were subordinate to them. But this did not mean that the Chinese underestimated or played down the significance of a fluent knowledge of English. Both company and platoon instructors were constantly trying to improve their English, and they were determined in their efforts to absorb the baffling complexities of G.I. slang. Their knowledge of world politics and issues was usually sufficient to befuddle unwary POWs who had been enticed into political discussions. Most of the instructors were adequate debaters, but this did not

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

prevent the POWs from tormenting them, a circumstance which sometimes caused the instructors to use the captive-captor relationship as a vehicle for their revenge.

The meager knowledge which the POWs were able to gather about the backgrounds of their instructors does not lend itself to any easy generalizations. Most of the instructors claimed to have had the benefit of a university education in China, and many mentioned having lived in the United States and having studied at American universities. Their former occupations included such jobs as ex-janitor at the U.S. Embassy and member of the O.S.S. in China during World War II. Many were too young to have had much experience in civilian pursuits. Almost all were between the ages of 20 and 35. They could not all be classified as unswerving disciples of communism; some seemed to adhere to the tenets of their faith more through stolid acceptance than through ardent fanaticism. At least one instructor implied that his present assignment constituted a sort of social probation; his family had been extremely wealthy and he was, therefore, suspect in the eyes of the regime. His future life in Communist China apparently hinged upon his conduct as a political instructor in the POW camps.

The following are alphabetical lists of the more prominent Korean and Chinese personalities. The physical descriptions and background information listed for each of these individuals were obtained from the debriefings of from one to as many as 13 returned

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

POWs. When possible, the probably correct romanization of the oriental names, as specified by the Wade-Giles (Chinese) and the McCune-Reischauer (Korean) systems, has been included.

NORTH KOREAN PERSONALITIES

AHN

Civilian; student interrogator at P'YONGYANG; college education in engineering; spoke fluent English; commissioned a major in May 51 after six months training at "Pak's Palace"; walked with a very long stride.

Nicknames: "Mr. Longfellow"

Physical Description: 6'1"; 170 lbs; 35 yrs; slender build; normal posture; black hair; long narrow face; bronze complexion; small eyes.

Probable Correct Name: AN*

HAN

Major; interrogator; formerly teacher at University of Seoul; graduate of University of Kyoto, Japan.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'5"; 140 lbs; 40 yrs; erect posture; sharp; oriental features, neat appearance.

KIM, Dong Suk (or Doc Song?)

Major; promoted to Lt Col in Jul 51; liked to be called colonel while still major; observed at the "Valley" and P'YONGYANG (Camp 12); member of political department of NKA; supervised propaganda activities for NKA;

* McCune-Reuschauer Romanization

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

KIM, Dong Suk (or Doc Song?)
(cont'd)

OIC of POWs in NK in Nov 50; connected with interpreting at truce talks; polished speaker; spoke Russian and excellent English; spoke of "better life" in Russia but had never been there; claimed to have been professor at Seoul University; had lived in South Korea and done some labor agitation work; professed to have been a South Korean delegate to UNESCO before coming to NK; wife and two children had been killed in bombing; sometimes vitriolic in attacks on U.S.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"; 130-160 lbs; 40 yrs; long black hair; oval face; light complexion; large eyes; wore glasses for reading; conflicting reports as to whether erect or slightly stooped posture.

KIM

Reported variously as Major, Lt Col, Brig Gen; observed at Camp 12 at various times; called colonel, but at one time wore major's uniform and at another time wore general's insignia (shoulder boards with two stripes and four stars); previously at P'YONGYANG; may have been commanding officer Camp 12 at one time; claimed to be related to KIM Il SUNG; reportedly claimed to be graduate of university in Akron, Ohio; another source, however, states he received his training at Imperial University, TOKYO, Japan; spoke fluent English; thoroughly familiar with literature and classical music; stated he was formerly a professor of English at University of SEOUL; prior to insitution of the ROK, worked with Americans in Korea but switched allegiances when RHEE became ROK president; gave impression he switched

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

KIM (cont'd)

not because he was inclined towards communism but because of intense hatred of RHEE; unsympathetic toward idea that CCF remain in Korea.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'4"-5'7"; 140-170 lbs; oval face; heavy beard; military manner; wore NK uniform.

KIM

Lt Col in NK Air Force when observed at Camp 2 and PYOKTONG; habitually pushed back hair with brisk movement; spoke grammatically correct English; claimed to be political science graduate of P'YONGYANG University; spoke some German and French and studied Russian from ZUN; said his father had been a wealthy lumber merchant and orchard owner before state took over.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'2"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; slender build; erect posture; long black hair; dark complexion; sometimes wore horned rimmed glasses.

KIM

Civilian; head of NK PsyWar Center; reported to have been honor graduate of some Japanese university; spoke fluent English, Japanese, Chinese and Russian.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'5"; 130 lbs; 50 yrs.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

KWAN — Captain; indoctrinated POWs at Camp 12; suspicious nature; often came around at night to try and find out what the POWs were talking about; not liked by POWs.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; long black hair; narrow face; light complexion; slender build; slightly stooped; wore horned rimmed glasses; very serious; noticably lacking in military appearance.

KWO — Interrogator at Camp 5; spoke fair English; manifested sympathetic attitude towards POWs..

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 155 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; average posture; black hair in long pompadour; oval face; dark eyes; average complexion.

Probable Correct Name: KUO*

LEE — Civilian; presented "readings" in English to POWs at Camp 3; rumored to have been a school teacher in South Korea; may have been a major in NKA; "likeable old man."

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: Approx. 60 yrs.

LEE — Major at the "Valley"; claimed to be a doctor; wore navy blue uniform and riding boots; spoke fair English; also Chinese and Japanese.

* McCune-Reischauer Romanization

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

LEE (cont'd)

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 175 lbs; 50 yrs; heavy build; round shouldered but erect posture; black hair streaked with gray; round face; dark complexion; wore glasses only on official calls.

LEE

Captain; instructor, interpreter and interrogator at Camp 7; professor at Seoul University; spoke, wrote, and understood English; also Japanese; married; with son and grandchildren in SEOUL.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'5"; 160 lbs; husky build; wore glasses; buck teeth; gold tooth upper left side.

LEE

Observed as Lt Col at P'YONGYANG (also described as a two-star colonel); chief of first NK interrogation center; boss of "Pak's Palace" until Apr 51; well educated; master's degree in Economics; spoke excellent English; maintained close relations with MAN, LI and Russian advisors; had lived in SEOUL; liked Americans; member of NO DONG DANG (Labor Party) - same as Communist Party for North Koreans.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'9"; 145 lbs; 38 yrs; powerful build; military bearing; erect posture; handsome face; bronze complexion; large eyes; scar on left leg.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

PAK

Major; KPA; observed as interrogator subordinate to LEE at P'YONGYANG, and in position comparable to executive officer at "Pak's Palace," where he was in charge of interrogation; also observed as commander and assistant commander of Camp 12; college education; spoke English and Japanese; excited speech; jerky mannerisms; judo expert; had been labor; agitator in South Korea; 1952, while at the front, received highest NK decoration twice; personal friend of KIM Dong Suk; reportedly a cruel, sadistic interrogator; clumsy interrogator; easily flew into a rage; equally disliked by NKs, POWs and Chinese; at Camp 12 didn't have much to do with political work and was liked by some POWs who believed he was trying to improve conditions; married; home in P'YONGYANG.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: Between 5'3" and 5'7"; 30-35 yrs; medium build; round shoulders but erect posture; face variously described as bulldog shape, round and narrow; has several scars; black hair, balding in front, combed back; looked partially Japanese; some gold teeth; commanding voice but sometimes hesitant in manner of speaking; became quick and violent when irritated; seldom smiled.

PAK (PAK or PAEK)

Major; observed at the "Valley" and Camp 12; supervised elections to the Central Peace Committee and recordings made at Camp 12; would stop a recording if he detected improper inflection or anything that aroused his suspicions; rumored to have attended Columbia Univ.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

PAK (PAK or PAEK) (cont'd)	Nicknames: May have been known as the "Professor." Physical Description: 5'7"; 135 lbs; 30 yrs; slender build; oval face; ruddy complexion; long black hair.
PYO	Colonel; observed at Camp 7; camp commander states that PYO had formerly been a ROK major, but had fled to the NKPA where he was employed in the Central POW Administrative Bureau; performed some interrogations. Nicknames: None Physical Description: 45 yrs; quite corpulent.
PYONG	Major; was first observed as a civilian at "Pak's Palace" where he was an interrogator; spoke fluent English, Russian, and Japanese; college graduate; had been assistant professor of Russian at Kim Il Sung University; interpreter for Col LEE; was engaged in black market activities; fond of social life, was described as being soft-hearted; his word was reliable; single. Nicknames: None Physical Description: 5'6"; 160 lbs; 30 yrs; athletic build; erect posture; black hair combed back; handsome face; yellow complexion; pink-cheeked; large "emotional" eyes.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

SUH, Mr.

Civilian; publisher, editor of P'YONGYANG newspaper; director of Radio P'[illegible]; excellent conversationalist and public speaker; college education; spoke fluent English, Russian, and Chinese; great physical stamina; previously worked on newspaper in SHANGHAI during WW II; married to "Seoul City Sue"; lived in SEOUL and published newspaper there prior to Korean Operation.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'2"; 125 lbs; 50 yrs; very slight build; stooped posture; black hair combed back; swarthy complexion; alert eyes; wore glasses.

SUH, Mrs.

Civilian; radio broadcaster and propagandist at P'YONGYANG; a civilian observer at Camp 12; attempted to get information from POWs through conversation; former U.S. citizen, from Lawrence County, Arkansas; maiden name: WALLACE; educated in U.S.; spoke English, Korean, and Chinese; former missionary and school teacher, believed to have renounced her U.S. citizenship to marry a Korean radio director, newspaper editor, and publisher; maintained that if to oppose RHEE was to be a Communist, then she was a Communist; remarked that she would like to return to the U.S.

Nicknames: "Seoul City Sue"; SAW, Madame.

Physical Description: 5'5"; 120-150 lbs; medium build; slouched posture; oval face; rosy complexion; blue-gray eyes; gray hair; pointed nose; great physical stamina.

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

TOE	Civilian; propaganda chief in NK at P'YONGYANG; spoke English; held position of high authority on propaganda activities during Korean Operation. Nicknames: None Physical Description: 5'11"; 160 lbs; 60 yrs; slender build; stooped shoulders; gray and black hair, pompadour; oval face; often in need of a shave; watery eyes; wore glasses.

CHINESE COMMUNIST PERSONALITIES

AJAR (sic)	Field grade officer; assistant CO of Co. 5, Camp 5; associated with DING while at Camp 2; spoke quietly and hesitantly when speaking Chinese; appeared mildmannered. Nicknames: None Physical Description: 5'11"; 180 lbs; 45 yrs; medium build; erect posture; long black hair; high cheek bones; Indian features; dark eyes.
CHAN or CHANG	Field grade officer; CO of 4th Co, Camp 5; chief of Educational Section at Camp 5, spoke English; liked to play baseball; claimed to be member of the Communist Party. Nicknames: None

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHAN or CHANG (cont'd)

Physical Description: 5'6" - 5'10"; 125-160 lbs; 25-35 yrs; medium build; erect posture; black eyes and hair; ruddy complexion.

Probable Correct Name: CHAN*

CHAING, Mme or CHONG

Civilian; observed at the "Valley"; wore tennis shoes, riding breeches and boots, regular CCF blouse, red piping on her trousers and sometimes on sleeves; spoke fluent English; used slang.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 4'8"; 110 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; erect posture; black hair worn in pigtails; round face; light complexion.

Probable Correct Name: CHANG*

CHANG

CO of 5th Co, Camp 5; spoke poor English; smoked a great deal.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'5"-5'8"; 130-145 lbs; 28-35 yrs; medium build; stooped posture; dark complexion; black eyes and hair.

CHANG

Chief interpreter at Co 2, Camp 2; spoke fluent English; used slang; got along well with POWs; called them by first name; married, no children; had been in California.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description; 5'6"; 150-175 lbs; 28-33 yrs; heavy build; erect posture; long hair.

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHENG

Possibly intelligence officer at Camp 1; interrogated POWs on their knowledge of intelligence personnel; spoke excellent English.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"; 140 lbs; wore glasses.

CHEW

Interrogator; in charge of mail at Camp 2; claimed to have college education; mild, shy person.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'2"-5'6"; 130 lbs; 25 yrs; medium build; long black hair; light complexion.

Probable Correct Name: CHU*

CHIANG

High level interrogator at "Death Valley" and Camps 2 & 5; college graduate; claimed to have served with U.S. troops in China during WW II; popular with POWs; spoke perfect English.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"-5'9"; 130-160 lbs; 23-35 yrs; medium build; black hair; light complexion; oval face; slight lisp.

CHIEN

Civilian; interrogator at Camp 5; pleasant and friendly.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 45 yrs; head permanently inclined towards right shoulder.

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHIN or SHIN

Female interrogator and interpreter at "Peaceful Valley."

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 23-25 yrs.

Probable Correct Name: CHIN* or HSIN*

CHIN

Interrogator at Camp 2; spoke fair English.

Nicknames: "Bug Eyes"

Physical Description: 5'4"; 130 lbs; 25 yrs; slight build; slightly round-shouldered; black hair; small black eyes; small oval face; light yellow complexion; dark eyes, wore small round glasses.

CHIN

Political officer at Camp 1; spoke excellent English.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 6'; 135 lbs;

CHIN

Chief prosecutor at Camp 2; a sadistic person, hated Americans; spoke excellent English.

Nicknames: "Hatchetman," "Hunchback," "District Attorney," "Public Prosecutor," "Scarface," "The Question Mark," "The Friendly Prosecutor."

Physical Description: 5'4"-5'8"; 120-150 lbs; 30-45 yrs; thin; stooped left shoulder; dark eyes; long black hair; light complexion; scar on left cheek, splay-footed gait.

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHIN

CO of 3rd Co, Camp 4; friendly, quiet person; treated POWs well.

Nicknames: "Little Chin," "Skoshi."

Physical Description: 5'4"-5'6"; 120 lbs; 22-31 yrs; medium build; fair complexion; black hair; red scar, size of half-dollar near left temple.

CHIN

Platoon leader of 3rd Co, Camp 4; a friendly, easy-going person who caused the POWs no trouble.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'11"; 180-195 lbs; 27 yrs; heavy build.

CHIN or CHEN

Chief instructor, also interrogator of 5th Co, Camp 3; spoke fair English; college graduate from SHANGHAI.

Nicknames: "Josephine"

Physical Description: 5'4"-5'8"; 130-135 lbs; 25-30 yrs; slender build; black hair.

Probable Correct Name: CHIN*

CHIN

Interrogator at Camp 1; questioned POWs on knowledge of KU KLUX KLAN (POW anti-Communist resistance group).

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 135 lbs; 25 yrs; slim build.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHIN

Officer in CCPLA; platoon leader at Camps 4 & 5; arrogant; harsh in treatment of POWs.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'3"; 110 lbs; 30 yrs; light build.

CHING

Interrogator - platoon leader at Camps 4 & 5; also an interpreter but was removed from job because he was too friendly with POWs.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 4'; 30 yrs; skinny build.

CHING CHONG, Lee

Platoon leader; interrogator at 1st platoon, 1st Co, Camp 2; spoke poor English; meticulous in appearance; observed as Lt Col; brushed his hair back and put his cap on again when talking to POWs.

Nicknames: "The Major"

Physical Description: 5'7"; 155-197 lbs; 25-33 yrs; stocky build; erect posture; dark complexion; scar on neck and shoulder (6").

Probable Correct Name: CHING*

CHING, Fong

Political officer at Camp 1

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: None

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHON

CO of 4th Co, Camp 5; an athletic person; spoke poor English; later became interrogator at camp hqs.

Nicknames: "Mickey Mouse"

Physical Description: 5'4"; 160 lbs; 35 yrs; stocky build; black eyes and hair; round face; mustache.

CHOW, Madame

Interrogator in camp hospital at Camp 5; tried to have POWs write for communist publications and to make recordings; served in camp hqs.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'2"; 120 lbs; 30 yrs.

Probable Correct Name: CHAO*

CHOW

Chief instructor of 2nd Co, Camp 3; worked at Hqs.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'2"-5'4"; 112-125 lbs; 21-28 yrs; slight build; buck teeth.

Probable Correct Name: CHAO*

CHOW

Platoon instructor at Camp 5; was recognized by one POW who had known him in 1946 when he (CHOW) was with the immigration officials in SHANGHAI; was surprised when confronted by POW about his whereabouts in 1946; was later removed from camp by CCF officials and unheard of since then.

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

CHOW (cont'd)

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: None

Probable Correct Name: CHAO*

CHU, Chi Ping Chin

Interrogator and interpreter at Camp 6; also the interpreter for General WONG when he was working on BW; had been a correspondent with the U.S. Navy during WW II.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: None

CHU, Teh

Supposedly the supreme commander of CCF in Korea; in Feb 51 he was introduced as such to a group of POWs and appeared on a stage brandishing a wooden hand grenade and exclaimed "The imperialists have closed the doors to peace"; spoke through an interpreter.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 160 lbs; 50 yrs.

DING

Field grade officer; CO of 5th Co (officers' company) at Camp 5; accompanied POW officers to Camp 2 and became camp commander there; wife and young daughter lived with him; spoke only Chinese; was a devout Communist.

Nicknames: "Snake Eyes," "Snake."

Physical Description: 5'8"-6'0"; 120-160 lbs; 34-40 yrs; slender build; erect posture; black eyes; long black hair; sallow complexion; gold teeth in uppers.

Probable Correct Name: TING*

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

FANG

Chief interrogator at GHQ at Camp 5; was highly trained and experienced at his job; was adept at American slang.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"; 135 lbs; 35 yrs; wore hair clipped short; had tinted, rimless glasses; eyes slightly crossed.

FU-EN

Instructor at Camp 3; claimed to have attended Washington State University; also Penn University where he studied political science; was married to an Englishwoman; stated he had read the Bible extensively, claiming that he had been a missionary at one time.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'1"; medium build; bald.

FUNG

Field grade officer; was 3rd in command of all POW camps; spoke English.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: None

Probable Correct Name: FENG*

GIN or GUNN

Platoon instructor - interpreter at Camps 2 & 5; spoke poor English; had taught high school in SHANGHAI; was transferred from Camp 2 in 1952 because of his too-friendly attitude towards POWs.

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

GWA

Field grade officer at Camps 2 & 5; college education; had been a school teacher; spoke fluent English; was chief of interrogation at Camp 2; was sincere Communist rumored to have been next in line for promotion to interrogation commander; planned to remain in service; not married.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'4"; 140 lbs; 45 yrs; stocky build; tired posture; black hair cut short; round face; yellow complexion; bland expression.

Probable Correct Name: KUO*

HO

Platoon leader for 3rd Platoon, 9th Co, Camp 3.

Nicknames: "Pregnant Helen"

Physical Description: Small, ugly, effeminate.

Probable Correct Name: HOU*

HO

Interrogator (?); spoke poor English; told a group of POWs (15) at Camp 3 that he didn't want to come to Korea.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; had one large incisor (upper) and one small one.

Probable Correct Name: HOU*

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

HO

Instructor; interrogater at "Mining Camp"

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; thin; hooked broken nose; several gold teeth.

Probable Correct Name: HOU*

HO

Instructor at Camp 4; spoke poor English.

Nicknames: "Black Hat"

Physical Description: 5'6"; 115 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; wore glasses.

Probable Correct Name: HOU*

HSIANG

Field grade officer; first Chinese interrogator in Korea; head of interrogation until General WONG came in Jan 51; was chief interrogator at PYOKTONG until Sep 51; chief of interrogation at Camp 2 until Dec 51; then at Camp 2½ at "No Name Valley"; a devoted athletic man; prodigious stamina; college graduate; spoke fluent English, a little Russian and Korean; was with OSS in China during WW II; parachuted behind Japanese lines to pay rewards to Chinese who helped downed airmen; liked Americans and helped many ill POWs; had been told that he could never become a Communist Party member because of his previous U.S. contacts; aspired to be Red Air Attache in Washington; claimed he had a mail box with a publishing house in HONG KONG.

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

HSIANG (cont'd)

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'8"; 125 lbs; 30 yrs; very slight build; erect posture; long black hair combed straight back; oval shaped face; sallow complexion; large warm eyes.

HSU or SHU

Instructor - interpreter at Camp 5; spoke poor English; claims to have a sister in San Francisco.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"; 130 lbs: 30 yrs; erect posture; slender build; olive complexion, oval face.

Probable Correct Name: HSU

HUANG

Doctor - interpreter at Camp 1 hospital; also a contributing editor to China Monthly Review; said to have contracted TB and returned to China.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"; 35 yrs; thin; protruding gold teeth.

JOHN

Officer (?) at 3rd Co, Camp 2; hesitated when speaking English; college graduate; claimed to be a maternity doctor; barred from squad because he wanted to give the men medicine when the political instructor refused same.

Nicknames: None

Pro-Chiang Reorientation

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

KIM (cont'd)

Physical Description: 5'6"; 150 lbs, 40 yrs; chocky build; erect posture; bald, black headed; round face; dark yellow complexion; had a mustache; brown eyes.

Probable Correct Name: CHOI*

KING

Chief instructor at Camp 5; spoke good English; couldn't get along with other Chinese personnel; treated POWs pretty well.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 145 lbs; 35 yrs; slender build; slightly stooped shoulders; black hair; sallow complexion; narrow face; brown eyes; wore glasses.

KU or KOO

Political instructor at Camp 5; interrogator at Camp 2; spoke excellent English; worked for U.S. in SEOUL; claimed to have attended UCLA.

Nicknames: "The Professor"

Physical Description: 5'6"; 160 lbs; 35 yrs; heavy build; fair posture; dark eyes; average complexion; black hair, mustache.

Probale Correct Name: KU*

KWANG

Seemed to be somewhat milder than "Screaming Skull" in manner.

Nicknames: "Bulehead"

Physical Description: 5'9"; 150 lbs; 30 yrs; very slender.

Probable Correct Name: KWANG*

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

LEE

Civilian; newspaper man at PYOKTONG; dignified speaker; easy to get along with; college education; spoke English and Russian; was a propaganda official; wore blue correspondence uniform.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6", 150 lbs; 25 yrs; medium build; good posture; black hair combed straight back; smooth light complexion; brown eyes.

Probable Correct Name: LI*

LEE

Political instructor of 4th Co, Camp 5; CO of 5th Co, Camp 5; spoke good English.

Nicknames: "Sneaky"

Physical Description: 5'7"; 140 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; erect posture; black hair; sallow complexion; round face.

Probable Correct Name: LI*

LEE

Field grade officer at Camp 2; was director for interrogations at Camp 2; political instructor of 3rd Co, Camp 2; spoke excellent English, also other languages; also chief instructor at Camp 2; college education.

Nicknames: "Mr. Lee"

Physical Description: 5'11"; 160 lbs; 30 yrs; stocky build; erect posture; black eyes; light yellow complexion.

Probable Correct Name: LI*

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

LEE

General officer; in charge of all POW camps in Korea; was replaced by WONG.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'8"; 150 lbs; 35 yrs; slender build; round face.

Probable Correct Name: LI*

LEE

Platoon leader of 4th Co (?), interrogator at Camp 1; spoke fair English.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 145 lbs; 35 yrs; medium build; black hair; brown eyes; oval face.

Probable Correct Name: LI*

LEE

Field grade officer; observed at Camp 2; participated as flag bearer in 1950 May Day parade in PEIPING; dynamic, enthusiastic speech mannerisms; spoke in bursts; loved sports; accomplished gymnast; mission school graduate; spoke fluent English; had been an interpreter for chief of mission (Roger LAPHAM); had been a school teacher; father was a restaurant owner; wants to be a party member, but knows that he can't be; eager to participate in China's educational plan as a teacher; hated interrogation and goofed off at it deliberately; had a keen organization sense; single; had a brother who is a pilot in FORMOSA.

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

LEE (cont'd)

Nicknames: "Big Lee"

Physical Description: 5'8"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; very slight build; erect posture; sparse, black hair cut short and combed straight back; oval face; yellow complexion; pronounced eyelids, alert; had a scar over right brow.

Probable Correct Name: LI*

LEE

Political officer at Camps 4 & 5; married; friendly and soft spoken manner.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build.

Probable Correct Name: LI*

LEONG or LEON

Chief instructor at Camp 5, 1st Co, Camp 5 for four months; shipped POWs to labor camps; attended Howard and Brooklyn Universities; spoke good English; was also political instructor at Camp 5.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'5"; 135 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; slightly humped posture; brown eyes; black hair; dark complexion; round face; wore glasses.

Probable Correct Name: LI ANG*

LEON

Platoon leader of 2nd platoon at Camps 3 & 5; athletic sort.

Nicknames: "Nigger Lips" "Rubberlips"

* Wade-Giles Romanization

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

LEON (cont'd)	Physical Description: 5'3"; 125 lbs; 25 yrs; medium build; erect posture; dark complexion; long face; black hair.
	Probable Correct Name: LI AN*
LI	Platoon interpreter for 3rd Platoon, 4th Co, Camp 5; spoke fair English; was later transferred to Camp 4; was CO of 5th Co, Camp 5.
	Nicknames: None
	Physical Description: 5'8"; 130 lbs; 35 yrs; slim build; straight posture; black hair; light complexion; large tooth in upper set.
LIM, (LIN or LYNN)	Company political instructor at 3rd Co, Camp 5; spoke good English; came from Malaya.
	Nicknames: "Screaming Skull"
	Physical Description: 5'2"; 130 lbs; 35 yrs; slender build; dark eyes; black hair; dark complexion; had an extremely large head.
	Probable Correct Name: LIN*
LIN or LINN	Instructor - interrogator at Camp 4.
	Nicknames: "Chief," "Little."
	Physical Description: 5'9"; 125 lbs; slender build; wore glasses; Roman nose.
	Probable Correct Name: LIN*

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LYN or LIN

Political instructor - chief instructor at Camp 1; spoke several languages.

Nicknames: "Instructor"

Physical Description: 5'5"; 130 lbs; medium build; black hair; brown eyes; tan complexion; flat face.

Probable Correct Name: LIN*

LING

Platoon instructor at Camp 3; came from SHANGHAI; spoke excellent English in a soft, high voice.

Nicknames: "Phyllis"

Physical Description: 5'5"; 120 lbs; 25 yrs; slender build; effeminate.

LING

Interrogator at Camp 5; spoke excellent English; would like to come to the U.S.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'8"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; thin.

LI or LIU

DING's bodyguard at 5th Co., Camp 5; political officer at Camp 2 Hqs; spoke poor English.

Nicknames: "Hatchet Man"

Physical Description: 5'7"; 160 lbs; 25 yrs; medium build; erect posture; black hair; light complexion; round face.

Probable Correct Name: LIU*

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LONG	Political officer of 3d Co., Camp 3; quick-tempered; a fanatic Communist; spoke fluent English; because of the shape of his nose and his unruly hair, he was given the nicknames (see below).
	Nicknames: "The Hawk;" "Ragmop"
	Physical Description: 5'8"; 175 lbs; 25 yrs.
	Probable Correct Name: LANG*
LU	Chief instructor of 1st Co., Camp 5; was mean to POWs; yelled, pushed, threatened and jailed men for failing to study hard; continually threatened POWs with labor camps and delayed repatriation.
	Nicknames: "Bulldog"
	Physical Description: 5'5"; 149 lbs; 25 yrs; medium build; erect posture; black hair parted on left side; light brown complexion; round face; brown eyes; wore thick glasses, plastic-rimmed.
LU	Head of hospital mess at Camp 2; had little or no education; would get things for the patients at the hospital either by stealing or buying.
	Nicknames: None
	Physical Description: 5'5"; 150 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; fair posture; black hair parted on the side; round face; fair complexion; brown eyes.
LUNG	Father was a general in the Nationalist Army on TAIWAN.

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

LIU (cont'd)

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; stocky build; baritone voice.

N40

Daily Life instructor - political instructor of 1st Platoon, 1st Co.; Camp 5; believed to be a homosexual; preferred certain men among the POWs; effeminate mannerisms; was insistent and concientious when dealing with POWs in regard to indoctrination.

Nicknames: "Margine"

Physical Description: 5'8"; 120 lbs; 25 yrs; slender build; effeminate posture; long black hair; parted on left side; dark brown complexion; brown eyes.

NEE

Political instructor, 1st Plt., 1st Co., Camp 5; censored POW mail; believed to have destroyed many letters; continually harassed POWs; had two years at a Chinese university; spoke fluent English; always crossed legs when sitting in a chair; came to Camp 5 from China.

Nicknames: "Sherlock Holmes"

Physical Description: 5'7"; 155 lbs; 25 yrs; stocky build; erect posture; short black hair; dark brown complexion; flat round face; very pimply face; brown eyes.

Probable Correct Name: NI*

PII

Instructor in 3d Co., Camp 1; lectured the POWs on socialism and materialism; also interrogated; attended Peking University; speaks English.

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PAI (cont'd)

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'11"; 140 lbs; wore glasses; mole on upper lip.

PAM

Intelligence; political officer of 2d Co., Camp 3; also interrogated POWs.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'8"; 140 lbs; 25 yrs.

Probable Correct Names: PAN*

PAN

Instructor at Camp 4; had a friendly approach.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'3"; 140 lbs; 30 yrs.

PENG, Te Huai

PENG stated to one POW that he was in command of all POW camps in North Korea; spoke to POWs in the fall of 1952 through an interpreter; definitely Chinese.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'2"; 155 lbs.

POT ANG

Assistant CO, 1st Co., Camp 5; was very good to POWs; spoke poor English; came to Camp 5 from a Chinese combat unit that had seen action against U.N.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'5"; 145 lbs;

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

POT ANG (cont'd)	40 yrs; medium build; humped shouldered; short black hair parted on left side; dark brown complexion; flat, round face; brown eyes.
SHEN, Ma Rye	Camp commander of Camp 4; smoked heavily; calm and well educated. Nicknames: "General" Physical Description: 5'6"; 125 lbs; 35 yrs.
SHEN	Daily Life instructor at 1st Co, Camp 5; was very good to POWs; spoke poor English. Nicknames: None Physical Description: 5'5"; 145 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; humped shouldered; short black hair parted on side (?); light brown complexion; round face; brown eyes; occasionally wore plastic-rimmed glasses.
SHIH	Instructor - interrogator at 5th Co, Camp 3; later in charge of recreation for regiment; believed to have carried Communist Party card; had great love for Russia; spoke poor English; married; from SHANGHAI; college graduate. Nicknames: "The Parrot," "Scarface." Physical Description: 5'4"; 135 lbs; 35 yrs; slender build; outstanding scar along side left eye (scar was ½" wide and 1" long).

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SHIN	Instructor at Camp 1; spoke excellent English; claimed to have college education. Nicknames: None Physical Description: 5'7"; 125 lbs; 25 yrs; slender build; black hair; brown eyes; sallow complexion. Probable Correct Name: HSIN*
SHIN	Political instructor at Camp 3; college graduate; from a wealthy SHANGHAI family; spoke fair English. Nicknames: None Physical Description: 5'5"; 110 lbs; 25 yrs; slender build; buck teeth; wore glasses. Probable Correct Name: HSIN*
SIN	Interpreter - interrogator (military) at Camps 2 & 5; soft, slow, deliberate voice; very calm; spoke fair English; didn't seem to be interested in politics; mostly military interests. Nicknames: None Physical Description: 5'10"; 165 lbs; 25 yrs; medium build; erect posture; long black hair; round face; light olive complexion.
SIN, Mong Chun	Dietician in Camp 5 hospital who attempted or planned to aid one POW to escape by taking him to SAN DANG, China. His address was Sojo 4, San Dang, China. Nicknames: None Physical Description: None

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NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

SIN

Interrogator at Camp 3; spoke poor English.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 160 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; erect posture

SU

Instructor at Camp 3.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'4"; 125 lbs; 25 yrs; medium build; prominent cheek-bones.

SUN

Political instructor at 5th Co (officers' company), also observed at 1st Co, Camp 2; spoke excellent English in a high pitched voice; an ardent Communist; was criminal investigator at Camp 2.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'6"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; erect posture; sallow complexion; black hair; dark eyes; wore glasses; effeminate mannerisms.

TIH

Instructor - interpreter in Camps 2 & 5; lectured the officer POWs on BW; spoke fair English.

Nicknames: "Pocket Pool," "Dibby Dibbit."

Physical Description: 5'7"; 135 lbs; 25 yrs; slender build; stooped posture; long black hair; narrow face.

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TO, Mr.

Political or intelligence officer at Camp 2; spoke excellent English with a British accent; formerly a professor of geology at a university in P'YONGYANG.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 45 yrs; slight build; always wore a tan beret.

TONG or TOUNG

Provost Marshal of Camp 5; in charge of investigating all infractions of camp rules; spoke English slowly and well; claimed to have been educated in U.S.

Nicknames: "Dick Tracy," "Tom," "Bill."

Physical Description: 5'8"; 165 lbs; 25 yrs; heavy build; erect posture; black, crew-cut hair; brown eyes; light complexion.

Probable Correct Name: TUNG*

TONG

Was in Education Department in Camp 4; spoke good English; allegedly worked for General Stillwell and with CAA.

Nicknames: "Singapore Joe"

Physical Description: 5'5"

Probable Correct Name: TANG*

TONG

Skilled surgeon at Camp 2; spoke English; was chief surgeon at Westlake General Hospital, SHANGHAI; would like to be party member, but was told that he never could be, due to past associations with Americans; was very friendly with POWs; expected to return to hospital in SHANGHAI; single.

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NND 867210
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TONG (cont'd)

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'5"; 130 lbs; 45 yrs; slight build; relaxed posture; black hair combed straight back; sallow complexion; bloodshot eyes, wore glasses.

Probable Correct Name: TANG*

TSAO, Ka Ching

Field grade officer; CO of guards at Camp 2; fastidious physical mannerisms; was a "very good man."

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'3"; 130 lbs; 30 yrs; very slight build; relaxed posture with slight stoop; black hair, combed straight back; oval face; yellow complexion; brown eyes.

TSE

Instructor for 1st and 2nd Co, Camp 4.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'3"; 115 lbs; 30 yrs; slender build; scar on back of head.

TSI or SI

Platoon instructor - interpreter at Camps 2 & 5; a shy person, he spoke poor English softly and slowly; POWs laughed at him constantly; conducted many POWs from KAESONG to exchange point.

Nicknames: "Pickle Nose," "Ginsburg," "Chinese Jew."

Physical Description: 5'1"; 125 lbs; 25 yrs; slender; erect posture; long black hair; light complexion.

Probable Correct Name: TSE*

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TU

Officer; seemed to be #1 political "honcho" when he came to Camp 2 (late 52); ran athletic meet at P'YONGJANG-NI; decisive in manner; gave lecture to all field grade officers on BW; did not practice violence; told POWs to check and judge when they got home; did not insist on comments.

Nicknames: "Four Eyes," "Mr. Moto."

Physical Description: 5'8"; 150 lbs; 30 yrs; black hair; round face; medium oriental complexion; horn-rimmed glasses; spoke slowly and distinctly with "part Jewish and Harvard accent."

TZE or ZEE

Chief instructor of 4th Co, Camp 5; a chain smoker; spoke good English; formerly owned a tobacco shop in SHANGHAI; was a sincere Communist.

Nicknames: "Fanatic"

Physical Description: 5'7"; 140 lbs; 35 yrs; medium build; erect posture; black hair; light complexion.

Probable Correct Name: TSE*

TZE or ZI

Chief interpreter at Camp 2; read off pronouncements; a heavy smoker; lived as a civilian in SHANGHAI.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'10"; 160 lbs; 40 yrs; medium build; stooped posture; black hair; long face.

Probable Correct Name: TSE*

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WA, Huan Li

Chief instructor at Camp 4; educated at Univ. of California; good to POWs; helped get them medical treatment; sometimes he gave out free cigarettes; had a list of 1640 U.S. personnel who died in captivity; made broadcast Christmas Day, Dec 51.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 23 yrs.

WAN

Interpreter at Bn and Regt Hqs at Camp 5; loved to play cards; was possibly on "death march;" was very mean to POWs; had pictures of himself taken with American officers during WW II when he was a lieutenant in the Nationalist Army of China.

Nicknames: "Fat Face," "Brute"

Physical Description: 5'4"; 135 lbs; 30 yrs; stocky build; very erect posture; black hair worn in different styles; dark brown complexion; big flat wide head; brown eyes; large lumps on face.

WANG or WONG, Yang Kung

General officer; commander of all POW camps; wore no insignia or marks of rank on any of his uniforms; spoke a little English; used gestures for emphasis.

Nicknames: "The Snake"

Physical Description: 5'7"; 155 lbs; 50 yrs; stocky build; round face; plae yellow complexion; buck teeth.

Probable Correct Name: HUANG*

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WANG	General officer; chief of interrogation in NK; spoke Russian and was learning English; was in charge of Chinese interrogation on aeronautical matters; MACGHEE met him at PYONGYANG, KANGGYE, Camps 2, 2½ and 5; an avid amateur photographer; very smooth and intelligent; believed in taking care of POWs; wore CCF AF uniform. Nicknames: "Horseface" Physical Description: 6'; 160 lbs; 30 yrs; black hair combed straight back; horsefaced; yellow complexion; large eyes; slight build; outstanding military bearing; erect posture. Probably Correct Name: HUANG*
WEE	Probably chief surgeon of camp hospital at Camp 5; a Chinese doctor who came to Camp 5 towards the end of 1952; an old man, he had been trained in the U.S. and knew some English; did not preach CCF propaganda and treated everyone equally; performed appendectomies, amputations, and other forms of surgery. Nicknames: None Physical Description: None Probable Correct Name: WEI*
WO, Doctor (Female)	A surgeon; was extremely kind to POWs; was removed from camp because of her sympathy toward internees. Nicknames: None Physical Description: None

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

WO

Known by one POW in 1946 while he was stationed in PEKING, China where WO ran a bar called "Manhattan Bar" (?); could speak English and gave some POWs tobacco; told one POW he was forced into CCF and had to join, otherwise the Communist government in China was going to confiscate his place of business; after WO got to Camp 5 he departed for the front lines to escort captured POWs to Camp 5.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: None

WONG

Instructor - interpreter of 5th Co., Camp 3; in charge of food committee there; spoke excellent English; is said to have been educated in Shanghai.

Nicknames: "Singapore Joe"

Physical Description: 5'5"; 145 lbs; 35 yrs; well-built; erect posture; black hair with gray streaks; round face; mustache; dark complexion; pock-marked face.

Probable Correct Name: HUANG*

WONG

Chief instructor - interpreter at Camp 5; later transferred to Camp 3; delivered many lectures at both camps.

Nicknames: "Apple Worm;" "Four Eyes," "Chinless"

Physical Description: 5'11"; 150 lbs; 30 yrs; thin build; stooped posture; black hair combed straight back; ruddy complexion; wore horn-rimmed glasses.

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WONG (cont'd)	Probable Correct Name: HUANG*
WONG	Instructor at Camp 1; had attended college; spoke English and Russian; pointed with his hand while talking. Nicknames: "Shaky" Physical Description: 5'5"; 135 lbs; 30 yrs; medium build; erect posture; black hair combed straight back; small face; brown eyes. Probable Correct Name: HUANG*
WONG or WANG	Field Grade Officer; interrogator - interpreter at "Pak's Palace," Camps 2 and 5; said his home was PEKING; claimed to have worked for US Intelligence in China during WW II; also that his father had worked in American Embassy in China; spoke excellent English; was a clever, ruthless interrogator; was an extremely arrogant, bellicose individual. Nicknames: "Dirty Picture;" "Hatchet Man" Physical Description: 5'11"; 175 lbs; 30 yrs; athletic build; erect posture; large head; square prominent features; sallow complexion; jutting jaw; black hair combed straight back or cut short. Probable Correct Name: HUANG*
WONG or WANG	Chief indoctrinator, interpreter and platoon instructor at Camp 3; college education; spoke fluent English; was learning Spanish from POWs; claimed

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

WONG or WANG (cont'd)	father was CG of 2d Nationalist Div which evacuated to TAIWAN. Nicknames: "The Pig" Physical Description: 5'; 180 lbs; 35 yrs; heavy build; military bearing; round, chubby face; black hair, receding; dark complexion. Probable Correct Name: HUANG*
WONG	Company grade officer; observed at 2d Plt, 1st Co., Camp 5; spoke good English; good physical condition; ex-officer with U.S. Army in WW II, CBI. Nicknames: "Meat Beater" Physical Description: 5'10"; 145 lbs; 25 yrs; skinny build; straight posture; long black hair; long face; light complexion. Probable Correct Name: HUANG*
WONG	Was platoon instructor for 3d Plt, at Camps 3 and 5; fanatical Communist; spoke fair English. Nicknames: "Ragmop" Physical Description: 5'7"; 150 lbs; 25 yrs; good posture; black, straight hair; round face; dark complexion; sometimes wore glasses. Probable Correct Name: HUANG*
WU or WOO	Interpreter - platoon instructor of 2d platoon, 3d Co., Camp 4; spoke fair English; arrogant in manner.

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WU or WOO

Nicknames: "Dirty Face"

Physical Description: 5'7"; 135 lbs; 25 yrs; slender build; erect posture; black hair; round face; dark complexion.

Probable Correct Name: WU*

WOO, Cha

Company grade officer; platoon leader of 2d Plt., at Camp 3 and 5; possible homosexual.

Nicknames: "Punk"

Physical Description: 5'4"; 135 lbs; 20 yrs; poor posture; skinny build; dark hair; oblong shaped face; yellow complexion.

Probable Correct Name: WU*

WU or WOO

Instructor in 4th Co., Camp 5; spoke English; was learning Army slang; fond of American sports; also exerted various administrative functions.

Nicknames: "Little General"

Physical Description: 5'6"; 130 lbs; 20 yrs; medium build; erect posture; black hair; sallow complexion; round face.

Probable Correct Name: WU*

WU

Political instructor in Camp 5; spoke excellent English in a high pitched voice when he was excited; a moody individual.

Nicknames: "Little Lips"

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WU

Physical Description: 5'6"; 160 lbs; 35 yrs; stocky build; erect posture; long black hair combed straight back; round face; dark complexion; dark eyes.

YANG

Chief of CCF instructors for all POW Camps; impressed one POW as being intelligent; seemed to know what he was doing.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: None

YEA or YEH

Political instructor at Camp 4; sent the POWs out on work details; spoke English.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'3"; 125 lbs; 30 yrs; stocky build; stooped posture; short black hair; scar on back of head.

Probable Correct Name: YEH*

YOUNG or YUNG

Instructor at Camp 1; had been in the U.S. for his education; lectured on the progress of the truce talks for a few days at Camp 1.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'8"; 35 yrs.

Probable Correct Name: YUNG*

ZUN

Observed as a "big shot" at Camp 2; spoke in a low voice; quiet and

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Zun (cont'd)

deliberate; attended Univ of Tokyo; spoke Japanese and Russian; joined the NKA as Pvt., pilot in NKAF, flying YAKS; grounded because of stomach trouble; wore NKAF wings above star on hat.

Nicknames: None

Physical Description: 5'7"; 155 lbs; 40 yrs; slender build; erect posture; black hair worn in crew cut; round face; olive complexion.

Probable Correct Name: TSUN*

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GLOSSARY OF PLACE NAMES

Place Name	Country	Grid Reference	Latitude	Longitude
ANTUNG	MANCHURIA	XE1744	40 09	124 22
CHANCH'ON	NORTH KOREA	BA8506	40 41	126 27
CH'ANG-NI	NORTH KOREA	XE8779	40 27	125 12
CHUNGGANG-JIN	NORTH KOREA	CB2427	41 47	126 53
CHUNGHA-DONG	NORTH KOREA	YF2703	40 39	125 40
HAEJU	SOUTH KOREA	YC3713	38 02	125 42
HUNGNAM	NORTH KOREA	CV7306	39 48	127 31
INCH'ON	SOUTH KOREA	BS9149	37 28	126 38
KAESONG	SOUTH KOREA	BT8505	37 58	126 33
KANGGYE	NORTH KOREA	BA9837	40 58	126 36
KOJI-DO	SOUTH KOREA	DP5858	34 52	128 33
KUNU-RI	NORTH KOREA	YD4998	39 42	125 54
MANP'OJIN	NORTH KOREA	BA7259	41 09	126 17
MUKDEN	MANCHURIA	------	41 48	123 27
MUNSAN-NI	SOUTH KOREA	CS0591	37 51	126 47
NOSANG	NORTH KOREA	YD3635	39 08	125 44
OSANG-DONG	SOUTH KOREA	YF2007	37 31	127 53
PANMUNJOM	SOUTH KOREA	------	37 58	126 40
PEKING	CHINA	------	39 56	116 24
PUKCHIN	NORTH KOREA	YE3453	40 12	125 45
P'YONGJANG-NI	NORTH KOREA	YF1301	37 25	128 01
PYONGTAEK	SOUTH KOREA	CR2994	37 55	127 08

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By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Place Name	Country	Grid Reference	Latitude	Longitude
P'YONGYANG	NORTH KOREA	YD3822	29 01	125 45
PYOKTONG	NORTH KOREA	YE0699	40 40	125 26
SAMSAN-DONG	NORTH KOREA	YD5526	39 03	125 57
SANGHWAAM-NI	SOUTH KOREA	CT1457	38 27	126 52
SEOUL	SOUTH KOREA	CS2057	37 33	126 58
SINANJU	NORTH KOREA	YD2386	39 36	125 36
SINUIJU	NORTH KOREA	XE1839	40 06	124 23
SUNCH'ON	NORTH KOREA	YD5267	39 25	125 56
SUP'UNG DAM	NORTH KOREA	YF6680	40 27	124 57
UIJU	NORTH KOREA	XE3051	40 12	124 32
UNSAN	NORTH KOREA	YE3927	39 58	125 48
WIWON	NORTH KOREA	BA5329	40 53	126 04
YANGDOK	NORTH KOREA	BU9643	39 13	126 38

Prisoner of War Camps and Internment Points

Camp	Location	Grid Reference
1	CH'ANG-NI	XE878797
2, Company 1	P'YONGJANG-NI	YF138017
2, Company 2	P'YONGJANG-NI	YF129022
2, Company 3	CHUNGHA-DONG	YF277036
2, Company 4	OSANG-DONG	YF203075
3	(Place name unknown)	XE851869

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Camp	Location	Grid Reference
4	WIWON	BA499304
5	PYOKT'ONG	YE062995
6	(Location undetermined)	
7	KAEYAMBOL	CB235225
12	NAMHO-DONG	YD533262
Bean Camp	(Near SUAN - BT706862)	
CCF Interr Cent	(Near PUKCHIN -- YE340530)	
Caves, The	---	YD550240
Death Valley	(Near PUKCHIN -- YE340530)	
Mining Camp	(Near SUAN - BT706862)	
Pak's Palace	---	YD421342
Peaceful Valley	(Near KANGGYE - BA9837)	
Valley, The	---	YE1394

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DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

INDEX

Administration of Camps 104-121
Anju 93
Anti-Communist activities 242,350
Antung 194-195
"Apex," the 91,121
Atrocities 71,91
Attitude of POWs 383
Attitude toward POWs:
  Comparison of three periods of internment 97-103
Attitude toward POWs, Chinese 94
Attitude toward POWs, North Korean 97
Autobiography: 183-184
  Outline of 584-586

Bacteriological Warfare 117,246-286
  Breakdown by grade of USAF personnel interrogated on 619
  "Confessions" 246-286
  Outline of material discussed in lectures 602
Bean Camp 94,96,359,360
"Bebops" (a POW group) 132
"Benjo Gang" (a POW group) 132
"Black Cat," the (a POW group) 134
"Black Diamond," the (a POW group) 133,134,136
"Black Dragon," the (a POW group) 127
"Black Robe," the (a POW group) 134
British POWs 114-118,120,129,359
Broadcasts, propaganda 85,86,515-524
Brutalities and atrocities 71,91

"Cage Members" (a POW group) 129
Camp 1 . . . . . 97,117,124,219,220,302,303 357,368,370,371,529,530,544
Camp 2 91,97,115,119,121,159,185,368,548
  Company 1 119,303,323,531,548,549
  Company 2 119,304,323,531,548,551
  Company 3 120,126,305,370,371,533,554,555
  Company 4 120,305,320,534,558,559
Camp 3 . . . . . 91,118,135,220,306,307,321 370,535-537,562,564,565

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Camp 4 97,116,120,132,307
368,538,568,569
Camp 5 95-97,114-117,121,133,134
136,184,218,220,224,225,307
369,370,507,539-541,572,573
Camp 6 120,289
Camp 7 91,96,121,218,289
Camp 12 121,218,289,575
Camp command structure 97,110-111
Camp discipline:
List of punishable offenses 621-625
Camp life and routine. 352-387
Camp newspapers. 94,227-235
Camp rules. 621-625
Camp system in North Korea, (POW). 93-103
Camps, administration of 104-121
Camps, organization of 104-121,529-541
Camps, permanent 95-98,110,301,302
Camps, temporary 92-95,108,294-301
"Cannibal Club," the 127
CCF:
Attitude towards POWs 94
Camp command headquarters 97,117
Control of POWs 386,387
Interrogation 140,143,163-165
167,168,174-188
Judicial procedures under 340-345
Central Peace Committee. 121,217
Chanch'on. 212
Chang-ni 117,302
Changsong. 117
"Chicken, Pork and Geese" (a POW group) 132
Chongchon River. 109
Chosin Reservoir 86,93,445
Chunggang-jin. 91,107
Chungha-dong 305
"Circle," the (a POW group) 129-131,135
Civilian internees 86,121
Clothing: 97,421-432
Shortage of 424-426
Codes, in correspondence 494-497
Colombian POWs 116
Communication
Between camps 315
Outside camps 315,318
Within camps. 313,314

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867270
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Command structure, camp. 97,110-111
"Confessors," EW. 246-286
Confiscation of UN uniforms. 422-424
Cooking staffs, organization of. 395-398
Cooking utensils 406-407
Correspondence: 472-508
Codes used in. 494-497
Incoming 497-504
Methods of transmission. 481-482
Outgoing 482-484
Relation to propaganda and indoctrination. 506-508
Restrictions on. 489-494
Counterintelligence personnel, interrogation of. 199-200
Counterintelligence. 71

Daily schedule for Camps 1-5 626-631
Death March. 91,440
"Death Valley". 93,96,108-110,114,176,182
354,355,358,359,444,466
Debriefing of ex-POWs. 69-71
Dental treatment 461
Disciplinary proceedings 345-348
Dispossession of NK civilians. 95
Distribution of food 404-405
Distribution of uniforms 426-431
Drugs, use of. 162,191,379-383
Dutch POWs 116

Eating utensils. 406-407
"Eight Balls" (a POW group) 132
Enemy personalities:
CCF. 648-682
NKA. 640-648
Escape and Evasion 288-336
Escape committees. 320-322
Escape recommendations by POWs 332-336
Escape routes. 290-294
Establishment of POW camps 83-121

"FHA" (a POW group) 127
Filipino POWs. 116
Films shown to POWs. 377,589
First (1st) Cavalry Division 85
Food 83,96,97,391-418
Procuring from outside sources 409-412
"Four Roses," the (a POW group) 116,120

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRS NARS, Date 4/11/90

French POWs 116,120

Geneva Conventions . . . . . 75,78-80 ,103,141,142
"Golden Cross," the (a POW group) 133,134
"Golden Earring," the (a POW group) 133
Greek POWs 116
Guard company, organization chart. 620
Guard personnel. 308-310
Guide to POWs (photograph of enemy document) 213
"Gun-So-Yen" (see Workers)

Hague Convention, The. 74,75,78
Headquarters of Chinese camp command 97
Headcount (see Roll Call)
Housing conditions 85,86,91
Hungnam. 445

Immunization record. 445
Inchon, Landing at 86,98,107
Indoctrination 76,93,94,97
103,113,208-244
Relation of correspondence to 228,237
Techniques. 220-244
Use of food for 414-416
Indoctrination lectures, themes of 591-601
"Informant Net" (a POW group. 127,128
Informers. 122-124
Inter-camp Olympics. 117
Internal organization of the POW camps 104-121
International Red Cross. 78,250-251
Letter on medical supplies. 632
Interrment:
Percentage of survivors in relation to months of
Capture. 633-634
Under CCF. 108
Under NKA. 107-108
Interrogation: 140-205
By CCF. 140,143,163-165
167,168,174-188
By NKA. 140,142,144-147
By Soviet personnel 198,199
Of CIC personnel. 199,200
Of USAF personnel 612-617
On BW. 606-607
Policy of CCF 165-174
Questions asked by CCF and NKA. 153,154,166
167,579-583

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Reference material available to CCF. 163,577,578
Resisting, POW recommendations for 203-205
Techniques:
of CCF. 188-198
of NKA. 144-163
Comparison of CCF and NKA 200,201
Interrogation Center, CCF. 361,362

Judicial proceedings:. 338-351
Under CCF. 340-345
Under NKA. 340
Under North Korean civilians 339

Kaesong. 257
"Kangaroo Court" (a POW group). 132
Kangaroo Courts. 348,349
Kanggye. 86,93,110,212
215,216,445
"Kill the Communists" (a POW group) 134
"KKK" (a POW group) 124,133,134
Korean civilians.
Contact with 318-320
Judicial procedures under. 339
Koto-ri. 93
Kunu-ri. 93,109

Labor details. 312,313
"Lenient Policy," Chinese 210,213,221,259,271,372
Libraries; reading material available in camps . . . 226,227,587,588
Life, Camp 352-387
"Little Theater Group" (a POW group). 129
Living conditions. 86,93,97,103
Location of camps. . . . . see Camps

Malnutrition 93
Mampo. 86,97,107,110,121,438
Maps (topographic and escape). 291
Medical
Conditions 83,93
Facilities 103,447-465
Treatment. 435-471
Medical officer, recommendations by. 470-471
Medical supplies, letter from Red Cross on 632
Memorandum (temporary duty at Fort Meade). 527
Mental pressures on BW interrogees 606,607

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Mining Camp. 94,96,359,360
Mortality rate among POWs. 91,93,94
Movies 377,589
Mukden 196,197,255,256,269
MVD. 270

Nationality, segregation of POWs by. 105
Newspapers, camp 227-229
NKA control of POWs. 885,97
NKA interrogation techniques 144-163
NK judicial and disciplinary procedures. 339,340
NKA personalities. 640-648
NKA Security Police. 91
NKVD 77
"Non-Benedict Arnold Club" (a POW group). 127
"Non-Confessors," BW. 94

Offenses, list of punishable 621-625
Officers
  Camp for 97,119
  Special company for. 119
"Old Soldiers' Home" (a POW group). 128,129
Olympics, Inter-camp 117,374-376
Organization of POW camps. 96
Organizational charts: Camps 1-5 529-541
Osang-dong 305

"Pak's Palace". 155-159
Panmunjom. 258,268,506
Peace committees 217
"Peace Fighters" 155,518,520
Peace Fighters' Chronicle. 219
"Peaceful Valley" 93,94,96,98,108-110
Permanent camps: 114,212,353,356,357,445
  life and routine in. 95,98,110,301,302,364-383
Personalities:
  NKA. 110-121
  CCF. 640-648
Photographs, aerial, Camps 1-5 648-682
Physical pressures exerted on BW interrogees 544,548,554,558
Plays, propaganda. 562,564,568,572
"Polish Falcons," the (a POW group) 606,607
Political leanings, segregation of POWs by 378
"Portrait of a Progressive" 132
. 105
. 591-601

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Preparation of food 398-404
Prisoners of war:
Groups and organizations 591-603
Historical role. 73-75
Squad leaders. 225
Treatment 73-82
by CCF 77,78,92
by NKA 91
by Soviets in World War II 75-77,81,82
"Progressive Ten Party" (a POW group) 134
Progressives 124
Propaganda:
Broadcasts 85,86,515-524
Efforts 86
Films shown to POWs. 377,589
Relation of correspondence to. 479,486,506-508
Release of POWs for. 94,215,216
Use of food for. 414-416
Propaganda meeting, photographs of 87,89
Psychological warfare. 75
Pyoktong 93,95-97,98,109,114,118,121
182,184,185,262,307,368,512
P'yongjang-ni. 303,304
Pyongtaek. 437
P'yongyang 97,107,110,155,156,213,214
217,249,250,254,265,360,437,512

Questions asked during interrogations. 153,154,166,167

Race, segregation of POWs by 105
Radio broadcasts 511-124
Rank, segregation of POWs by 105
Ration, breakdown, food. 404,405
Reactionaires 242,350
Reading material available in camp libraries 587-588
Recommendations:
by medical officer 470-471
by POWs on escape. 332-336
by POWs on resisting interrogation 202-205
Red Cross:
International. 78,250,251
Letter on medical supplies. 632
Russian. 78
Reference material available to CCF during interrogation 163,577,578

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90

Release of POWs to US lines for propaganda 94
Resistance groups. 242,350
Roll calls 310,311
Routine, camp. 352-387
Russian Red Cross. 78

Sanghwaam-ni 378
Sanitation, food 407-409
Schedules, daily; Camps 1-5 626-631
Second (2d) Infantry Division. 93,109
Segregation of POWs:
By nationality 105
By political leanings. 105
By race. 105
By rank. 105
Self-analysis of a returned "Progressive". 591-601
"Self-criticism". 237,238,346
Seoul. 107,213
Sergeants' camp. 97
"Shadow," the (a POW group) 126
Shortage, clothing 424-426
Shot record. 455
"Show," the (a POW group) 131
Sinanju. 93,254
Sinuiju. 249
Sketches, Camps 1-5. 545,549,551,555,559
565,569,573,575
Songs. 378
Soviet personnel, interrogation by 198,199
Special officers' company. 119
Squad leaders, POW 225
Sunchon. 109
Supply procedure, food 404-407,409-412
Survivors in relation to months of capture, percentage of 633-634

"Task Force Smith". 84
"Tattoo Club" (a POW group) 134
Temporary camps. 92-95,108,294-301
Life and routine in 354-364
"Tiger," the. 91
Topography and escape, map of. 291
"Traitors' row" 155
Transfer of POWs from camp to camp 86,91,92,97
Transportation of POWs 85
"Troy Government" (a POW group) 127

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By [illegible] NARS, Date 4/11/90

"True Americans" (a POW group) 126
Turkish POWs 114,115,120,359
Twenty-fifth (25th) Infantry Division. 85
Twenty-fourth (24th) Infantry Division 84
"Twin Peaks". 254

"Un-American Activities Committee" (a POW group). 127
Uniforms:
Comparison with CCF. 424-426
Distribution of. 426-428
Unaan. 92,109
USAF personnel: types and periods of interrogation 606-607
US Army personnel captured in the Korean Operation, by month of capture. 101

"Valley," the 93,96,108,109,114,153
327,354,355,358,359,444
"Vipers," the (a POW group) 134

"War Camp" (a POW group). 133
"War Council" (a POW group) 133
War crimes 71,91,338,340
Wiwon. 120,307
"Workers," the. 94

Yalu River 86,92,95,97,120,194
288,289,293,302,329,370
Yangdok, ... 258

DECLASSIFIED
NND 867210
By BRG NARS, Date 4/11/90